Denver Journal of International Law & Policy
Volume 20
Number 2 Winter

Article 11

January 1992

Vol. 20, no. 2: Full Issue
Denver Journal International Law & Policy

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/djilp

Recommended Citation
20 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y (1992).

This Full Issue is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at
Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Denver Journal of International Law & Policy by an
authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,digcommons@du.edu.

DENVER JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND POLICY

VOLUME 20
1991-1992

Denver Journal
of International Law and Policy
VOLUME 20

NUMBER 2

WINTER 1992

MYERS S. McDOUGAL DISTINGUISHED LECTURE

How

NEW Is THE NEW INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER? ..........

.........................................

L ouis B . Sohn 205

RESTRUCTURING FOR PEACE: CHALLENGES FOR THE
21st CENTURY
REDRESS FOR GULF WAR VIOLATIONS OF

Frank C. Newman 213

HUMAN RIGHTS ...........................

FRIEND OR FOE OR SOMETHING ELSE: SOCIAL MEANINGS
OF REDRESS AND REPARATIONS ............

Eric K. Yamamoto 223

REDRESSING HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES ..........

Jon M. Van Dyke 243
Gerald W. Berkley

SRI LANKA:

A

STUDY IN MICROCOSM OF REGIONAL PROBLEMS

AND THE NEED FOR MORE EFFECTIVE PROTECTION OF

Patricia Hyndman 269

HUMAN RIGHTS ...........................

TRAGEDIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ, LIBERIA, YUGOSLAVIA, AND
HAITI-REVISITING THE VALIDITY OF HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW-

Ved P. N anda 305

PART I .....................................

SPECIAL TOPIC LAW

INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN

THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS
AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL

HUMANITARIAN LAW .................

Christiane Bourloyannis 335

INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS SECTION
CANADIAN SECURITIES LAW ....................

Richard Lachcik 357

BOOK REVIEW
LEGITIMATE USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST STATE-SPONSORED
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM .............
Marianne 0. Larivee

433

Denver Journal

E

of International Law and Policy
NUMBER 2

VOLUME 20

WINTER 1992

BOARD OF EDITORS
DEBRA AsIMus

Editor-in-Chief
KATHERINE FRIESS

Symposium Editor
ANGELA M. BORRILLO
Administrative Managing Editor

MATTHEW C. AZER
Editorial Managing Editor

KEVIN BEERS
LEONARD LEVINE, JR.

Business Editors
KRISTIN RASCINER

EDWARD ALLEN

Capital Markets Editor

Book Review Editor

STEPHEN BARTELL
STACY BOWERS
KYLE DIERCKS
BILL ESBENSHADE

CAROL ITEN
GRIFFITH KUNDAHL
F. MARK MODZELEWSKI

Articles Editors
KELLY ARCHER
RICHARD GLUCKSMAN

CHRISTINE GRZESIAK

General Editors
MEMBERS
GINGER ADAIR
SUE ATKINSON
LISA BERKOWITZ
FRANCIS BROWN
CHRIS CASTILLIAN
SAM DEPIZZOL
PETER HARRIS
RUBEN HERNANDEZ
FLOY JEFFARES
JOHN KELLOGG

FLORIAN KOGELNIK
LISA LONGACRE
COURTENAY MANES
LAJA MANGALAT
MELANIE MARMORSTEIN
DENNIS McELWEE
MARK McGANNON
MICHELLE MILLER
ROBERT NEUHARD
JON ROBINSON

POLLY NOLIN
THOMAS ROCK
PAMELA SLATER
REBECCA STEINEBREY
PATRICIA THATCHER
BLAKE THOMPSON
WENDELL WALKER
GREGG WEBER
RICH WEISS

FACULTY ADVISOR
VED P. NANDA
ADVISORY BOARD
YONAH ALEXANDER
THEODORE L. BANKS
M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI
UPENDRA BAXI
WILLIAM M. BEANEY
JOHN BETZ
HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL
MURRAY BLUMENTHAL
ZACK V. CHAYET
DOMINIQUE CARREAU
ALFRED J. CoCo
GEORGE CODDING
JONATHAN C.S. Cox
ARGHYRIOS A. FATOUROS
ROBERT A. FRIEDLANDER
EDWARD GORDON

JOHN LAWRENCE HARGROVE
DONALD W. HOAGLAND
FREDERIC L. KIRGIS
RALPH B. LAKE
DENNIS 0. LYNCH

MYRES S. McDoUGAL
MAURICE B. MITCHELL
JOHN NORTON MOORE
JAMES A. R. NAFZIGER
GLADYS OPPENHEIMER
EKKEHART MULLER-RAPPARD
WILLIAM M. REISMAN
DANIEL L. RITCHIE
LEONARD v.B. SUTTON
ROBERT B. YEGGE
WILLIAM F. ZARANKA

MYER S. McDOUGAL
DISTINGUISHED LECTURE

How New Is the New International Legal
Order?
Louis B. SOHN*
In September 1990, in the midst of the Gulf crisis, President Bush, in
an address to a joint session of both houses of Congress, espoused a new
goal for the foreign policy of the United States. He expressed the hope
that out of these troubled times a new objective can emerge - "a new
world order," a new era "freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the
pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace, . . . a world
where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle."'
A few weeks later, appearing before the United Nations General Assembly, President Bush called for a "new partnership of nations" that
would be based "on consultation, cooperation, and collective action....
united by principle and the rule of law supported by an equitable sharing
of both costs and commitment."' Its goals would be "to increase democracy, increase prosperity, increase peace, and reduce arms."' He was glad
to see that the United Nations started fulfilling its promise as the world's
"parliament of peace," and that it has become "the place to build international support and consensus" for meeting not only the challenge of
aggression but also other challenges, such as threats to the environment,
debt burden, terrorism, drug trafficking, and refugees.' "Calls for democ* Visiting Congressional Professor, National Law Center, George Washington University; Distinguished Jennings Randolph Fellow, United States Institute of Peace; Woodruff
Professor of International Law, School of Law, University of Georgia (on leave); Bemis Professor of International Law, Emeritus, Harvard Law School. The views expressed are those
of the author alone; they do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Institute
of Peace.
1. President George Bush, Toward a New World Order, DEP'T ST. DISPATCH, Sept. 17,
1990, at 91-94.
2. President George Bush, The U.N.: World Parliamentof Peace, DEP'T ST. DISPATCH,
Oct. 1, 1990, Currency Policy No. 1303.
3. Id.
4. Id.
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racy and human rights," he said, "encourage our hopes for a more stable,
more prosperous world." 5
This vision of a new world rising from the ashes of a war is an old
one. Writing more than a hundred years ago, the eminent British international lawyer William Edward Hall pointed out that over the last couple
of centuries, at the close of each fifty years, international law has occupied a more solid position than that which it occupied at the beginning of
the period. While he expected that great wars would still occur, unscrupulously waged, he also foresaw that after each such war the world would do
penance "by putting itself under straighter obligations than those which
it before acknowledged."' This happened in the lifetime of some of us,
first after World War I when the League of Nations was created "to promote international cooperation and to achieve international peace and security, . . .by the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among Governments, and by the
maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations
in the dealings of organized peoples with one another."7
Again, after World War II, in the 1945 Charter of the United Nations, the Governments of the United Nations, acting on behalf of their
peoples, agreed "to maintain international peace and security" through
"effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to
the peace and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches
of the peace," to "settle their disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered," to cooperate "in promoting and encouraging respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms," as well as "to promote social progress
and better standards of life in larger freedom," and "to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from
treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained."8
Coming closer to our times, in 1988, in the last year of the Reagan
Administration, the Department of State published a booklet setting out
in considerable detail the interests and objectives of American Foreign
Policy.' It might be useful to quote here the list of these interests and
objectives; according to the booklet, the United States was seeking to:
1. Uphold the principles of freedom, the rule of law, and observance of
fundamental human rights;
2. Promote our domestic prosperity;

5. Id.
WILLIAM EDWARD HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW vii, iX-X, (4th ed. 1895).
7. See League of Nations Covenant, in Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, Part I. See
also other Peace Treaties signed in 1919 and 1920, reprinted in HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL
LEGISLATION 1 (1931).
8. U.N. CHARTER preamble, arts. 1 and 2 [cited in order slightly different than the one
used in the Charter].
9. Fundamentals of U.S. Foreign Policy, DEP'T ST. DISPATCH, Mar. 1988, at 1.

6.
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3. Protect the security of our nation and its institutions, as well as
those of our allies and friends;
4. Contribute to a safer world by reaching equitable and verifiable
arms reductions agreements with the Soviet Union;
5. Assist the economic development of poorer nations; and
6. Act in a manner consistent with our humanitarian instincts.
Apart from domestic goals affecting the American ability to pursue
these foreign goals, the statement emphasized the global goals of "prosperity, security and democratic change." In particular, it supported: (a)
"a global trend of democratic institution-building" that requires a "balanced approach to the defense of human rights and fundamental freedoms" as well as easing "the plight of millions suffering from want, violence, and oppression throughout the world;" (b) "the global trend toward
greater confidence in free market-oriented solutions to the problems of
economic growth, and the movement everywhere in the world ... to decentralize, deregulate, and denationalize;" (c) the continuance of efforts
"to achieve equitable, balanced and verifiable arms control agreements
with the Soviet Union that would enhance strategic stability;" and (d) the
exploitation of the "possibilities for the United Nations and increasingly
significant country groupings to deal with regional concerns and foster
global economic development. 0
Some of these objectives were stated in a tentative fashion, and the
comprehensive comments on them in the later parts of the pamphlet
show still the "Cold War" mentality and only minimal interest in bringing the United Nations into the picture. The situation changed drastically
during the Bush Administration, when several impossible dreams suddenly were realized - the liberation of Eastern Europe, the unification of
Germany, the freeing of the Baltic States, the revolutionary changes in
the Soviet Union, the collapse of communist ideology, and the return of
the United Nations to the role it was designed to play. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Gulf crisis resulted in another chance to fulfill
Professor Hall's prophecy. A new world order is in the making, and there
is again the hope that the rule of law will supplant the rule of the jungle,
that the partnership of nations, hoped for at San Francisco in 1945, will
actually be established, based on the one hand on "consultation, cooperation and collective action," and, on the other hand, increased democracy,
prosperity through a free market, reduced arms, and a United Nations
enabled to both maintain peace and protect human rights.
To assess these developments, in May 1991, the Fletcher School of
Law and Diplomacy and the United Nations Association of the United
States of America, with the assistance of the Hitachi Foundation, organized a Roundtable given the task of "Defining a New World Order" more
precisely. The discussion was chaired by Elliot Richardson and Brian Ur10. Id. at 1, 4, and 9.
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quhart, and was based on a thoughtful paper by Professor Alan K. Henrikson, who was also in charge of preparing the conference report. 1 I was
privileged to participate in this conference. Other participants included
experts not only from the United States but also from Africa, Asia, Latin
America, the Soviet Union, and Western Europe, as well as experts experienced in international organizations and United Nations activities. They
agreed on the need to design a more efficient and more effective international system, based on improved international cooperation. The New
World Order has to respond to the new challenges brought by "the process of democratization and liberalization," which in turn is connected
with the new emphasis on "individual rights, economic freedoms, and political liberty." In addition, "the increased globalization of economic and
political issues leads to greater interdependence among states." The
breakup of empires and the demands for self-determination in new areas
of the world result at the same time in the revival of national, ethnic, and
religious rivalries that collide with the trend toward interdependence.
Some participants warned that there might develop a tendency for a few
strong nations to use strong measures to impose cooperation, but most
thought that it will be generally recognized that the new international
system would fail if the views of the developing world, which represents
four-fifths of the world's population, are not respected. All nations must
feel that the decisions of common international institutions do in fact
promote both peace and justice, and do it even-handedly; only such decisions will command general acceptance.'"
In light of this discussion and the many articles and statements that
have appeared in newspapers and learned periodicals, I would like to concentrate the remainder of my own statement on a more limited area, the
International Legal Order or the World Rule of Law, a concept often
mentioned but seldom discussed in depth. This concept has two main ingredients: the rule of law in relations between states; and the rule of law
in relations between states and individuals, especially the need to protect
individuals against the abuse of power by state authorities.
The current emphasis on self-determination, democracy, and human
rights destroys to some extent this dichotomy. The international community's interest in these issues strikes at the roots of traditional concepts of
national sovereignty and territorial integrity. The new concept of the
World Rule of Law, however, does not allow some states to act as selfappointed guardians of World Order; instead it transfers the duty to

11. See Alan K. Henrikson, Defining a New World Order: A Discussion Paper (May
1991), and Defining a New World Order: The Conference Report [hereinafter Conference
Report]. Professor Henrikson, in a prophetic fashion, participated a few years ago in the
Negotiating World Order Project of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, and edited
a volume of essays written by "international negotiators" (the diplomatic artisans), and by

"world order builders" (the international architects).
TISANSHIP AND ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL DIPLOMACY

12. Conference Report, supra note 11, at 6-8.

NEGOTIATING WORLD ORDER: THE AR-

(Alan K. Henrikson ed. 1986).
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monitor compliance with its basic concepts from individual states to international institutions, both global and regional. As the International
Court of Justice pointed out in the Corfu Channel Case, the alleged right
of intervention was a "manifestation of a policy of force," has given rise
to most serious abuses, and, being reserved to the most powerful, "might
easily lead to perverting the administration of justice itself."" Such abuse
of power can be avoided only under a system in which an international
institution would decide whether an intervention is necessary, who should
be authorized to intervene, and how the intervention will be monitored.
To ensure that all these decisions are made properly, and that due process, both as to substance and procedure, is observed, a supervisory role
may be assigned to the International Court of Justice, acting though advisory opinions which would be accepted in advance as binding.-" The following example may illustrate how this system might work.
It is generally accepted that one of the objectives of the World Rule
of Law is to protect small and weak states against their more powerful
neighbors, not only against direct aggression, as in the case of Kuwait,
but even against threats to the peace and breaches of the peace, and
other acts below the threshold of aggression which affect a small state's
security, independence or free choice of government.
In several recent instances, one of the major powers has intervened
either in a civil war in favor of the party with similar ideology, on humanitarian grounds because of a gross violation of human rights, or in order
to restore a constitutional government replaced by a military junta. Now
that law has been recognized as a social science, a lawyer may perhaps be
allowed to simplify the facts of a case to allow more thorough analysis of
the interaction among the principal factors. A slightly revised Nicaraguan
case may serve as a good example, provided it is restricted to the issue of
the support to the contras, thus avoiding the complications caused by the
dispute over the facts of prior "attack" of Nicaragua on El Salvador, over
the scope of its intervention in El Salvador's civil war, and over the existence of a proper justification for the exercise of the right of collective
self-defense. While these parts of the International Court's decision have
been severely criticized, the rules enunciated by the Court with respect to
the right to intervene in a civil war have been generally accepted.
Assuming these more limited facts, the International Court of Justice
has made clear that an intervention by a state in a civil war in another
state even through indirect means such as organizing, or encouraging the

13. Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania), 1949 I.C.J. 34-35.
14. For example, in the Convention of the Privileges and Immunities of the United
Nations, Feb. 14, 1946, 21 U.S.T. 1418, T.I.A.S. No. 6900, 1 U.N.T.S. 16, Article VII, Section
30 provides that if a difference relating to the interpretation or application of the Convention should arise between the United Nations and a Member State, "a request shall be made
[to the International Court of Justice] for an advisory opinion on any legal question involved," and that the opinion given by the Court "shall be accepted as decisive by the
parties."
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organization of irregular forces or armed bands, including mercenaries,
for incursion into the territory of another state, may be considered as a
armed attack, "if such an incursion because of its scale and effects, would
have been classified as an armed attack rather than as a mere frontier
incident had it been carried out by regular forces."' 16 While the Court did
not consider "assistance to rebels in the form of provision of weapons or
logistical or other support" as an armed attack, it pointed out that such
assistance may be regarded as "a threat or use of force" or as "intervention in the internal or external affairs of other States."' 6 In a later part of
the case, the Court took a broad view of the principle of non-intervention,
which it considered as "part and parcel of customary international law,"
although it was not spelled out in the Charter of the United Nations. 7
The Court refused, in particular, to permit a State "to intervene, directly
or indirectly, with or without armed force," in the affairs of another
State, "in support of an internal opposition .. .whose cause appeared
particularly worthy by reason of the political or moral values with which
it was identified."'" Only some economic measures are permissible in that
case, such as cessation of economic aid, reduction of commodity quotas,
or a trade embargo.1"
This proscription of the use of force or intervention by any State in
situations where another State grossly violates international law - for
instance, by engaging in genocidal extermination of a part of its population because of ethnic differences - should not deprive the people concerned of help against the aggressor. For instance, a World Rule of Law
approach might permit the United Nations Security Council: (a) to declare that such gross violations of an important rule of international law
constitute a threat to the peace; and (b) to authorize a State or a group of
States to take such measures as may be necessary, including the use of
force, to stop these violations. To prevent any abuse of this right of authorized intervention, the State against which the action is being authorized should be allowed to petition the General Assembly to ask for an
advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice whether the circumstances of the case justified such authorization. A special legal committee of the Assembly might be authorized to grant such a request, and
15. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United
States of America), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 103, $ 195 [hereinafter Nicaragua Case]. The Court relied
in this case, to some extent, on the definition of aggression approved by the General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX), 29 G.A.O.P. Supp. No. 31(A/9631), at 143. That resolution was
adopted by consensus on December 14, 1974, after seven years of negotiations.
16. Nicaragua Case, supra note 15, at 104, T 195. See also id. at 119, 1 230, and at 12627, 1 247. Two dissenting judges were willing to consider even such activities as an armed
attack. See id. at 331-47, 17154-71 (Judge Schwebel) and at 543 (Judge Jennings).
17. Id. at 106, T 202.
18. Id. at 108, 1 206.
19. Id. at 125-26, 11 244-45. For a more detailed discussion of these aspects of the case,
see Louis B. Sohn, The InternationalCourt of Justice and the Scope of the Right of SelfDefense and the Duty of Non-Intervention, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A TIME OF PERPLEXITY
869 (Yoram Dinstein ed. 1989).
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might be obliged to do it in any case where the complaint is not frivolous.
The Court would be obliged to give this request priority and render
promptly its opinion whether the intervention was justified. If not, the
Security Council would be obliged to terminate the intervention. On the
other hand, the approval of the intervention by the Court would rally the
world public opinion in support of the Council's action.
This is just one example of how the Would Rule of Law approach
would help in a situation that, unfortunately, still occurs quite often. It
illustrates how, step by step, the United Nations may develop new powers
able, to paraphrase the words of President Bush, to increase peace, to
increase democracy, and to bring us closer to a more stable, more prosperous world.

RESTRUCTURING FOR PEACE:
CHALLENGES FOR THE 21st
CENTURY

Redress for Gulf War Violations of Human
Rights
FRANK C. NEWMAN*

While addressing a Honolulu audience in October 1990, President
Bush mentioned the Nuremberg Trials, and pronounced that, "Saddam
Hussein . . .will be held accountable for his 'outrageous' behavior....
[He] must know [that the] stakes are high."' Addressing the United Nations General Assembly a month earlier, the President had declared:
Iraq and its leaders must be held liable for these crimes of abuse and
destruction. But this outrageous disregard for basic human rights
does not come as a total surprise. Thousands of Iraqis have been executed on political and religious grounds and even more through a
genocidal, poison gas war waged against Iraq's own Kurdish villagers?
Who is still looking to Nuremberg Law and will Saddam and his ruling clique really be "held liable?" As yet we do not know. We do know,
however, that the Iraqi government has been proclaimed accountable and
that severe penalties have been prescribed via a series of United Nations
Security Council resolutions.
The most important question we confront is how the United Nations,
the United States, and other nations will continue to deal with Iraq's victims as well as its vanquished. We recognize the stakes are high not only
because of the wrongdoings but because people's legal rights and, as President Bush said, "basic human rights," have been grossly violated.
My inquiries here are, first, whether those who manage the affairs of
* Justice of the Supreme Court of California (retired) and Ralston Professor of International Law, University of California, Berkeley (emeritus).
1. Don Balz, Near Site of Japanese Attack, Bush Issues Warning to Saddam Hussein,
WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 1990, at A19.
2. President George Bush, The U.N.: World Parliment of Peace, DEP'T STATE DisPATCH, Oct 1, 1990, Current Policy No. 1303.
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the United Nations and its member nations really do respect the Rule of
Law; and second, whether they have the sagacity, while seeking to
restructure the world order, to honor international law as well as mandates of the United Nations Charter that concern "human rights and fundamental freedoms" and "universal peace."
I. RESOLUTION 687 OF APRIL 3, 1991
"[A]cting under Chapter VII of the Charter" (to maintain or restore
international peace and security), the United Nations Security Council in
Resolution 687 declared a cease-fire "effective between Iraq and Kuwait
and the Member States cooperating with Kuwait in accordance with resolution 678." Resolution 678 and twelve others were affirmed "except as
expressly changed to achieve the goals" of Resolution 687.4
At present, many media representatives continue to hold the view
that civilians in Iraq are suffering more than those in Kuwait, Jordan,
and Iran. Facts are cited which imply that the leaders of the United
States and the United Nations are focusing primarily on Kurdish needs
and on nuclear and other weapons-controls, as well as oil slicks and
burned oil wells. There is an least an awareness regarding two items: the
Security Council's "prohibitions against the sale or supply to Iraq of commodities or products"' and other embargo rules, and the modifications of
those rules that may be forthcoming because of "humanitarian needs" as
well as Iraq's desire for income sufficient to meet its obligations regarding
burned wells and other gigantic costs of the war.
That brief summary, whether or not accurate, must next be tested by
careful examination of words in Resolution 687 such as the following:
Kuwaiti Property: The Security Council requested a Secretary General's report on "steps taken to facilitate the return of all Kuwaiti property seized by Iraq, including a list of any property that Kuwait claims
has not been returned or which has not been returned intact."6
Losses, damages, debts: The Council reaffirmed "that Iraq, without
prejudice to the debts and obligations of Iraq arising prior to 2 August
1990 ....

is liable under international law for any direct loss, damage,

including environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources,
or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and corporations,as a result
of Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait," and decided "to
create a fund to pay compensation for claims ..

.

and to establish a Com-

mission that will administer the fund."' 7 Those words in Resolution 687
restate paragraph 8 of Resolution 674, which warned Iraq that "under
3. U.N. Charter art. 1, 11 2, 3.

4. S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess, at 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991), reprintedin

30 I.L.M. 847, 852 (1991).
5. Id.

6. Id.
7. Id. (emphasis added).
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international law, it is liable for any loss, damage or injury arising in regard to Kuwait and third states, and their nationals and corporations, as
a result of the invasion and illegal occupation of Kuwait by Iraq." 8
Further, all Iraqi statements made since 2 August 1990 repudiating
its foreign debt are null and void, and "Iraq must adhere scrupulously to
all of its obligations concerning servicing and repayment of its foreign
debt. ''9

II.

REDRESS, REPARATIONS, AND INTERNATIONAL -LAW

The 1990-91 Security Council resolutions as a whole, which duly respect often-scoffed-at commands of the United Nations Charter, are precedent-shattering. Regardless of how or whether they continue to be enforced, they are destined to have an immense impact on the international
laws of armed conflict, whether external or internal.
My focus is on civil redress and on the critical issue of how we can
best help people whose human rights are being or have been violated."0
My hope is that ideas such as these may be of aid to the many dedicated
United Nations leaders who believe that for us "to blame" is merely one
approach among many labeled "to help," and that the victims of a war
that has been won merit much more attention than do violators of laws
that clearly should have governed. A quintessential United Nations protagonist at the moment is Theodoor van Boven of the Netherlands, whose
report was presented to the United Nations Human Rights Sub-Commission in August, 1991. Since 1989, he has been entrusted with the undertaking of a study concerning the right to compensation and rehabilitation
for victims of gross violations of human rights, taking into account relevant existing international human rights norms on compensation and relevant decisions and views of international human rights organs, with a
view to exploring the possibility of developing some basic principles and
guidelines.
III.

WHAT ABOUT NUREMBERG LAW?

A powerful fact is that the post-World War II Nuremberg trials enlightened us regarding not only criminal law but also civil law. A brief
recently filed in a United States court reads, in part:
It is true that many torturers and others . . . should be punished as
criminals. Yet it is not always true that seeking criminal punishment

8. S.C. Res. 674, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess, at 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/674 (1990), reprinted
in 29 I.L.M. 1561, 1563 (1990).

9. S.C. Res. 687, supra note 4, 30 I.L.M. at 852.
10. Here I will not discuss national law (e.g. constitutional powers of the President v.
Congress; federations v. "republics;" civilian uprisings, etc.). Nor will I propose any amendments or revisions of law, because I want to stress how implementation and enforcement of
existing law might be made more effective. I also reserve for future study some obviously
troubling questions regarding criminal punishment.
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is an effective means of helping people whose human rights have been
violated.
The forms of redress that most often help victims of human rights
violations are not penal fines or imprisonment. So what are they? The list
includes restitution, damages (including punitives), injunctions (court ordered) and cease and desist orders (from administrative tribunals), declaratory judgments and orders (judicial and administrative), and the imposition of varied types of civil discipline: rebuke, demotion, and
discharge of military personnel and other government officials, suspension
and revocation of licenses and permits, etc.
Most people whose international human rights have been violated
will be aided more by non-criminal than by criminal sanctions. The main
contribution of international criminal law will be the proscription of conduct regarded as wrongful. If the wrongs are provable, jurists and activists can then design forms of redress that will be far more constructive
than are fines and imprisonment.
Related is this excerpt from Vasak and Alston's UNESCO book on
human rights:
Here there is no room for a summary or precis of the case law and
practice of international criminal law. There is room, however, for a
warning that repeatedly seems to be unheeded. This is the warning:
Human rights activists must remember that a main contribution of
the relevant criminal law is its proscribing of illegal conduct....
Why is that important? For many reasons. A crucial fact is that
too many people, once the word "Nuremberg" is mentioned for example, immediately begin discussing criminal intent, proof beyond reasonable doubt and related concepts of penal law. Because those topics
are labyrinthine, we tend to forget that governments and government
officials may well have committed illegal acts whether or not the acts
also were criminal.
That is exactly what happened, for example, in numerous discussions of "Nuremberg and Vietnam." The cost to human rights law was
not that possibly guilty individuals escaped prosecution. The greater
cost was that, too often, all the talk of criminality left undiscussed
and unsettled the basic issues as to whether the new and brutal techniques of warfare that were used in Vietnam were illegal or not ....1
Those paragraphs suggest these conclusions: (1) a variety of noncriminal forms of redress may often be enforceable against some participants
in wars, other armed conflicts, or related confrontations; and (2) the patent needs of many victims for such redress can be bolstered by pertinent
provisions of international criminal law.
Several of the United Nations Gulf War resolutions refer to "interna-

11. KAREL VASAK, THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 166 (Philip Alston
ed., rev. ed. 1982).
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tional law" and "international humanitarian law." Security Council Resolution 674 adds "general principles of international law."' 2 Those phrases
include treaties and also customary law.' s Iraq, like many nations, has
arguably not ratified a treaty that defines the Nuremberg crimes of aggression, war crimes, or crimes against humanity. Those three proscriptions illustrate the full sweep of customary law. Sometimes it incorporates
words of treaties that have not been universally ratified.' Sometimes
only a few nations have inaugurated it.' And sometimes every nation is
bound even when the inaugurating lawmakers are unidentified. 6
The most authoritative pronouncements of "customary" Nuremberg
wrongs are found in Allied Control Council Law No. 10 and read as
follows:
(a) Crimes against Peace: Planning, preparation, initiation, or
waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international
treaties, agreements, or assurances, or participation in a common plan
or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing.
(b) War Crimes: Violations of the laws or customs of war. Such
violations shall include, but not be limited to murder, ill-treatment, or
deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of
war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or
private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages, or
devastation not justified by military necessity.
(c) Crimes against Humanity: Atrocities and offenses, including
but not limited to murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation,
imprisonment, torture, rape, or other inhumane acts committed
against any civilian population, or persecutions on political, racial or
7
religious grounds.
IV.

WHAT ABOUT SADDAM HUSSEIN AND

His COHORTS?

This conflict [may] reinvigorate the arcane "law of war" and further
advance it from its genesis as an oxymoron to an increasingly operative rule of law. Perhaps most sensitive . . . is the extent to which war

12. S.C. Res. 674, supra note 8, at 2, 29 I.L.M. at 1562.
13. For a widely endorsed restatement of that phenomenon, see the Statute of the International Court of Justice article 38(1)(b & c); cf. Frank C. Newman, Introduction: The
United States Bill of Rights, International Bill of Human Rights, and Other "Bills," 40
EMORY L.J. 731, 738 (1991) (text preceding n.23).
14. See generally Geneva Convention Relative to the Treament of Prisoners of War,
T.I.A.S. 3364; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of

War, T.I.A.S. 3364; U.N.

CHARTER.

15. E.g., Agreement For the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals
of the European Axis at Nuremburg, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 278.
16. For example piracy, slave-trade, torture, etc.

17. See Frank C. Newman & Weissbrodt,
(1990).

INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
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crimes may have been committed and, if so, whether those who committed them will be held to account, and how.18
From 1950 to 1990, innumerable Nuremberg wrongdoers were not
punished. Should we nonetheless now reinvigorate the punishment process? The only tolerable answer is YES. If the question involved wrongs
like piracy and the slave trade, or drug barons and other terrorists, there
would be few objections. Are unpenalized crimes against peace, war
crimes and crimes against humanity for any reason more tolerable? NO!
In future years the world will need international courts and prosecutors, as well as processes that assure fairness and adjudications that respect due process. Yet while we strive for those goals we need not abjure
the assessment of blame. By utilizing national tribunals, as in grave
breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and international "civil" penalties, as achieved via the Security Council's Gulf War resolutions, we can
certainly penalize wrongdoing and at the same time aid victims.
Since 1950 have some tyrants been penalized in ways to help their
victims? Yes, often, and progress is gradually being made. That it has
been "modest" suggests that we contemplate "modest victories" that for
decades have marked the hesitant use of penalties and remedies other
than the injunction, say, in so many civil liberties and civil rights conflicts
in the United States.
V.

WHAT ABOUT THE KURDS -

AND OTHER ILL-TREATED GROUPS?

On April 5, 1991 the Security Council in Resolution 688 condemned
"the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish populated areas." 19 The Resolution demanded that Iraq "immediately end this repression" and expressed "the
hope that an open dialogue will take place to ensure that the human and
political rights of all Iraqi citizens are respected."20 The Secretary-General was asked to report and also "to address urgently the critical needs
of the refugees and displaced Iraqi population," and the Council decided
"to remain seized of the matter."
The media have not focused on the fact that Resolution 688 should
protect many more than Kurds. Far too little attention has been given to
phrases in the Resolution such as "the Iraqi civilian population" and "the
human ... rights of all Iraqi citizens." Note too that the Secretary-General must "use all the resources at his disposal... to address urgently the
2
critical needs of the refugees and displaced Iraqi population."
Writing with acerbity in The Humanist, Gerry O'Sullivan has predicted that, "With the war now officially declared over, the United Na-

18.
19.
20.
21.

Homer E. Moyer, Jr., Legal Issues of the Gulf War, 20 INT'L L. NEWS 2, 4 (1991).
S.C. Res. 688, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess, at 1, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 858, 858 (1991).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
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tions will again be about as newsworthy as a cat up
media recently may have improved the "pre-peace"
Nations news I suggest that, overall, no more than a
To illustrate: could many reporters, media analysts,
questions like these?

a tree. '12 While the
coverage of United
B-minus is merited.
and pundits answer

1. How many coalition allies did the United States muster, and which
sent military aid in what quantity? Who are currently "active" United
Nations allies?
2. Which United Nations bodies have participated, other than
UNICEF and the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees?
3. Has the United States at last paid all dues and other moneys and
services it has owed to the United Nations?
4. Has the United Nations estimated its Gulf War costs and published the figures?
5. Do United States citizens have access to reasonable estimates regarding how many dollars the United States "spent" from August 1990
through 1991?
6. Have United Nations bodies, the ICRC, and other organizations
supplied reasonable estimates of war deaths, both military and civilian?
Other casualties? And the number of refugees from August 1990 through
1991?
7. Have friends of the United Nations become more satisfied or less
satisfied as to the good faith and the performance of United States representatives in United Nations forums?
8. Most significantly, on whom do we rely for information that citizens in the United States and elsewhere need concerning all who have
suffered or are suffering "direct loss, damage . . . or injury [or analogous
harm]?" 8
VI.

WHAT ARE WE LEARNING FROM THE MEDIA?

On the morning of July 15, 1991, illustratively, newspapers an24
nounced: Iraqi Atom Effort Exposes Weakness in World Controls;
"[Iraqi officers] thought they were going to get medals... Instead, they
were hanged;" 25 "Eighteen people were killed in an increasingly bloody
struggle between Kurdish rebels and security forces in southeast Turkey;"'2 6 "Two ... Marine Corps reservists who filed for conscientious objector discharges during the gulf war and now face possible court-martial
for desertion are no longer threatened with the death penalty, members

22.
23.
24.
25.

Gerry O'Sullivan, Against the Grain, THE HUMANIST, May/June 1991.
S.C. Res. 674, supra note 8.
N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1991, at Al, col. 3.
Generals Reported Dead in Hussein Purge, L.A. TIMEs, July 15, 1991, at A4, col. 3.

26. L.A.

TIMES, July

15, 1991, at A13, col. 1.
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of their family said."27
On that day the New York Times mentioned neither the Middle East
nor the United Nations, but one letter to the editors does refer to a July 1
editorial that proposed "to let Iraq export oil but turn the proceeds over
to the United Nations."28 The only pertinent pundit, appearing several
days earlier in the New York Times, was A.M. Rosenthal, who concluded,
"We should now recognize a whole series of coalition mistakes, misjudgments and delusions. They add up to one huge, historic error, uncorrectable until understood, acknowledged and rectified: allowing a beaten dictator to stay in power, slaughter his domestic enemies and prepare for
renewed struggle with foreign enemies."'29 The lead San Francisco Chronicle editorial, concerning the London session of the G-7 leaders, predicts
that "global arms trade . . . and other items will crowd the agenda environmental issues, Third World debt, the Middle East and Yugoslavia, among others - and none should be shortchanged." 3
The morning's sole report on victims was Jean Mayer's column,
"Iraq's Malnourished Children."3 1 But what about the many foreign governments, nationals and corporations that also were promised redress by
the United Nations Security Council resolutions? Indeed, what has happened to them, and who among the media will now keep us informed?
Of course not all has been lost. For instance, George Bush's overall
approval rating remained sky high several months after the gulf war. 2
And the United Nations Security Council is, thank God, still in business.
Yet hauntingly relevant is this metaphor (unwitting I think) supplied by
columnist Herb Caen: "Don't miss Steinhart Aquarium's finest sign, the
one above the shark tank which reads, 'If you are in the water with a
dangerous shark, swim normally, not excitedly, and try not to bleed.' "23
For me, the uniquely thoughtful and poignant piece is Arthur
Hoppe's "Suffer Little Children:"
Another waif was at the door [and] said he was from Iraq. "Go
away," I said testily. "I'm already supporting 10 Bangladeshi, 6 Eritreans and my lazy brother-in-law."
"Oh, please, sir . . ." he said. "I was hoping you might see your
way clear to releasing some of those frozen Iraqi assets so that I could
buy a little food and medicine."

27. S.F. CHRONICLE, July 15, 1991, at A15.
28. N.Y. TIMeS, July 1, 1991, at A12, col. 2.
29. On My Mind: Mistakes of the War, N.Y. TIMEs, July 12, 1991, at A29, col. 6.
30. London Summit's Urgent Agenda, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, July 15, 1991, at A18
(emphasis added).
31. N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1991, at Al, col. 1.
32. See e.g. N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1991, at D1, col. 1.
33. Herb Caen, There Are The Times, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, July 15, 1991, at Dl
(emphasis added).
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"Well, I'd like to," I said, "but we froze those assets to punish you
for invading Kuwait."
"Excuse me, sir", he said, "but a Harvard research team said...
that 170,000 Iraqi children would succumb to malnutrition and disease unless you lifted your sanctions. And 6,000 have already died."
"Lift our sanctions?" I cried. "I can see you don't understand a thing
about our foreign policy, young man."
. I [then] said patiently, "Our president has made it quite clear
that we can't lift those sanctions until you get rid of that monster
Saddam Hussein.... We licked him fair and square [and] now we're
going [to] keep those sanctions on to teach him a lesson. .

.

. The

man's a selfish, lying, power-mad, corrupt dictator. Our plan is to
make him suffer by starving you ....

Don't you worry, son ....

We'll

save you from that rotten tyrant. Our policy never fails. Look at all
the Nicaraguans and Vietnamese we saved from communism through
our starve-the-kids policy."
"But I thought millions of Vietnamese children survived to live
under communism," he said. "I'm speaking of the ones who didn't," I
explained.
The scrawny tyke sighed. "Well, I'll do my best to go along [but]
my hunger pangs are getting just awful, and I think I'm coming down
with a fever." I couldn't help but pat him on the head. "Keep up the
good work, son," I said encouragingly. "We'll get that S.O.B. yet.' 4

34. Arthur Hoppe, Suffer Little Children, SAN

FRANCISCO CHRONICLE,

July 15, 1991, at

Friend, or Foe or Something Else: Social
Meanings Of Redress And Reparations
ERIC

I.

K.

YAMAMOTO*

INTRODUCTION

One billion dollars and an apology: reparations by the United States
government for 60,000 surviving Americans of Japanese ancestry imprisoned during World War II without charges, trial or evidence of necessity.1
Redress for lost homes, families, and freedom, for serious harm inflicted
by a government upon its own people on account of their race.2
Who has benefitted from redress and reparations; who has been ignored? What freedoms have been protected; what obligations forsaken?
What promises have been fulfilled; what illusions fostered? In what diverse ways may society come to understand redress and reparations for
WWII Japanese American internees? Put another way: What are the
evolving social meanings of the United States government's reparations
law and program? 3
*

Associate Professor, William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawaii, Ma-

noa; J.D., Boalt Hall, University of California at Berkeley. My thanks to Edie Feldman and
Cathy Takase for their assistance. This article builds upon a shorter essay scheduled for
publication in RESTRUCTURING FOR PEACE: CHALLENGES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (University
Press of America 1992).
1. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 1989b-4(a)(1) (1988) (authorizing $20,000 payment to each surviving former internee).
2. This article discusses government reparations programs that redress group-based
civil rights violations by governments against their own citizens. It does not address directly,
but may shed some light upon, the other situation in which reparations is usually discussed:
one country's payment to another country's people as compensation for violations of international human rights norms. The most recent example of this latter type of reparations is
the call for Iraq to compensate the Kuwaiti people for the harm resulting from Iraq's "blatant violation" of international law in the occupation of Kuwait. Allan Gersen, U.N. is Best
Forum for War Trial, and Charles Brower, Make Saddam Pay Reparation, in Making the
Case Against Saddam Hussein, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 4, 1991, at 10.
3. "Meanings" here is pluralized. Meanings are social constructions, dependent in part
upon historical context and in part upon the power and interests of those ascribing the
meanings and their relationship to the actors and events that are the subject of characterization. MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE 175-77 (1990); PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS,
ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991). We cannot ask about the meaning or value of something without asking "from whose perspective?" Any event or action might accrue multiple
and inconsistent meanings, or varying reach and impact. And those meanings may change
over time See Charles L. Black Jr., The Lawfulness of the Desegregation Decisions, 69
YALE L.J. 421, 424 (1960) (discussing the "social meaning" of segregation). This essay starts
with the idea that "the law generally, and civil rights law in particular, not only imports
rules of conduct, it signifies.., structures of value and meaning." W. HARMICK, AN EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY OF LAW: MAURICE MERLEAY PONTY 129-40 (1987).
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Some of the meanings are salutary. Former WWII internees have
benefitted in myriad ways - financially, culturally, emotionally. Some
also say government and all of society have benefitted. Reparations are
proof that the United States constitution works, that government is selfcorrecting, and that the American legal and political systems are essentially just. Still others say the United States has bolstered its moral foundation to command international allegiance to human rights. Its reparations program may be a model for other countries concerned about
redemption for past wrongs. Those views are supported by generally-held
assumptions and theories about the ameliorative effect of civil rights
laws.4
But are these salutary views overstated? Or misguided? Do reparations laws inevitably engender institutional and attitudinal changes reflecting "lessons learned?" Or might redress and reparations ultimately
aid in the perpetuation of institutional power structures and public attitudes that suppress freedom for those society views as different and vulnerable? Certain critical theories about law tend to support this latter
view.5
The reparations program for WWII Japanese American internees is
on-going, and the long-term effects of that program and the law creating
it are largely undetermined. This essay sketches a framework for inquiring into the societal effects and values - the evolving meanings - of
reparations. It first delineates conflicting salutary and critical views of
reparations for WWII Japanese American internees and identifies divergent theories of civil rights laws underlying those conflicting views. It
then offers in broad concept an additional basis for assessing impact and
ascribing meaning - one that links past process to future action, acknowledging contingency in the .construction of meaning; one that emphasizes minority perspectives on actual institutional and attitudinal
restructuring.
This concept is described in the context of recent theories about the
conflicting potential of civil rights laws, especially concerning issues of
racial subordination. It suggests inquiry beyond reparations itself - inquiry into the non-reparations consequences over time of a reparations
movement's political and legal processes. It suggests that a reparations
law's salient meanings lie not in the achievement of payments and apologies to a particular group or in symbolic constitutional victories, but in
the commitment of recipients and others to build upon the reparations
process' inter-group linkages and political insights to contribute to broadbased institutional and attitudinal restructuring. Whether those commitments are made and acted upon may, and should, in principal part determine enduring social meanings of reparations.

4. See infra notes 23-36, and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
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II.

SOCIAL MEANINGS OF REDRESS
REPARATIONS FOR JAPANESE AMERICAN WORLD WAR II

INTERNEES

The Japanese American redress movement provided more than reparations for former internees. It also provided political and legal insights
into the breakdown of a democratic system of checks and balances during
a time of national stress.
The redress movement's roots date back to the late 1960's when a
second-generation Japanese American started a personal campaign of
public education and legislative lobbying in support of reparations for
former internees. That informal campaign, progressing slowly in fits and
starts, gradually gained momentum, expanding its base through newlyformed university ethnic studies programs and engendering organizational support, media curiosity and legislative interest. Various groups,
often at odds with one another, coalesced in general support of a national
coalition for redress.'
Progress stalled in the late 1970's, however. The legal basis for reparations was ill-defined. Although many came to realize the historical
"wrong" of the internment, public support for legislative reparations, and
even support within the Japanese American communities, waned. Two
events in the early 1980's galvanized the reparations movement. First,
Japanese American congresspersons from California and Hawaii pushed
through seemingly innocuous legislation creating a study commission.
This commission, however, was anything but the commonplace congressional commission whose effect, if not purpose, is to delay and obscure.
The commission's thorough and aggressive investigation unearthed new
information and provided the solid factual record for reparations.7
The second event involved lawsuits: the coram nobis litigation in
1983 that reopened the WWII court cases challenging the constitutionality of the internment and the Hohri class action suit that sought damages
for the internees' loss of freedom and property. Toward the end of WWII
the United States Supreme Court ruled in the infamous Korematsu case
that the internment did not transgress the Fifth Amendment's Due Process clause, that "military necessity" justified it.9 Fred Korematsu's legal
6. The history of the Japanese-American redress and reparations movement is welldocumented. See, e.g., WILLIAM MINORU HOHRI, REPAIRING AMERICA 37 (1988); PETER IRONS,
JUSTICE LONG OVERDUE (1988).
7. REPORT OF CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF
CIVILIANS, PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED (1983) (hereinafter CWRIC REPORT).

8. My view of reparations is situated by my participation in 1983 and 1984 on the legal
team that litigated the reopening of Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214 (1944) - the case that
in 1944 upheld the constitutionality of the internment. The HOHRI class action was ultimately dismissed on statute of limitations grounds. Hohri v. United States, 586 F. Supp. 769
(D.D.C. 1984), aff'd in part and rev'd in part 782 F.2d 227 (1986), vacated 482 U.S. 64

(1987), on remand 847 F.2d 779 (1988), cert. denied 488 U.S. 925 (1988). While the suit was
pending on appeal, its threat of a possible multibillion dollar recovery exerted pressure on
Congress concerning reparations.
9. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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challenge failed at that time, and the government imprisoned him for refusing to abide by the military's exclusion orders leading to the internment. That same case was reopened by Mr. Korematsu in 1983 through a
highly unusual petition for a writ of coram nobis. Korematsu renewed his
legal challenge on the basis of newly discovered, now declassified government documents from WWII which revealed three extraordinary facts:
first, before the internment, all involved government intelligence services
unequivocally informed the highest officials of the military and the War
and Justice Departments that the west coast Japanese as a group posed
no serious danger, and that there existed no justification for mass internment; second, the key west coast military commander based his internment decisions on invidious racial stereotypes about the inscrutable, inherently disloyal Japanese American; and third, the military, War and
Justice Departments concealed and destroyed evidence and deliberately
misled the Supreme Court in 1944 when it was considering the Korematsu case and the asserted military necessity justification for the
internment. 0
The Supreme Court in 1944 accepted as true the government's false
statements about military necessity without close scrutiny - and with
tragic consequences. The Court's unquestioning acceptance of racial stereotypes and false statements of necessity "not only legitimized the dislocation and imprisonment of loyal citizens without trial solely on account
of race, but it also weakened a fundamental tenet of American democracy
- government accountability for military control over civilians."" Justice
Jackson, in his scathing dissent, pinpointed the dangerous latent legal
principle of the 1944 Korematsu decision. "What the Court appears to be
doing, whether consciously or not . . . [is] to distort the Constitution to
approve all the military may deem expedient."1 2
The recent reopening of the Korematsu case," with its revelations,
highlighted the danger to citizens, and minorities particulary, of unscrutinized military and government national security power. That danger led
the federal court hearing the case in 1984 to observe:
As historical precedent [Korematsu] stands . . . as a caution that in
times of distress the shield of military necessity and national security
must not be used to protect governmental actions from close scrutiny
and accountability. It stands as a caution that in times of international hostility and antagonisms our institutions, legislative, executive
and judicial, must be prepared to exercise their authority [to enforce

10. Eric K. Yamamoto, Korematsu Revisted - Correcting the Injustice of Extraordinary Government Excess and Lax Judicial Review: Time for a Better Accommodation of
National Security Concerns and Civil Liberties, 26 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 2, 24-26 (1986).
See also PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR (1983).
11. Yamamoto, supra note 10, at 3.
12. Id.
13. Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
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constitutional guarantees] to protect all citizens from the petty fears
and prejudices that are so easily aroused."
The judicial decisions in the reopened Korematsu and related Hirabayashi 8 cases and the Congressional Commission's investigation and report in 1983"8 provided firm legal and factual bases for legislative reparations. Along with the Hohri class action, they helped galvanize a renewed
reparations movement in the mid-1980's. Many former internees, for the
first time, actively pushed for redress, joined by civil liberties groups.
Public education programs and community fundraising efforts flourished.
Other minority group organizations lent support. Japanese American congresspersons and others, after protracted debate, negotiated the civil
rights legislation through Congress,'1 7 resulting in an apology by the President and a payment of $20,000 per surviving internee. Payments commenced in October of 1990.
Many rejoiced. Redress and reparations, and the process of obtaining
them, were cathartic for former internees. A measure of dignity was restored. Former internees could finally talk about the internment. Feelings
long repressed, surfaced. One woman, now in her sixties, stated that she
always felt the internment was wrong, but that, after being told by the
military, the President and the Supreme Court that it was a necessity,
she had come seriously to doubt herself. Redress and reparations and the
recent successful court challenges, she said, had now freed her soul."8

III.

CONFLICTING VIEWS

OF REDRESS AND REPARATIONS

Many former internees clearly have benefitted from redress and reparations. With that understanding as a starting point, we pose a broader
inquiry: What are the evolving social meanings of governmental redress
and reparations?' Multiple and sometimes colliding views are emerging.
A.

Salutary Views

One view is that the United States Constitution works. Government,
if pushed, eventually will do the right thing. This view implies that redress and reparations for WWII Japanese American internees is a symbolic victory for everyone. Government war and national security powers

14. Id. at 1418. See also Note, Developments in the Law - The National Security
Interest and Civil Liberties, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1130, 1134 (1972) (observing characteristic
political branches' overestimated "threats to national security to the detriment of civil
liberties").
15. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943), later proceeding 627 F. Supp.
1445 (W.D. Wash. 1986), aff'd in part, rev'd in part 828 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1987). See also
Minoru Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943).
16. CWRIC REPORT, supra note 7.
17. See generally HOHRI, supra note 6.
18. This conversation with a Nisei (second generation) woman followed a public presentation by members of the Korematsu litigation team in Palo Alto, California, in May, 1984.
19. See supra note 3 for a definition of the term "meanings."
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were ultimately brought within bounds. The democratic system of checks
and balances, over time, worked.
A related message is that wrongs against a racial group in the United
States can be made right. The government reaffirmed its commitment to
20
fundamental freedoms for all citizens.
Another salutary view is that reparations enabled the United States
to demonstrate to other countries its commitment to human rights norms.
That demonstrated commitment enhanced America's capacity to participate in resolving international human rights disputes.
A final salutary view is atonement and abrogation of societal guilt.
The past has now passed, the slate wiped clean. American society is finally free to move forward. Implicit in this view is a notion peculiarly
linked to American culture: money discharges moral obligation. Once you
"pay off," you are morally freed. 21
The collective message of these salutary views is that a democratic
constitution and its political and legal systems are ultimately responsive
to peoples' rights, including the freedoms of minorities. Societal mistakes
can be transformed, however belatedly, into social progress. A society that
rightfully repairs those it wrongfully harms has moral standing to assess
other countries' allegiance to human rights norms. The United States, for
example, as part of its contemplation of a free trade agreement with Mexico, is being encouraged to exert pressure upon the Mexican government
to curb police and military torture of citizens. 22 The overall message conveyed by these salutary views is significant, and it reveals considerable
valve of a government program of reparations.
This message is enhanced by generally-held assumptions and theories
about the ameliorative effect of civil rights "laws." In broad concept, laws,
and especially legislation designed to prevent or remediate harm to society's less powerful or stigmatized, reflect a value consensus.2 3 Certain
types of discriminatory behavior should be prohibited, certain types of
injuries redressed. That consensus about how things should be, reflected

20. See HOHRI, supra note 6, at 225 ("We tend to invest our institutions with the responsibility for our freedoms. The redress movement, like the Constitution, violates this
conventional view of American democracy. We believe that a small group, with little more
than its remembered pain and desire to have its grievances redressed, can act to repair a
breach in our democratic society. . . . Our movement has become part of our legacy to
America, our contribution to American democracy.").
21. Critics of this notion "detect a certain commodifying vulgarity in throwing money
at injured people ....
Reparations, one could argue, promotes the idea that everyone has a
price, that every wound is salved by cash." Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 394-95 (1987).
22. See Amnesty International Report, Mexico: Torture with Impunity (1991) (describing police and military torture of citizens).
23. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Rainbow Republicanism, 97 YALE L. J. 1713, 1713-14
(1988) (critiquing the "republican revival in constitutional law" and its conception of politics as the "articulation of the common good" in a manner "compatible with the nurturance
of 'social plurality' ").
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in the law, will over time compel more or less conforming conduct.",
5
Brown v. Board of Education's"
rejection of the separate-but-equal principle in 1954 led to the end of formal segregation in public facilities and
accommodations. The federal Voting Rights Act"6 encouraged many African Americans to vote and run for office. Recognition of civil rights
through legislation, executive pronouncements or court rulings is a societal victory - part of the difficult march toward equality and fairness in
society. And benefits accrue from that recognition, both practical and
symbolic. These assumptions and civil rights law theory, generally stated
here, provide foundation for the salutary views of congressionally-authorized reparations for WWII Japanese American internees.
B.

Critical Views

Salutary views, however, collide with critical ones. A principal criticism is that the salutary views described earlier are often conveyed from
an unstated vantage point: mainstream America. What may further the
general interests and serve the values of mainstream America, and the
governmental structure that supports it, what may be a "societal victory,"
may in practical effect undermine the struggles and dreams of those
outside the cultural mainstream.2 Another, and related, criticism is that
reparations legislation has the potential of becoming a civil rights law
that at best delivers far less than it promises and that at worst creates
illusions of progress, functioning as a hegemonic device to preserve the
status quo.
These criticisms might be productively examined by asking two questions, one broad and one narrow, both stated from the vantage points of
minority groups concerned about meaningful social structural and attitudinal changes: What has been the impact of governmental redress and
reparations for WWII Japanese American internees (1) on the institutional and legal structure of government power to restrict fundamental
freedoms of minorities in the United States, especially in the context of

24. See Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Anti-discriminationLaw, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1347-48 (1988).
Crenshaw discusses popular public perceptions of and theories about the effects of civil
rights reforms, quoting Alfred Blumrosen:
"[Tihe condition of black American[s in 1985 is so much improved, as a
result of the 1964 legislation. The success of the Civil Rights Act contained the
seeds of its loss of public support. Racism alone simply will no longer do as an
explanation for the current condition of depressed minorities. The rhetoric of
the sixties sounds hollow to Americans of the eighties because it is hollow."
Id. at 1347-48, n.63 (Alfred Blumrosen, Twenty Years of Title VII Law: An Overview 13
(April 18, 1985) (unpublished manuscript on file at Harvard Law Library)).
25. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b).
27. Matsuda, supra note 21, at 396-97.
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military and domestic national security matters, and (2) on societal attitudes towards and actions concerning Asian Americans?2"
1.

Structure of Government/Minority Group Power Relations

Derrick Bell's interest-convergence theory suggests that dominant
groups will only concede "rights" to minorities when the exercise of those
rights benefits the dominant groups' overall interests.29 According to this
theory, a government is likely to make reparations only at a time and in a
manner that furthers society's dominant interests. Those interests are
furthered by preserving existing power structures during times of stress.
Does the interest-convergence theory illuminate aspects of redress
and reparations? At a minimum, the theory casts an interesting light on
certain events and people and raises poignant questions.3 0 In most situations, even when a strong moral case for reparations is made, government
opposes reparations.3" Stated practical reasons include inordinate cost

28. This discussion does not address likely criticisms of those who view race-specific
remedial policies and laws as threats to democratic governance. See HERITAGE FOUNDATION
MANDATE

FOR LEADERSHIP:

POLICY

MANAGEMENT

IN

A CONSERVATIVE

ADMINISTRATION

(Charles Heatherly ed., 1981). See also Crenshaw, supra note 24, at 1336-41 (discussing the
"Neoconservative Offensive").
29. Derrick A. Bell Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergehce
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L.R. 518, 523 (1980) (The "principle of 'interest convergence' provides:
the interest of blacks in achieving racial equality will be accommodated only when it converges with the interests of whites"). As an example, Bell observes that Brown v. Board of
Education's rejection of the separate-but-equal doctrine served U.S. interests internationally by enabling the U.S. to claim moral high ground in its cold war against communism.
Racial remedies may be the "outward manifestations of unspoken and perhaps subconscious
judicial conclusions that the remedies, if granted, will secure, advance, or at least not harm
societal interests deemed important by middle and upper class whites." Id.
30. Professor Matsuda observes:
Some thoughtful victim group members are inclined to reject reparations
because of the political reality that any reparations award will come only when
those in power decide it is appropriate. Hayden Burgess, a native Hawaiian
nationalist lawyer, suggests that any award of cash reparations is inadequate,
for it ignores the Hawaiian's primary need: restoration of the Hawaiian government and removal of the United States presence in Hawaii. Rather than a topdown model of reparations granted by the United States, Burgess prefers negotiations between the Hawaiians and the United States as equals, perhaps mediated by a neutral third party in an international forum.
Matsuda, supra note 21, at 396.
31. The U.S.-aided overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy in 1893 was regarded by many
(including former President Grover Cleveland) as an illegal invasion of a sovereign, interna-

tionally-recognized country. See MELODY K. MACKENZIE, SOVEREIGNTY AND LAND: HONORING
THE NATIVE HAWAIIAN CLAIM (1982); Native Hawaiian Study Commission Minority Report
(majority report by Republican-appointed commissioners found reparations unwarranted);
Blondin, A Case for Reparations for Native Hawaiians, 16 HAWAII B.J. 13 (1981); Ramon
Lopez-Reyes, The Demise of the Hawaiian Kingdom: A Psycho-cultural Analysis and
Moral Legacy - Something Lost, Something Owed, 18 HAWAII B.J. 3 (1983); Neil M. Levy,
Native Hawaiian Land Rights, 63 CAL. L. REv. 848 (1975). The U.S. acquired through annexation in 1898 ownership of substantial amounts of Hawaiian land. The Hawaiian reparations movement has nevertheless faced both tacit and overt U.S. government opposition.
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and the impossibility of redressing all historical transgressions against all
groups - "if we do it for one group we've got to do it for all, and we can't
afford that." ' Stated legal reasons for government opposition to reparations include the existence of circumstances justifying the transgression,
the difficulty of identifying perpetrator and victim groups, the lack of sufficient connection between past wrong and present claim and the difficulty of calculating damages.3 " Indeed, the Reagan administration for a
long time opposed reparations to WWII Japanese American internees ostensibly for these practical and legal reasons and vigorously if not bitterly
fought to dismiss the reopened Korematsu case.
So why did then President Reagan and candidate Bush later acquiesce to reparations legislation? Explanations abound, but none involve a
desire to restructure government power. One explanation is that their
tepid and belated support was an attempt to temper the anti-civil rights
aura of ultra-conservative Republicans to attract moderate voters." An
explanation for broader governmental support is that, domestically, in the
context of increasingly volatile minority group criticisms about continuing
disenfranchisement, reparations afforded decisionmakers an opportunity
to point to a model minority that survived and flourished despite hardship3 5 - conveying the message that the system works, and things historically wrong are made right. Internationally, reparations enabled decisionmakers to enhance somewhat the United States' image as a country
committed to human rights - bolstering an ostensible moral foundation
for military incursions abroad, for mediation of Middle East conflicts and
for the continuing struggle with the Soviet Union.
From these simplified generalizations emerges a specific question:
Has formal governmental redress of group-based injuries resulted in a reshaping of the amorphous structure of government military and national
security power over citizens that led to the imprisonment of innocent
Americans on account of their race? If the interest-convergence theory is
accurate, the answer is probably "very little." If very little restructuring
of institutional power has occurred, then reparations may have unforseen
ill-effects for Japanese Americans and all minorities. The criticism is not
that reparations are insignificant for recipients; the criticism is that they
can lead to an "adjustment of individual attitudes" towards the historical
injustice of the internment without giving current "consideration to the

32. Congressperson Bauman opposed creation of the CWRIC because it would mean
"many other groups who have suffered at the hands of the Government throughout our 204year history and even beyond should also have their commission, their investigation, their
examination of history with a report issuing forth." 126 CONG. REC. 18,864 (1980), quoted in
Matsuda, supra note 21, at 383-84, n. 251. See generally Mary Reiko Osaka, JapaneseAmericans and Central European Jews: A Comparison of Post- War ReparationsProblems,
5 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 211 (1981).
33. Matsuda, supra note 21, at 373-74.
34. Some might say that President Bush revealed his true colors after the election when
he unsuccessfully attempted to scuttle funding for reparations payments.
35. The "model minority" label is discussed later in this section.
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fundamental realities of power."36 The "danger lies in the possibility of
enabling people to 'feel good' about each other" for the moment, "while
leaving undisturbed the attendant social realities" creating the underlying
conflict."' According to this view, redress and reparations could in the
long term "unwittingly be seduced into becoming one more means of social control that attempts to neutralize the need to strive for justice."3 "
Critical legal theory provides support for these views. It highlights
the unfulfilled expectations of civil rights laws. Critical theory sharply rejects the view of the ameliorative effect of civil rights laws, challenging
the notion of the civil rights movement's steady march toward social
equality.39 It examines the often limited and emphemeral social structural
impact of civil rights legislation and court rulings. Legislation needs to be
implemented and court pronouncements need to be interpreted and applied. Who implements, interprets and applies? What social and political
forces guide the actors and shape their actions? Rights are "indeterminate and contingent"40 and are often conferred by those in power as
"safety valves" to relieve accumulating pressure for fundamental social
structural changes. 41 According to this view at the extreme, reparations
laws are hegemonic devices employed by those in power to induce consent
to existing social and economic relationships, and reflect no more than
illusions of social progress.
As Kimberly Crenshaw insightfully argues, critical legal theory's
"trashing" of civil rights laws in this manner, especially concerning race,
rests on an incomplete if not flawed foundation. It overlooks the paucity
of societal mechanisms for countering the devastating impact of racism in
society; it overemphasizes "consent" and ignores the effect of coersion
and popular consciousness in forms of race-based oppression; and it trivializes the function of civil rights discourse and laws, despite sharp limitations, in contributing to a race-consciousness necessary for addressing
questions of power and structural change.4 2

36. Edmonds, Beyond Prejudice Reduction, MCS CONCILLIATION QUARTERLY, Spring
1991, at 15. See also Gary Peller, The Politics of Reconstruction, 98 HARV. L. REV. 863
(1985) (reviewing BRUCE ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW (1984)).
37. Edmonds, supra note 36, at 15 (discussing the limitations of the multicultural conflict resolution concept of "bias reduction").

38. Id. See generally Richard Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal
Studies Have What Minorities Want?, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 301 (1987).
39. This reflects a very broad summary of aspects of critical legal studies which represents a complex critique of liberal theory. See generally Allan David Freeman, Legitimizing
Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme
Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978).
40. See Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363, 1371 (1984).
41. Delgado, supra note 38, at 304 (summarizing and critiquing Critical Legal Studies).
For a thorough discussion of critical legal theory see MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE To CRITICAL
LEGAL STUDIES (1987); Robert W. Gordon, New Developments In Legal Theory, in POLITICS
OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 281, 286 (David Kairys ed., 1982).
42. Crenshaw, supra note 24, at 1382 (referring specifically to "the efforts of Black people to transform their world").
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Recent critical race theories43 acknowledge the considerable limitations of rights discourse and yet find particular value in it. Those theories, discussed later, might be employed to build upon and then recast
critical legal theory's view of reparations as illusion. From this perspective, reparations legislation and court rulings in cases such as Korematsu
do not necessarily or inevitably lead to a restructuring of governmental
institutions, a changing of societal attitudes or a transformation of social
relationships, and the dangers of illusory progress and co-optation are
real. At the same time, reparations claims, and the rights discourse they
engender in attempts to harness the power of the state, can and should be
appreciated as intensely powerful and calculated political acts that challenge racial assumptions underlying past and present social arrangements. They bear potential for contributing to institutional and attitudinal restructuring in some fashion, under certain circumstances, although
they do not do so necessarily or inevitably.
We might thus reframe in an empirical light the question posed earlier: Has reparations for WWII Japanese American internees in practical
effect altered the structure of governmental relations with minorities, especially in the context of military and national security matters, or has it
enabled society to feel better about itself without addressing issues of
domination and oppression, power and injustice?
Consider the following concerning the government's national security
power and the interests of minorities."" In 1991, during the Gulf War, the
43. See infra notes 69-74 and accompanying text for a more developed discussion.
44. Also consider the following concerning government and minority group relations: In
1989 the U.S. Supreme Court issued a series of opinions markedly restricting minority civil
rights. A series of cases slashed minority access to federal courts to challenge discriminatory
actions. See City of Richmand v. J.S. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (applying strict scrutiny standard of review to city's minority contractor set-asides ordinance and holding a generalized finding of discrimination in the construction industry insufficient to justify minority
racial quota); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (declaring racial harassment in employment not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1981); Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio, 493 U.S. 802 (1989) (ruling that Title VII plaintiff bears both the burden of proving
disparate impact and the burden of disproving the employer's assertion that the adverse
employment practice was a business necessity); Lorance v. A.T. & T. Technologies, 490 U.S.
900 (1989) (affirming dismissal of female employees' Title VII claim through a restrictive
interpretatation of the statute of limitations period for challenges to discrimnatory seniority
systems); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (upholding white firefighters' collateral attack of a consent decree resolving admitted fire department discrimination on grounds that
the white firefighters were not formal parties to the consent decree litigation).
In 1990 President Bush, speciously alluding to illegal quotas, vetoed congressional legislation aimed at restoring those minority rights. See Dick Thornburgh, Kennedy-Hawkins
Bill Would Mandate Hiring by Skin Color, L.A. DAILY J., June 27, 1990, at 6, col. 3; Agustus
Hawkins, Opponents of Measure Use Scare Tactics in Lieu of Facts, L.A. DAILY J., June 27,

1990, at 6, col 5; Bush Rejects Civil Rights Bill,

COURAGE IN THE STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE AND

Vol. 6, at 3, Nov./Dec. 1990. One report indicated that the White House was so
determined to build political capital among white conservatives and moderates that it has
kept that quota controversy alive by scuttling efforts by a group of top corporate executives
(the Business Roundtable) to forge a compromise bill with civil rights leaders in 1991. Priscilla Painton, Quota Quagmire, TIME, May 27, 1991, at 20, col. 3.
PEACE,
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FBI undertook an aggressive campaign of interrogation of Iraqi Americans in the United States, implying by manner and style a presumption
of disloyalty by reason of race."5 In several recent cases, the United States
Supreme Court affirmed the government's power to restrict or suspend
completely the civil rights of citizens in the interest of national security,
without any meaningful showing of necessity. Those cases involved discrimination against gays,4" women,4 7 political speakers 8 and assertedly
subversive citizens seeking to travel abroad. 9 The Court's value judgments in those cases, and its deference to unsubstantiated government
assertions of necessity, resemble the Court's disastrous approach in Korematsu in 1944.50
The danger of that approach - the "distortion of the Constitution"
to validate unjustifiable harm to the unpopular, according to former Justice Jackson - is illustrated by President Bush's 1989 proposed executive
order concerning uniform security clearance procedures for people working with or for the government. The proposed order eliminated due process rights for citizens in many instances. It also authorized revocation of
the procedural safeguards that did exist whenever an agency head perceived the safeguards to be "inconsistent with national security interests
of the United States."51 Most significant, the proposed executive order
used the mantle of national security to exclude from employment those
with so-called exploitable vulnerabilities - targeting gays and other unpopular minorities. 2
And consider the following specifically concerning the structure of
governmental relations with Asians in the United States in the context of
military and national security matters. In 1988 the United States Coast
Guard embarked on a program of selective enforcement of a prohibition
against non-citizen offshore fishermen. The Coast Guard, which never
before enforced the 200-year old prohibition, targeted only permanent
resident Vietnamese fishermen. The Coast Guard targeted those refugee
fishermen only after fielding complaints from competing American fishermen. The Coast Guard justified its selective enforcement policy on national security grounds. The Vietnamese fishermen, however, were not
representing foreign fishing fleets and, as permanent residents, were eligible to serve in the United States armed services and even the Coast

45. See Dr. Ibrahim Aoude Parallels Arab Americans and AJAs, LEADING THE WAY,
May 1991, at 9, cols. 1-3.
46. Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988).
47. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
48. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976); United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675 (1985).
49. Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984).
50. Yamamoto, supra note 10, at 30-41 (comparing value judgments underlying the Supreme Court's approaches to national security restrictions of civil liberties). See also STEPHEN

Dycus, et al.,

NATIONAL SECURITY LAW

407-08 (1990).

51. DYcus, supra note 50, at 533 (discussing the Proposed Executive Order Governing
Access to Classified Information).
52. Id. at 517-18.
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Guard. As in the Korematsu case, the government offered no evidence of
any threat to national security. When the United States Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals heard the Vietnamese fishermen's legal challenge, Judge
Noonan observed that the government's position on national security
"would open the way for placing aliens 'in concentration camps' and making citizenship a condition of release.""3
In 1990 Marine officer candidate Bruce Yamashita leveled charges of
continuing racism against Japanese Americans in the Armed Services.
Specifically, Yamashita charged, and has since supported with independent witness testimony, that Marine training officers directly violated
Marine nondiscrimination regulations with impunity. They subjected
Yamashita to constant racial taunting and belatedly dismissed him from
the program along with several other minority candidates under the pretext of "lack of leadership."'
In 1990 the amended Immigration Act responded in part to the perception that "Asians and Latinos have 'overused' the preference system
to the detriment of Europeans and others." 5 One of the amended Act's
apparent goals was to preserve the racial "balance" in the United States
by excluding Asians who altogether comprised three percent of the
United States population. Some support for the amendment eerily resembled cries of "yellow peril" in the early 1900s in Hawaii and California the Asian threat to the country's culture and security - which led to
5
Asian exclusion legislation. 1
This greatly simplified description of events, of course, paints an incomplete picture. It nevertheless lends general support to the view that
reparations for WWII Japanese American internees has not necessarily
entailed a fundamental restructuring of governmental relations with
Asian Americans particularly, and minorities generally, especially con-

53. The Case Against the U.S. Coast Guard, ASIAN LAW CAUCUS REPORTER, Jan. 1991,
at 2.
54. Bruce Yamashita's Story Could Be About All Asian Americans, LEADING THE WAY,
May 1991, at 4-5, cols. 1-3 (newsletter of Honolulu Chapter, Japanese American Citizens
League); HAWAII HERALD, Nov. 2, 1990, at 1.
55. Congress Passes New Immigration Law, ASIAN LAW CAUCUS REPORTER, Jan. 1991,
at 4.
56. See CWRIC REPORT, supra note 7, at 28-36 (describing the history of anti-Asian
legislation on the west coast).
For apparently similar reasons, the University of California at Berkeley imposed a formal but clandestine ceiling on Asian American admissions. Asian Americans were seen as
destroying the predominantly white, racial "balance" of the University. The implicit message: "We can't let in Asian overachievers and maintain affirmative action for other minority groups." We Shall Not Be Used, ASIAN LAW CAUCUS REPORTER, July 1990, at 7 (reprint
of address by Mari Matsuda). In addition, few Asian-Americans are visible in positions of
political and economic leadership. Asian Americans typically are viewed by many as firstrate scientists, engineers and entrepreneurs. They are not viewed as leaders of government
and industry. Not Enough Asian Managers,Says U.S. Commissioner, PACIFIC CITIZEN, June
14, 1991, at 1 (describing the glass ceiling for Asian Americans).
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cerning military matters and governmental assertions of national security
power.
2.

Attitudes Towards Asian Americans

The complex structure of government/Asian American relations is in
part a consequence of government and citizen perceptions of and attitudes towards Asian Americans. Images of "yellow peril" fueled antiAsian legislation before World War I157 and undergirded the military's
internment decisions. Indeed in 1943 the United States Justice and War
Departments argued, without supporting evidence, and the Supreme
Court implicitly accepted as fact, that Japanese Americans were a "large,
unassimilated, tightly-knit racial group, bound to an enemy nation by
strong ties of race, culture, custom and religion." ' How have those perceptions and attitudes been affected by redress and reparations for Japanese American World War II internees? Of course, no singular view of
Asian Americans in the United States exists. There is, however, a continuing and encompassing societal perception of Asian Americans as "different," a popular consciousness that is simultaneously perversely dark and
unrealistically bright.
From one perspective, Asian Americans are once again permissible
targets. Redress and reparations have atoned for past government sin.
Governmental constraints have been lifted. Former President Reagan,
President Bush and prominent members of Congress have stoked the
fires by repeatedly engaging in Japan-bashing. Their direct focus was
competition in the auto industry. Their unspoken message, however,
seemed to be that sneaky, unscrupulous Asians were stealing United
States business opportunities. Similarly, solicited Japanese investment in
the United States met with scorching criticism: Japan is buying
Hollywood and gobbling huge chunks of United States real estate "Japanizing" America.
For these and other reasons, some perceive Asian Americans as
America's "punching bag."5'9 The perception is that Asian Americans have
become a scapegoat for a mainstream America frustrated by a depressed
economy, corporate corruption, housing shortages and inadequate public
education. Society's ills are blamed on inordinate privileges for minorities. Asian Americans are high enough in profile yet small enough in numbers to make accessible and indefensible targets. According to this view,
there extends from the early 1900's through the present an "unbroken

57. See supra note 4.

58. See Final Report, Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast, vii (1942) (prepared
by General DeWitt, the military commander responsible for the relocation orders, and submitted to the War Department and Justice Departments which in turn submitted it to the
United States Supreme Court). See also, Brief of the United States, at 11, Hirabayashi, 320
U.S. 81 (1943); Yamamoto, supra note 10, at 24, notes 87-88.
59. Yamamoto, supra note 10, at 24.
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line of poor and working Americans who turn their anger and frustration
into hatred of Asian-Americans." 60
Indeed, we have witnessed an explosion of racial hate messages on
university campuses, with students feeling license to derogate minorities.
The FBI recently reported a marked increase in race-related violence
across the country.6 ' We have seen increasing racial violence against
Asian Americans, African Americans, Jewish Americans and Hispanic
Americans. In North Carolina, New York City, Los Angeles, and Northern California, Asians recently have been the targets of highly publicized
racial harassment and violence.6 2 Vincent Chin, a Chinese American, was
bludgeoned to death by unemployed white auto workers who mistook him
for a "Jap." The state criminal justice system imposed no jail time for the
convicted murderers because their anger towards Asian Americans, although misplaced, was "understandable." 6'
Asian Americans continue to be perceived by many as "different:"
different and competitive threats; different and untrustworthy; different
and vulnerable. Reparations without on-going government opposition to
continuing stigmatization may highlight if not foster that perception of
difference.
Asian Americans are also sometimes perceived as different from
other minorities. Redress and reparations tend to highlight that perception. Others might legitimately ask, why no reparations for the government-sanctioned enslavement of African Americans? Why limited reparations for some and no reparations for Native Americans deprived of land
and culture? Why no reparations for Native Hawaiians despite the illegal
government-assisted overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy? Why no redress for groups who, unlike most Asian American groups, were "conquered" by the United States and made American under protest?
There appears to be a rift developing between Asian Americans and
other minorities. Reports of street clashes between Asian immigrants and
African Americans surface regularly.6 4 African American leaders omit
Asian Americans when mentioning minority groups in the United States.
Contributing to the rift is the model minority label hung on, and sometimes willingly accepted by, Asian Americans.
Asian Americans are touted by government and mainstream America,
somewhat schizophrenically, as the "model minority." Model minority

60. Id.
61. Hate Violence in the United States, FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN, Jan. 1991, at
14.
62. Anti-Asian Violence, Oversight Hearing, Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional
Rights, Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, Nov. 10, 1987; AntiAsian Violence Escalates, ASIAN LAW CAUCUS REPORTER, Jan. 1991, at 5.
63. See Detroit Asian-Americans Protest Lenient Penalties for Murder, NEW YORK
TIMES, April 26, 1983, at A16, cols. 1-4.
64. Spike Lee's film "Do the Right Thing" sharply portrays one type of brewing inner
city conflict between neighborhood immigrant Asian grocers and African Americans.
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status is fraught with hidden meaning. It clashes with contemporaneous
perceptions of untrustworthiness and threatening competition. The inconsistency is illuminated by the interest-convergence theory and by aspects of labeling theory."' Those assigning the label do so, even if subconciously, for self-interested reasons, sometimes masking an exclusionary
purpose with a seemingly benign attribution of difference. The model minority label conveys a silent message: Japanese Americans during World
War II and all Asian Americans historically suffered discrimination; Asian
Americans put their collective noses to the grindstone, overcame hardship
without government aid and became model "minority" citizens. Why
can't other minority groups do the same; if they did, they'd be rewarded
too.
The model minority label thus can foster an illusion of power restructuring in several ways. First, the label minimizes for Japanese Americans the deep-seated harm inflicted by the government's abuse of its military and national security power. Second, it masks the problems of poor
Asian communities and continuing discrimination against Asians." Third,
it excuses government from acting affirmatively to prevent subordination
of and discrimination against minorities, since minority groups are handling things on their own. Finally, it falsely privileges Asian Americans at
the expense of others, driving a wedge between Asian Americans and
other minority groups.17 Government reparations limited to Japanese
American WWII internees tends to highlight, and perhaps in some ways
exacerbate, a potential rift between Asian Americans and other minority
groups.6 8
IV.

LOOKING AHEAD

This essay has outlined in simplified fashion salutary views, some
perhaps overly bright, and critical views, some perhaps overly dark. These
views point to differing, and in important ways conflicting, social meanings of reparations.
It is not enough, however, to say that people differ, that their situations differ and that understandably observer viewpoints differ. In looking ahead we should ask: What meanings might we seek to construct concerning reparations for Japanese Americans to transcend these conflicting
views and to enhance future efforts at restructuring public and private

65. MINOW, supra note 3, at 175-177 (describing labeling theory and its criticisms and
variations).
66. See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
67. Professor Matsuda describes her "fear that Asian Americans are in danger of becoming the racial bourgeoisie," reinforcing a racial hierarchy with white on top, black at
bottom and yellow in the middle. We Shall Not Be Used, supra note 56, at 5.
68. That rift does not, however, speak to the inappropriateness of reparations. It speaks
instead to the inappropriateness of governmental silence and inaction in the face of grievous
historical injustice inflicted by government upon other minority groups in the United States.
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institutions and changing societal attitudes to promote citizen freedom
from governmental abuses of power?
As indicated earlier, the generally-held assumptions about the inevitable social structural benefit of civil rights laws are unrealistically bright.
They ignore issues of differential power in the interpretation and enforcement of those rights. At the same time, the sharply critical views of civil
rights laws trivialize the personally transformative aspects of reparations
programs practically experienced by many and the politicizing impact of
formal challenges to entrenched power reflected in civil rights claims.
How then are we to assess the values of and attribute meanings to reparations laws and programs? Recent scholarship on race and rights addresses
the multiple and conflicting potential and limitations of civil rights laws. 69
It acknowledges that rights recognized by legislation and court rulings
often have limited effect on existing social arrangements, that rights discourse can create illusions of progress and that the pursuit of rights can
divert precious psychic and financial capital away from other means of
addressing pressing concerns. It also acknowledges that minorities have
pursued. civil rights to some advantage, 0 even though advantage is not
defined in traditional terms, criticizing critical theories of rights that ignore the pervasive effect of racism in America 7 ' and the paucity of vehicles and fora for those racially subordinated to develop group identity,
communicate group voice and challenge institutionalized power.7 2 Some
observe in minorities a dual consciousness about their experiences and
rights that hints at transendence 3 Others perceive legal rights, with distinct limitations, not as immutable objects but as "processes of communitcation and meaning-making." 74 All look beyond the existence, or

69. See Crenshaw, supra note 24, at 1335 ("The civil rights community must come to
terms with the fact that anti-discrimination discourse is fundamentally ambiguous and can
accomodate conservative as well as liberal views of race and equality. This dilemma suggests
that the civil rights constituency cannot afford to view anti-discrimination doctrine as a
permanent pronouncement of society's committment to ending racial subordination."). For

critical race theory scholarship advancing essentially this view, see DERRICK BELL, AND WE
ARE NOT SAVED (1987); P. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991); R. WIL(1990); Charles Lawrence, The
Id, the Ego and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV.
317 (1987); Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Anti-discrimination Law, and a
Jurisprudencefor the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L. REV. 1329 (1991).
70. See Robin D. Barnes, Race Consciousness: The Thematic Content of Racial Distinctiveness in Critical Race Scholarship, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1864, 1868 (1990) ("although
conceding that the use of rights discourse may prove 'contradictory, indeterminate, reified
and marginally decisive,'. . . for people of color, particularly African-Americans, the symbolic function of rights has served as a formal sanction against invidious treatment and as a
tool for empowerment").
71. Crenshaw, supra note 24, at 1335.
72. See Eric Yamamoto, Efficiency's Threat to the Value of Accessible Courts for Minorities, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 341 (evaluating rights claims in terms of traditional and
critically evolving values of process).
73. Matsuda, supra note 21, at 341; Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 401 (1987).
74. Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE L. J.
LIAMS, THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT
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achievement, of rights as "laws-on-the-books." All, to some extent, acknowledge dynamic processes connected to but extending beyond the
"law" and their potential for contributing to social structural change.
From this perpsective, if a reparations law is seen as the end, then
illusions of change will likely be fostered. If government, mainstream
America and Asian Americans choose to embrace singularly the salutary
views of reparations described earlier, then little fundamental change will
occur in the structure, operation and output of policy-making bodies, bureaucracies and businesses. Reparations may come to mean part redress
for specific civil rights violations and part buy-out, remedying harm for
identifiable past injuries for some while perpetuating the military and national security power structures and societal attitudes that gave rise to
those group-based injuries.
Also from this perspective, if reparations laws are sharply criticized
as merely a tool of the powerful to perpetuate existing power arrangements, and reparations efforts and pursuit of similar laws are abandoned,
then something of particular value will be foresaken.
The meaning of reparations may transcend these colliding salutary
and critical views if reparations laws are viewed as part of larger on-going
processes rather than as the end in themselves. Reparations for WWII
Japanese American internees may acquire special meaning domestically
and internationally if Asian Americans critically self-assess their model
minority status, vowing not to be used." If they and others scrutinize and
challenge government exercises of national security power that restrict
civil liberties, especially the freedoms of minorities, and if they activate
political organizations and employ lobbying, media and legal skills developed during the reparations drive, they can join in addressing broadbased problems affecting all minorities in the United States and, to some
extent, throughout the world. The politicization of former internees and
larger segments of the public, the development of organizations for political education and action and the creation of inter-ethnic group links are
salient aspects of the recently completed reparations process. They hold
promise beyond the particular Japanese American WWII internees' reparations effort. They hold potential for reassessing values, reaffirming political commitments and pushing for reallocation of decisional power not
only in legislatures, courts and bureaucracies, but also in schools, workplaces and homes.
Cast in this light, two insights emerge that enhance our framework
for evaluating reparations laws and programs. One is normative: that redress and reparations by government must result over time in a restructuring of the institutions and relationships that gave rise to the civil or
human rights violation. Otherwise, as a philosophical and practical matter, a reparations program cannot be (1) effective in addressing root

1860, 1862 (1987); Yamamoto, supra note 72, at 408-09.
75. See Matsuda, We Shall Not Be Used, supra note 56, at 7.
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problems of government power abuse and citizen freedom, and especially
minority group freedom, (2) integrated into a country's moral foundation
for responding to domestic problems or for urging other countries to
restructure government-citizen relationships, or (3) offered as a meaningful model for the United States and other countries concerned about justice in redressing past wrongs committed against their own people.
A second insight is descriptive: restructuring those institutions and
changing societal attitudes will not flow naturally and inevitably from a
government reparations program for a particular group. Government and
dominant private interests, it appears, will cast redress and reparations in
ways that tend to perpetuate existing power structures and dominant
group/minority group relationships. Those benefitting from reparations
must draw upon the political insights and commitments derived from
their particular reparations process and join with others to push for bureaucratic, legal and attitudinal restructuring. Their efforts must extend
beyond their own reparations.
Such an evolving meaning of reparations might transcend colliding
salutary and critical views. It is a meaning that brings to mind Frank
Newman's inversion of a popular phrase - "thinking locally and acting
globally." ' Think locally to grasp the experiential lessons of power and
77
value learned throughout the hands-on process of the reparations drive.
Act globally to link with others different in culture or race but similar in
efforts to restructure institutions.
Whether Asian Americans collectively will participate in that restructuring, whether they will choose a path connecting Asian Americans with
others, or whether they will choose the separatist path of a seemingly
healed model minority, are open questions. Of course, Asian Americans
are not a singular, homogeneous group. Several paths will likely be followed. But will one path predominate in the hearts and minds of Asian
Americans and in the perceptions of other minorities, of government decisionmakers, of mainstream America? No clear answer emerges.
Yet consider the following. The permanent resident Vietnamese fishermen selectively prohibited from offshore fishing by the United States
Coast Guard, ostensibly for national security reasons, recently achieved a
Congressional repeal of the underlying 200-year-old prohibition. They did
so through strong lobbying by and support from political and legal networks developed during the Japanese-American reparations process.
These broad networks also endeavored to reveal and challenge the antiAsian "yellow peril" aspects of the amended Immigration Act of 1990.
They spoke out against the FBI interrogation program launched against

76. Frank Newman, former Justice of the California Supreme Court, inverted the popular phrase, "think globally, act locally," during a group discussion at a Restructuring for
Peace Conference sponsored by the University of Hawaii's Spark Matsunaga Institute for
Peace in June, 1991.
77. See generally Yamamoto, supra note 72.
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Iraqi-Americans during the Gulf War. They intervened in the Yamashita
Marine racial harassment case, coordinating protests that resulted in the
reopening and publicizing of the military investigation. They joined in
protest of the President's proposed, and later withdrawn, security clearance executive order. They also helped explain to local prosecutors the
racial underpinnings of anti-Asian violence, resulting recently in criminal
trials and public understandings markedly different from those connected
with Vincent Chin's murder a few years earlier.
On a broader scale, Asian American groups joined with the NAACP
and other minority groups to push for the Civil Rights legislation of 1990
and 1991 to counteract the effects of recent Supreme Court decisions.
They joined in the challenging the qualifications and outlook of Supreme
Court nominee Clarence Thomas. They also joined in the efforts of African American leaders to mediate increasingly intense neighborhood conflicts between Asian immigrants and African Americans. They are lending
support to Native Hawaiian reparation's efforts.
These efforts, of course, do not mean that Asian Americans collectively have chosen one path over the other. Asian Americans speak in
many voices and act in disparate ways. Indeed, particularized experiences
can lead to perilous generalizations. Some Asian Americans embrace
model minority status, others are concerned with self-survival or group
advancement. These efforts do indicate, however, that some of the political organizations, insights and commitments derived from the process of
struggling for redress and reparations have far from withered. They hint
at an evolving, contingent social meaning of reparations with potential for
transcending colliding salutary and critical views, a meaning linked to
continuing efforts toward institutional and attitudinal restructuring.

Redressing Human Rights Abuses*
JON M. VAN DYKE**
GERALD W. BERKLEY***

I.

INTRODUCTION

When an authoritarian regime that has engaged in gross violations of
fundamental human rights is replaced by a freely elected government
committed to the rule of law and fair procedures, how should the new
government handle the violations of the previous regime? This question
has challenged the new governments in Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile
directly, and has also been a issue recently in other Latin American nations such as Brazil, Paraguay, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, and El
Salvador. European countries such as Spain, Greece, and the nations of
Eastern Europe have also had to grapple with this question, as have
Asian countries such as the Philippines, South Korea, and others.
Each of these nations has considered this problem in the context of
its unique situation. Their actions have been affected by the level of
"grossness" of the human rights abuses, the extent to which their new
government is stable and secure, the extent to which members of the previous government retain positions of power, and the state of the nation's
economy. The national responses have ranged from a total disregard of
past human rights abuses to the prosecution of all primarily responsible.
A number of human rights scholars and activists have written recently on these diverse reactions, and they have almost uniformly concluded that each nation has an obligation to prosecute their violators.
This conclusion, although certainly moral and just, is apparently not realistic as a practical matter for many nations. It is necessary, therefore, for
other nations and the international community as a whole to assist by
providing tribunals and forums for prosecutions. This paper surveys the
national responses that have thus far occurred, reviews the recent literature on this topic, and offers some recommendations about how the international community can assist.
II.

THE OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE REDRESS FOR GROSS ABUSES

A rich literature has emerged in the last several years from the
human rights community arguing that international law requires governments to act affirmatively to punish those who have committed gross
* This article was presented at the conference held in honor of the late Senator Spark

M. Matsunga, entitled "Restructuring for Peace: Challenges for the 21st Century," held in
Honolulu, Hawaii, June 2-5, 1991.
** Professor of Law, University of Hawaii at Manoa.
*** Professor of History, University of Guam.
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human rights abuses.' The arguments in favor of prosecuting the culprits
who have used official positions to violate the rights of citizens are simple
and straightforward:
1. To deter future violations of fundamental human rights.2
2. To reassert the central role of law in civilized society, to foster respect
for democratic institutions and advance the nation's transition (or return)
distinguish between the previous regime and
to democracy, and clearly
3
the new government.
3. To reassert the inherent dignity of each individual by providing the
victims and their families their day in court."
4. To provide a complete and irrefutable record of what happened, so
that no one can pretend the abuses did not occur.'
5. To comply with obligations of international law.
The argument that international law requires prosecution is developed in detail in several recent articles.' These commentators identify

1. See, e.g.,

THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY

(Chapter III is entitled "Responsibility of States for Violations of
Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms"); Alejandro Garro & Enrique Dahl, Legal Accountability For Human Rights Violations in Argentina: One Step Forwardand Two Steps
Back, 8 HUM. RTS. L.J. 283 (1987); Ellen Lutz, After the Elections: Compensating Victims
of Human Rights Abuses, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN HUMAN RIGHTS 195 (E. Lutz, H. Hannum
& K. Burke eds., 1989); George C. Rogers, Argentina's Obligation to Prosecute Military
Officials for Torture, 20 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 259 (1989); Jamie Malamud-Goti, Transitional Governments in the Breach: Why Punish State Criminals, 12 HUM. RTS. Q. 1
(1990); Kathryn Lee Crawford, Due Obedience and the Rights of Victims: Argentina's
Transition to Democracy, 12 HUM. RTS. Q. 17 (1990); Naomi Roht-Arriaza, State Responsibility to Investigate and Prosecute Grave Human Rights Violations in InternationalLaw,
78 CAL. L. REV. 451 (1990); Ricardo Antonio Latcham, Duty to Punish: InternationalLaw
and Human Rights Policy of Argentina, 7 B.U. INT'L L.J. 355 (1990); Symposium, Transitions to Democracy and the Rule of Law, 5 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 965 (1990) [hereinafter
cited as American University Symposium] (see especially Remarks of Nigel Rodley at 104448, remarks of Diane Orentlicher at 1049-58, remarks of Juan Mendez at 1058-61, remarks
of Lawrence Weschler at 1061-63, remarks of Hurst Hannum at 1080-83); Diane Orentlicher,
Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a PriorRegime, 100
YALE L.J. 2537 (1991).
2. 7 See, e.g., Malamud-Goti, supra note 1, at 11-12; Orentlicher, supra note 1, at 2542.
3. See, e.g., Orentlicher, supra note 1, at 2542-44; Malamud-Goti, supra note 1, at 1112; Rogers, supra note 1, at 300-4.
4. See, e.g., Orentlicher, supra note 1, at 2544 n.22.
5. See, e.g., Malamud-Goti, supra note 1, at 11; Orentlicher, supra note 1, at 2546 n.32.
6. See, e.g., Roht-Arriaza, supra note 1; Orentlicher, supra note 1; Meron, supra note 1;
Crawford, supra note 1, at 44-49; Rogers, supra note 1, at 272-91; Rodley, in American
University Symposium, supra note 1, at 1044-48. One dissenting perspective has been offered by Professor Hurst Hannum, who said in 1990 that he thought the "conclusion that
punishment of human rights violators was required under international law ... cannot be
sustained at the present time." Professor Hannum also said that he was "quite attracted to
Diane Orentlicher's suggestion that 'wholesale impunity' . . . might be an illegal abdication
of international responsibility, but I think we are far from having achieved customary interLAW 136-245 (1989)
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several specific human rights treaties that contain an explicit duty to
prosecute violators' and also contend that other comprehensive human
rights treaties8 establish an affirmative duty to protect human rights
which includes investigating abuses and punishing wrongdoers. One commentator states, for instance, that:
Authoritative interpretations make clear, however, that these treaties
require States Parties generally to investigate serious violations of
physical integrity - in particular, torture, extra-legal executions, and
forced disappearances - and to bring to justice those who are responsible. The rationale behind these duties is straightforward: prosecution and punishment are the most effective - and therefore only adequate - means of ensuring a narrow class of rights that merit special
protection.'
The recent decision of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in
the Velasquez Rodriguez Case'0 is cited in support of this conclusion. In
a case involving an unresolved disappearance in Honduras, the Court said
that the American Convention on Human Rights imposed on each state
party a:
legal duty to take reasonable steps to prevent human rights violations
and to use the means at its disposal to carry out a serious investigation of violations committed within its jurisdiction, to identify those
responsible, to impose the appropriate punishment and to ensure the
victim adequate compensation."
Customary international law can also be cited to support the proposition
that prosecutions are required in cases of serious violations of the right to
physical integrity, as exemplified by the prosecutions after World War II
at Nuremberg and Tokyo. 2
As persuasive as these arguments are, it is also possible to identify

national law that any foreign ministry in any country in the world would consider itself
bound by." Id.
7. See, e.g., Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948,
G.A. Res. 260A (III), 7 U.N.T.S. 227; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature Feb. 4, 1985, 39 U.N.
GAOR Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1985), entered into force June 26, 1987,
reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984), as modified, 24 I.L.M. 535 (1985).
8.See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [hereinafter
"ICCPR"], done at New York, Dec. 16, 1966, entered into force March 23, 1976, U.N.G.A.
Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967), reprinted in
6 I.L.M. 368 (1967); European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, done at Rome, Nov. 4, 1950, entered into force Sept. 3, 1953, 213
U.N.T.S. 221; American Convention on Human Rights, done at San Jose, Nov. 22, 1969,
entered into force, July 18, 1978, 36 O.A.S. Treaty Series 1, O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser. L/V/
11.23 doc. rev. 2, reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970).
9. Orentlicher, supra note 1.
10. Judgment of 29 July 1988, Inter-Am. C.H.R. Ser. c/4, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 291
(1989).
11. Id. at 174.
12. See, e.g., Orentlicher, supra note 1, at 2585-95.
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substantial arguments against prosecutions:
1. "Fragile democracies may not be able to survive the destabilizing effects of politically charged trials."' 3
2. Even in more stable countries, protracted trials may make it harder to
heal the wounds that have divided a country. Protracted trials will promote the "psychology of vengeance and hatred," which will divide rather
than unite a people and will interfere with nation-building and economic
development.1
3. Authoritarian regimes that face "a virtual certainty of punishment"
5
will resist "voluntarily relinquishing power.'
Some commentators who argue that prosecutions are not always warranted contend that many of the goals of prosecutions can be achieved by
a thorough investigation that lays out the facts but does not take the
additional step of punishing the wrongdoers.' 6 This approach has been
pursued in Chile.' 7 It has also been pointed out that punishment need not
always take the form of criminal prosecution and incarceration, but can
also include loss of rank, job, or pension rights, and monetary fines which
can be used to compensate victims and their families."8
The next section describes what has happened in some of the countries that have moved from authoritarian regimes to democratic governance in recent years. Their methods of dealing with leaders in the authoritarian regime who have violated human rights has varied dramatically
from the swift and sure prosecutions in Greece against the top "Colonels,"' 9 to the general amnesty in Uruguay,2" to ignoring the problem altogether in several countries. The one lesson that seems clear from these
descriptions is that some help will be needed from regional and international human rights bodies, and from the national courts of other countries, if the apparent requirement of international law that human rights
violators be pursued and punishment is to be given real teeth.

13. Orentlicher, supra note 1, at 2544. This argument has been used, for instance, in
Uruguay and the Philippines. See infra notes 39-50 and 103-4 and accompanying text.
14. Orentlicher, supra note 1, at 2550, quoting a statement made by Polish activist
Adam Michnik in Lawrence Weschler, A Reporter At Large, THE NEW YORKER, Dec. 10,
1990, at 127.
15. Orentlicher, supra note 1, at 2549.
16. See, e.g., Orentlicher, supra note 1, at 2546 n.32; Roht-Arriaza, supra note 1, at

508-09.
17.
18.
19.
20.

See infra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
Roht-Arriaza, supra note 1, at 509.
See infra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 39-50 and accompanying text.
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III.

WHAT HAS ACTUALLY HAPPENED

A. Latin America"1
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay, and -

perhaps

more ambiguously - El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Panama
have each moved from an entrenched military dictatorship to elected civilian rule in the last few years. Each nation has had to confront the
human rights abuses of the former dictatorships and each has developed
its own strategy for addressing this difficult problem. The widely differing
approaches taken by each country illustrate the challenges presented.
1.

Argentina

Several different military juntas dominated the Argentine government between 1976 and 1983. Arguing that they were waging a "war
against subversion," the military personnel of these juntas forcibly abducted somewhere between 9,000 and 30,000 Argentine citizens during
this period.22 Several hundred military officers reportedly planned this
strategy, and many of these individuals also participated in the torture
sessions which frequently followed the kidnappings.2 3
The loss of the war with the United Kingdom over the Malvinas
(Falkland) Islands in 1982 caused the junta to lose popular support, and
civilian rule was restored with the election of Raul Alfonsin as President
at the end of 1983. His election brought forth immediate demands both
from the families of those who had disappeared (desaparecidos) and from
various human rights organizations to prosecute those responsible for the
human rights abuses of the past. President Alfonsin responded with a
plan to investigate and initiate criminal proceedings against those considered liable. A decree was issued authorizing the arrest and prosecution of
nine junta leaders in power between 1976 and 1983.24

The Argentine Congress then approved further action. Their law pro21. For a comprehensive survey of available Latin American human rights resources,
see Perkins, Latin American Human Rights Research 1980-89: A Guide to Sources and a
Bibliography, 19 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 163 (1990).
22. The exact number of the "disappeared," a euphemism for the forced and unacknowledged abduction of persons by the state military, security, or police forces, or by other
state-sanctioned groups, is disputed. The National Commission on the Disappearance of
Persons, NUNCA MAS 10 479-81 (Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, trans. eds. 1986). See Osiel,
The Making of Human Rights Policy in Argentina: The Impact of Ideas and Interests on a
Legal Conflict, 18 J. LATIN AM. STUD. 135 (1986). See generally Rogers, supra note 1;
Malamud-Goti, supra note 1; Crawford, supra note 1; Carlos S. Nino, The Duty to Punish
Past Abuses of Human Rights Put Into Context: The Case of Argentina, 100 YALE L.J.
2619 (1991); and Judgment on Human Rights Violations by Former Military Leaders,
Suprema Corte de Argentina, Dec. 30, 1986, 26 I.L.M. 317 (1987).
23. Osiel, supra note 22, at 141; Emilio F. Mignone, Cynthia L. Estlund & Samuel Issacharoff, Dictatorshipon Trial: Prosecution of Human Rights Violations in Argentina, 10
YALE J. INT'L L. 118, 119 (1984).
24. Garro & Dahl, supra note 1, at 284. See also Latcham, supra note 1, at 357.
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vided a rebuttable presumption of innocence for military personnel acting
under orders from a superior officer, but this presumption did not extend
to those who were found guilty of committing "atrocious or aberrant" acts
such as torture.2 5 Original jurisdiction was given to Argentina's highest
military tribunal, with the proviso that if that court's actions were unjustifiably or negligently delayed, the Federal Chamber of Appeals would
assume jurisdiction.
Alfonsin, hoping to reduce the military's alienation, announced that
he would limit prosecutions to those most responsible for authorizing the
abuses and those who actually committed the most egregious violations.
Unfortunately, this strategy failed, because it badly miscalculated the Argentine military's willingness to have any of its members prosecuted.
Their position manifested itself in the Supreme Council of the Armed
Forces' refusal to continue proceedings against the junta leaders."
The Federal Chamber of Appeals then assumed authority over these
cases as the statute authorized. Several additional indictments were
handed down, and public trials commenced in April 1985. Six months
later, five of the defendants were convicted. The Argentine press carried
daily accounts of the trials, and huge rallies occurred at which thousands
of the nation's citizens demanded justice."
The military, its sense of persecution and alienation heightened by
the constant publicity, reacted with threats of violence. The Argentine
Congress, in an attempt to defuse the situation, then passed a "Full
Stop" law which imposed a 60-day deadline for filing additional complaints or charges against any alleged perpetrators. 8 This strategy also
failed. Special prosecutors and human rights activists worked day and
night to draft as many indictments as possible. The military rose in
insurrection.
With few options available to him, President Alfonsin reached an
agreement whereby in exchange for a halt to the rebellion a law was enacted that exonerated all military personnel below the rank of brigadier
general from any criminal liability for acts committed between 1976 and
1983. This law also created an irrebuttable presumption that lower-ranking officers were merely following orders or acting under other modes of
duress. Accordingly, about 400 officers and enlisted personnel who had
been subject to prosecution were granted immunity, leaving fewer than

25. Law 23049, art. 11. "Torture ... is widely agreed to be so manifestly illegal an act
that no officer could reasonably be presumed to have been unaware of the criminality of
such an order." Osiel, supra note 22, at 147. See also Carlos Santiago Nino, The Human
Rights Policy of the Argentine Constitutional Government: A Reply, 11 YALE J. INT'L L.
217, 228 (1985).
26. Mignone, Estlund & Issacharoff, supra note 23, at 125-38.
27. Osiel, supra note 22, at 142; Garro & Dahl, supra note 1, at 287; Latcham, supra
note 1, at 361. The demonstrations regularly drew as many as 70,000 supporters.
28. Law No. 23492, (Dec. 23, 1986)(Law of "Full Stop"), translated in 8 HuM. RTs. L.J.
476 (1987).
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fifty officers to stand accountable for the disappearance, torture, and
death of thousands of Argentine citizens. 9
In May 1989, Carlos Menem replaced Alfonsin as the elected president of Argentina. On October 6, 1989, pressured by riots and hyper-inflation, President Menem pardoned both those already convicted and the
remaining thirty senior military officers who were to have been tried. Two
federal public prosecutors who challenged the constitutionality of this action were threatened with disciplinary hearings and dismissal because
they ignored orders from the Argentine Attorney General to say nothing.
The pardons ended all but one of the criminal prosecutions of those responsible for the human rights abuses of the past. The only trial that
remained on the docket was that of Guillermo Suarez Mason, former
Commander of the First Army Corps, 0 and he was also later pardoned.,"
2.

Chile

General Augusto Pinochet seized power during the 1973 overthrow of
elected President Salvador Allende. During the more than 16 years of
harsh military rule that followed, thousands of Chileans suffered gross
human rights abuses. On March 11, 1989, President Patricio Aylwin took
power after the first free election since 1971.1' President Aylwin found
himself in a very difficult position with regard to the abuses of the Pinochet period. The new Chilean Constitution, written mostly to General
Pinochet's specifications, leaves the General with substantial residual
power. Not only does he have the authority to hand-pick nine members of
the 48-seat Senate, but General Pinochet himself remains as chief of the
Army. In addition, General Pinochet provided an amnesty during his
reign for human rights abuses committed before 1978.- 8
Pinochet's continuing power was assumed to stand in the way of
meeting the demands for justice and retribution by those who had suffered torture, imprisonment, and exile, and by the relatives of those who
were murdered or "disappeared" during the 1973 to 1989 period. President Aylwin, however, courageously appointed an independent body, the
Commission of Truth and Reconciliation, made up of prominent public

29. Crawford, supra note 1, at 25.
30. Argentina's Phony "Reconciliation," WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 1991, at A22; Daniel
Drosdoff, Menem Pardons: A Bid for Military Support, UNITED PREsS INT'L, Jan. 1, 1991;
Argentina Decrees Explain Why Former Military Leaders Were Pardoned, BBC SUMMARY
OF WORLD BROADCASTs/THE MONITORING REP., Jan. 1, 1991, at ME/0959/iii; Cristina
Bonasegna, Critics Denounce Argentina's "Dirty War" Pardons, CHRISTIAN ScI. MONITOR,
Dec. 31, 1990, at 4.
31. Suarez Mason had been extradited from the United States in 1988 where he had
fled to avoid prosecution. See Daniel Drosdoff, U.S.-Argentina Ties Strained, UNITED
PRESS INT'L, Jan. 9, 1991.
32. Tom Wicker, "Middle Way" in Chile, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1990, at A25, col. 1.
Thomas Boadle, Chilean Government Moves to Defuse Explosive Rights Issue, REUTERS
LIaR. REP., Apr. 23, 1990.
33. Wicker, supra note 32.
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figures, who were charged with investigating and disclosing the facts of
Pinochet's human rights transgressions. 34 This group was not given the
authority to fix blame or recommend prosecution, in an apparent concession to Pinochet's threat that the day one of his men was touched, the
35
rule of law in Chile would end.
On March 5, 1991, President Aylwin went on national television in
Chile to reveal to the people of his country what the Commission had
discovered after nine months of investigation. 6 The first 1,094 pages of
the report defined concepts and described the historical, political, judicial, and institutional framework in which the events took place, and then
recounted, in chronological order, all the cases in which the Commission
determined that a human rights violation resulted in the death or disappearance of identified victims. It also provided a report on the background and circumstance of each abuse.
Three distinct time periods were identified. During the first - September 11 to December 31, 1973 - massive detentions and the executions
of many political prisoners occurred. The second period - January 1974
to August 1977 - was the DINA (National Intelligence Directorate) era,
when systematic action was taken to exterminate those considered politically dangerous. The largest number of "disappearances" took place during this period. The third period - September 1977 to 1983 - featured
attacks on terrorists groups and the repression of protests.
The total number of victims of gross violations of human rights, according to the Commission, was more than 2,000 for all three periods: 59
killed after a court-martial; 90 killed during protests; 101 killed while attempting to avoid capture; 815 died as a result of torture; 957 "disappeared;" and 90 killed by attacks carried out by politically motivated
civilians.
The next seventy-four pages of the Report recommended types of
reparations and vindications to impede or prevent future human rights
violations. Noting that both moral and material compensation was absolutely necessary for the transition towards true democracy, the Commission proposed the public vindication of the victims' good names, and the
establishment by law of a single reparation pension designed to provide
relatives of the victims with special health, education, and housing benefits. The Commission also proposed the creation of an autonomous
human rights foundation that would continue the task of trying to determine the whereabouts of the disappeared, and keep records of human
rights abuses.3 7 The final 635 pages of the Report contain brief biographi-

34. Id. See also Paul Mylread, Chile's Government Seeks to Heal Scars of Military
REUTERS LIBR. REP., Apr. 23, 1990.
35. Ariel Dorfman, Perspective on Chile, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1991, at B7, col. 3.
36. Chilean President'sAddress and Comments on Human Rights Violations Report,
BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Mar. 6, 1991, at ME/1013/D/1.
37. Id. See also Leslie Crawford, Chile's Litany of Torture Becomes Contested History,
FIN. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1991, at 8.
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cal data, in alphabetical order, for each of the individuals who, in the
Commission's judgment, died or disappeared as victims of violations of
their human rights.
This Report is an extraordinary indictment of the Pinochet dictatorship's cruelty, its systematic policy of terror, and its incessant lies; it had
the streets and cafes of Chile abuzz with talk. Not only was the wall of
silence removed, but the military's desecration of Chile is now an official
truth in the public domain. The reality belongs to all and can be denied
by none, although not surprisingly General Pinochet has said that "The
army denies the report both historical and juridical validity.","
3. Uruguay
In contrast to most of its neighbors, Uruguay was profoundly committed to a pluralistic democracy during the first half of this century.
With its relatively small population of less than three million, Uruguay
served as an oasis of tolerance surrounded by a desert of repression. Unfortunately, in the 1960's this began to change."
Uruguay's civilian government proved incapable of handling a deepening economic crisis, and an urban-based guerrilla movement, the
Tupamaros, began to emerge. In 1973, the country's military commanders
took charge. Congress was disbanded, and the nation's long-cherished
human rights were suspended. During the next ten years, according to
Amnesty International, Uruguay acquired the dubious distinction of having the world's highest per-capita rate of political incarceration. Although
relatively few "disappearances" or killings occurred, one out of every 50
Uruguayans was detained at some point between 1973 and 401985. Torture
was pervasive - virtually everyone arrested was tortured.
Finally, in March 1985, after prolonged negotiations, the military dictatorship relinquished enough power so that a democratically elected government could assume office. Julio Maria Sanguinetti, a center-right corporate attorney who had been heavily involved in the bargaining for the
return to civilian rule, was chosen by the people of Uruguay as their President. Almost immediately an amnesty covering all political prisoners was
1
granted.'

38. Malcolm Coad, Chile To Press Rights Probes Despite Pinochet's Criticism, WASH.
POST, Mar. 29, 1991, at A17.
39. Lawrence Weschler, A Reporter at Large: The Great Exception, THE NEW YORKER,
April 10, 1989, at 85 (Part I appeared in THE NEW YORKER, April 3, 1989).
40. Id. See also David Kennedy, Spring Break (Visiting a Political Prisonerin Uruguay), 63 TEX. L. REV. 1377 (1985); Uruguay:Encouraging Return to Democracy, 34 INT'L
COMMISSION OF JURISTS 20 (1985); Camille Jones, Human Rights: Rights of Relatives of Victims (Uruguay), 25 HARV. INT'L L.J. 470 (1984); Statement By Senator Dr. Alberto
Zumaran, Special Representative of His Government of Uruguay to the United Nations
Commission of Human Rights, Mar. 8, 1985 (transcript), 7 HUM. RTS. Q. 574 (1985).
41. Statement by Dr. Zumaran, supra note 40, at 579; Uruguay: Encouraging Return
to Democracy, supra note 40, at 23-24.
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Between the spring of 1985 and the final days of 1986, a flood of
criminal complaints against the military concerning gross human rights
violations clogged the judicial system. High ranking military officers, who
were still powerful and totally unrepentant, simply refused to allow anyone serving under them to honor the subpoenas requiring court appearances. In reaction, on December 22, 1986, the Sanguinetti Government
passed a "Law Declaring an Expiration of the State's Punitive Authority," which in effect granted total amnesty to those responsible for past
human rights abuses.42
Senator Manuel Flores Silva, a journalist and professor, who voted in
favor of this 1986 law, explained his position as follows:
Uruguay lived through a transition from authoritarian rule which
was not at all typical. We didn't have the benefit of the classic situation in which the dictatorship suffers an external defeat, like Argentina in the Malvinas or the Greek generals in Cyprus, and therefore
has to step down. We didn't have the other classic way out, either, in
which the dictatorship loses as a result of an internal war, as happened in Nicaragua with the downfall of Somoza. Our way was to mobilize civil society and gradually encircle the regime until it accepted
the transition.

The trouble is that by mid-1986 we were falling back into the
logic of extremes. Ironically, dictatorships freeze things, and, coming
out of ours, we almost seemed to be back in 1972 and 1973 - the
same hatreds and polarizations all over again, leading toward an identical impasse and an identical probable outcome. We had to find a
way out of that trap. It was very important, because it hasn't been
shown anywhere that there is a law according to which dictatorships
automatically fall. Sometimes they don't fall. For us to present an amnesty project, therefore, was not a matter of doing the necessary dirty
work. It was a matter of making a moral decision to give priority to
43
the possibility of a future of agreement over a past of division.

Vice-President Enrique Tarigo, a journalist and lawyer who also supported the 1986 amnesty, rationalized his decision as follows:
To secure convictions against, say, fifty military people, we would
have had to have at least five hundred officers parading through the
courts - as accused, as suspects, as accomplices, or, at any rate, as
witnesses. It would have taken anywhere from four to eight years, because that's how long a penal process does take.... And I don't think
any state
can withstand having its armed forces destroyed in such a
44
fashion.

42. Weschler, supra note 39, at 85.
43. Id. at 90 (emphasis added).
44. Id. at 91.
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As to whether Uruguay could build a democracy after ignoring the
gross human rights violations of the past, Tarigo responded:
When Franco died [in Spain], a new page was turned, because
everybody realized that to go back and review events of forty years
earlier would provoke a whole new civil war. Life continues, life is
made up of things that are not pretty, that are not the subject of a
beautiful poem. And the function of government is not to write poetry
but to build a real future."
President Sanguinetti argued that because all political prisoners had
been granted amnesty in March 1985, giving the military amnesty in
1986:
was a question of moral equivalency: we felt that if we were going
to a settling of accounts for the left and the terrorists the military
should be amnestied too ....11
We could have had a moral trial, an investigation followed by an
amnesty. But that situation had all the problems and none of the advantages. To open that discussion would have been to preserve old
wounds ....The experience of Argentina confirms it: the trials there
were not permitted to continue - only the top generals were punished, and not those directly responsible for all the assassinations.'
Sanguinetti felt that a year and a half of controversy was enough, and
that it was time to move on: "[I]t was time for a punto final (full stop). I
don't have eyes in the back of my head. I have eyes only for the future.""8
Many Uruguayans disagreed with these views. They favored a commission of inquiry, an officially sanctioned truth telling. Some wanted trials and verdicts. Accordingly, they challenged the "Law Declaring an Expiration of the State's Punitive Authority" under a constitutional
provision allowing a referendum on any law if 25 percent of the registered
voters so request. Just before Christmas 1987, and after a heated petition
drive that was marked by repeated governmental attempts to disqualify
voters' signatures, over 637,702 signatures were turned into the Electoral
Court, more than enough to force the referendum. The government's initial response was to try a filibuster. Every one of the signatures was reviewed twice, and then, finally, checked against the original of the signer's
registration papers. While this was going on, Sanguinetti took to the Uruguayan airwaves to remind the people of the problems that had occurred
in Argentina when efforts were made to redress past human rights
abuses.49

45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 92
48. Id. at 86-87.
49. Id. at 87-88. See also Washington Varela, The Referendum Campaign in Uruguay:
An Unprecedented Challenge to Impunity, 13 H.R.I. REP. 16 (1989). Varela makes the
point that no other country in Latin America has a referendum provision such as Uruguay's.

DENY. J. INT'L

L. & POL'Y

VOL. 20:2

Next the Electoral Court announced that it would accept retractions
of signatures from those so inclined. Finally, on April 16, 1989, after more
government-backed scare campaigns, the referendum was held and the
attempt to overturn the 1986 amnesty was defeated. A strong minority of
42 percent had, however, supported repeal of the "Law Declaring an Expiration of the State's Punitive Authority.""0
4. Brazil
A military dictatorship ruled Brazil betwenn 1964 and 1985. Although not as brutal as some in the region, these military leaders were
responsible for the deaths of about 200 people, the disappearance of another 150, and the torture of thousands. Negotiated civilian rule returned
in 1985, but with the understanding that the new government would not
investigate or try the former military officials."
In March 1990, Fernando Collor de Mello took office as Brazil's first
directly elected president since 1960. He had promised the people of Brazil that he would abolish the National Intelligence Service, the former
dictatorship's secret police force which was responsible for most of the
past human rights violations. In September 1990, a mass grave containing
more than 1,700 bodies was discovered. Most were the remains of paupers, but about 50 were apparently the victims of summary execution
during the military rule. 2 The painful memories stirred by this discovery
caused many Brazilians to demand a full investigation.
5.

Paraguay

In February 1989, the reign of the Western Hemisphere's most durable dictator ended. General Alfredo Stroessner, who first took power in a
coup in August 1954, had utilized repression to resist any movement toward democracy in Paraguay for nearly 35 years. Declining health and
attempts to transfer leadership to his son prompted a fierce military coup

He also quotes Sanguinetti as saying that the petition drive was a "Mission Impossible."
50. Varela, supra note 49, at 16. Amnesty International reacted to the Uruguayan referendum with the following statement:
The results of the referendum cannot be interpreted as freeing the Government of Uruguay of its international obligations, including the need to take
steps to make the truth about past criminal human rights violations such as
torture, "disappearances" and extra-judicial executions publicly known, to
bring those responsible for such violations to justice and to ensure that measures are taken to ensure that such abuses are not under any circumstances
tolerated in the future.
Remarks of Nigel Rodley, American University Symposium, supra note 1, at 1045 (1990). In
the most recent election, Sanguinetti's Colorado Party lost by a large percentage to the
opposition Blanco o Nacional Party. Remarks by the Honorable Didier Opertti, American
University Symposium, supra note 1, at 1042.
51. Old Fears Die Hard in Brazil, Cm.TRmB., Sept. 10, 1990, at 8.
52. Id.
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led by General Andres Rodriques. 53
Within a week of the overthrow, tens of thousands of Paraguayans
took to the streets demanding an end to the corruption and violence, and
free and open elections. Unfortunately, General Rodriquez announced
that he intended to fill the remainder of Stroessner's term until 1993 and
indicated that political change would be neither sudden nor profound. He
did make a commitment to respect human rights and eventually bring
democracy to Paraguay, but has made no mention of any attempt to redress past human rights violations.5 4 Time will tell. As for Stroessner, at
seventy-eight years of age he is in exile in Brasilia, but his ghosts, real
5
and imagined, continue to influence events in Paraguay.
6.

Guatemala

During the intense, systematic repression of the successive military
regimes that ruled Guatemala from 1978 to 1985, it is estimated that
nearly 40,000 people disappeared. 8 A period described as a "Reign of Official Terror" commenced in 1978 under General Lucas Garcia.5 7 All persons suspected of harboring "dangerous" opinions were targeted. The two
military dictatorships that followed, the first in 1982 under General Rios
Mantt, and the second in 1983 under General Oscar Humberto Mejia
Victores, continued the use of violence as a means of social and political
control.5 8 In 1986, when President Cerezo took office as the first democratically elected civilian president in twenty years, some expressed hope
that the human rights abuses would cease and that some redress of the
past violations would be forthcoming. Unfortunately, although the military had relinquished formal power in hopes of obtaining foreign aid, they
retained considerable actual authority. They enacted an amnesty law
(Decree Law 8-86) a few days before Cerezo's inauguration, and have seen
to it that no human rights investigations have occurred.,,

53. Stroessner Shows Force That Has Kept Him in Power 32 Years, REUTERS, June 25,
1986; Brian Nicholson, ParaguayansAwait Changes in Wake of Coup, UNITED PRESS INT'L,
Feb. 4, 1989.
54. James Smith, Military Coup Topples Paraguay'sStroessner; Incoming President
Promises Democracy, Respect for Rights, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1989, at 1, col. 2; James Smith,
Paraguay Ruler Denies Links to Drug Traffic, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1989, at 5, col. 1; Peter
Bate, Opposition Stages First March After Stroessner's Downfall, REUTER LIBR. REP., Feb.

11, 1989; Peter Bate, Thousands of ParaguayansMarch to Mark Stroessner's Downfall,
REUTERS, Feb. 11, 1989.
55. James Brooke, Paraguay Jittery Over The Exiled Stroessner, N.Y. TIMES (Nat'l
ed.), Mar. 3, 1991, at A14, col. 3.
56. Central America Report (Infopress Centro Americana), Mar. 7, 1986, at 6.
57. GEORGE BLACK, GARRISON GUATEMALA 47 (1984).
58. Id.; See generally AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, GUATEMALA: A GOVERNMENT PROGRAM
OF POLITICAL MURDER (1981).

59. William Schirmer, "Those Who Die for Life Cannot Be Called Dead:" Women and
Human Rights Protests in Latin America, 1 HuM. RTS. Y.B. 41, 59-60 (1988).
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Nicaragua

Between the time the Sandinista-led revolution toppled rightist dictator Anastasio Somoza in 1979 and their subsequent loss of power in the
February 1989 general election, numerous instances of human rights
abuses occurred. Recent discoveries of clandestine graves have sparked
debate in President Violeta Chamorro's government over whether the
human rights violations committed by both the Sandinistas and their opposition, the Contras, should be investigated and prosecuted or forgiven
and forgotten in a spirit of national reconciliation. 0
The Nicaraguan Association for Human Rights, founded in 1986 with
U.S. funding to educate and monitor the Contras on human rights, and
the Nicaraguan Centre for Human Rights, funded by Dutch nongovernmental organizations and international church groups, are both active in
investigating and publicizing past abuses. 1 The latter group utilizes forensic experts from Argentina and Costa Rica.
Sweeping amnesty laws for political crimes were passed by both the
outgoing Sandinista-dominated assembly in March and the pro-Chamorro
assembly in May. These laws may or may not cover violations of international human rights.6"
8.

El Salvador

In October 1979, a group of young military officers ended the atrocity-filled rule of General Carlos Humberto Romero. The new regime frequently proclaimed ambitious plans to democratize the government of El
Salvador, but many members of this new government had, in fact, been
involved in the death squads of the past which were responsible for some
30,000 killings.6
In December 1981, the United States Congress, motivated at least in
part by continuing reports of human rights abuses in El Salvador, enacted an aid certification program that required periodic reviews of that
nation's domestic policies and activities. The President of the United
States was directed to determine whether the government of El Salvador
was making a concerted and significant effort to comply with internationally recognized human rights norms.6 4 In late 1990, the U.S. Congress actually withheld $425 million in military aid after the El Salvador government failed to prosecute vigorously the military men responsible for the

60. William Jacobsen, Clandestine Graves in Nicaragua Open Debate on War Crimes,
REUTERS LIBR. REP., Oct. 3, 1990. The original story concerning these graves may have been
a hoax. See Abe Rosenfeld, Contras May Have Played Grim Hoax, CM. TRIB., Nov. 1, 1990,

at C22.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Amy S. Griffin, Comment, Constitutional Impediments to Enforcing Human
Rights Legislation: The Case of El Salvador, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 163, 164 (1983).
64. Id. at 163, 173.
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deaths of six Jesuits, their housekeeper, and her daughter in November
1989.65
On March 10, 1991, the first relatively peaceful elections - after
thirteen years and some 75,000 deaths - were conducted in El Salvador.
These elections were for legislative seats and municipal posts, and actually succeeded in reintroducing some diversity into El Salvador's politics.8 6 As a further ray of hope, almost immediately after this plebiscite, a
United Nations human rights fact-finding team visited the country with
the aim of initiating a full-scale U.N. monitoring of human rights in El
Salvador. Both sides of the current civil war, the U.S.-backed government
and the leftist guerrillas (FMLN), requested the U.N. action. 7
9.

Panama

In 1968, the military took charge of the government of Panama under
General Omar Torrijos. After Torrijos' death in a 1981 plane crash, General Manuel Antonio Noriega, commander of the Panama Defense Forces,
quickly deposed two military rivals to achieve power behind a succession
of civilian presidents. Human rights abuses, sporadic under Torrijos, escalated rapidly under Noriega6 8
Serious attempts to topple Noriega commenced in March 1988. Demonstrations, strikes, coup attempts, and a United States-engineered cash
crisis all failed to dislodge the General.6 9 Finally, on December 20, 1989,
U.S. forces drove Noriega from power and replaced him with a threeparty coalition.7 0 Within six months, however, one of the three top leaders, Ricardo Arias Calderon, had begun rebuilding the military with many
of the same officers and men who had made up Noriega's corrupt and
brutal Panama Defense Forces. 71 In April 1991, several U.N. human
rights officials stated that the government of Panama has a duty at least
to investigate all violations of human rights since 1968, but no such action

65. Lyng-how Ramirez, United States: New Debate in Congress Over Aid to El Salvador, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Mar. 14, 1991.
66. Bleeding Toward Peace - Exhaustion Could End El Salvador's Civil War, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 14, 1991, at A14.

67. U.N. Rights Team Ends Fact-FindingMission to El Salvador, REUTERS

LIBR. REP.,

Mar. 22, 1991.

68. Richard Boudreaux, Panama Suspends Rights, Jails Scores to Quell Unrest, L.A.
TIMES, June 12, 1987, at 1, col. 5; Doctors Begin Autopsy of Body of Panama Supreme
Court Justice, REUTERS, Nov. 2, 1987.
69. Bernard Debusmann, Panama Declares Emergency, Suspends Basic Civil Rights,
REUTERS, Mar. 18, 1988; William Branigan, Strike Aimed at Ousting Noriega Begins Today,
WASH. POST, Mar. 21, 1988, at A13; Dan Williams, Church Pressed to Take Active Panama
Role, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1988, at Al, col. 4; Lionel Barber, U.S. Takes Fresh Tack in Bid
to Oust Noriega, FIN. TIMES, at 5; Robert Pear, Hemispheric Group Asks Noriega to Yield
Power, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1989, at A8, col. 3.
70. Helen Dewar & Tom Kenworthy, Decision Was Made Necessary by the Reckless
Actions of General Noriega, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 1989, at A35.
71. Kenneth Freed, Noriega Officers Resurface; Panama Coalition Strained, L.A.
TIMES, June 25, 1990, at Al, col. 5.
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has yet taken place."2
B.

Europe

Several European countries have recently struggled with these same
questions of how to redress past human rights as they have moved from
dictatorship to democracy. Their approaches have been mixed. Spain, because of the nature of the Spanish Civil War, the long Franco regime that
followed and the negotiated nature of the transition to civilian rule, virtually ignored the human rights violations of the Franco period. Greece, on
the other hand, actively prosecuted those responsible for human rights
abuses during the 1960's under "the Colonels." For the newly emerging
democracies of Eastern Europe, the decision of how best to handle past
human rights transgressions has not yet been made.
1.

Spain

Between 1924 and 1936, diverse ideological groups of the right and
left engaged in an intense political struggle in Spain, and in 1936, this
ideological conflict blossomed into a full-scale civil war." When the war
ended in 1939, the left was defeated and many leftists fled to exile. General Francisco Franco took power and for the next several years his brand
of fascist/military dictatorship engaged in gross human rights violations,
including arbitrary arrest, imprisonment, torture, and execution. Around
1960, however, a more moderate phase began. Opposition groups from the
Catholic Church, labor, and higher education succeeded in gaining some
concessions. The press and the media became more open, and democracy
was openly promoted in the universities. These accomplishments, however, did not signal a complete end to the repression. Arrest and prosecu74
tion of labor and student leaders continued, albeit sporadically.
When Franco finally died in 1975, enlightened leaders such as King
Juan Carlos and Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez deftly directed the transition to democracy. Juan Carlos championed rapid liberalization in both
work and deed. 5 Suarez installed liberal General Gutierrez Mellado as
Minister of Defense. 7 s Then Suarez, with United States support, cleverly
enveloped the Francoist military hierarchy in NATO. They became so absorbed in committees, meetings, and travel that the civilian government

72. Panama Urged to Investigate Civil Rights Abuses Past, REUTER LIaR. REP., Apr. 4,
1991.
73. The best account of the Spanish Civil War in English is H. THOMAS, THE SPANISH
CIVIL WAR (1986).
74. See generally THOMAS LANCASTER & GARY PREVOST, POLITICS AND CHANGE IN SPAIN
(1985). See also RAYMOND CARR & JAMES FUSI, SPAIN: DICTATORSHIP TO DEMOCRACY (1979);
JOHN COVERDALE, THE POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION OF SPAIN AFTER FRANCO (1979); and PETER PRESTON, SPAIN IN CRISIS (1976).
75. James Malefakis, Spain and Its Francoist Heritage, in FROM DICTATORSHIP TO DEMOCRACY 225 (J. Henz ed., 1982).

76. Id. at 226.
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was free to map the transition to democracy. 7
The issue of amnesty was defused. In July 1976 and March 1977, all
political prisoners were released. 78 Those in the police and military who
were responsible for the gross human rights abuses that had occurred in
the 1940s and 1950s had either died or, if still alive, were retired. Memories of the past brutality had sufficiently faded so that redress never became a major issue. The people of Spain appeared
content with utterly
78
repudiating the Francoist past at the polls.
Since 1975, Spain has witnessed a remarkable series of events: the
dismantling of the 36-year-old Franco fascist/military dictatorship; its replacement in 1979 with a constitutionally elected government; and in
1982, 1986, and 1989, the election of Socialist majorities in the Spanish
Parliament. Today Spain stands as one of the more stable parliamentary
democracies in Europe.8 0
2. Greece
In 1967, George Papadopoulos established the military dictatorship
of "the Colonels" in the nation renowned as the birthplace of Western
democracy. In the early stages of his regime, Papadopoulos spoke of providing a transition to parliamentary democracy, but the deeds of his dictatorship served instead to halt and reverse the process of democratization. Maladministration, scandal, corruption, and human rights abuses,
including the systematic use of torture, became hallmarks of the regime.8 '
The immediate cause of the Colonels' loss of power was its ill-conceived military adventure in Cyprus in 1974. This foolish act gave Turkey
the excuse it needed to seize a section of the island. Senior Greek military
officers who had previously supported the establishment of the Papadopoulos junta8 2 decided that a return to civilian rule was appropriate to
prevent the military disaster that would result from a full-scale war with
Turkey.
A new government was immediately formed under the leadership of
exiled former premier Constantine Karamanlis. The military attempted

77. Remarks of Professor Howard J. Wiarda, American University Symposium, supra
note 1, at 1026-27.
78. Malefakis, supra note 75, at 226.
79. Id. at 223 & 227.
80. Fred Lopez, Bourgeois State and the Rise of Social Democracy in Spain, in RONALD H. CHILCOTE, TRANSITIONS FROM DICTATORSHIP TO DEMOCRACY 17 (1990).
81. See generally CONSTANTINE TSOUCALAS, THE GREEK TRAGEDY (1969). See also
Kourvetaris, The Role of the Military in Greek Politics, 8 INT'L REV. HIST. & POL. SCI. 91
(1971); see generally RICHARD CLOGG & GEORGE YANNOPOILos, GREECE UNDER MILITARY
RULE (1972), R. ROUFAS, INSIDE THE COLONELS' GREECE (1972) and RICHARD CLOGG, A SHORT
HISTORY OF MODERN GREECE (1979).
82. Harry Psomiades, Greece: From the Colonels' Rule to Democracy, in FROM DICTATORSHIP TO DEMOCRACY 252-55 (J. Henz ed., 1982); S. Hadjiyannis, Democratizationand the
Greek State, in CHILCOTE, supra note 80, at 131, 132-39.
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to barter for an amnesty, but to no avail. Karamanlis initiated a series of
decrees aimed at both redress and setting Greece on the road to democracy. All political prisoners were released. Over 100,000 civil servants who
had served between 1967 and 1974 were either disciplined, transferred, or
dismissed. The Military Police were stripped of the authority that had
3
made them a dreaded instrument of the dictatorship.
In late October 1974, the five ringleaders of the 1967 coup, including
Papadopoulos, were arrested. A few days later, they were officially
charged with high treason84 along with 44 former officers. Their trials received widespread radio, television, and press coverage and highlighted
the gross human rights abuses of the 1967-74 era. Eighteen of the military
leaders were convicted with sentences ranging from substantial time in
prison to death. To avoid any possibility of creating martyrs, the death
sentences were immediately commuted to life imprisonment.8 5
Other trials followed that were more controversial. 6 Offenders who
had "turned state's evidence" escaped prosecution. Some who were convicted were set free after paying modest fines or were given suspended
sentences. No compensation, except reinstatement in jobs where possible,
was provided for the victims of torture.
Nevertheless, the Greek experience stands in sharp contrast to that
of most other countries that have made the transition to democracy. The
Karamanlis government brought to justice those most responsible for the
gross human rights abuses of the Colonels' rule."
3.

Eastern Europe

The recent transition from dictatorships to elected civilian rule in
Eastern Europe resulted from increasing economic hardships, bankrupt
ideology, and the loosening of the Soviet grip on the region. One of the
questions now facing the new governments is how best to deal with past
human rights abuses. 8 Two examples serve to illustrate the problems.
a.

East Germany

The East German communist regime collapsed in 1989. Erich Honecker, the former dictator who is charged with responsibility for the
deaths of more than 200 persons shot while trying to escape across the
border to West Germany, and former state security (Stasi) Minister Erich
Mielke, were scheduled for trial. The 78-year old Honecker was, however,

83. Psomiades, supra note 82, at 255.
84. Id. at 255.
85. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, TORTURE IN GREECE: THE FIRST TORTURERS' TRIAL, 1975
(1977).
86. Psomiades, supra note 82, at 265.
87. Id.
88. Paul Taylor, Human Rights Accords, Once Dead Letter, Flourish in E. Europe,
REUTER LIBR. REP., Nov. 13, 1990.
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spirited out of Germany in March 1991 in a Soviet military aircraft, ostensibly for medical treatment.8 9 Mielke, age 83, is said to be senile. 90 On
May 21, 1991, Willi Stoph (the former prime minister), Heinz Kessler
(the former defense minister), Fritz Streletz (the former secretary of the
National Defense Council), and Hans Albrecht (another Council member)
were also arrested for their participation in adopting the shoot-to-kill order in 1974."'
Beyond these former leaders, the major question confronting the new
united German government is how to deal with the more than 100,000
former Stasi agents and the much larger number of persons who collaborated with them in violating human rights in East Germany. 92 According
to the newspaper Der Morgen: "There is only a vague hope of more trials
against those who ruled East Germany close to bankruptcy, ignored
human rights and almost succeeded in robbing the 17-million-strong population of its dignity." 93
b.

Romania

Romania held its first multiparty parliamentary and presidential
elections in fifty years in May 1990, five months after Nicolae Ceausescu's
rule was overthrown in what appeared to be a popular revolt. In fact,
coup plans had been in the works for more than a decade. When nationwide demonstrations began in December 1989, Ceausescu loyalists within
the Romanian Army, who had been firing on the demonstrators, suddenly
switched sides on December 21, and backed the National Salvation Front
(F.N.S.). Days later, after Ceausescu's execution, the bulk of those responsible for past human rights abuses - the specialized paramilitary
police force known as the Securitate - laid down their weapons. It was
obvious that a deal had been struck so that the military and Securitate
would not be held accountable.94
Although the government of President Ion Iliescu has conducted
show trials of Ceausescu's son and brother (a former general) and some
former Securitate leaders, it is clear that nothing more will be done to
bring to justice to those responsible for past human rights abuses. In fact,
had Iliescu been unable to suppress the June 1990 demonstration in

89. John Tagliabue, 4 Ex-Officials of East Germany Arrested, N.Y. TIMES (Nat'l ed.),
May 22, 1991, at A3, col. 4.
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NATION, Jan. 7, 1991, at 14.
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Bucharest's University Square, the military and Securitate would proba95
bly have reasserted themselves in the name of law and order.
C.

East Asia

The Asia/Pacific region is the only part of the world without a regional human rights charter.96 One reason may be the size and diversity
of this region. Another reason, particularly applicable to East Asia
(China, Japan, and Korea), is the legacy of Confucianism, which tends to
both deemphasize individual rights and stress harmony rather than
97
compulsion.
1.

South Korea

South Korea's recent experiment in moving from authoritarian rule
to democracy has not included a major examination of past human rights
abuses. Roh Tae Woo, a former general and confidant of former dictator
Chun Doo Huan, was elected president in 1987, in Korea's first free election; since then this Asian nation of some forty-two million has resisted a
return to military rule. 98 Major problems nonetheless remain.
Critics cite continuing human rights violations, particularly infringements on student and labor organizations. They also note that the pervasive internal security apparatus and the laws that supported three decades of oppression under military rule are still in place. 99 Roh's October
1990 "war on crime" has brought charges of human rights abuses by both
Amnesty International and Asia Watch. 00
Roh's government has acted to redress some past human rights
transgressions, but with a rather obvious attempt to balance the punishment of past misdeeds against a desire to counter demonstrations against
Roh's leadership. In one recent case, Kwon In-sok, who was sexually
abused by a police detective after her arrest in 1986, was awarded forty
million won ($58,000) and the police detective was sentenced to five years
in jail.'0 ' Yet in another incident involving the pre-1987 detention of labor activist Kim Keun-tae, despite the fact that the government itself
provided evidence of torture, the case against the four accused police of10 2
ficers remains on hold.

95. Id.
96. See generally Jon M. Van Dyke, Prospects for the Development of Intergovernmental Human Rights Bodies in Asia and the Pacific, in NEw DIRECTIONS IN HUMAN
RIGHTS, 51, 52 (E. Lutz, H. Hannum & K. Burke eds., 1989).
97. Id. at 56.
98. Fred Hiatt, S. Koreans Reflect on Changes: Nation Marks Third Anniversary of
Start.of Democratization,WASH. POST, June 29, 1990, at A29.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. S.Korean "Sex Torture" Victim Opens Labour Office in Seoul, REUTERS LiBa.
REP., Feb. 13, 1990.
102. David E. Sanger, Crackdown in a 'Freer'Korea Puzzles Opposition, N.Y. TIMES,
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Philippines

Human rights violations were a central issue giving new momentum
to the "People Power" revolution that ousted dictator Ferdinand Marcos
in February 1986. President Corazon Aquino acted immediately to release
all political prisoners and to establish a Presidential Committee on
Human Rights to investigate past abuses. A new constitution was drafted
that insured the dignity of every human and guaranteed full respect for
human rights. 01°
Primarily because of the fragility of the Aquino government, however, little has been done in the Philippines to bring to justice those responsible for past human rights transgressions. The Aquino government's
main contribution has been to support civil suits in the United States
against Marcos family members for the human rights crimes perpetrated
during the Marcos era."0
IV.

"UNIVERSAL"

FORUMS FOR REDRESSING HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES

The mixed pattern of national responses to human rights abuses described above indicates that some back-up or fail-safe systems are needed
to buttress each nation's ability to redress the abuses that occurred during the previous authoritarian regime. If international law does indeed
10 5
require that all serious violations of physical integrity be punished,
then the mechanisms of international law should be called upon to assist
this process. Although these mechanisms are still in a primitive and
evolving state, they can serve to reinforce national resolve and assist
where the nation may feel inadequate to address the task.
A.

The Global Forum -

The Human Rights Committee, Geneva

More than fifty nations have now ratified the Optional Protocol to
the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, 0 6 which allows
citizens to bring complaints against their own government. The Human
Rights Committee consists of eighteen experts elected by those nations
that have ratified the Covenant, and they are now actively evaluating
complaints and issuing opinions concerning the alleged human rights
abuses. Some of their opinions have addressed major human rights
abuses, and they have already established interpretive norms on the

Aug. 3, 1990, at A2, col. 1.
103. Ben Cohen, Warning: Joining the Bar is Hazardous to Your Health, FAR E. ECON.
REV., Nov. 3, 1988, at 80-81; The New Constitution of the Philippines, 38 THE REVIEW,
INT'L COMMISSION OF JURISTS 12 (1987).

104. Cohen, supra note 103. See In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights
Litigation, MDL No. 840 (1991) (a class action suit on behalf of all the victims of torture
and murder in the Phillipines during the Marcos martial law era; trial is scheduled for August 1992).
105. See supra notes 5-12 and accompanying text.
106. ICCPR, supra note 8.
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meaning of many of the provisions of the Covenant.
One of the first decisions of the Committee in 1979, for instance,
dealt with torture in Uruguay and the Committee concluded that torture
and other inhumane treatment had occurred.1 0 7 During this early period,
the Committee established the rule that if a nation did not respond to the
Committee's request for information about a complaint, "the Committee
may consider such allegations as substantiated in the absence of satisfactory evidence and explanations to the contrary submitted by the State
party."' 0 8 Once a complaint is received, therefore, the burden shifts to the
government to respond to it, and if the government provides only vague
or conclusory comments the Committee will accept the allegations as
true.
Another early case involved the summary execution of fifteen prominent citizens by the Suriname government in 1982. The Committee ruled
that this action had violated their right to life and ruled that the government had a duty to compensate the families of the victims. 0 9 Although
the Committee does not have the power to enforce its rulings, it is expected that the courts of each contracting party to the Covenant will enforce them.
These and the many similar opinions that the Human Rights Committee is issuing should provide a strong framework for providing redress
for human rights abuses, and should reinforce the obligation of each nation to protect human rights.
B.

The Regional Forums

Three regional human rights conventions are now operational in Europe, the Western Hemisphere, and Africa. 110 Each allows individuals to
bring complaints, and nations can also bring complaints against other nations in some circumstances. The most dramatic case relevant to redressing abuses is the case brought by Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden against Greece during the period of the Colonels. 1' The
European Human Rights Commission established a Subcommission to examine the merits of the case, but after some initial cooperation the Colo-

107. Uruguay Human Rights Case, 16 U.N. CHRONICLE 66 (July-Oct. 1979). See also,
e.g., Case of Hiber Conteris, Communication No. 139/1983; CCPR/C/25/D/139/1983 (July
23, 1985) (concluding that Uruguay had violated the complainant's human rights through
extreme ill-treatment during periods of confinement).
108. Hiber Conteris, supra, note 107.
109. Communications Nos. 146/1983 and 148-54/1983; CCPR/C/24/D/146/148-154/1983
(April 4, 1985).
110. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms, supra
note 8; American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 8; African Charter on Human
and Peoples' Rights, done at Banjul, June 27, 1981, entered into force Oct. 21, 1986, O.A.U.
Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev. 5 (1981), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 59 (1982).
111. The Greek Case, 12 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HuM. RTS (1969) (Eur. Comm'n on Hum.
Rts). See James Becket, The Greek Case Before the European Human Rights Commission,
1 HuM. RTS. J. 91 (1970).
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nels refused to allow the Subcommission members to visit certain notorious prisons. The Subcommission and then the full Commission prepared
a report condemning Greece, and the Committee of Ministers was prepared to vote on a proposal to suspend Greece from the Council of Europe in December 1969 when Greece walked out of the meeting and then
withdrew from the Council and the European Convention. European
banks withdrew financing from Greece; because of the economic hardships and the invasion of Cyprus described above, " 2 the Colonels were
overthrown and democracy returned.113 The new government then prosecuted the abusive military leaders in the most successful example of a full
redress.
4
In the Inter-American system, the Velasquez Rodriguez Case"
states that affirmative obligations exist to investigate human rights
abuses and make a full accounting. This decision establishes a strong precedent and indicates that the Inter-American Human Rights Commission
and Court will be vigilant in trying to ensure that human rights abuses
are properly redressed.

C.

The Domestic Forums of Other Nations

Another useful way to redress human rights abuses is to bring civil
suits against the abusers if they should seek asylum or a safe haven in
another country. In the United States, these actions have been successful
in recent years under the Alien Tort Claims Act," 5 which provides jurisdiction for aliens suing for torts committed in violation of international
law. Suits brought by victims of torture and murder and their families
against human rights abusers from Paraguay,"" Argentina,' " and the
Philippines" 8 (for abuses that have occurred in those countries) have led
to verdicts in favor of the victims and their families. Collecting judgments
remains a challenge, but the principle appears to have been firmly established that U.S. courts will provide a forum for human rights cases if personal jurisdiction can be obtained over an alleged abuser.
D.

Other Remedies
Extra-legal remedies are also possible, although they present risks of

112. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
113. FRANK NEWMAN AND DAVID WEISSBRODT, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 478-79
(1990).
114. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
115. 28 U.S.C. § 1350. See also Torture Victim Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 102-25,
CONG. REC. H11244 (signed into law March 12, 1992).
116. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
117. Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D.Cal. 1987) and 694 F.Supp. 707
(N.D.Cal. 1988).
118. Trajano v. Marcos, Civ. No. 86-0207 (May 13, 1991)(award of $4.5 million to the
family of a young man tortured and killed, against Imee Marcos).

DENV. J. INT'L

L. & POL'Y

VOL. 20:2

destabilizing the legal system. Kidnappings " have occurred, as in the
Eichmann situation where Israeli agents entered Argentina and spirited
the administrator of the death camps back to Israel for trial."10 Although
Israel was scolded for this act by the U.N. Security Council, Argentina
did not object with any vigor, and Israel's assertion that it could assert
universal jurisdiction over Eichmann's heinous crimes has been accepted.
The United States' actions in Panama in December 1989 which led to the
seizure of General Manuel Noriega are similar in some respects. The
United States justified its entry as necessary to protect vital national interests and to free Panama from the burdens of an authoritarian
dictator."12
The concept of "humanitarian intervention" has become increasingly
recognized, although it remains highly controversial. 2 When, if ever, do
human rights abuses justify intervention by one or more countries into
another to free the citizens of that country? Although few commentators
are willing to give a green light to this type of activity because of its susceptibility to abuse, examples can be found of this type of intervention
and it is frequently met with general approval.
V.

CONCLUSION

The momentum toward freedom and the protection of individual and
group rights has been steadily increasing in recent years, and it appears
as if we may be on the threshold of an era in which the goal of universal
respect for human rights is at hand. To hasten the movement toward this
important goal and to secure the gains that have already been made, it is
useful to identify and punish in a full and formal manner those government officials who have abused their positions of power by seriously violating the physical integrity of their citizens. A strong argument can be
made that international law already requires such an accounting, and
even if it does not such prosecutions can be justified as necessary to deter
future misconduct and ensure that the historical record of the past misconduct is accurate.
Most new democracies have, however, been unwilling or unable to
embark on this path. Except for Greece, the efforts to redress the human
rights abuses have been disappointing. It is necessary for the international community to assist newly emerging democracies so that they do
not have to shoulder the entire burden of punishing the members of the
authoritarian regime that previously governed. International and regional

119. See generally Recent Development, The Domestic and InternationalLegal Implications of the Abduction of Criminals from Foreign Soil, 26 STAN. J. INT'L L. 573 (1990);
and United States v. Alvarez-Machain, No. 91-712 (argued before the Supreme Court April
1, 1992).
120. Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann, Israel, Supreme Court 1962, 36 INT'L L.
REP. 277 (1968).
121. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
122. See Ved Nanda's article in this issue.
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human rights bodies can assist greatly by adjudicating disputes and
clearly articulating the rules that govern these situations. National courts
of other nations should also be receptive to providing jurisdiction for civil
suits.
Redressing human rights abuses is not a matter of vengeance, but
one of simple justice. The victims deserve the dignity of a full redress,
and the commitment to a rule of law and democratic principles can be
greatly strengthened by this process. The process of developing and
strengthening international and regional human rights mechanisms
should greatly assist the achievement of this goal.

Sri Lanka: A Study in Microcosm of
Regional Problems and the Need for More
Effective Protection of Human Rights
PATRICIA HYNDMAN*

I.

INTRODUCTION

This paper analyzes events both as a study in microcosm of some
current human rights issues in the Asia Pacific region, and as a vehicle
through which to address the current need for more effective protection
of human rights as one necessary part of a wider strategy for the promotion and enhancement of peace.'
Sri Lanka, like many other countries, has recently experienced a deteriorating economy and a consequent serious decline in standards of living, a state of affairs exacerbated by the deflection of government expenditure to military purposes and away from programs of education,
research, health and welfare. During the last decade, the numbers of incidents of violence occurring in the country with ethnic, religious and political overtones have been escalating rapidly. In many of these incidents
police and security forces have at best stood by ineffectively or, at worst,
have themselves participated in attacks on unarmed minority groups, on
peaceful strikers, and on demonstrators. Vigilante groups have sprung up
in different parts of the country. The numbers of extra-judicial executions, tortures, arbitrary arrests, murders, and disappearances number in
the tens of thousands, and political detainees have been brutally murdered while held in custody in state prisons. Meanwhile, the government
has repeatedly failed to mount impartial investigations to identify and
bring to justice the perpetrators of these breaches of human rights.
In a different arena, government sponsored transmigration schemes
have exacerbated ethnic tensions, particularly in the eastern parts of the
* LL.B. (London); LL.M. (London); Barrister (Greys Inn and Supreme Court of New
South Wales); Dip. Ed. (U.B.C.); Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of New
South Wales, Sydney, Australia; Secretary, Human Rights Committee of LAWASIA 198290; Director, University of New South Wales Human Rights Centre 1986-90; Member, Editorial Board, International Journal of Refugee Law; and Delegate on three observer missions
to Sri Lanka, for LAWASIA in August 1983 and February 1985, and ASIA WATCH in
December 1991.
1. See further PATRICIA HYNDMAN, THE COMMUNAL VIOLENCE IN SRI LANKA (1983)
[hereinafter HYNDMAN, COMMUNAL VIOLENCE]; PATRICIA HYNDMAN, DEMOCRACY IN PERIL, SRI
LANKA: A COUNTRY IN CRISIS (1985) [hereinafter HYNDMAN, DEMOCRACY IN PERIL]; and recent reports of non-governmental organizations in Sri Lanka, e.g. the reports of the Civil
Rights Movement (CRM), of the Movement for Inter-Racial Justice and Equality (MIRJE),
of the Center for Society and Religion, and from Amnesty International reports.
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country. Elsewhere, Sri Lanka's indigenous peoples, the Veddhas, have
been pushed off the lands they traditionally occupied, and discrimination
of different kinds have been practiced against other minority groups.
Added to this there have been incidents calculated to undermine the independence of the judiciary and of lawyers; human rights lawyers have
been threatened and attacked, some even murdered, as a direct consequence of their involvement in the defence of some particular accused.
Successive and lengthy states of emergency have been declared. Increasingly wide powers have been vested in the executive arm of government, and this trend has been accompanied by an increasing non-accountability of both the military and police forces. Over the past decade
emergency powers have been used to disadvantage real and assumed political opponents of the party in power through, inter alia, the proscription of opposition parties, the imprisonment of their leaders, or other
measures to silence them and their campaigns in the periods prior to elections. In addition there has been severe press censorship and extensive
direct and indirect government control over the media generally. Despite
such measures, there have also been serious irregularities in the conduct
of elections, some of which have received later sanction in legislation.
During the last ten years in Sri Lanka there has been a steady escalation of violence, an erosion of democratic principles and of the rule of
law, serious breaches of human rights, the creation of situations of severe
deprivation and an increasing brutalization of society. As in all communities, the violence and hardship has impacted most severely on those
groups least able to protect themselves -- the elderly, the sick or injured,
and children. One direct consequence has been that Sri Lanka has become a major producer of asylum seekers, thereby adding to the strains
and stresses currently experienced by the international system protecting
refugees.
First, some background information on Sri Lanka is provided to put
the events outlined in this introduction into context. These events are
then examined in more detail. Next, a possible approach is considered
towards the prevention of such escalations of violence, erosions of democracy and derogations of human rights.
In its Preamble, the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights states:
recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable
rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world [and that] it is essential , if man
is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion
against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law.
In this paper, ways to contribute to that foundation of freedom, justice and peace are considered. In the second part of the paper, one possible means of the promotion of "the recognition of the inherent dignity
and of the equal and inalienable rights of all people," an initiative currently being taken by the LAWASIA Human Rights Committee is ex-
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amined. This initiative has so far led to a Draft Pacific Charter of Rights
and, it is hoped, will lead ultimately to the establishment of a human
rights promotion and protection mechanism for the Pacific, and eventually prove an impetus for the establishment of such a mechanism for the
Asia Pacific region as a whole.
II.
A.

SRI

LANKA:

A

STUDY IN MICROCOSM

Background Information on Sri Lanka
1.

Demography, Religion, Language and Legal System

According to the 1981 census, the population of Sri Lanka is
predominantly Sinhalese (74%), 18.2% Tamils, and 7% Muslim descendants from Moorish traders.2 The remaining 0.8% includes small minority
groups such as: the tribal peoples (the Veddhas); the Burghers (descendants of colonial-era Ceylonese-European marriages); and the few Europeans who live on the island.
The arrival in the country of the first members of the two largest
ethnic groups, the Sinhalese and the Tamils, is shrouded in myths and
legends. It seems that members of both groups have been in Sri Lanka for
at least two thousand years. Historically, the Sinhalese have considered
the Tamils as invaders upon Sinhalese territory. Both groups originally
arrived from India -- the Sinhalese from northern, and the Tamils from
southern, India. The Tamils who live in Sri Lanka are divided into two
separate groups. The smaller group, the "Indian" Tamil group, forms
5.6% of the total population. They are descendants of people brought
from India to Sri Lanka by the British in the nineteenth century as indentured laborers to work on plantations. These people live mainly in the
hill country in the central part of the island, and most of them still work
on the plantations.
The majority of the Tamils in the country (12.6%) are variously
called the "Ceylon," "Jaffna," or "Sri Lankan" Tamils. This group has
lived in Sri Lanka for hundreds, possibly thousands, of years. Many
"Ceylon" Tamils live in the north and east, areas claimed by Tamil militants for the separate state they wish to establish. In the early 1980's, in
the northern and eastern districts, Tamils formed 97.7% of the population in the district of Jaffna, 89.9% in Mullaitivu, 76.3% in Vavuniya,
72% in Batticoloa, 64.0% in Mannar, and 36.4% in Trincomalee. In addition, many "Ceylon" Tamils have lived and worked for generations in areas of the country with a predominantly Sinhalese population.'
The island is home to a variety of religions. The great majority of the
Sinhalese people are Buddhist; a small number are Christian. The Tamil
2. Department of Census Statistics, Ministry of Plan Implementation, Sri Lanka Census of Population and Housing (1981).
3. Id.
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population is predominantly Hindu, although some Tamils also are Christian. A smaller segment of the population, mainly the descendants of
Moorish traders, are Muslims. The percentages in the 1970's were said to
be: Buddhists 66.3%, Hindus 18.5%, Christians 8.4%, and Muslims

6.7%.4
A factor of some significance is that many people in Sri Lanka identify Buddhism with Sinhalese nationalism and virtually equate being
Sinhalese and being Buddhist. Many Buddhists believe that Sri Lanka
was consecrated by the Buddha. The country is one of the world's major
Buddhist centers. It is claimed that the Buddhism which exists in Sri
Lanka is the closest to the original teachings of Buddha. Buddhism has
been preserved here while, in surrounding countries, other religions have
gained strength. This adds to the feeling that moves towards separatism
not only threaten the Sinhalese race but also threaten Buddhism, a fear
that has tended to dominate government policy, to be exploited by rival
political parties for short-term political gains, to exacerbate tensions and
to result in expressions of intolerance towards other groups and other
religions.
Language is another important factor. The Tamils and the Sinhalese
have languages which are quite different and which have different alphabets. During British rule the medium of education in many schools, especially those in the cities, was English. As a consequence both Tamils and
Sinhalese could be, and were, educated together. The common language
provided an essential bridge by which friendships transcending ethnic
barriers could be formed.'
After Independence in 1948, moves were made to use the local languages. The consequence has been that children are taught either in
Sinhala or in Tamil. They learn from different basic texts and are imbued
with different traditions and cultures. They grow up separately, speaking
different languages, writing in different alphabets and identifying with
one of the two races only. Some Sinhalese and some Tamils, but not large
numbers, speak English in addition to their own language, but many
Sinhalese people do not speak Tamil and vice versa. Hence many people
in the country are unable to communicate with each other. This situation
undoubtedly has been instrumental in providing fertile ground for the
growing misunderstandings and misperceptions between the two
communities.
In addition to these complexities in the fabric of the society, the
country's legal system has complexities of its own. Described by one author as a "legal museum," it contains elements of the laws of the main
ethnic groups overlaid with elements of the systems introduced by successive colonial powers and, more recently, modern Sri Lankan law, legislative and judicial. Sri Lanka was colonized first by the Portuguese in the

4.
5.

35 (1978).
note 1, at 277.

JAMES JUPP, SRI LANKA: THIRD WORLD DEMOCRACY
HYNDMAN,
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early sixteenth century and later by the Dutch, who were followed by the
British. The Portuguese left little trace of their legal system, but RomanDutch law has had a strong and continuing influence. The British retained the legal system administered by the Dutch but gradually an overlay of English common law and statutes filtered in as well. In addition
unofficial regulation continues in the form of local values and social and
religious practices.
2. The Post-Independence Constitutions and the Protection of Basic Rights Under the Present Sri Lankan Constitution
At the outset it should be noted that the Tamil community has not
participated in the drafting, nor in the adoption, of any of the post-Independence constitutions. Tamils claim that they have, therefore, never relinquished sovereignty over their traditional homelands. They assert that
this sovereignty reverted to them when Sri Lanka emerged from colonial
dependence at the time of the granting of independence by Britain in
1948. In essence and without going into detail, the Tamils claim the right
to the international legal principle of self-determination.6
The Soulbury Constitution' provided for the Ceylon Constitution Order-in-Council which had effect from February 4th 1948 and contained no
bill of rights, but in section 29 did provide that:
No... law shall... make persons of any community or religion liable
to disabilities or restrictions to which persons of other communities or
religions are not made liable; or ... confer on persons or on any community or religion any privilege or advantage which is not conferred
on persons of other communities or religions.
Should any legislation be enacted which was alleged to contravene the
rights guaranteed by the constitution, the matter could be taken to the
courts and ultimately to the Privy Council in London, at that time the
final court of appeal in the Sri Lankan court hierarchy.
Section 29, the safeguards it provided, and appeals to the Privy
Council were abolished when Sri Lanka became a Republic and a new
constitution was enacted by Mrs. Bandaranaike's government in 1972.
This new constitution conferred priority status upon both the language
and the religion of the majority Sinhalese community, declaring Sinhala
to be the country's only "official language" and giving "foremost place"
among religions to Buddhism.
The newest and present Constitution was promulgated by the
Jayawardene government in 1978 very shortly after it came to power in
the 1977 general elections. This Constitution did accord to the Tamil lan6. See R. Balasubraminian, Ceylon Tamils and the Revival of Sovereignty, in
supra note 1, at 372-75.
7. The Order-in-Council of the United Kingdom Parliament under which Sri Lanka
came to independence in 1948, authorized in the Ceylon Independence Act, 1947, 11 Geo. 6,
Ch. 37 (Eng.).
HYNDMAN, DEMOCRACY IN PERIL,
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guage the status of being a "national" language,' though Sinhala is still
the only "official" language.' Freedom of religion is guaranteed by Articles 10 and 14. However, Buddhism remains in the "foremost place"
among religions,' 0 and Article 9 states that "it shall be the duty of the
state to protect and foster the Buddha Sasana."
The 1978 Constitution contains a much more comprehensive protection of rights than did its predecessors. Many, but not all, of the rights
contained in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
are included in Chapter III."' Protected are: freedom of thought, conscience and religion; freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading
punishment; the right to equality and freedom from discrimination on the
grounds of race, religion, language, caste, sex, political opinion or place of
birth and the possibility of special protection for the advancement of
women, children or disabled persons is provided for; freedom from arbitrary arrest, detention and punishment; prohibition of retro-active penal
legislation; and freedom of speech, assembly, association, occupation and
movement. Article 4(d) states:
The fundamental rights which are by the Constitution declared
and recognized shall be respected, secured and advanced by all the
organs of government, and shall not be abridged, restricted or denied,
save in the manner and to the extent hereinafter provided.
Article 15 allows restrictions to be placed on some of these protected
rights in the interests of national security, racial or religious harmony,
national economy or public order, and the protection of public health or
morality. Nevertheless no limitation is permitted on the rights protected
by Article 10, freedom of thought, conscience and religion, or by Article
11, freedom from torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment.
Article 27 of Chapter VI of the Constitution contains many of the
rights which receive protection under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 2 These are included as "directive
principles of state policy and fundamental duties." As is the case with
many similar provisions in other constitutions, for instance some of constitutions of Pacific island states, these provisions are not enforceable.'3
A potentially very valuable provision which was introduced in the
1978 Constitution is Article 126. This provides for the enforcement of the
rights protected under Chapter III, and gives the Supreme Court sole and
exclusive jurisdiction to determine questions relating to the infringement,

8.

9.
10.
11.
12.

art. 19 (1978).
Id. at art. 18.
Id. at art. 9.
Id. at arts. 10-17.
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
SRI LANKA CONST.

Art. 10(1), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, adopted by G.A. Res. 220 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp.
No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6313 (1966).
13. SRI LANKA CONST. art. 29 (1978).
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by executive or administrative action, of any fundamental right, or language right, protected by the Constitution. In addition, Article 156 makes
provision for the establishment of an Ombudsman. The duty of this office
is to investigate and report "upon . . . allegations of the infringement of
fundamental rights and other injustices by public officers and officers of
public corporations, local authorities and other like institutions."
The independence of the judiciary receives comprehensive constitutional protection." The Preamble refers to the "immutable republican
principles of representative democracy" and assures to " all peoples freedom, equality, justice, fundamental human rights and the independence
of the judiciary as the intangible heritage that guarantees the dignity and
well-being of succeeding generations." Article 107 governs the appointment and removal of judges of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal.
The appointments are made by the President, the judges hold office "during good behavior." They may not be removed except by the President
and only then after an address for removal made by Parliament introduced by not less than a third of its members and supported by a majority of the total number of members, including those not present. Under
Article 108, judges' salaries are to be determined by Parliament and may
not be reduced for any judge during that judge's term of office. Article
116 provides that every judge shall exercise and perform his/her powers
and functions without being subject to any direction or other interference, and that every person who, without legal authority, interferes or
attempts to interfere with the exercise or performance of the judicial
power or functions of any judge shall be guilty of an offense.
3.

Ratification of International Human Rights Instruments

Early in its term of office, the Jayawardene government ratified several important international human rights instruments: the International
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights,16 including Article 41 recognizing
the Human Rights Committee as competent to hear inter-state complaints, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, 6 the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid," and the International Convention on
s
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.i

14. See id. at Ch. XV and arts 107, 108, 116.
15. International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171, adopted by G.A. Res. 220 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (1966).
16. Supra note 12.
17. International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
Apartheid, July 18, 1976, 1015 U.N.T.S. 244, adopted by G.A. Res. 3068, U.N.GAOR, 28th
Sess., Supp. No. 30A, U.N. Docs A/9233/Add., and A/L.712/Rev. 1 (1973).
18. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
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Regional Problems in Microcosm

B.

1. Children
Children by their very nature are vulnerable, unable to protect themselves against the superior power of adults, and against socio-economic,
civil and political and other conditions over which they have no control.
Children are always among the first to take the brunt of civil strife, burgeoning third world debt and the hardships which follow. Children in Sri
Lanka are no exception. One aspect only of their condition is examined in
this paper, the situation of those children who are forced prematurely
into the labor market by poverty and associated factors.
Frequently young children work for long hours in totally unsatisfactory conditions. They may have no adequate protective clothing, no unions to advance their rights, no severance or unemployment benefits and
no health care. Although domestic protective legislation concerning the
conditions of working children is quite extensive in Sri Lanka' 9 as it is in
other nearby countries of South Asia, social and economic realities often
militate against its enforcement. Working children frequently have no
educational or training opportunities to enable them to progress in later
years to more skilled occupations. Childhood is the time when a child's
future is set, yet with little or no access to welfare, health or educational
facilities, or effective legal protection, young child laborers generally exist
in conditions of extreme hardship, and are caught in a vicious cycle of
poverty and oppression from which it is unlikely that they, or their children in turn, will ever escape.20 Distressingly, the numbers of children in
the world who must work to survive' are increasing.
As in many developing countries, the population of Sri Lanka is
predominantly rural. Child laborers in the rural sector work on tea plantations, in farming, or in activities ancillary to the fishing industry. When
working out of doors they may go unprotected against burning sun, driving rain or cold temperatures. Recently small boys between the ages of
eight and fourteen who had been kidnapped from their homes were found
in coastal areas laboring in the scorching sun for long hours each day,
22
salting and drying fish.
In the urban sectors of the countries of South Asia children work atall kinds of jobs:2 ' as domestic servants, in factories, as "apprentices" to

19. See S. Goonesekera, Child Labour and Child Prostitution in Sri Lanka and the

Legal Controls, in THE
BER

12-13, 1984:

MEETING OF EXPERTS ON THE EXPLOITATION OF THE CHILD, NOVEMSINGAPORE AND THE CONFERENCE ON CHILD LABOUR AND CHILD PROSTITU-

FEBRUARY 21-23, 1986, KUALA LUMPUR (Patricia Hyndman ed., 1986) [hereinafter
Goonesekera, Child Labor].
20. See Report of Seminar on the Exploitation of Child Laborers (1988).
21. ILO Regional Workshop to Combat Child Labor, Sept. 1986, PIACT/1986/9, at 2.
22. Goonesekera, Child Labor, supra note 19, at 137.
23. Id. at 137.
TION,
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various trades, in hotels, restaurants and street trades, in mines, heavy
manufacturing industries, and on construction sites, in jewelry industries,
and with automobile repairs and servicing -- to name just some of their
occupations. Others are "self-employed," performing tasks such as shining shoes, and scavenging for re-usable waste.
Children are used for purposes which are clearly illegal as well. Their
swiftness and nimbleness encourage adults to employ them to thieve.
Both boys and girls are employed in organized prostitution, pornography
and drug trafficking. Clubs in the developed world advertise sex tours to
third world countries such as the Philippines and Sri Lanka, and provide
clients with information regarding the availability of young boys, the risks
involved, how much to pay and how to avoid being arrested. In addition,
children are being recruited, often against their free will and at very
young ages, into national armed forces and into various armed militant
groups.
Children in Sri Lanka suffer from abuses of all these kinds -a far
cry from the protection sought to be conferred on them by more than 80
international instruments, and most recently by the most comprehensive
of the international instruments for the protection of children, the 1989
UN Convention of the Rights of the Child. 4
2. Minority Issues
As may be imagined from the background already provided there is
potential in a country like Sri Lanka for a number of minority issues to
surface. A survey of some of them is briefly outlined in this section.
a. The Minority Syndrome
The first is the "minority syndrome." Several communities within Sri
Lanka are fearful due to their positions as minorities. The Sinhalese
themselves, despite being a 74% majority in the island, number only
twelve million and thus are a very small group in the South Asia region.
Only twenty-two miles away across the Palk Straits are the nearest shores
of the state of Tamil Nadu in Southern India, with its more than fifty
million Tamil inhabitants.
In addition to the Tamils, who are considered in a separate sub-section, other communities as well have exhibited signs of anxiety due to
their position as minorities. Christians generally, and Sinhalese Christians
in particular, feel isolated, and are fearful as a minority group. Some
Muslim communities have been subject to violent attacks and recently
are said to have launched counter-attacks on other groups.
The fears of these different groups, whether originally realistic and
legitimate or not, have served to heighten the level of tension in the coun24. United Nations Convention of the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25 (Nov. 20,
1989), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1448 (1989).
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try, and thus make outbursts more likely. There is a dangerous and
frightening spiral of fears, non-communication, resentments and over-reaction which more and more is erupting in alarming episodes of violence.
b.

The Veddhas

The Veddhas are probably the oldest race in the island.2" Their number is variously estimated but is very small, 0.01% of the population at
most.26 A difficulty encountered when attempting to estimate their numbers is the problem of definition: Who is a Veddha?
The Veddhas are nowhere defined for the purposes of national law.
The approach used for the 1911 Census was that people who "had knowledge of their varuge" (i.e. social group or clan), and a knowledge of Veddha religion combined with hunting as an "occupation" would be counted
as a Veddha. 27 In the Census of 1946, the procedure adopted was that
whoever described himself or herself as a Veddha, if he or she thought fit'
to do so, was counted as such.28 Generally when Veddhas are spoken of
the reference is to a group whose membership is defined by culture, selfperception and the perception which other groups have about them,
rather than to a group defined by race, or by language (i.e. differences in
the culture and in the structural organization of the Veddha community
distinguish it from other communities in the country).
The Veddhas have their own language, which is unwritten but continues to be spoken in remote areas. Veddhas who live a traditional lifestyle in the jungle do not attend schools and cannot read or write; Traditionally Veddhas were hunter-gatherers and the forest ecology determined the structure of their society. 29 The restricted scale of resources
available to them and their nomadic lifestyle demanded that the size of
individual groups remain small. Veddha groups, or clans, are generally
composed of either the nuclear or extended family or by a few family
units. Unlike the Sinhalese and the Tamils, the Veddhas do not have a
system of dowry. Instead, simple gifts are given by the prospective son-inlaw to the father of the bride, and he in turn is given a small gift by his
future wife.30 In Veddha society there is no striking difference in the status of men and women. Women are not considered inferior. There are
discriminations, however, in property entitlement.
Traditionally, each clan occupied a clearly defined territorial area
spread throughout a jungle region. Boundaries were determined by the
mark of an arrowhead on rocks or trees and these were treated with respect by other Veddhas. The territory of each clan historically was suffiGOONETILEKE, 1 BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CEYLON 179 (1973).
26. The latest available Census figures in which the Veddhas were separately recorded
are those of 1953. They then numbered 3,000, or 0.01% of the population.

25. H.A.I.

27. 1911 Census, cited in NANDADEVA
28. Id. at 95.
29. Id. at 48.
30. Id. at 95

WIJESEKERA, VEDDHAS IN TRANSITION

192 (1964).
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cient to supply members of the group with game, roots, plants, flowers
and honey. The Veddhas live in simple dwellings, lean-tos, caves or
hollow trees, as is appropriate to their nomadic life-style. Their tools are
simple. Luxuries, and indeed any possessions, are few. Personal belongings are kept to a minimum, and most property is held in common with
other members of the clan. The Veddhas' religion, like that of many other
primitive peoples, is animistic. 1
Today, little of the territory in which Veddhas traditionally lived remains in its natural state, and full expression of traditional Veddha culture found among the jungle dwelling tribes is fast disappearing. Cultural
assimilation of the Veddhas with other societies has been going on for
many hundreds of years. In addition, over the last several decades the
Veddha hunting grounds have been greatly diminished. Since the early
nineteenth century, lands have been cleared and transformed into plantations. In the twentieth century, irrigation schemes have rendered formerly unproductive lands capable of supporting farming, and successive
waves of agricultural settlement have reduced the areas of wilderness
available to support nomadic tribes. Private entrepreneurs have, legally
and illegally, felled forest timber, and the modern hunting practices of
other Sri Lankans have seriously depleted the wildlife in the jungles.
Generally, the Veddhas have quietly submitted to encroachment by
other groups, or, if they have resisted, they have done so passively and
ultimately have retreated. As the land available to them has been reduced
they have begun to practice shifting cultivation, but they are not naturally agriculturalists and would much prefer to hunt. The Veddha view of
the jungle surrounding their dwelling areas is one of communal property
which belongs to the clan members.
Under Sri Lankan law there is no recognition of Veddha rights to
their ancient lands. No treaties have been made with them, and they
come under no special legal provisions. Despite the legal pluralism of
some parts of the Sri Lankan legal system there is no institutionalized
place for Veddha traditional laws, and Veddha views of the jungle land
surrounding their villages as being held in communal ownership conflict
with the government view of these areas as Crown land. According to
Brown, an anthropologist writing in 1978: "Even in recent historic times
the Veddhas are known to have been still widely distributed throughout
the island." 2 An article in the Lanka Guardian in 1983 warned that the
"perpetuation of the Veddha institutional structure is clearly linked to a
particular forest ecology" and that "disturbance of this delicate relationship" will lead to a destabilization of the structural basis of this community and thereafter their existence as "an individual techno-cultural
group."33 In 1982, an academic member of Peradeniya University pre-

31. S. Senevirantne, The Curse of the Duveni, LANKA GUARDIAN, May 1983, at 10.
32. JAMES BROWN, VEDDHA VILLAGES IN ANURADHAPURA 31 (1978).
33. Seneviratne, supra note 31, at 9.
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dicted that in fifteen or twenty years time the Veddhas would be extinct.34 This prediction seems, sadly, to be increasingly probable as warnings are not being heeded and the plight of the Veddha people is afforded
scant attention. 5
c.

The Status of Tamils "Of Recent Indian Origin"

Both Sinhalese and Tamil groups perceive each other as having received unfair privileges and advantages. Some of these perceptions are
due more to misunderstandings and myths that to actual facts. Some
have real foundation.
One sector of Sri Lankan society with very real cause for feeling aggrieved is the group known as "Indian" Tamils brought to Sri Lanka from
southern India by the British in the nineteenth century to work in the
plantations. Since that -time these people have worked for long hours for
very low pay, and they have contributed enormously to the country's
economy. Yet, although born in Sri Lanka and, in many cases, descended
from one, two or more generations of ancestors also born in the country, a
hundred years after their initial arrival large numbers of "Indian" Tamils
were without Sri Lankan citizenship and in effect stateless persons.
Prior to Independence, they, in common with all others born in either India or Sri Lanka, were British subjects and entitled to vote. In
fact, in the general elections of 1947 they elected seven Indian Tamil
Members of Parliament s' and exercised a significant influence on the voting in several other electorates as well. No provisions concerning citizenship were contained in the 1948 Constitution. For the "Indian" Tamils
this omission carried grave consequences.
One of the first acts of the new government was to determine the
country's citizenship requirements. Legislation was enacted conferring
citizenship only on those people who had either been born in Sri Lanka to
fathers also born there or, if those seeking citizenship had not been born
in the island, their fathers and grandfathers were required to have been
born there. Due to the lack of records such facts were very difficult to
prove. Not everyone was required to furnish the proof in order to acquire
citizenship, but Indian Tails were required to provide this evidence, and
generally could not do so. By a later statute, citizenship was made available by registration in certain circumstances, but for a variety of reasons
few Indian Tamils took advantage of this provision.
The outcome was that most Indian Tamils were rendered effectively
stateless and were disenfranchised as well. A group without voting power
is likely to experience considerable difficulty in securing equal treatment
for itself, and this has been the case for the Indian Tamils. Education and
34. Professor K.N.O. Dharmadasa, COLUMBO DAILY NEWS, June 4, 1982.
35. V. Stegborn, Sri Lanka: The Veddhas - A People Under Threat, 42 IWGIA
LETT'ER 166 (1985).
36. HYNDMAN, DEMOCRACY IN PERIL, supra note 1, Appendix XXIII, at 166.

NEWS-

1992

MICROCOSM OF REGIONAL PROBLEMS

medical facilities in the areas where Indian Tamils reside have been consistently of a lower than general standard, and social welfare benefits and
the granting of cost of living adjustments have lagged seriously behind
those enjoyed by other sectors of the community."1 Although over the
years various arrangements have been made to grant citizenship to Indian
Tamils - citizenship either of India or of Sri Lanka - by the mid-1980's
considerable numbers of these people, despite Article 15 of the Universal
Declaration ("Everyone has the right to a nationality"), continued to be
both stateless and exceedingly underprivileged.3
d.

The "Ceylon" Tamils

i. Education and State Sector Employment
During colonial times Tamils held what was later perceived to be a
disproportionately large number of university places, high governmental
positions, domination of the professions. This happened partly because
particularly good missionary schools had been established in Tamil areas,
and partly due to other factors which have long motivated Tamils in Sri
Lanka to view education, and work in the professions and public sector,
as the means to economic progress.
After Independence successive governments took measures to redress
the imbalance between Sinhalese and Tamils in educational achievement
and public sector employment.3 9 These measures included the provision
of better schools in Sinhala districts and "standardization" and then
"quota" systems of admissions to universities and a favoring, by government policy, of Sinhalese as against Tamils in new recruitment to state
employment. The consequence was a greatly reduced proportion of university places and public sector jobs gained by Tamils. International
human rights norms and Article 12(2) of the Sri Lankan Constitution forbid discrimination between people "on the grounds of race, religion, language, caste, sex, political opinion, place of birth or any one of such
grounds," except when separate treatment is justified as a measure essential to empower disadvantaged groups. When this is the case, empowering
positive discrimination is permitted, but only temporarily, until the formerly disadvantaged groups have reached a position of real equality.
By the early 1980's, statistics compiled by the Marga Institute, a research organization based in Colombo'4 0 were released by the University
Grants Commission 4 and by government sources, showing any previous
37. Sie, e.g. HYNDMAN, COMMUNAL VIOLENCE, supra note 1, at 260 (statement adopted
by the National Council of the Ceylon Workers Congress, August 14, 1983).

38. See

HYNDMAN, DEMOCRACY IN PERIL,

supra note 1, at 9-13.

39. See HYNDMAN, COMMUNAL VIOLENCE, supra note 1, at 272-276.
40. FAR E. ECON. REV., Nov. 17, 1983, at 31.
41. Statistics on University admissions released by Division of Planning and Research,
University Grant Commission, 1983, reprinted in LANKA GUARDIAN, Nov. 1, 1983, at 10. Statistics on public sector employment released by the Dept. of Census and Statistics and Min-
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imbalance to have been corrected. However, the quota system and employment selection systems were not withdrawn. To Tamils, with their
emphasis on educational achievement, accessibility on a criterion of merit
to university entrance and to pubic sector employment is extremely important, and these policies have been the source of very real grievances.
ii.

The Status of the Tamil Language

The status of the Tamil language within Sri Lanka has been another
source of discontent. In 1956, eight years after Independence, Mr.
Bandaranaike's government enacted the Official Language Act."2 This legislation provided that Sri Lanka's only "official" language would be
Sinhala"3 and reversed the resolution, adopted in 1944 by the State Council, that both Sinhalese and Tamil would be the country's official languages. Henceforth, the official administration of the country was to be
conducted in Sinhalese, and proficiency in Sinhalese became a requirement for confirmation of, appointment to, and promotion within the public service. This requirement contributes to Tamil difficulties both in
gaining public sector employment and later in securing promotion, since
Sinhalese for Tamils, and Tamil for Sinhalese is very much a second or
third language.
In 1958 the Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Act was passed.
This legislation would have ameliorated the situation somewhat, providing as it did for the use of Tamil in the spheres of education, public examinations and official correspondence conducted with Tamil speaking
people. Unfortunately, the regulations required for its implementation
were not brought into effect until 1968. They were carried through at that
time amidst strong protests from the opposition parties, by Mr. Dudley
Senanayake, the then Prime Minister, in pursuance of the SenanayakeChelvanayakam Agreement made between the government and Tamil
leaders in 1965. In 1961, Mrs. Bandaranaike's government passed the
Language of the Courts Act, which provided for the replacement of English by Sinhala in certain courts of law. In 1972, under this same government, the position of Sinhala as the country's only "official" language was
given constitutional status. The Tamil people have interpreted the language policies of the different post-Independence Sinhala dominated governments as an indication that they were being accorded inferior status.
The Jayawardene government, recognizing that past language policies were a source of grievance to the Tamil people" sought, by provisions
which it included in its 1978 Constitution, to grant a greater measure of
recognition to the Tamil language. Although Sinhala remained the "offiistry of Plan implementation Committee for Rational Development, Sri Lanka's Ethnic
Problems: Myths and Realities, LANKA GUARDIAN, Nov. 1, 1983.
42. Act No. 33 (1956).
43. Id. at § 2.
44. See UNP Election Manifesto, Colombo, 1977, and its statements and undertakings
concerning The Problems of the Tamil Speaking People.
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cial" language and "the language of administration throughout Sri
Lanka," both Tamil and Sinhala were declared to be "national" languages.4 5 The new Constitution provided that both languages may be
used in Parliament, though English is also used in Parliament and Hansard is published in all three languages, and that official documents and
laws must be published in both Sinhala and Tamil."6 Under the Constitution, candidates at any official examination are entitled to be examined,
and students are entitled to education, in either of the two official languages. The Tamil language is required to be used in addition to Sinhala
as the language of administration and in the courts4 of the northern and
eastern regions,46 and any person is entitled to "receive communications
from, and to communicate and transact business with, any official in his
'49
official capacity, in either of the national languages.
The protection thus accorded to the Tamil language by the 1978
Constitution was a very fair recognition of the rights of an 18% majority.
Unfortunately, the failure has been in its implementation. The constitutional recognition was not resized in practice and Sinhala continued to be
used as the language of communication by government departments even
when entirely inappropriate, for instance in replies to letters written in
Tamil by Tamil people.
iii.

"Colonization"

Another major factor which has caused severe problems and resentments is the policy, carried out by successive governments over a long
period of time, of land redistribution, or "colonization" as it is called in
Sri Lanka. This process began when the British brought Tamils from India to work on the plantations in the nineteenth century and placed them
on land taken from Sinhalese people in the hill country to the great resentment of those displaced. More recently, from the 1930's onwards, successive governments have adopted a .policy of settlement of the north,
central and eastern regions of the island. This has been done as formerly
dry and unproductive areas have been rendered fertile by irrigation
schemes and has consisted mainly in the resettling of Sinhalese people
from the more densely populated southern areas.
From the outset the Tamil people have objected that this program
affected land within the regions they have regarded as their traditional
homelands. They regard the relocation of large numbers of Sinhalese into
the areas where Tamils have historically formed a high proportion of the
population as a deliberate plan to bring about a change in the ethnic
composition of those areas. The resettlement program has inevitably re-

45. SRI LANKA CONST. art. 19 (1978).
46. Id. at arts. 22-23.
47. Direction made under SRI LANKA CONST. art. 24(1)(a) (1978), on Sept. 7, 1978, reprinted in GAZETTE EXTRAORDINARY, No. 1/6.
48. Id. at art. 22(1).
49. SRI LANKA CONST. art. 22(2) (1978).
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duced the effectiveness of Tamil voting power in these parts of the
country.
Some Sinhalese, on the other hand, see these Tamil protests as further evidence of what they view as the inflated demands which this group
continually makes, perceiving the underlying motivation as being the desire of a minority group to secure for itself large tracts of hitherto
sparsely occupied land.
The government approach is that Sri Lanka is home to all Sri
Lankans, that all citizens should be free to live in any part of the island,
and that the colonization programs give due recognition to the rights of
everyone. The argument here is that under the programs, the people are
resettled in numbers proportionate to the ethnic composition of the entire island.5"
Colonization has been a source of agitation for many years and proposed resolutions have included more than one agreement reached between government and Tamil leaders. The first such agreement was made
in 1957.51 This, and a later agreement made in 196552 were both abandoned unilaterally by the different governments which had made them in
response to pressures mounted against their implementation by the oppo53
sition parties of the time.
e.

Tamil Moves Towards Violent Opposition

The approach adopted by Tamils to secure what they regard as their
due measure of recognition within the country was, for the first thirty
years after Independence, a peaceful one. They sought a federal arrangement within one country, not a separate state, and did not resort to, nor
advocate, violence as a means of achieving this. In the mid-1970's however, disillusioned and feeling that they were steadily losing ground, the
Tamil political parties reformed themselves as one party, the Tamil
United Liberation Front (TULF). One of the planks in TULF's election
platform was separatism, although with the stated aim of achieving this
through negotiation and not by force.
On this platform, TULF gained all the seats in the northern part of
the country, some of those in the eastern region, and became the major
opposition party at the 1977 general election. At about the same time, a
small group of Tamil youth declared their intention to establish a separate state and began to resort to violence. Until this time the conduct of
most Tamil people in Sri Lanka had indicated that they opposed an approach of force.

50. During my visits to Sri Lanka I have been unable to locate any statistics from
which it is possible to verify the actual numbers and ethnic proportions of those who have
been resettled under the schemes.
51. Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact
52. Senanayake-Chelvanayakam Pact.
53. HYNDMAN, DEMOCRACY IN PERIL, supra note 1, at 21-22.
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f.

Government Responses to Growing Tamil Militancy

In order to check the rise of Tamil militancy, the demand for a separate state, and other forms of opposition, the Jayawardene government
took a number of measures seriously curtailing rights in circumstances
where these curtailments were not "strictly required by the exigencies of
the situation," and hence were not legitimate under
Article 4 of the Inter54
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
In response to criticisms, the government repeatedly argued that the
steps were essential and that the country was in a state of emergency.
Ironically, the exacerbation of the situation to this degree may have been
brought about in no small measure by restrictions which were excessive
from the outset. Indeed, even given a justifiable state of emergency, some
of the provisions taken were so extreme as to be in contravention of applicable international human rights norms.
The history of the relevant legislative measures is as follows. In 1979
harsh preventive detention legislation was enacted,55 first as a temporary
measure but made permanent in 1982.56 This prevention of terrorism legislation, although general in its wording, until the late 1980's was directed
almost exclusively at young Tamil males. Indeed in many villages all the
young Tamil males were rounded up and arrested simply because their
age and ethnic origin were deemed by the security forces to make it likely
that they may, at some time, engage in militant activities.57
Successive states of emergency were declared in the early 1980's and,
from May 1983 until after President Jayawardene stepped down and
President Premadasa came to power in 1989, a continuous state of emergency was maintained covering the whole island. Laws promulgated under
this emergency regime,5 8 together with the prevention of terrorism legislation, have permitted, inter alia: strict censorship of the media,59 silencing
of political opposition,60 prolonged detention without charge or trial, arbitrary arrests and imprisonment, and the holding of detainees incommunicado, in army camps and police cells."1 Many detainees have been tortured, some murdered, many others have "disappeared." Inquests into
the deaths of those who have died in state custody have been suspended
except when deemed permissible by security personnel.6 2 The prevention

54. Supra note 15.
55. Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, No. 48 (1979).
56. Act No. 10 (1982).
57. HYNDMAN, DEMOCRACY IN PERIL, supra note 1, at 43-45.
58. The emergency regulations were brought into existence by proclamation as required
by art. 155(3) of the Constitution, and renewed as required by resolutions passed by a 1/3
majority of parliament under art. 155(8). The authority for the enactment of the emergency

regulations is the Public Security Ordinance, sec. 5.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Reg. 14.
Regs. 12, 28, 68.
Regs. 16-20.
Reg. 55A-G.
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of terrorism legislation and emergency regulations, although initially used
primarily against Tamils, have since been used also in the south against
insurgent Sinhalese groups.
Other emergency regulations imposed on Tamil-dominated areas in
the north and east of the island are so stringent that, where implemented,
they have caused massive disruption to the normal civilian life of the areas affected. Essential services have ground to a halt, hospitals could not
function adequately, factories were closed, farming could not be carried
out, transportation could not function, schooling was disrupted, and
banks and post offices did not operate. There were grave shortages of
food, fuel, medical and other supplies. The result: deprivation, hardship
and suffering and, from time to time, an exodus of great numbers of
Tamils fleeing to southern India and elsewhere.
The emergency regulations and the prevention of terrorism legislation, and their mode of implementation, have over the years led to an
increasing feeling amongst the Tamil people that the government identifies the entire Tamil population of the north and east, and not just the
militant elements, as its enemy. The consequence has been increasing fear
and resentment amongst the people in these areas and, despite increasing
violence by Tamil militants, a growing feeling in the minds of more and
more hitherto peaceful Tamil people that their only hopes of salvation lie
with the militants.
g.

Erosions of Democracy and the Rule of Law

i.

Erosions of Democracy

The 1978 Constitution established a system conferring very wide executive powers on the President.6 3 At the 1977 general elections, the
United National Party (UNP) government gained a landslide victory,
winning 140 of the 168 seats in Parliament. Landslide victories are not
uncommon in Sri Lankan elections. Until 1977, since which date the UNP
has retained its hold on power, it and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party
(SLFP), alternated in office at each election with tremendous swings in
the numbers of votes received on each occasion.
Under the 1978 Constitution, elections were due in 1983 but were not
held. Instead, in 1982 the government used its large majority to amend
the Constitution 4 in order to allow the Parliament to remain in power for
a further six years without a general election but on the result of a referendum. By this means the government, by a vote of 54.6%, retained its
huge parliamentary majority. 5 In the meantime, the President held in his

63. See SM LANKA CONST. arts. 30, 35, 43-44, 46-47, 52, 54 (1978).
64. Id. at amend. IV.
65. In August 1982, the Third Amendment to the Constitution was passed. This inserted a new provision, Article 31(3A), empowering the incumbent President to go to the
people after only four years of his six year term in office, and to hold an election at that
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possession signed, undated letters of resignation of all the Members of
Parliament of his party.
The referendum to extend the life of the Parliament was held under
strictures which severely hampered the opposition campaign. Some opposition politicians were detained under emergency regulations. Some have
been stripped of their civic rights. Some opposition papers were banned
and some opposition presses were sealed. The polling itself was marred by
the harassment of electoral officers, candidates and voters. 6
ii.

Changes in Electoral Laws

The Ceylon (Parliamentary Elections) Order-in-Council of 1946 was
amended in 1984 7 in a manner which gave rise to several concerns. For
instance: henceforth, a result may be declared even if ballot boxes are
missing. Further, an "information," which need not be in writing, stating
it is not possible to commence or continue a poll due to "the occurrence
of events of such a nature," described as a "disturbance" in the marginal
note, is conclusive of the existence of those events.es Once an information
has been made, counting can commence without the receipt of the ballot
boxes from the polling station at which a "disturbance" has been reported, and the result can be declared without these votes being
counted. 9
The effect is to disenfranchise those voters whose votes are in the
ballot boxes which do not reach the counting station, and also to disenfranchise those who cannot vote due to the occurrence of "events of such
a nature." In effect the legislation concedes election irregularities to be a
feature of Sri Lankan life, yet until the time of the Jaffna Council elections in 1981, at which blatant irregularities occurred, elections in Sri
Lanka had always been conducted openly and honestly. The procedure
this legislation establishes for the counting of votes and the declaration of
winning candidates in circumstances where "disturbances" have occurred
allows a severe erosion of principles whose maintenance is essential if a
truly democratic system is to survive.
iii.

Threats to the Independence of the Judiciary

The independence of the judiciary is well provided for under the
1978 Constitution. Despite this, the independence of judges has been
threatened more than once in recent years. Constitutional guarantees depend for their effectiveness on a determination by those with substantial

time seeking a mandate for a further term. The President did this and in an election boycotted by many Tamils, he received 52.9% of the total number of votes polled.
66. See Civil Rights Movement of Sri Lanka, Colombo, Was the Referendum Free and
Fair?*(1983).
67. Act No. 36 (1984).
68. Id. at § 47A.
69. Id. at § 48.
70. E.g., SM LANKA CONST. arts. 107-08, 116 (1978).
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power under the Constitution that the guarantees be given force.
The transitional provisions of the 1978 Constitution state: "[AIll
judges of the Supreme Court and the High Courts . . .holding office on
the day immediately before the commencement of the Constitution shall,
on the commencement of the Constitution, cease to hold office." 71 This
gave the Jaywardene government the opportunity, which it took, to effectively remove a number of judges from the former court by not re-appointing them and, instead, to appoint others to positions on the newly
established Supreme Court. Many lawyers in Sri Lanka saw the changes
thus made to have been politically motivated. By taking this action the
government was able to avoid the effect of the constitutional safeguards
to secure the tenure of the judiciary.
In two cases in the early 1980's,"2 members of the police force were
promoted after being found by the Supreme Court to have acted unlawfully. In each case the Supreme Court had heard complaints brought
against the police officers concerned under Article 126, which gives the
Supreme Court sole and exclusive jurisdiction to determine questions relating to the infringement, by executive or administrative action, of any
fundamental right protected by the Constitution. The Court had, in both
cases, found that the rights of the complainant had been infringed. The
promotions were reported to be made to ensure that public officials
should "follow
orders without fear of consequence from adverse court
73
decisions.
Two days after the handing down of the judgment for the second
case the houses of the three Supreme Court judges concerned were surrounded by rowdy mobs shouting obscenities, creating disturbances, and
carrying placards referring to the judgment. No one was hurt, but all attempts by the judges to obtain the assistance of the police proved futile.
An editorial in The Island, on the 13th June, 1983, stated:
There is proof that the demonstrators had been brought in buses.
The authorities must initiate an immediate enquiry to ascertain who
was responsible for this demonstration and why the police failed to
respond ...If the judges of the Supreme Court cannot receive immediate protection from the vulgar mobs what chance will the ordinary
citizen stand?
No such enquiries were held and no action was taken. Such a situa-

71. Id. at art. 163.
72. In the first case the Rev. Dharamitipola Ratanasata, Secretary to Pavidi Handa,
brought an action claiming infringement of the right to freedom of expression under Art.
126 after the Superintendent of Police had seized 20,000 of the organizations's leaflets in
which opposition was expressed to the 1983 referendum to extend the life of Parliament.
The second case arose out of an incident during an International Women's Day demonstration in March 1983 when Mrs. Vivienne Goonewardene, a former MP, complained she was
assaulted while in a police station inquiring about a photographer apprehended during the
demonstration.
73. Civil Rights Movement Publication, Ref CRM E 2/6/83 Colombo, 1983.

1992

MICROCOSM OF REGIONAL PROBLEMS

tion neither protects the independence of the judiciary nor serves to reinforce, in the minds of the citizens of the country, a belief that the rule of
law will be respected and observed.
Twice shortly thereafter allegations of impropriety in the behavior of
judges of the Supreme Court were made, and were considered by Select
Committees of Parliament set up for the purpose. At the time many people expressed concern that, taking into account the background in both
cases, i.e. judgments delivered of which the executive disapproved, and
statements made that were critical of the executive, the bringing of the
two judges in question before a Select Committee of Parliament was intended to clearly indicate to them that they are subordinate to, and not
independent of, the executive and the legislature. Democracy cannot survive long without an independent judiciary. In Blackstone's words:
In this distinct and separate existence of the judicial power in a
peculiar body of men, nominated indeed, but not removable at pleasure, by the crown, consists one main preservative of the public liberty;
which cannot subsist long in any state, unless the administration of
common justice be in some degree separated both from the legislative
and also from the executive power."4
h. Other
Lawlessness

Incidents

Which

Have

Tended

to

Encourage

In recent years other incidents also have tended to encourage lawlessness and to reduce the confidence of ordinary citizens in the power, or
willingness, of the legitimate forces of government to protect them." Attacks by organized mobs occur not infrequently, and result in murders,
rape, destruction of property and looting. There has been strong evidence
of complicity by the security forces in some of these attacks. Nonetheless
the government has repeatedly failed to instigate independent, public and
impartial inquiries to identify, and bring to account, those responsible.
Indemnity legislation has been passed on at least two occasions to restrict
legal proceedings against Ministers, Deputy Ministers or any person holding office in the government.7 6 Such legislation inevitably gives rise to the
impression that the government has condoned any breaches of the law
which may have been committed by these people.
Acts of violence are an increasingly common occurrence. Vigilante
groups flourish. Human Rights activists are threatened, tortured and
killed. The numbers of lawyers willing to take cases involving human
rights issues decreased dramatically in 1989 and 1990 as the killings increased. Since the perpetrators and organizers of these atrocities are not

74. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 269 (T. Tegg, 1830).
75. See generally SOME SIGNIFICANT EXAMPLES OF INCIDENTS TENDING TO ENCOURAGE
LAWLESSNESS: CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN SRI LANKA, COLOMBO, reproduced as Appendix
XI, HYNDMAN, DEMOCRACY IN PERIL, supra note 1, at 361-3.
76. See, e.g., Indemnity Act, Act No. 20, 1982.
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apprehended and brought before the courts, lawlessness and intimidating
behavior carried out by a variety of different groups have become more
and more prevalent. A climate of impunity has been allowed to develop.
As mentioned earlier, the repressive measures and the violence initially used against Tamils in the northern and eastern parts of the country has, more recently, been used also in southern Sri Lanka against militant Sinhalese, those suspected of being militant, and their families.
Sinhalese as well as Tamils were fearful of arbitrary arrest, detention and
torture, and many of them left the country in search of asylum elsewhere.
Sixty thousand deaths are said to be attributable to the excesses of the
security forces in the wake of the recent failed insurrection in the south
by the rural Sinhalese Marxist J.V.P. movement." As in countries of
South America, mothers here have organized marches to bring attention
to the increasing numbers of people taken into detention who simply
"disappear."
The violence developed to involve factions of Sinhalese against each
other and against the government, as well as security forces against them
and against the Tamils in the north. Rival Tamil militant groups carry
out vendettas against each other. Corpses have been found at the sides of
roads encircled by tires filled with petrol and ignited, or bodies are found
hanged from lamp posts, or with heads severed. In fact violence seems to
have become a way of life in Sri Lanka, the instant solution to all
problems, though more recently, the situation in the south has become
much calmer.
i.

The Present Position

The tragedy of the catalogue of events just recited is all the more
disturbing when viewed against the context in which it has occurred. Until the early 1980's, Sri Lanka was widely regarded as a country with an
excellent reputation for upholding democratic principles, in which human
rights were respected and where the rule of law prevailed. Moreover, the
present situation of erosion of democratic values, weakening of the authority of the rule of law, perpetration of violence, and provocation of
racial antagonism has occurred against the background of a country with
considerable assets.
Statistics from the early 1980s show the population to be highly literate, with an 85% literacy rate among adults, life expectancy of 69 years,
and a low infant mortality rate of 37.7 per thousand. While the per capita
income of the country has never been high, Sri Lanka possesses the essential resources to be successful. The island is not overpopulated, enjoys a
good climate, and possesses large areas of forests, fertile lands, abundant
farming and fishing and productive, plantations. Physically, Sri Lanka is
remarkably beautiful. It has a long-established civilization, many historical monuments of great interest and antiquity, a rich and varied culture

77. British Refugee Council,

SRI LANKA MONITOR,

March 1991, at 4.
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and, the present problems notwithstanding, a charming, friendly and
overwhelmingly hospital people.
Yet escalating violence of the kind described above has occurred and
must, eventually, reach the stage where it causes total collapse of normal
civilized society. In parts of Sri Lanka it would seem, sadly, that this is
precisely what has now come about.
I do not know when you will get this letter - if at all. But I am
sending it through some priests who are going abroad - to Colombo,
Sri Lanka!!! you may laugh - but the sad reality is such.
The North and East is completely cut off from the rest of the
island and the world. No telecommunication, no postal service, no
transport, no electricity -no everything. No food is allowed to be
brought in except through the Red Cross who managed to bring in
just a few tons of food. Food items are gone up in price by six or seven
times. Petrol, diesel and kerosene by twelve times as these are
brought in illicitly on bicycles from 115 miles away. There are more
than five hundred thousand refugees in the North and East by government estimates. A good number are in camps but the majority are
with friends, relatives, and good Samaritans.
Here, one of the tragic experiences one faces daily is the bombing
of civilian targets night and day. Every night, every day. Our Bishop's
house bombed, our Cathedral bombed, hospitals bombed, power station bombed, thousands of houses demolished in Jaffna, Kilinochchi,
Vavunya, Trincomalee, Manar, Batticaloa. Killing civilians, where the
Sri Lankan army is in control, is a routine affair - with the help of
the so called Home Guards. More than 75,000 refugees as at yesterday
have gone to India. Often one hears of many dead bodies being
washed ashore, shot by the Sri Lankan Navy, or by overloading.
I cover a broad range from one end of my parish to the other,
with many churches, and some small islands. Though the parish had a
vehicle and a boat, now due to scarcity of fuel much of my travelling
for services - both religious and humanitarian - is on the bike. (To
the islands of course by sail boat). There is a co-Pastor who helps me.
At the moment, much of my time is spent on looking after the welfare
of the refugees. Every church is being organized to cater to the refugees. Many weary refugees trek through my parish to find boats to
India. Their stories are just tragic. I have no space or time to write
them to you just now. May be one day....

j.

78

Sri Lanka: A Producer of Asylum Seekers

One consequence of these events has been that Sri Lanka has become
a major producer of asylum seekers. As recounted in the letter, thousands
of people are displaced within the country in search of sanctuary from

78. Extract of a letter written from Northern Sri Lanka August 1990.
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violence, thousands from the north are trying to get to India, many others
are reaching countries further afield by plane and applying for refugee
status there. At the same time international refugee protection is experiencing a period of severe strain.
As summarized in December 1990:
[T]he number of refugees has almost doubled in the last ten years
the resources available to UNHCR [the Office with the UN mandate for the protection of refugees] have hardly increased at all. The
basic needs of many uprooted people are not being met. Many of the
world's poorer countries, where the largest concentrations of refugees
are to be found, are struggling to cope with the pressure that the new
arrivals have placed on scarce resources. In the Third World there is
now a discernible tendency to make asylum and protection conditional upon adequate levels of assistance. In the industrialized states,
both politicians and the public have reacted negatively to the growing
number of people seeking sanctuary in their territory. The principles
of refugee protection, painstakingly developed over the course of the
...

last 40 years, are increasingly being challenged

....

79

The situation in Sri Lanka and the exodus from the country is adding to
the crisis.
Government acceptance of obligations towards refugees is made in a
compromise between the state's absolute power to decide who may enter
and remain in the country, and the recognition of a wider requirement to
assume, and honor, commitments to people recognized by the international community to be deserving of international protection. The definition of such people - "refugees - is a restrictive one. Only those with a
well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion satisfy its
criteria under international law.80
Developed states which earlier might have more generously offered
places of resettlement for refugees already in camps in countries of firstasylum, or which might more generously have accommodated those arriving at their borders and seeking to remain there, are today experiencing
something described as "compassion fatigue."
The 1970's and the 1980's have seen the advent of first "boat" and
now of "jet" refugees. No longer do asylum-seekers merely cross neighboring borders. Modern forms of travel, particularly air travel, has produced the phenomenon of large numbers arriving at the borders of countries geographically far removed from their country of origin, countries
with which there are often no historical, linguistic or cultural ties. With a
worsening economic recession, and increasing numbers arriving in this
manner, these distant states are becoming increasingly reluctant to enter-

79. UNHCR, 1990: THE GLOBAL OUTLOOK, REFUGEES, Dec. 1990, at 3.
80. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1A(2), 19 U.S.T. 6260; T.I.A.S.
6577; 189 U.N.T.S. 137 (1951).
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tain claims for asylum from people for whom they feel no special responsibility. The situation is exacerbated as governments view large numbers
of these people not as "genuine refugees" but as people in search of a
higher standard of living, or "economic refugees." In addition they are
frequently seen as attempting to by-pass normal immigration procedures
and to "queue-jump" to achieve their ends. Governments express concern
for refugees already in camps whose chances of receiving resettlement offers from third countries may diminish if great numbers of people arrive
to claim refugee status directly from resettlement states; such arrivals
may exhaust the number of places which any given government is prepared to offer for refugee resettlement.
The consequence? An unsympathetic response to all asylum-seekers.
Sometimes no access is provided to refugee status determination procedures, sometimes the procedures which do exist are not fair procedures,
sometimes the 1951 Refugee Convention definition criteria receive an excessively strict interpretation, sometimes there are forcible repatriations
to the country of origin. In other instances people are rejected at the
frontier on the basis that another state has a more direct and immediate
responsibility. The rejecting state does not always ascertain that this
third state will in fact honor this responsibility."
In the result there is the danger that genuine refugees may be returned, directly or indirectly, to the territory from which they have fled.
Such return, if the people in question are refugees according to international law, is contrary to the obligations imposed by the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol82 and,
relevant to states which are not signatories to these international instruments, may also be contrary to customary international law.
Asylum-seekers from Sri Lanka who apply for refugee status in distant states are both contributing to the factors which are bringing refugee
protection under strain and, in some cases, are themselves falling victim
to those strains.
C.

Concluding Comments on Part II

The current situation of violence and ethnic tensions within Sri
Lanka is one which perhaps wise statesmanship could have avoided. Unfortunately, as is so often the case, the steps taken were frequently steps
to secure short-term political advantage while the rights of many of the
people of Sri Lanka, or of particular groups of them, were ignored. Succeeding governments, political parties in opposition and other powerful
factions, militant groups included: all have contributed to this state of
affairs.

81. See, e.g., J. Crawford and Patricia Hyndman, Three Heresies in the Application of
the Refugee Convention, 1 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 155 (1989).
82. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, TIAS No.
6577.
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Once violence erupts, the taking of violent measures to control its
perpetrators is a comprehensible, instinctive response, but a circular pattern is thereby set in motion, and violence begets violence. This is precisely the type of instinctive "eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth" response
that civilized society and the establishment of legal systems has sought to
transcend and relegate to the level of an historical anachronism. Longterm solutions will be achieved only through negotiation and removal of
the grievances which underlie militant movements. There is ample evidence, both in Sri Lanka and elsewhere, that strong legislative, administrative and military measures by governments in attempts to deal with
movements expressive of dissatisfaction do not work and the victory, at
any level of society, achieved as a result of coercion merely sets the stage
for later retaliation.

III.

THE NEED FOR MORE EFFECTIVE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

What then can be done? Protection of basic rights, of the independence of the judiciary, and of access to a fair and democratic system is
provided under the Sri Lankan Constitution yet this protection has not
proved effective. The reality is that national guarantees of fundamental
rights, however impressive their appearance, will only be as effective as
those wielding real power allow them to be. When use (and abuse) is
made of declarations of states of emergency in circumstances not strictly
in conformity with the requirements of international human rights law,
when opportunity is taken in these periods to increase the power in the
hands of the executive body and/or military forces, when minority groups
are not afforded protection and respect, when the independence of the
judiciary is not jealously maintained, and easy and effective access to
both the legal system and the democratic processes are not assured, provisions protecting the rights of individuals, whether in ordinary legislation, the common law or enshrined in the constitutional document, simply will not work.
Such provisions may look good, and they may, to a degree, enable the
rulers of the state possessing them to posture on the international stage,
but in the final analysis they will not achieve their purpose: the protection of the rights of the citizens of the country in whose laws they feature.
This is not to say that the enactment of laws, or constitutional provisions,
which aim to achieve this purpose should not be encouraged but that
without more they cannot be expected to prove effective in all circumstances. In times of crisis politics tend to override both constitutions and
national legal protections.
Is there any guide from international human rights law? The Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations, in its statement of that organization's aims, ranks respects for human rights second only to the need to
save later generations from the scourge of war. On joining the United Nations, member states "pledge themselves to take joint and separate action" for the achievement of the United Nations' goal of the promotion of
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms "for all without dis-

1992

MICROCOSM OF REGIONAL PROBLEMS

tinction as to race, sex, language or religion."83
In 1948 the United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. 4 Today the rights it enunciates, encompassing civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, are, for the most part, encapsulated in and made legally binding on the states parties to them, including
Sri Lanka, by the two major international covenants on human rights: the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights88 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.86 Undeniably,
despite the considerable number of ratifications of these and other important international human rights instruments, the human rights record of
some of the signatory states leaves much to be desired. Nonetheless, despite limitations to the effectiveness of international human rights instruments, their finalization and adoption is a significant step forward in that
they provide an agreed, if not always observed, measure which governments have accepted as the standards of human rights they are required
to afford to those within their jurisdictions. No longer can ratifying governments claim with any legitimacy that breaches of these obligations towards people resident within their territory is a matter of domestic jurisdiction only, and not a matter of proper concern to the wider
international community. By their signatures, any breaches of these instruments become breaches of those governments' binding obligations
under international law.
In addition to these developments at the gobal level, there have been
regional initiatives. First European states, and then the states of Latin
America developed human rights instruments. s7 Both regions have established regional commissions and courts of human rights. Recently the Organization of African Unity developed a regional charter of human rights
and, in 1987, established a commission of human rights.8 The Arab region, which has a commission on human rights, has now produced a draft
regional charter of human rights.
The regional settlement of disputes threatening international peace
and security is envisaged in Articles 33 and 52 of the United Nations

83. U.N. CHARTER preamble.
84. Univesal Declaration of Human Rights art. 16(3), G.A. Res. 217A (I1), U.N. Doc.
A/810 (1948), reprinted in R. LILLICH, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS 10.1
(1985).
85. Supra note 15.
86. Supra note 12.
87. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, signed Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222; and American Declaration of the Rights
and Duties of Man, OAS Treaty Series No. 36, OAS, OR, OEA/Ser.A/16, reprinted in 9
I.L.M. 673 (1970) and the American Convention on Human Rights, OAS, OR, OEA/SER.L/
V/E.23, Doc. 21, Rev. 2 (1948).
88. See African Charter on Human and People's Rights (Banjul Charter), adopted June
27, 1981, entered into force Oct. 21, 1986, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67iRev.5, reprinted in 21
I.L.M. 59 (1981). In late 1987, the African Commission on Human Rights, created by the
African Charter, began to function.
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Charter and can, quite legitimately, be extended to disputes concerning
human rights violations. In fact Article 44 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights expressly recognizes this. 9 There are some
legitimate concerns, however, concerning the form which regional human
rights instruments might take. The whole concept of universal human
rights can be threatened if regional instruments stray from the basic
norms of the international instruments and, as a consequence, produce
one set of human rights for Africa, a different set in the Americas, yet
another in Europe and so on. The United Nations has from time to time
expressed reservations to regional arrangements on this score, and care
does need to be exercised to ensure that the rights in the universal instruments are strictly maintained in all regional documents.
Despite these cautions, when it comes to implementation there is
much to be said for the establishment of regional systems. Many states
which have recently shaken off the yoke of colonialism are not happy at
conceding part of their new found independence to any external system,
particularly to one located in a remote area of the world, and more particularly if that is the geographical location of their former colonial rulers.
Further, the same system of implementation will not necessarily be appropriate in different parts of the world given, to take just one example,
the widely differing geographical considerations of size and distance operating, for instance in Europe as compared to the Pacific. Also, regional
mechanisms have an advantage over the global in that the nations cooperating within a regional framework are likely to have certain commonalities eg of culture, language, law and political and economic institutions
and, in such a context, measures adopted for the promotion and implementation of human rights standards are likely to be more realistic and
practicable than are their United Nations counterparts.
Certainly the European and Inter-American systems have developed
much more effective implementation procedures than has been possible
at the global level. It is too early yet to know how effective the African
Commission will be. The Inter-American system was founded and operates in a region which has seen severe breaches of human rights not unlike those just catalogued in the case of Sri Lanka, yet through its establishment of an individual petition system, its scrutiny even of states in its
region which have not ratified the Inter-American Convention on Human
Rights, its reporting on country situation, its sending of on-site missions
and its constant emphasis on the need for democratic systems of government and the observance of the rule of law, has done a great deal to encourage a return of democracy to states within that region in recent
years. 90

89. Supra note 15.
90. For a good account of the system, see R.E. Norris, The Individual Petition Procedure of the Inter-American System for the Protection of Human Rights, in GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 108-132 (H. Hannum ed., 1984).
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Notably absent from concrete regional arrangements are the Asian
and Pacific states. During the last decade, a regional body, the Law Association for Asia and the Pacific (LAWASIA), has taken steps aimed at
encouraging wide-ranging discussion of possible regional and sub-regional
arrangements for this area, and in the next section of the paper the steps
so far taken by the LAWASIA Human Rights Committee are briefly
outlined.
A.

Steps Taken by the Lawasia Human Rights Committee

The LAWASIA Human Rights Committee has had a continuing interest in the establishment of human rights mechanisms in the region
since it came into being at the Sixth LAWASIA Conference held (ironically it now seems) in Colombo in 1979. From the outset one of the Committee's terms of reference has been to initiate steps towards the ultimate
establishment of an Asian Commission and/or Court of Human Rights.
Unlike Europe, Africa and the Americas, the Asia Pacific region has
no existing inter-governmental structure with which a regional human
rights commission could be associated. For this and other reasons the
Committee has seen the establishment of such a commission as a longterm project, and has felt it desirable to approach the task in stages. The
Committee therefore has sought to promote the protection of human
rights in the region in several different ways: first, through its dissemination of information concerning human rights issues; second, through its
services in setting in motion the meetings which established a regional
coalition of non-governmental human rights organizations; and third,
through the taking of specific steps which it is hoped ultimately will lead
to the establishment of sub-regional (and eventually of a regional)
commission.
1.

Dissemination

In furtherance of this goal, the Committee, like may other human
rights NGO's, has produced and distributed various publications. It has
commissioned the translation of the Universal Declaration on Human
Rights, the International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights and the
International Covenant on Economic, Cultural and Social Rights into several important Asian languages, including Thai, Filipino, Hindi, Malay
and Burmese. The Committee has produced and published several reports covering human rights issues of importance in the region, e.g. reports on militarization in the Pacific,' on the status of women,92 on issues
concerning indigenous populations," on the situation in Burma, 94 and in

91. LAWASIA Human Rights Newsletter, September 1986.
92. LAWASIA, Women and the Law (Lahore, 1987).
93. LAWASIA, Aboriginal Deaths in Custody (Sydney, 1987).

94. M. Szteinvok, Burma (LAWASIA, Sydney, 1988).
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March 1991 on the situation in Tibet.9 5 In addition, it has convened a
number of conferences on matters of regional human rights concern, e.g.
on the status of women, on the independence of the judiciary and of the
legal profession, and on the exploitation of children. Since governments
in Asia and the Pacific have a poor record in terms of the numbers of
accessions to and ratifications of international human rights instruments
the committee has actively urged them to ratify the major international
human rights instruments. The Committee sends observer missions to
contentious human rights trials and to situations raising serious human
rights issues and publishes reports of these missions, e.g. to Pakistan,9 6
Sri Lanka, 97 mainland Malaysia,98 and Sarawak. 9

2. The Establishment of a Regional Coalition of Human Rights
NGO's
An initiative which the LAWASIA Human Rights standing Committee took in its early years was to play the role of catalyst in the formation
of a regional coalition of non-governmental human rights organizations.
The lack of inter-governmental structures to protect human rights in the
Asia Pacific region has meant that the activities of non-governmental organizations have assumed greater significance in the protection and promotion of human rights than might otherwise have been the case. Cooperation and contact between active non-governmental human rights organizations has the potential to fulfil a variety of useful purposes: to enable more effective pursuit of common goals, to provide contact, information and support, the opportunity to avoid duplication of effort and also
to provide assistance in the protection of members who are, from time to
time subject to harassment simply by virtue of their activities.
Accordingly, the LAWASIA Human Rights Committee in the early
1980's organized and addressed a series of meetings of groups of non-governmental human rights bodies to explore the kinds of co-operation
which might be useful. The NGO's attending the first meeting held in
Bangkok in 1981 were very much in favor of establishing some loose form
of organization, and the Committee undertook to perform a co-ordination
role. Subsequently, NGO meetings were held in Colombo in June 1982, in
New Delhi in October 1982 and in Manila in September 1983. At the 1983
meeting, attended by 27 organizations from 12 countries, the Asian Coalition of Human Rights Organizations (ACHRO) was formed. This body, as
established in Manila, is separate from and independent of LAWASIA,
and since that time has pursued its own vigorous program of activities.
95. LAWASIA-TIN Report, DEFYING THE DRAGON (1991).

96. See generally R.

LAWASIA COUNCIL ON THE INDEPEN(1982).
97. HYNDMAN, DEMOCRACY IN PERIL, supra note 1.
98. See generally D. MALCOLM, THE TRIAL OF PARAM CUMARASWAMY (1986).
NICHOLSON, REPORT TO THE

DENCE AND FREEDOM OF LAWYERS IN PAKISTAN

99. See generally D.
(1988).

BONIFACE, CASES AGAINST PENAN TRIBAL MEMBERS IN SARAWAK
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3. Moves Towards the Establishment of Regional and Sub-regional
Human Rights Commissions
At the Sixth LAWASIA Conference, Mr. P.J. Downey of New Zealand, later to become the Co-Chairman, with Mr. F.S. Nariman of India,
of the LAWASIA Human Rights Committee, presented a paper advocating the creation of a Human Rights Commission for the South Pacific
region, urging that such a move would be a viable step towards the eventual establishment of a Commission of Human Rights for the entire AsiaPacific region.
Shortly afterwards, Dr. D.H. Geddes, then Secretary General for
LAWASIA, prepared a background paper'00 for the U.N. convened Seminar on National, Local and Regional Arrangements for the Promotion
and Protection of Human Rights in the Asian Region held in Colombo in
June 1982. In this paper Dr. Geddes canvassed the desirability and difficulties of setting up a regional human rights commission. He looked at
the history of the establishment of the European, African, American and
Arab Commissions, and pointed out that, with these as examples, it
should be possible, allowing for the differences appropriate to the context
of this region, to set up such a body here. He concluded, however, that
since there was no inter-governmental structure for the region as a whole,
it would be wise to approach the task in stages, with the establishment of
a regional Human Rights Commission being the ultimate goal. Indeed,
the U.N. Colombo Seminar did not resolve to establish such a Commission, seeing it as a very long term project indeed.
Dr. Geddes recommended, among other approaches, the creation of
sub-regional commissions as a preliminary step to the setting up of an
overall regional human rights commission. For this purpose he divided
the area into four sub-regions: the Western Region (Iran, Afghanistan,
India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka); the Central, expanded
ASEAN region (Burma, Thailand, Laos, Kampuchea, Vietnam, Malaysia,
Singapore Indonesia, Philippines); the South and Western Region (Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Fiji and the Pacific Island communities); and the North and North-Eastern Region (China, Hong Kong,
North Korea, South Korea and Japan).
In many ways the Pacific region would be the one easiest to tackle
first for the reasons outlined in Mr. P.J. Downey's paper presented to the
Sixth LAWASIA Conference: cultural affinity, a good degree of political
understanding, a certain historical involvement, relationships of trade
and through the continual movements of people in and around the region.
There is generally good human rights record in this part of the world,
something seen as a promising sign in that it indicates a climate favorable
to, and respectful of, human rights. In addition there are existing structural groupings, such as the South Pacific Commission and judicial con-

100. This paper is reproduced in LAWASIA, Recent Trends in Human Rights (1982).
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ferences are held regularly. Such structures could well provide a base of
co-operation from which to begin to build.
In April 1985, the LAWASIA Human Rights Standing Committee
convened a Seminar in Fiji to consider prospects for the establishment of
a Pacific Human Rights Commission.' The sixty-three participants were
all people keenly interested in human rights. Delegates attended from
Australia, Belau, Cook Islands, Eastern Caroline Islands, Fiji, France,
French Polynesia, Hawaii, Korea, Malaysia Philippines, Nauru, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka and Western Samoa.
They included lawyers, non-governmental representatives, social workers,
judges, church workers, academics and representatives of minority (including indigenous) groups.
Included amongst the speakers were a Senior Lawyer with the European Commission of Human Rights; the Minister for Foreign Affairs of
the Provisional Government of Kanaky; the Vice President of the World
Council of Indigenous People; an anti-nuclear lawyer from the Republic
of Belau; the Chairman of the New Zealand Human Rights Commission
and the Deputy Chairman of the Australian Human Rights Commission.
The conference was opened by the Fijian Minister of Justice and Attorney-General. Government observers from Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong, Guam, Western Samoa, Kiribati, India
and Malaysia were also in attendance.
Among the topics discussed at the conference were: decolonization
movements in New Caledonia and French Polynesia; nuclear issues affecting the Pacific; the position of women; and the rights of indigenous populations and issues of development. It was the first time people from, or
interested in, the Pacific area had agreed to come together to discuss
many of these issues in such a way. A report of the proceedings of the
Conference and an edited collection of all its papers was prepared and
distributed to heads of government in the region. At the same time governments were again urged to ratify the major human rights conventions,
invited to promote greater awareness of human rights among their people
and encouraged to give consideration to the early establishment of an inter-governmental treaty-based human rights body.
In its Recommendation No. 10102 thc meeting had urged the LAWASIA Human Rights Committee to conduct a research project to investigate whether or not a human rights commission for the area might be
feasible. In accordance with this recommendation the Committee established first a Drafting Committee and later a Working Party whose members all possessed considerable experience and expertise within the Pacific area. A meeting of the Drafting Committee, held in Sydney in late
June 1986, resulted in a brain-storming session which proved fruitful and

101. See Report on The Conference on Prospects for the Establishment of an Intergovernmental Human Rights Commission in the South Pacific Held in Fiji (1985).
102. Id. at 510.
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worthwhile. Draft proposals were then drawn up. A Working Party was
constituted which met in Apia in August 1986, and the draft which had
emerged from the Sydney meeting was taken further. The Law Ministers,
who were in Western Samoa for the South Pacific Law Conference being
held at the same time, were told of the project and expressed interest in
it. After this meeting the members of the Working Party remained in
contact and continued to work together.
In May 1987 a regional UNESCO Conference was held at the University of New South Wales Human Rights Centre in Sydney, Australia,
called Human Rights Teaching, Information and Dissemination.10 3 In
Session 13, What is to be Done: The Need for a Regional Impetus, the
LAWASIA initiative towards a Human Rights Commission for the Pacific
area was the subject of discussion. The Papua New Guinean representative on the LAWASIA Working Party, also a LAWASIA Human Rights
Committee member, was the paper-writer for this session.
The UNESCO Seminar participants, in commenting on the paper,
noted that discussion by Pacific participants throughout the seminar had
reflected a concern about the adoption of human rights instruments form
outside the region. The point was made that often what is important is
not how human rights are phrased in charters, but how they are interpreted and applied. At the present time, the European application of the
European Convention constitutes a large proportion of the available jurisprudence. Through a regional charter and commission the Pacific region
would be able to develop its own distinct jurisprudence. This would assist
in avoiding "Eurocentric" interpretations of human rights. The participants saw immense benefit flowing from this to the whole international
human rights movements. They expressed support for the project and
urged LAWASIA to continue it, suggesting that perhaps UNESCO might
also become involved.
Turning to a larger forum, in August 1988, the LAWASIA Human
Rights Committee organized a seminar' 0 4 which was held in Manila. A
delegate from the Geneva based U.N. Center for Human Rights joined
the thirty-seven delegates from twelve countries who attended the seminar. The program addressed human rights and the role of international,
regional and national governmental commissions, the protection of
human rights in national constitutions, education and issues of
implementation.
Returning more specifically to its promotion of a Pacific Human
Rights mechanism, the LAWASIA Human Rights Committee in May
1989 convened a seminar in Apia, Western Samoa."0 5 The Drafting Com-

103. See UNESCO, Report of Asia-Pacific Regional Seminar Human Rights Teaching,
Information and Dissemination (1987).
104. See LAWASIA, Conference Report, Human Rights Today and Tomorrow: National Human Rights Commission and Other Organs (1989).
105. See LAWASIA, Report of Seminar on Draft Pacific Charter of Human Rights
held in Western Samoa (1989).
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mittee produced a report raising the issues to be considered in relation to
the establishment of a regional human rights body and had also developed a Draft Charter which had taken as its model the African Charter of
Human and People's Rights." 6 The Draft Pacific Charter sets down civil,
political, economic, social, cultural and people's rights, and refers also to
the duties of governments and the duties of individuals. It contains a provision for a Pacific Human Rights Commission to be established not only
to supervise compliance, ' but also to assist governments with activities
related to human rights issues generally. '08 It is envisaged that this would
involve assisting governments in meeting their reporting and other obligations incurred under regional and international human rights treaties,0 9
obligations which can impose very considerable strains on small states
with limited resources.
The applicable principles by which the Commission is to be guided
include the major international human rights instruments and also Pacific traditions. The Commission is required to draw inspiration from international law on human rights and also to take into consideration as
subsidiary measures "other general or special international conventions,
laying down rules expressly recognized by Parties to the present Charter;
Pacific practices consistent with international norms on human and peoples' rights; customs generally accepted as law; general principles of law
recognized by Pacific states; as well as legal precedents and doctrine." 110
Article 61A provides:
The Parties recognize the customs and traditions of the diverse
communities of this region. The rights, freedoms and duties recognized in this Charter shall be interpreted and understood by the Parties and the Commission in the light of these customs and traditions.
This draft of the Working Party was the subject of discussion at the
Apia Seminar and, as a consequence, further amendments were made.
LAWASIA has now forwarded copies of this latest version of the Draft
Pacific Charter and its Explanatory Memoranda to all governments in the
Pacific region, requesting comments and suggestions."' It is hoped that
the next activity will involve Pacific government representatives in active
discussion about the proposed charter, about a possible commission, and
the whole issue of the protection and promotion of human rights.

106. The Draft Charter and explanatory memoranda are reproduced at the end of the

1989 LAWASIA

WESTERN SAMOA SEMINAR REPORT.

107. Id. at arts. 45-62.
108. Arts. 30-65.
109. Art 45.
110. Art. 60.
111. Copies of the Draft Pacific Charter and its Explanatory Memoranda may be obtained from the new Secretariat to the LAWASIA Human Rights Committee. In October
1990 the Secretariat moved form its earlier location in the Faculty of Law at the University
of New South Wales in Sydney to its present location in the Faculty of Law at the University of Atenio in Manila.
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IV.

CONCLUSION

The recent severe breaches of human rights, the escalation of violence, and the erosion of democracy and of the rule of law in Sri Lanka
exemplify the point that domestic protection of basic rights, without
more, may not always be able to withstand internal political pressures,
and that the protection of human rights at an international level is essential. This realization led to the emphasis in the U.N. Charter on the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms for all without discrimination, to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to the many
other human rights instruments which have now been drafted and
adopted at the international level. Despite this growth of international
human rights instruments, the development of effective universal enforcement mechanisms, which achieve both acceptability to large numbers of
governments and also offer effective protection of fundamental rights, is
taking time, persistent effort and a great deal of patience. To date, regional implementation systems, specifically the European and the InterAmerican systems, have offered a far more effective protection of human
rights than has ben achieved at the global level.
Although the aim, ultimately, must be for effective universal implementation arrangements, current experience would suggest that in the
short term, and as a step along the way, it may be beneficial to establish
such arrangements first at regional and sub-regional levels. Accordingly,
these moves by the LAWASIA Human Rights Committee are put forward
for consideration as one possible approach through which we may seek to
further the promotion of human rights and thus the protection of the
inherent dignity and equal and inalienable rights of all members of the
human family which, as acknowledged in the Preamble to the Universal
Declaration, are essential prerequisites for a true and firm foundation for
freedom, justice and peace in the world.

Tragedies in Northern Iraq, Liberia,
Yugoslavia, and Haiti - Revisiting the
Validity of Humanitarian Intervention
Under International Law - Part I*
VED

I.

P.

NANDA**

INTRODUCTION

Several recent situations call for a reexamination of "humanitarian
intervention," a controversial international law doctrine that suffers from
normative ambiguities.' These situations include: (1) the Kurdish plight
in northern Iraq in the aftermath of the Gulf War; (2) the tragedy of the
Liberian civil war; (3) the protracted civil war in Yugoslavia between
Croats and Serbs; and (4) the brutal oppression in Haiti following the
*
**

Part II will appear in a forthcoming issue of the DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y.
Thompson G. Marsh Professor of Law and Director of the International Legal Stud-

ies Program, University of Denver College of Law. This is an expanded version of my remarks at a conference in June 1991 in Honolulu, Hawaii, entitled, "Restructuring for Peace:
Challenges for the 21st Century," and sponsored by the Matsunaga Institute for Peace and
East-West Center, University of Hawaii, and the United Nations University. I gratefully
acknowledge the research assistance of Ed Allen, a third-year student at the University of
Denver College of Law, on the sections on Uganda and Kampuchea. See also Decades of
Disaster: The United Nations' Response, Hearing Before the House Select Committee on
Hunger (July 30, 1991), 102d Cong., 1st Sess., at 21-24, 66-86 (testimony and prepared
statement, respectively, by Ved Nanda, entitled, "A United Nations Convention on the
Right to Food, Humanitarian Intervention, and the U.N. Response to International Disasters - An International Law Perspective").
1. Voluminous literature exists on the subject. See generally FERNANDO R. TES6N, HuMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND MORALITY (1988) [hereinafter
TESON]; MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 107-08 (1977); HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1973), and the authorities cited id. at
229-234; Michael Bazyler, Reexamining the Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention in
Light of the Atrocities in Kampuchea and Ethiopia, 23 STAN. J. INT'L L. 547 (1987); Captain Thomas E. Behuniak, The Law of the Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention by
Armed Force: A Legal Survey, 79 MIL. L. REV. 157 (1978); Ian Brownlie, Humanitarian
Intervention, in LAW AND THE CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 217 (John Norton Moore
ed., 1974); H. Scott Farley, State Actors, Humanitarian Intervention and International
Law: Reopening Pandora'sBox, 10 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 29 (1980); Tom J. Farer, Human
Rights in Lao's Empire: The JurisprudenceWar, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 117 (1991); Jean-Pierre
L. Fonteyne, The Customary InternationalLaw Doctrine of HumanitarianIntervention:
Its Current Validity under the U.N. Charter,4 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 203 (1974); James A.R.
Nafziger, Self-Determination and HumanitarianIntervention in a Community of Power,
20 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 9 (1991); Kevin Ryan, Rights, Intervention and Self-Determination, 20 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 55 (1991); Ved P. Nanda, Humanitarian Military
Intervention, 23 WORLD VIEW, Oct. 1978, at 23; Eisuke Suzuki, A State's ProvisionalCompetence to Protect Human Rights in a Foreign State, 15 TEXAS INT'L L.J. 231 (1980).
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ouster of a democratically elected government by military leaders.
Competing claims based on territorial integrity versus humanitarian
assistance present a dilemma for the publicist and the decision-maker
alike. It may be recalled that Iraq invoked traditional rules of international law - sovereignty and territorial integrity - to claim that the
world community was prohibited from intervening in its internal affairs.2
Despite frequent challenges on these grounds, a persistent issue presents
itself: Is there an emerging right, and perhaps even a duty, on the part of
the world community to intervene in the internal affairs of a state when
egregious violations of basic human rights occur there?
This article and a later companion piece examine the pertinent issues
involved in a determination of the validity under international law of
claims to humanitarian intervention. Part I will examine the recent foreign intervention in Iraq, the presence of U.S. and allied forces to establish safe havens, and the stationing of the United Nations guards in
northern Iraq to protect the Kurds from the forces of Saddam Hussein all of which occurred pursuant to U.N. Security Council action under
3
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.
The thesis of these articles goes a step further. The right to provide
humanitarian assistance exists even in those situations where Chapter VII
is not invoked, suggesting that the doctrine of nonintervention should be
interpreted in light of the equally strong and complementary norms of
international human rights law. The right to provide humanitarian assistance must be balanced against the duty of nonintervention. The choice
between these complementary norms, the former reflecting developments
in international human rights law and the latter reflecting state sovereignty with its attributes of territorial integrity and political independence, must be based on specific criteria which I will enunciate.
First, this article analyzes humanitarian intervention as an exception
to nonintervention, the widely recognized principle of customary international law. 4 This is followed by six case studies of unilateral state intervention, justified by the intervening state in part on grounds of humanitarian intervention. The next section applies the doctrine to the Kurdish
situation. Finally, the paper concludes with an appraisal and
recommendations.
In Part II, which will be published at a future date, I will discuss the
situations in Liberia, Yugoslavia, and Haiti.

2. See Youssef M. Ibrahim, Iraq Rejects European Plan for Kurdish Haven in North,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1991, at A12.
3. See S.C. Res. 688, Apr. 5, 1991, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 858 (1991) [hereinafter S/

RES/688].
4. See, e.g., Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), 1986 I.C.J. REP. 14, 106-110 [hereinafter
Nicaragua v. U.S.].
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If intervention is to be defined as "interference by a State in the domestic or foreign affairs of others in opposition to its will and serving by
its design or implication to impair its political independence, 5 the conclusion is inescapable that, under state practice, nonintervention has become a governing principle of international law.0
The principle of nonintervention is premised on respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence, and is an adjunct
to the principle of the nonuse of force embodied in Article 2(4) of the
United Nations Charter.' Numerous resolutions, declarations, and conventions adopted by international organizations and conferences reflect
state acceptance of the principle of nonintervention as customary international law. To illustrate, the 1928 Convention on the Duties and Rights of
States in the Event of Civil Strife prohibited intervention even by nationals of one state in the affairs of another state.' In 1933, the Montevideo
Convention on Rights and Duties of States9 explicitly stated that no state
"has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another."' 0 Three years later, the Buenos Aires Additional Protocol Relative
to Non-Intervention affirmed that the parties "declare inadmissible the
intervention of any one of them, directly or indirectly, and for whatever
reason in the internal or external affairs of any of the contracting
parties.""
Following the Second World War, the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of
Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) 2 reaffirmed the inviolability of the
territorial integrity, sovereignty, and political independence of each member state.'" The following year, the Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS) 4 stated in Article 15:
5. CHARLES CHENEY HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED

BY THE UNITED STATES 246 (1945). Oppenheim defines intervention as "dictatorial interference in the affairs of a state by another state." See 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 305
(H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955).
6. See Nicaragua v. U.S., supra note 4.
7. Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter reads: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations."
8. Convention Concerning the Duties and Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife,

Feb. 20, 1948, 46 Stat. 2749, T.S. 814, 134 L.N.T.S. 45, art. 1.
9. Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 STAT. 3097, T.S. 881,
165 L.N.T.S. 19.
10. Id. at art. 8.
11. Additional Protocol Relative to Non-intervention, Dec. 23, 1936, 51 Stat. 41, T.S.
923, 188 L.N.T.S. 31, art. 1.
12. Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Sept. 2, 1947, 62 Stat. 1681,
T.I.A.S. 1838, 21 U.N.T.S. 77.
13. Id. at arts. 1 and 6.
14. Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394,
T.I.A.S. 2361, 119 U.N.T.S. 3, as amended by Protocol of Buenos Aires, Feb. 27, 1967, 21
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No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or
indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs
of any other State. The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed
force but also any other form of interference or attempted threat
against the personality of the State or against its political, economic,
and cultural elements.
Article 17 of the O.A.S. Charter is unequivocal in its prohibition on
intervention: "The Territory of a State is inviolable; it may not be the
object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures of
force taken by another State, directly or indirectly, on any grounds
whatever." Charters of other regional organizations, including the Organization of African Unity, 5 Pact of the League of Arab States, 6 and Treaty
of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance (the now defunct
Warsaw Pact), 7 contain similar prohibitions.
Pertinent United Nations declarations include the 1965 Declaration
on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States
and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty,"8 which
stated that "no State may use or encourage the use of economic, political,
or any other type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain
from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign right or to secure
from it advantages of any kind." Five years later, the General Assembly
adopted a Declaration on Principles of Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States,"9 which approved the principles
enunciated in the 1965 Declaration as the "basic principles" of interna20
tional law.
The International Court of Justice noted in its decision on the merits
in the case of Nicaragua v. U.S. that, "in view of the generally accepted
formulations, the principle [of nonintervention] forbids all States or
groups of States to intervene directly or indirectly in internal or external
affairs of other States."' 2' Earlier, in the 1949 Corfu Channel case, 2 2 the
International Court of Justice had stated:
[T]he alleged right of intervention as the manifestation of the policy
of force, such as has, in the past, given rise to most serious abuses and
such as cannot . . . find a place in international law . . . [especially

U.S.T. 607, T.I.A.S. 6847.
15. See Charter of Organization of African Unity, May 25, 1963, art. III, reprinted in 2
I.L.M. 766 (1963).
16. Pact of the League of Arab States, Mar. 22, 1945, art. 8, 70 U.N.T.S. 237.
17. Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance, May 14, 1955, art. 8,
219 U.N.T.S. 3.
18. G.A. Res. 2131, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, at 12, U.N. Doc. A/6220
(1965).
19. G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 18, U.N. Doc. A/8018 (1970).
20. For a discussion of this declaration, see Nicaragua v. U.S., supra note 4, at 100,
107.
21. Supra note 4, at 108.
22. Corfu Channel Case, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 4.
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when] it would be reserved for the most powerful States, and might
easily lead to perverting the administration of international justice
itself.2
States, however, have not faithfully complied with the principle of
nonintervention, for history is replete with instances of state intervention.
In the post-War era, superpowers have often used coercive measures, directly or indirectly, against other states in flagrant violation of this principle. Examples abound: the U.S. interventions in the Dominican Republic,
Viet Nam, Grenada, and Nicaragua; the Soviet interventions in Hungary,
Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan. Similar instances can be cited
in Angola, Mozambique, and Central America. The point is that states
regularly justify forcible intervention by invoking complementary norms
of international law, such as self-defense and collective self-defense.
As an exception to the general prohibition on intervention, states
have, however, traditionally asserted their right to intervene on humanitarian grounds to protect their own nationals or a third state's nationals
in another state, or even the nationals of the state against which coercive
measures were undertaken.2 ' Most publicists writing in the late 19th century and at the turn of the 20th century supported this assertion on the
assumption that if a state denied certain minimum basic rights to the
people within its territory, any other state could remedy the situation by
intervention.25 In the words of one commentator, such intervention was,
however, justified only "in extreme cases . . . where great evils existed,
great crimes were being perpetrated, or where there was danger of race
extermination."26 Similarly, another commentator considers intervention
permissible on the grounds of "tyrannical conduct of a government towards its subjects, massacres and brutality in a civil war, or religious
2' 7
persecution.
The doctrine of humanitarian intervention is subject to a major criticism: only powerful states are able to exercise the alleged right, and hence
they are likely to abuse it, especially since international law has traditionally lacked effective safeguards against such abuse. Professor Ian Brownlie contends that humanitarian intervention was, in fact, occasionally
abused during the 19th century, and had fallen into disuse by 1945.28 Another observer, however, concludes after his study of state practice, that,
while divergences certainly existed as to the circumstances in which

23. Id. at 35.
24. See authorities cited in Fonteyne, supra note 1, at 214-226.
25. See, e.g., id.; IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE

OF FORCE BY STATES

338 nn. 1-5 (1963) for citations to the works of these publicists. See also ELLERY C.
ELL, INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL

LAW

53 (1921);

STOW-

ELLERY C. STOWELL, INTERNATIONAL

A RESTATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES IN CONFORMITY WITH ACTUAL PRACTICE 349 (1931).
26. AMOS S. HERSHEY, ESSENTIALS OF INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC LAW AND ORGANIZATION 239
(rev. ed. 1927).
27. HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 302 (4th ed. 1895).
28. See BROWNLIE, supra note 25, at 338-42.
LAW:
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resort could be had to the institution of humanitarian intervention, as
well as to the manner in which such operations were to be conducted,
accepted as an inthe principle itself was widely, if not unanimously,
29
tegral part of customary international law.
Opponents of humanitarian intervention contend that the prohibition on the use of force, which is enshrined in Article 2(4) of the U.N.
Charter, should be interpreted broadly and consistently with its plain
language. Consequently, they argue, there is no scope for considering humanitarian intervention as a valid exception to the Article 2(4) norm. 0
On the other hand, one can claim validity for humanitarian intervention by: (1) arguing that the proper interpretation of Article 2(4) would
be to proscribe the use of force when it is directed at sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political independence of a state; (2) suggesting that humanitarian intervention, by definition, does not seek to challenge these
attributes; or (3) focusing on the promotion and protection of human
rights as constituting an important obligation under the United Nations
Charter. 1 Also, the doctrine was widely accepted by states and publicists
alike under traditional international law.32
In the U.N. era, unilateral humanitarian intervention remains highly
controversial. Although publicists generally view it with skepticism, a proponent, Professor Tes6n, has recently suggested after studying four such
cases - the 1979 Tanzanian intervention in Uganda, the 1979 French
intervention in central Africa, the 1971 Indian intervention in East Pakistan, and the 1983 U.S. intervention in Grenada - that state sovereignty
and prohibition of the use of force should be interpreted in a manner
consistent with "other well-established principles - those that have to do
with upholding a modicum of human dignity."3 He concludes: "The
problem of the legal status of humanitarian intervention is not a problem
of fidelity to international law. Rather, it is one of determination of the
law and of proper balance between competing principles." 4

29. Fonteyne, supra note 1, at 235.
30. See, e.g., BROWNLIE, supra note 25, at 342; Tom Franck & Nigel Rodley, After Bangladesh: The Law of HumanitarianIntervention by Military Force, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 275,
299-302 (1973). See also Nigel Rodley, Human Rights and HumanitarianIntervention: The
Case Law of the World Court, 38 INT'L & CoMp. L.Q. 321, 327-28 (1989): "The burden of the
[I.C.J.'s] message [in Nicaragua v. U.S.] is that the United States could not [justify its military activities]; and, in the process, it has confirmed the view of those of us who argue that
the doctrine of unilateral armed humanitarian intervention has no justification at law."
(Footnote omitted).
31. See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER preamble, arts. 1, 55 and 56.
32. See, e.g., authorities cited in supra notes 24-25.
33. TEs6N, supra note 1, at 200.
34. Id. (emphasis in original). See also id. at 245: "The right of humanitarian intervention is consistent with the United Nations Charter and positively supported by state practice, when both are examined in light of [a] normative theory [under which rights of states
derive from human rights]." See also Bazyler, supra note 1, at 619:
Recent history shows the need for the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. Nations must be prepared to utilize the doctrine where necessary - not
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An observer must nevertheless acknowledge the absence of a general
consensus on the definition of humanitarian intervention, the set of criteria to judge its permissibility or impermissibility under international law,
and the safeguards necessary to prevent its abuse. However, a limited use
of humanitarian intervention, consisting of claims to rescue one's nationals or a third state's nationals, is generally regarded as permissible under
international law, even though it causes a temporary breach of a state's
territorial integrity.3 5 To illustrate, the Restatement (Third) of the For6
eign Relations Law of the United States"
states:
It is increasingly accepted that a state may take steps to rescue
victims or potential victims in an action strictly limited to that purpose and not likely to involve disproportionate destruction of life or
property in the state where the rescue takes place. Whether a state
may intervene with military force in the territory of another state
without its consent, not to rescue the victims but to prevent or terminate human rights violations, is not agreed or authoritatively determined. Such intervention might be acceptable if taken pursuant to
resolution of a United Nations body or of a regional organization such
as the Organization of American States. 7
It should be added that any use of force is subject to the limitations
of "necessity" and "proportionality."3 8
III.

CASE STUDIES

In this section, I will examine six cases of unilateral state intervention in which a claim was made that intervention was based in part on
humanitarian grounds: the United States' 1965 intervention in the Dominican Republic, 9 1983 intervention in Grenada,4" and 1989 interven-

only because of principles of justice, but also on practical grounds. Inaction
now sows the seeds of future massacres. The world cannot 'sing away the atrocities in Ethiopia.
35. See, e.g., the statement by the U.S. representative during the U.N. Security Council
debate on the Entebbe rescue mission by Israel, in which he justified Israel's action:
There is a well established right to use limited force for the protection of
one's own nationals from the imminent threat of injury or death in a situation
where the States in whose territory they are located is either unwilling or unable to protect them. The right ... is limited to such use of force as is necessary and appropriate to protect threatened nationals from injury.
U.N. Doc. S/PV. 1941 (1976).
36. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
(1987).
37. Id. at § 703 Comment e. See also id. at § 905.
38. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Use of Force: Law and U.S. Policy, in COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 37, 45 (2d ed.
1991). See generally Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L.
REV. 1620 (1984); Symposium: The Use of Force in the Post-Cold War Era, 20 DENV. J.
RELATIONS, RIGHT V. MIGHT -

INT'L L. & POL'Y 1 (1991).

39. See infra § I11(A).
40. See infra § IIl(E).
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tion in Panama; 1 India's 1972 intervention in East Pakistan;" Tanzania's
1979 intervention in Uganda;48 and Vietnam's 1978 intervention in
Cambodia."
A.

The 1965 U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic"

The U.S. marines landed in Santo Domingo on April 28, 1965,4 four
days after an internal conflict began in the Dominican Republic. 4 7 The
United States justified its action on several grounds,' including humanitarian intervention."' The State Department Memorandum outlining legal bases for U.S. action in the Dominican Republic specifically stated
that the landing of the U.S. troops was "an emergency action to protect
lives," which was taken "under conditions in which immediate action was
essential to preserve the lives of ... nationals of the United States and
many other countries."5 Justifying the action on humanitarian grounds,
the Memorandum said that the action was taken
after the United States had been officially notified by Dominican authorities that they were no longer able to preserve order. The factual
circumstances of the breakdown of order in the Dominican Republican [sic] were such that the landing could not have been delayed beyond the time it actually took place without needless sacrifice of lives
...[including] foreign nationals ....5'
Similarly, in several statements President Johnson made following
the sending of the U.S. marines to the Dominican Republic, 2 he reiterated the necessity of taking this action because the military authorities in
the Dominican Republic had informed the U.S. government that lives of
American and foreign nationals were in danger, the Dominican authorities were "no longer able to guarantee their safety," and the assistance of
U.S. military personnel was needed for their protection. In a statement
President Johnson made at a news conference on June 17, 1965, 3 he explicitly recalled the situation preceding his decision to send the U.S.

41. See infra § III(F).
42. See infra § III(B).
43. See infra § III(C).
44. See infra § III(D).
45. In this section I have relied extensively on my prior work, Ved Nanda, The United
States, Action in the 1965 Dominican Crisis: Impact on World Order, 43 DENV. L. J. 439
(1966) (Part I); 44 DENY. L. J. 225 (1967) (Part II).
46. See N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1965, at Al.

47. See U.S. Acts to Meet Threat in Dominican Republic, 52 DEP'T ST. BULL. 738
(1965) (President's statements on sending the United States marines to the Dominican
Republic).
48. See generally Nanda, supra note 45, Pt. I, at 443-44 (enumerating several claims
forwarded by the United States).
49. See id. at 472-79.

50. 111

CONG.

REC. 10733 (daily ed. May 20, 1965).

51. Id. at 10734.
52. See 52 DEP'T ST. BULL. 738 (1965); 53 DEP'T ST. BULL. 19, 20 (1965).
53. See 53 DEP'T ST. BULL. 19 (1965).
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troops. He said that Ambassador Bennett was talking to him over the
phone from under his desk as he had "a thousand American men, women,
and children assembled in the hotel who were pleading with their President for help to preserve their lives," and while "bullets were going
through [Ambassador Bennett's] windows.

54

The President further said

that
as we had to go into the Congo to preserve the lives of American citizens and haul them out when they were being shot at, we went into
the Dominican Republic to preserve the lives of American citizens and
the citizens of a good many other nations ....

We removed 5,600

people from 46 nations, and we didn't sprain an ankle doing it.""
This assertion was reiterated by several United States government
officials, including Ambassadors Bunker," Stevenson 57 and Bennett;58
Secretary of State Rusk;5 9 Undersecretaries Mann60 and Ball;61 Legal Adviser to the Department of State Meeker;6" and the President's special
adviser to the Dominican Republic, former Ambassador Martin."
Following the U.S. intervention, on May 1, 1965, the Organization of
American States (OAS) sent a special committee to the Dominican Republic to offer its good offices to obtain, urgently, a cease fire.6 On May
14, the U.N. Security Council adopted a resolution, inviting the Secretary-General "to send, as an urgent measure, a representative to the Dominican Republic for the purpose of reporting to the Security Council on

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
said:

Id. at 20.
Id.
See 52 DEP'T ST. BULL. 854, 859, 861 (1965).
See id. at 739-40, 876-77.
See 111 CONG. REc. 23668, 23669 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1965) (speech in Atlanta).
See 52 DEP'T ST. BULL. 842-43, 938 (1965) (press conference of May 26, 1965). He

As late as 4 o'clock in the afternoon of that Wednesday, we had in front of
us reports from our Ambassador in which he himself was not recommending
that we use our own forces with respect to that situation. But then, as you now
know from other sources, the President and Secretary of Defense and I were in
a meeting on another matter and about 5:15 we were handed a telegram from
our Ambassador, saying that the situation had completely deteriorated, disintegrated, that the police and military authorities there had indicated that
they could no longer undertake responsibility for the security of American and
foreign nationals, and that if these people were to be safe, U.S. forces would
have to be employed.
Id. at 942.
60. See 53 DEP'T ST. BULL. 733-34 (1965).
61. See 52 DEP'T ST. BULL. 1045-46 (1965).
62. See 53 DEP'T ST. BULL. 61-64 (1965).
63. See V. Martin, Inside the Drama and Chaos of the Dominican Upheaval, LIFE,
May 28, 1965, reprinted in 111 CONG. REc. 23299 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1965).
64. See 52 DEP'T ST. BULL. 741 (1965) for the text of a resolution adopted on May 1,
1965, by the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, under which the
special committee was dispatched.
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the present situation.""6 The Secretary-General's representative arrived
on the scene on May 18, 1965.66 Subsequently, the bulk of the U.S. troops
formed the core of an Inter-American Peace Force which was established
with the "sole purpose" of cooperating in the restoration of normal condi67
tions in the Dominican Republic.
The OAS committee was successful in negotiating a cease-fire on
May 5.68 This, however, did not last long, for on May 13, armed hostilities
started again.6 9 Eventually, on May 21, another cease-fire was arranged
through the good offices of both the United Nations and the OAS.70 This
was followed by the formation of a provisional government on September
3, 1965.1' General elections in the Dominican Republic were held in June
1966; 7' a gradual withdrawal of the Inter-American forces started in July
1966 and was completed on September 21, 1966.71
Opponents of the U.S. intervention challenged the action, suggesting
that the United States had overreacted and had failed to provide sufficient evidence to justify the necessity of such action, 7 " and asserting that
while the action was undertaken "on the pretext of protecting American
lives," its real reason lay in other political objectives.7 However, the U.S.
is to be faulted primarily not because of its failure to meet the necessity
criterion, but on other grounds. First, its action was not limited to accomplishing that objective. It also claimed other objectives for its intervention: (1) to prevent a Communist takeover, and (2) to take unilateral action to give the OAS competence to address the situation.7 6 Second, the
U.S. intervention was not limited in duration; troops stayed in the Dominican Republic for over a year, long after there was any perceived or
claimed justification for its presence to protect American lives. Third, the
question has been raised about the validity of the request by the Dominican military junta for the U.S. armed forces.7 7 Finally, the action was uni-

65. See U.N. Doc. S/RES/203 (1965).
66. See U.N. Docs. S/6358, S/6365, S/6369 (1965) (Secretary-General's reports to the
Security Council on the appointment, and on his arrival in Santo Domingo).
67. For the text of the resolution establishing this force, see 52 DEP'T ST. BULL. 862-63
(1965). See also U.N. Doc. S/381, at 3 (OAS Secretary-General's speech after the signing of
the Constituent Act, Inter-American Armed Forces, at Santo Domingo on May 28, 1965).
68. See OAS Off. Rec. OEA/Ser. F/11. 10 Doc. 38 Rev., reprinted in 52 DEP'T ST. BULL.
868 (1965)(Text of the Act of Santo Domingo).

69. See generally TED SZULC, DOMINICAN DIARY 207-68 (1965).
70. For a summary report, see UN MONTHLY CHRON., 1965, at 9-10.
71. For the OAS report to the U.N. Secretary-General on the formation of the provisional government, see U.N. Doc. S/6676 (1965).
72. See Paul L. Montgomery, Balaquer Defeats Bosch in Dominican Balloting, N.Y.
TIMES, June 3, 1966, at 1, col. 7.
73. See O.A.S. Peace Force Starts Pullout, N.Y. TIMEs, June 29, 1966, at 16, col. 1; see
also N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1966, at 3, col. 1.
74. See Nanda, supra note 45, Pt. I, at 464-65.
75. See, e.g., UN MONTHLY CHRON., 1965, at 3, 4 (speech in the Security Council by the
Soviet representative).
76. See Nanda, supra note 45, Pt. II.
77. See id., Pt. I, at 465-67.
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78
lateral, without prior consultation with the OAS or the United Nations.
79
Thus, the United States did not meet the test of proportionality.

B.

India's 1971 Intervention in East Pakistan (Bangladesh)

The genesis of this intervention lies in the partition of India in 1947
which created the state of Pakistan, composed of two disparate, parts
physically separated by a distance of over 1,000 miles and also divided by
ethnic, cultural, and linguistic differences. 80 The two elements tending to
bind these parts - a common religion, Islam, and alienation from India
- did not suffice to ensure stability. By the late 1960s the economic and
political domination of East Pakistan by West Pakistan had caused serious political unrest in East Pakistan.
In the Pakistani general elections of December 1970, the Awami
League party, led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, won an overwhelming victory, capturing 167 of 313 seats in the National Assembly on a program of
political and economic autonomy for East Pakistan.81 The election results
were apparently unacceptable to the elites in West Pakistan who, undoubtedly, faced with some alarm the East Pakistani demand for autonomy and the prospects of being ruled by the East Pakistani Awami
League party.
In early 1971, negotiations for the convening of the National Assembly to draft a constitution broke down, causing the simmering unrest in
East Pakistan to surface in mass demonstrations against the Pakistani
government. This crisis was intensified by Sheikh Mujib's call for noncooperation with the government. Serious acts of civil disobedience followed, including refusal to pay taxes and a total strike in government
offices and businesses. The East Bengali mood began to reflect a desire
for complete independence as opposed to mere autonomy.
Eventually, on March 25, 1971, the Pakistani military struck Dacca
without warning and initiated a reign of terror throughout East Pakistan
which continued with increasing intensity until December 1971.82 Villages

78. See id. at 467-68.
79. See id. at 468-70.
80. For events leading to the eventual breakup of Pakistan, see generally Ved Nanda,
Self-Determination in InternationalLaw, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 321, 323 (1972); Ved Nanda, A
Critique of the United Nations Inaction in the Bangladesh Crisis, 49 DENY. L. J. 53, 54-56
(1972); Choudhury, Bangladesh: Why It Happened, 48 INT'L AFF. 242 (1972); International
Commission of Jurists, The Events in East Pakistan 1971 (1972), and the authorities cited
in these publications.
81. On the election results, see Ministry of External Affairs, Republic of India, Bangla
Desh Documents, cited in 4 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y. 550 (1971); FAR EASTERN EcONOMIC
REV., Jan. 9, 1971, at 19-21. The text of the Awami League Manifesto is reprinted at 4
N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y. 524 (1971).

82. For accounts of the alleged atrocities by the Pakistani army, see Hearings Before
the Subcomm. to Investigate Problems Connected with the Refugees and Escapees of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong. 1st Sess., pt. 1 at 95-226, pt. II at 311-53, pt. III
at 431-81 (1971) [hereinafter Senate Hearings]; Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Asian
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were burned; civilians were indiscriminately killed; Hindus were massacred, as were university teachers and students, lawyers, doctors, Awami
League leaders, and Bengali military and police officials. 83 The horror of
these events led observers to accuse the Pakistani armed forces and
razakars, the local volunteer militiamen who were collaborators of the
Pakistani armed forces in East Bengal, of committing selective genocide,
purportedly to deprive East Pakistan of Bengali leadership.84
By December 1970, this wave of terror forced approximately 10 million people to flee from East Pakistan and take refuge in India. 5 This put
a severe strain on India-Pakistan relations and on December 3, 1971, fullscale war erupted between the two nations.
The war lasted two weeks, with horrible destruction: "Thirty million
people dislocated by the war. More than 1.5 million homes destroyed.
Nine million refugees returning from India to rebuild their lives and
homes. War damage drastically reducing rail traffic. Key rail and road
bridges destroyed.""6 According to the Swiss U.N. Chief in Dacca, Toni
Hagen, the destruction suffered by Bangladesh was greater than that suffered by Europe in World War 11.87 On December 16, 1971, India won the
and Pacific Affairs of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 92d Cong. 1st Sess., at 35-590
(1971).
83. See Schwarz, Bloody Baptism for Bangladesh, MANCHESTER GUARDIAN WEEKLY,
Dec. 25, 1971, at 4, cols. 1, 3.
84. See Norman Cousins, Genocide in East Pakistan,SATURDAY REV., May 22, 1971, at
20; Shaplen, A Reporter at Large: The Birth of Bangladesh, NEW YORKER, Feb. 12, 1972, at
40, 65, where the author quotes the resident editor of the Indian Express (New Delhi) as
describing in May 1971 the Pakistani action as "a demographic war" designed to "destroy or
drive out those whom it considers immediately or prospectively undesirable." The first thorough expos6 was published in Mascarenhas, SUNDAY TIMES (London), June 13, 1971, reprinted in Senate Hearings, supra note 82, pt. 1, at 120 (with accompanying editorial at
118).
85. This is the reported number of refugees. See Mehta, Letter From West Bengal,
NEW YORKER, Dec. 11, 1971, at 166; Bengalis' Land a Vast Cemetery, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24,
1972, at 1, col. 5; Swaran Singh Says India Seeks No Pakistani Land, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13,
1971, at 16, col. 3 (statement of India's Defense Minister Singh); THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, Dec. 18, 1971, at 14, col. 1; N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1971, at 46, col. 1 (editorial); id. at
47, col. 1 (statement by John Lewis, former U.S. AID director of India, 1964-69). For a
Reuter report on the return of all the refugees to Bangladesh, see THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, Mar. 28, 1972, at 19, col. 2. For a succinct account, see Crisis in South Asia - A
Report by Senator Edward M. Kennedy to the Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees (Nov. 1, 1971).
86. Winder, Bangladesh: a Race for Solutions, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Apr.
4, 1972, at 1, col. 2. See also Ved Nanda, Bangladesh Economy in Ruin, ROCKY MTN. NEWS,
Oct. 1, 1972, at 1, col. 1.
87. See Bleak Future, TIME, Feb. 28, 1972, at 30. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman estimated
that the Pakistanis may have killed three million Bengalis. See also Mujib Says Trials Are
Set For PakistaniP.O.W.'s, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1972, at 3, col. 1; TIME, Feb. 28, 1972, at
30. The police chief in Dacca is reported to have described the "slaughter of East Pakistan"
in these words: "The whole country is a mass grave. Who knows how many millions have
been killed?" 'Who Knows How Many Millions Have Been Killed' in the East?, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 22, 1971, at A14, col. 1. A New York Times correspondent reported a month after the
surrender that he found "on a recent tour of the countryside, that almost every town in East
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war, and on December 17 it declared a unilateral cease-fire after the surrender of the Pakistani armed forces. 8 This resulted in the rebirth of
East Pakistan into a new independent country, Bangladesh.
India justified its intervention on two grounds: to protect the Bengalis from gross and persistent violation of their human rights by the
Pakistani armed forces, and to address the problem of ten million Bengali
refugees on Indian territory. In the Security Council discussion on India's
intervention, the representative of India urged the Council on December
6, 1971, to "consider some realities." 89 He said:
Refugees were a reality. Genocide and oppression were a reality.
The extinction of all civil rights was a reality. Provocation and aggression of various kinds by Pakistan from March 25 onwards were a reality. Bangladesh itself was a reality, as was its recognition by India.
The Council was nowhere near reality.90
Subsequently, on December 12, he said:
It was not India which declared or started war; it was not India
which was responsible for creating the conditions that led to the present unfortunate conflict; it was not India which deliberately and systematically refused to meet the aspirations of the 75 million people
inhabiting the country, once part of Pakistan; it was not India which
perpetuated the repression, genocide and brutality which provided the
springboard for the freedom movement of Bangla Desh, which led to
the decision of the people of that region to create a free and independent nation; it was not India which forsook the long period of nine
months during which a reasonable political settlement could have
been evolved with the leaders and people of Bangla Desh.
The United Nations had been unable to deal with the root cause
of the problem in East Bengal. Informal consultations in the Security
Council in July and August indicated that the international community could not, due to limitations born of its commitments to the doctrine of domestic jurisdiction, act in the matter. In the face of a direct
violation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the provisions of Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter by Pakistan, the Security
Council and the United Nations should have found themselves in a
Pakistan had one or more of these graveyards where the Pakistanis killed hundreds of
thousands of Bengalis, apparently often on a daily basis, throughout their 9 months of military occupation." Bengalies' Land a Vast Cemetery, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1972, at Al, col. 5.
See also East PakistanisShot in Reprisal, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1971, at Al, col. 2; What's
News, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 1972 at Al, col. 3; A Journalistis Linked to Murder of Bengalis, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 1972, at Al, col. 6; Day of Terror for 50,000 Bengalis: Thousands
Were Slain, Homes Razed, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1971, at A2, col. 6. In Khulna alone, the
number of people killed at one execution site is estimated at between 10,000 and 15,000.
MOTHERLAND (New Delhi), Jan. 30, 1972, at 8, col. 3.
88. See Statement by Mrs. Gandhi on Truce and Surrender, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17,
1971, at A16, col. 5 (Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's statement in the Indian Parliament on
the truce and surrender).
89. UN MONTHLY CHRON., Jan. 1972, at 3, 25.
90. Id.
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position to intervene and persuade Pakistan to return to reason. That
did not happen. While developments proceeded on their inexorable
course towards the present tragedy, the United Nations continued to
be inhibited by considerations of domestic jurisdiction.9 1
After two resolutions calling for a cease-fire were vetoed by the Soviet Union,92 the Security Council eventually adopted a resolution, deciding to refer the question to the General Assembly,93 as apparently there
were no prospects for a consensus among the major powers.
The Assembly met twice on December 794 and adopted a resolution,
by a vote of 104 in favor to eleven against, with ten abstentions, which
called for an immediate cease-fire and a mutual troop withdrawal by India and Pakistan.9 5 Since India did not comply with the Assembly recommendations, the Council was again called into session at the request of
the United States. The Council met seven times between December 12
and 21.96 The Soviet Union vetoed one more resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire and troop withdrawal;" and finally the Council
adopted a resolution on December 21, by which it demanded that a durable cease-fire and cessation of all hostilities on the India-Pakistan subcontinent be strictly observed until troop withdrawals had taken place. 98
Ironically, India had already unilaterally declared a cease-fire on December 17 after the surrender of the Pakistani armed forces. 99
This round of Council meetings is of significance only in its rehash of
the earlier arguments. Pakistan accused India of "aggression" and violation of its territorial integrity, while several representatives called for
both a cease-fire and a political settlement in East Pakistan, referring to
the Pakistan oppression in East Pakistan and the need to acknowledge
the wishes of people in East Pakistan. However, as the eventual surrender
of the Pakistani army became imminent, the tone of the Council debates
shifted from an emphasis on an immediate cease-fire to a fresh concern
for a political settlement. For instance, on the evening of December 15,
1971, the Soviet delegate said that "many delegations had told him personally that the Soviet approach to the solution of the problem regarding
the interrelationship between cessation of hostilities and a political settlement, was perfectly correct." 100 The delegate from Ceylon (now Sri

91. See id. at 29.
92. See id. at 19, 20.
93. See id. at 25.
94. For a summary report, see id. at 89-91.
95. G.A. Res. 2793 (XXVI) (1971). The text is contained in UN MONTHLY CHRON., Jan.
1972, at 91.
96. For a summary report, see id. at 26-45.
97. For the text of the draft resolution, see id. at 28. For voting on the resolution, see
id. at 34.
98. S.C. Res. 307 (1971). For the text, see id. at 45-46.
99. See N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1971, at A16, col. 5 (Prime Minister Gandhi's statement
in the Parliament of India on the truce and surrender).
100. UN MONTHLY CHRON., Jan. 1972, at 38.
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Lanka) considered "a political settlement in East Pakistan to be central
to any solution, and negotiations between the Government of Pakistan
and the acknowledged leaders of the people of East Pakistan to be the
only effective and legitimate means of achieving it."""
Commentators were divided in their response to India's intervention.
Some considered it a valid act of "humanitarian intervention,"'' 2 while
others argued that it was unlawful.' 0 3 An observer must, however, conclude that there was no doubt regarding the nature or extent of the
Pakistani military's atrocities on Bengalis. The United Nations' inaction
over a period of nine months of continuing onslaught in East Pakistan is
equally well documented. India promptly withdrew its forces. Also, India
was not condemned at the United Nations for its intervention. As to India's motives, it unquestionably must have welcomed the opportunity to
split Pakistan into two countries and weaken it, thereby minimizing the
perceived threat to India from a strong neighbor. However, in Security
Council discussions, the Indian representative's statement is worth noting, as he said: "We are glad that we have on this particular occasion
nothing but the purest of motives and the purest of intentions: to rescue
the people of East Bengal from what they are suffering.' 0 4
C.

Tanzania's 1978 Intervention in Uganda

Throughout Idi Amin's dictatorship of Uganda, the world community
found itself outraged by the gross and consistent pattern of human rights
violations that occurred.' 0 5 Reports of public executions, rape, torture,
and arbitrary arrests surfaced from a variety of sources. 0 6 Estimates were
that nearly 300,000 people perished at the hands of the regime and that
thousands more were forced to flee.' Amnesty International concluded
in its June 1978 report that convincing evidence existed to indicate that
the Ugandan military regime was in fact responsible for these atrocious
violations of human rights.' 06
After years of human rights violations in Uganda, as well as a series
of border skirmishes between Tanzania and Uganda, Tanzanian troops,
along with Ugandan exiles and refugees, launched a full scale invasion
101. Id.
102. See, e.g., HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 17-19 (R. Lillich
ed., 1973) (Michael Reisman's comments); TES6N, supra note 1, at 186-87.

103. See, e.g. Franck & Rodley, supra note 30; Ian Brownlie, Thoughts on KindHearted Gunmen, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 139 (R. Lillich
ed., 1973).
104. 26 U.N.S.C. Off. Rec., 160th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV. 1606, at 18 (1971).
105. See generally Farooq Hassan, Realpolitik in InternationalLaw: After TanzanianUgandan Conflict "HumanitarianIntervention" Reexamined, 17 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 859
(1981).
106. See Amnesty International, Human Rights in Uganda, Report, June 1978, Doc.
AFR 59/05/78 [hereinafter AI Report].
107. See Hassan, supra note 105, at 896.
108. See AI Report, supra note 106, at 19.

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 20:2

into Uganda. By April 11, 1979, within four months of the time the invasion began, the mission to overthrow Amin was completed, and the
Ugandan National Liberation Front (UNLF) had formed a provisional
government."0 9 In spite of the rejoicing by the Ugandans and relief felt by
the world community, this was a transgression of Uganda's sovereignty
that raised the issue of permissible humanitarian intervention.
Undoubtedly, the Amin regime persistently and grossly violated the
basic human rights of the Ugandan people. Amin's barbarous, and well
documented, treatment of Ugandan and foreign nationals alike left little
question as to how extreme the violations had become."' While many
countries condemned the actions of Amin, nothing tangible was done by
the United Nations or the Organization of African Unity to put to an end
the regime's abhorrent conduct. There existed such a widespread loss of
life, as well as many other deprivations of human rights,' that the need
for intervention was apparent.
Tanzania's actions appear, however, to have failed the test of proportionality. Tanzanian troops were without a doubt the decisive element in
Uganda's liberation. 2 Tanzanian troops, which numbered in excess of
20,000, emerged as the ultimate liberators. 3 While Tanzania would have
been justified in protecting exiles and defending its borders from the
Ugandans, the amount of force used to overthrow the incumbent regime
far exceeded that required to accomplish these goals." 4
As to the duration of intervention, months after the fighting ended,
Tanzanian troops still occupied much of the nation they had liberated.
After the intended goal of liberation was accomplished, withdrawal was
slow to occur. It appeared that Tanzanian troops stayed long after their
objectives could be viewed as "humanitarian."""
As to the purpose of intervention, Tanzania's motives seemed to be
partly for humanitarian reasons, but mainly out of self interest. Although
Tanzania "often decried Amin's human rights record," Tanzanian intervention was undertaken not merely to rectify an immediate human rights
problem.' 6 From the outset of the conflict, Tanzania justified its intervention as being a reaction to the armed attack launched by Uganda at
the end of October 1978.117 Tanzania "seemed determined to pursue a
military solution and overthrow Amin's government." ' Had Tanzania

109.

NATALINO RONZITTI, RESCUING

NATIONALS ABROAD THROUGH MILITARY COERCION

AND INTERVENTION ON GROUNDS OF HUMANITY 102 (1985).

110. See AI Report, supra note 106, at 19.
111. See id. at 12.
112. See Hassan, supra note 105, at 905.
113. See id.
114. See Burrows, Tanzania's Interventionin Uganda: Some Legal Aspects, 35 WORLD
TODAY 306, 308 (1979).
115. See Hassan, supra note 105, at 898.
116. See id. at 893.
117. See RONZITTI, supra note 109, at 102.
118. See Hassan, supra note 105, at 893.
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"sincerely only wanted the Ugandan government to recognize the sanctity
of human life, it should have drastically curtailed its forces following the
fall of Kampala and completely withdrawn after the war."' " 9
The action was also clearly unilateral. Tanzania's President Nyerere
made this clear when he stated: "What we did was exemplary at a time
when the OAU found itself unable to condemn Amin .... When African
nations find themselves collectively incapable of punishing a single country, then each country has to look after itself.' 120 Although the majority
of the world community would have liked to see Amin removed as president, it was only through the actions of the Tanzanian government acting
unilaterally that such a goal was finally accomplished.
Finally, how should alternatives and outcomes be balanced? First, inhumane treatment and the massive loss of life of Ugandans was a fact.
Second, although many countries had condemned Amin for such gross
violations of human rights, nothing was done to immediately stop them.
Thus, while one could argue that the Tanzanian intervention was not justified in many respects, it seemed necessary to put an end Amin's egregious behavior. In fact, the Tanzanian action was welcomed by most
12 1
members of the world community.
D.

Vietnam's 1978 Intervention in Cambodia

In April 1975, the Khmer Rouge forces took control of the
Kampuchean capital of Phnom Penh and defeated the remains of the republican government.' 22 Immediately afterward, the Pol Pot regime began a program of reorganization that led to human rights violations of the
worst sort. 2 3 Reports of torture, killings, and mass deportation became
well documented. 2 " In a three-year period, it is estimated that more than
2 million lives, out of a population of 7 million, were lost through disease,
starvation, and slaughter.' 25
In spite of the outrage by the international community, no concrete
measures were taken "to prevent the continued perpetration of atrocities
in Kampuchea."' 26 Instead, reports continued of how hundreds of

119. Id. at 894.
120. Cited in S.K. Chatterjee, Some Legal Problems of Support Role in International
Law: Tanzania and Uganda, 30 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 755, 757 (1981).
121. See id. at 767.
122. See, e.g., Bazyler, supra note 1, at 551.
123. See RONZIrrI, supra note 109, at 98.
124. For a more detailed account, see Hearing before the Senate Subcommittee on
East-Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations on the Current Situation in Indochina: Regional Political Developments; The Cambodian-Vietnamese Conflicts; Refugee Problems; S. Res. 323, Relating to Human Rights in Cambodia, and S. Res.
469, Concerning the Inhumane Acts of the Government of Cambodia Against the People of
Cambodia, Aug. 21, 1978, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) [hereinafter Hearing on East Asia].
125. Id.

126. See
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supra note 109, at 98.
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thousands of refugees were still fleeing to neighboring countries.'1 7 Finally, on December 25, 1978, the Vietnamese army, along with the Popular Liberation Front (PLF), invaded Kampuchea and gained control of
the government."18 The invasion marked the end of the Pol Pot regime
and the installation of the Vietnamese-supported Peoples' Republic of
Kampuchea.
There exists no doubt that the Kampuchean people suffered some of
the most egregious human rights violations ever documented. Their case
under the Khmer Rouge regime became "a perfect candidate for humanitarian intervention.""' 9 Undoubtedly, gross and persistent human rights
violations occurred, along with alleged acts of genocide, as is evidenced by
the deaths of nearly one-third of the Kampuchean population during the
Pol Pot regime. As stated by the chairman of the United Nations Human
Rights Subcommission, the human rights violations by the Khmer Rouge
were "the most serious to have occurred anywhere since Nazism. "130
The Vietnamese invasion failed the test of proportionality.
Thousands of Vietnamese troops were used to overthrow the Khmer
Rouge and were the virtual creators of the PLF."1 1 The Vietnamese were,
in essence, controlling operations, and even a decade after the invasion
continued to keep troops and advisors in Kampuchea.' 3 The amount of
force used and the duration of intervention can in no way be justified as
merely humanitarian, considering the massive role the Vietnamese played
in overthrowing the Khmer Rouge.
As to the motives of the Vietnamese, there is some doubt as to
whether their purpose was in fact merely humanitarian. The Vietnamese
were known to harbor territorial ambitions over Kampuchea, and were
themselves frequent abusers of human rights.1 3' In fact, Vietnam had at
first "denied that it had even invaded Kampuchea," and later asserted
that they never even gave military help to the PLF.13' These flagrantly
incredible remarks, combined with the violent and hostile attitudes the
Vietnamese and Pol Pot's regime had for each other,"" were strong indicators that Vietnam's intervention was undertaken for other than humanitarian reasons.
The Vietnamese acted unilaterally, without seeking "the assistance of
any other nation when invading Kampuchea. Moreover, before taking
unilateral action, Vietnam did not ask for approval of the United Nations
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or any regional organization."1 36 In fact, the majority of the international
community, with the exception of the Soviet Union and some of its aligned states, openly condemned Vietnam's actions and refused to recognize the new government.3 7
It must be added that the international community, including the
United Nations, took no effective action to respond to the tragedy in
Kampuchea. It took three years to get the issue of human rights violations by the Khmer Rouge on the United Nations' agenda.13 8 Even then,
actions were postponed. There was no diplomatic solution available; only
the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea put an end to Pol Pot's regime. 13 9
E.

40
The 1983 U.S. Intervention in Grenada1

On October 25, 1983, the United States led an armed intervention in
Grenada; assisting 1,900 U.S. troops were 300 soldiers from six Caribbean
states."" In announcing the landing of these troops in Grenada, President
Reagan said that the action was taken in response to "an urgent, formal
request" from the five-member Organization of Eastern Caribbean States
(OECS) "to assist in a joint effort to restore order and democracy" in
Grenada.4 He justified the U.S. action,
in part, on the ground that it was
3
needed to protect American lives.'
The invasion force, which eventually grew to 7,000, met little resistance and succeeded in just three days in securing "all significant military
objectives . . . including the two airports, the campuses of the St. George's
University School of Medicine, the Governor-General's residence, the radio and power stations, Forts Frederick and Rupert, and the Richmond
Hill prison."' 4 4 Within a week, the remaining pockets of resistance were

136. Id.
137. See RONZIrri, supra note 109, at 99.
138. See Bazyler, supra note 1, at 553.
139. See Eric Lane, Mass Killing by Governments: Lawful in the World Legal Order?,
12 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y. 239, 276 (1979).
140. I have relied extensively on my prior work, Ved Nanda, The United States Armed
Intervention in Grenada - Impact on World Order, 14 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 395 (1984). See
also TES6N, supra note 1, 188-99; Gordon, Bilder, Rovine & Wallace, InternationalLaw and
the United States Action in Grenada:A Report, 18 INT'L LAW. 331 (1984) [hereinafter Report]; Isaak I. Dore, The U.S. Invasion of Grenada: Resurrection of the "Johnson Doctrine?," 20 STAN. J. INT'L L. 173 (1984); Doswald-Beck, The Legality of the U.S. Intervention in Grenada, 31 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 362-66 (1984); John Moore, Grenada and the
InternationalDouble Standard, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 145 (1984); Christopher Joiner, The
United States Action in Grenada - Reflections on the Lawfulness of the Invasion, id. at
131; see also Detlev F. Vagts, InternationalLaw Under Time Pressure: Grading the Grenada Take-Home Examination, id. at 169.
141. See Assault Force Spearheaded by U.S. Troops Invades Grenada and Seizes
Both Airports, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1983, at 1, col. 1, 6.
142. Grenada - A Preliminary Report 1 (Dept. of State and Dept. of Defense, Wash.
D.C., Dec. 16, 1983) [hereinafter Grenada Rep.].
143. See id.
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eliminated.' 45 United States casualties included eighteen killed and 116
wounded in action, while forty-five Grenadian civilians were killed and
337 wounded, and twenty-four Cubans were killed in action and fifty-nine
wounded.' 46 The U.S. forces began withdrawing from the island in early
November 1983.'14 The last 950 U.S. Combat
troops left Grenada in mid48
December, seven weeks after the invasion.'

On November 3, 1983, the Queen's representative and the only civilian authority on the island announced that he would appoint a broadbased nonpolitical interim government, and expressed hope that elections
to form a government would take place within six months.' 9 An interim
governing council was appointed on November 9, 1983, and sworn in on
November 15.' 0 The Council promised to hold elections "as soon as practical," and its legal adviser announced that a state of emergency imposed
in Grenada after the U.S. invasion had been lifted. The Council established an Advisory Tribunal to review the cases of persons under detention and, after reviewing these cases, the tribunal decided that thirty-nine
prisoners should continue in detention.' 5 ' Following the invasion, Grenada began receiving foreign economic assistance, the bulk of which was
provided by the United States. 52
For several months preceding the intervention, Grenada's Marxist regime was torn by internal dissension. On October 14, 1983, Prime Minister Maurice Bishop was placed under house arrest. On October 19, a
crowd freed Bishop and proceeded to Fort Rupert. Bishop took over the
Fort while the crowd disarmed the garrison. In a few hours, the
Grenadian People's Revolutionary Army troops captured Bishop, as well
as three of his ministers and two union leaders, brought them into the
Fort's courtyard and executed them.
Subsequent events included the formation of a Revolutionary Military Council (RMC) headed by General Austin, an official proclamation
of a round-the-clock, shoot-on-sight curfew, more arrests, the closing of
the Pearls Airport, and the cancellation of flights. During the next five
days there was disorder in Grenada. International journalists and diplo145.
Oct. 31,
146.
147.
sador to
"already

See, e.g., U.S. Troops Patrol as Grenada Edges Closer to Normal, N.Y. TIMES,
1983, at Al, col. 6.
Grenada Rep., supra note 142, at 1.
See, e.g., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1983, at A7, col. 2, for the statement by U.S. AmbasGrenada, Charles A. Gillespie, claiming that the number of remaining troops had
been cut down to around 1,000."
148. See, e.g., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1983, at Al, col. 2; Editorial, Remember Grenada?,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1983, at 24, col. 1; Grenada Rep., supra note 142, at 1.
149. See New Government for Grenada Due Early Next Week, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4,
1983, at Al, col. 4. See also Grenadian Aide of U.N. Says He Will Form an Interim Government, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1983, at A8, col. 1.
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Nov. 16, 1983, at A5.
151. Grenada Collective Action, GIST, Jan. 1984, at 2 (U.S. Dept. of State).
152. Id.

1992

HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

mats were not permitted entry into the country. However, on October 22,
1983, two U.S. diplomats from Barbados arrived on a charter flight to
discuss evacuation of U.S. nationals. Two more U.S. diplomats arrived by
another charter flight on October 23. The Grenadian authorities denied
that there was any need for evacuation. On October 24, a few small planes
were allowed to land and depart, but the airport was not open to normal
traffic. The invasion occurred the next day.
U.N. Security Council discussion on the issue was spirited. The invasion was condemned "with varying degrees of harshness" by most of the
speakers, and defended only by a small number of Caribbean States. 5 '
On October 28, 1983, the Council's vote on a resolution deploring the invasion was eleven in favor, one (the United States) against, and three
(Britain, Togo, and Zaire) abstaining. 54 The resolution, vetoed by the
United States, stated that the Security Council "DEEPLY DEPLORES
the armed intervention in Grenada, which constitutes a flagrant violation
of international law and of the independence, sovereignty and territorial
integrity of that State." '55 The resolution also called for "an immediate
cessation of the armed intervention and the immediate withdrawal of the
foreign troops from Grenada."' 56 Subsequently, on November 2, the U.N.
General Assembly adopted a resolution virtually identical to the Security
Council Resolution of October 28 by a recorded vote of 108 in favor to
nine against, with twenty-seven abstentions.'57 In a separate recorded
vote of seventy-one in favor to twenty-three against, with forty-one abstentions, the Assembly approved a Belgian amendment calling for free
elections in Grenada "as rapidly as possible to choose its government
democratically."' 58
On November 6, 1983, the U.N. Secretary-General reported that he
had sent Diego Cordovez, Under Secretary-General for Special Political
Affairs, to Grenada where he held a number of consultations during his
stay.' 59 Among the items discussed were the multinational force established by the OECS (numbering about 300 and supported by a U.S. Task
Force on land and off-shore), withdrawal of the U.S. combat forces, formation of an Advisory Council by Governor-General Sir Paul Scoon, and
preparations for general elections.' 60
On the day following the intervention, the Permanent Council of the

153. See Richard Bernstein, U.S. Vetoes U.N. Resolution 'Deploring' Grenada Invasion, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1983, at 1, col. 4.
154. Id.
155. Operative Paragraph 1 of the Resolution, reprinted in Text of the U.N. Resolution, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1983, at 4, col. 3.
156. Id. at Operative Paragraph 4.
157. See Assembly Calls for Cessation of "Armed Intervention" in Grenada, UN
MONTHLY CHRON., Jan. 1984, at 4 [hereinafter Cessation].
158. Id.
159. U.N. Doc. A/38/568, Nov. 6, 1983. For a summary of the report, see Cessation,
supra note 157, at 5.
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Organization of American States met in an extraordinary session. ' At
that session, representatives of several Latin American States, including
Colombia and Argentina, criticized the action in Grenada on the ground
that it was in violation of the principle of nonintervention as embodied in
the OAS Charter.
Criticism of the United States' action was muted for several reasons.
First, the invading forces struck fast and decisively, crushing the initial
resistance and taking over the island with a minimum cost in lives and
property."6 2 This was possible because the Revolutionary Military Council
(RMC), which had taken over on October 19, 1983,63 received no external
military assistance except for the help of the Cubans already on the island."" Second, the population of Grenada responded favorably, indeed
enthusiastically, to the invasion."6 5 Subsequent events in Grenada, such
as the withdrawal of the occupying troops and the formation of an interim government,' 6 were perhaps additionally responsible for a modification of the positions taken by critics.
The Reagan administration consistently argued that its intervention
in Grenada was justified, in part, on humanitarian grounds. Following
President Reagan's invocation of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention,'6 7 other Government officials relied on humanitarian intervention to
justify the United States action.
To illustrate, in his news conference on October 25, 1983, Secretary
of State Schultz asserted that one of the reasons for the President's decision to commit U.S. forces in Grenada was "[t]o secure the safety of
American citizens - and, for that matter, the citizens of other countries
- and to assure that any who wish to leave may do so. '68 The next day,
at a meeting of the OAS Permanent Council, Ambassador Middendorf
expressed the "particularly humanitarian concern" of the United States
in the following words:
The deteriorating conditions on the island posed a threat to the
continued safety of U.S. citizens there, who number 800-1,000, largely
consisting of medical school students and faculty. There is substantial
precedent for military action to ensure the safety of foreign nationals

161. For transcript, see OEA/Ser. G Doc. CP/ACTA 543/83 (1983).
162. For a report on casualties, see Grenada Rep., supra note 142, at 1.
163. See id. at 36.
164. See, e.g., id. at 1; Michael T. Kaufman, Grenada Troops Pressing Battle Around
Capital, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1983, at Al, col. 5.
165. See, e.g., Dennis Volman, Grenadians Welcome U.S. Troops and Aid, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Nov. 3, 1983, at 9, col. 1; Adam Clymer, Grenadians Welcomed
Invasion, a Poll Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1983, at A21; L.A. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1983. Pt. 1, at
1, col. 1.
166. See, e.g., Grenada Rep., supra note 142, at 1; Grenadians Named to a Ruling
Panel, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1983, at A10.
167. See Grenada:Collective Action by the CaribbeanPeace Force, 83 DEP'T ST. BULL.,
Dec. 1983, at 67, 68 [hereinafter, Grenada: Collective Action](remarks of President Reagan).
168. Id. at 69 (Secretary Schultz's news conference).
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in such conditions of disorder. While there have been no specific
threats against U.S. citizens, a number had sought to flee, even in the
absence of organized evacuation efforts, at great risk. The military
council on the island had promised to reopen the airport on October
24 but did not do so, thus heightening concern over the continued
welfare of these citizens. The lack of respect for human rights and the
degenerating conditions, of course, also posed a threat to other foreign
nationals, and indeed, to the people of Grenada. 69
The U.S. Permanent Representative at the United Nations, Ambassador Kirkpatrick, made similar statements at sessions of the United Nations Security Council and the United Nations General Assembly.1 70 Kenneth Dam, Deputy Secretary of State, on November 4, 1983, presented
the clearest legal brief for the United States' position:
U.S. action to secure and evacuate endangered U.S. citizens on
the island was undertaken in accordance with well-established principles of international law regarding the protection of one's nationals.
That the circumstances warranted this action has been amply documented by the returning students themselves. There is absolutely no
requirement of international law that compelled the United States to
await further deterioration of the situation that would have jeopardized a successful operation. Nor was the United States required to
await actual violence against U.S. citizens before rescuing them from
the anarchic and threatening conditions the students themselves have
171

described.

The uncontroverted facts are that the rescue mission of the U.S.
medical students was completed within a few days after the U.S.-led
forces landed in Grenada. The U.S. forces, however, remained on the island long after U.S. nationals had been evacuated. 17 2 On two other factual
issues, however, there is some controversy. One pertains to the nature of
the threat to U.S. nationals, that is, whether it was imminent. The other
relates to the airport operations out of Grenada on October 24, that is,
whether American medical students were free to leave Grenada if they
wished to do so."'
Granting the validity of the Reagan administration's assertion that
the lives of U.S. nationals were endangered and that the situation in Grenada was so chaotic that the promises of the military rulers could not
have been trusted, 7 4 there simply is no justification on humanitarian

169. See id. at 73 (Ambassador Middendorf's statement).
170. See id. at 74-76 (Ambassador Kirkpatrick's statement).
171. Id. at 79, 81 (Deputy Secretary Dam's remarks).
172. Although the rescue mission was completed within the first three days, the last
combat troops remained on the island for two and a half months longer, withdrawing in
mid-December.
173. See, e.g., Was the U.S. Invasion Necessary?, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1983, Pt. IV, at 1,
col. 1.
174. See Hedrick Smith, Ex-U.S. Official Cites Ease in Leaving Grenada Day Before
Invasion, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 29, 1983, at A7, for a statement by the White House spokesman,
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grounds for the continued presence and activities of U.S. troops in Grenada after the rescue operations were completed during the first few days
of the military action.
17 5
F. The 1989 U.S. Intervention in Panama

U.S. military forces landed in Panama on December 20, 1989. President Bush explained that General Manuel Noriega had declared "a state
of war with the United States and publicly threatened the lives of Americans in Panama. 1 7 6 This, he said, had been followed by the murder of an
unarmed American serviceman by Noriega's forces and the beatings and
harassment of others. He added that, as General Noriega's "reckless
threats and attacks upon Americans in Panama" had created an "imminent danger to the 35,000 American citizens in Panama," he, as President, was obligated "to safeguard the lives of American citizens. 1 77
Subsequently, on January 3, 1990, when Noriega was en route to
Homestead Air Force Base in Florida, President Bush declared that he
had accomplished all four objectives for which he had ordered U.S. troops
to Panama. These were "to safeguard the lives of American Citizens, to
help restore democracy, to protect the integrity of the Panama Canal
17
treaties, and to bring General Manuel Noriega to justice.'
As to the validity of the humanitarian intervention claim,' 79 tensions
between Panama and the United States had been steadily rising even
prior to Noriega's annulment of the May 1989 elections, and tensions had
further escalated in the week preceding the armed invasion.'"0 On December 15, 1989, Panama's legislature adopted a resolution formally declaring
the country to be in a state of war with the United States. Noriega was
named "Maximum Leader" and given sweeping new powers. According to
the resolution, the move was prompted by U.S. "aggression" and the economic sanctions in effect against Panama since 1988."1' The Bush administration, however, described the Assembly's action as "another hollow
step in an attempt to force his [Noriega's] rule on the Panamanian peo-

Larry Speakes, who stated, "What they told us, we simply did not trust. There was no way
we could be at all assured that their promises would have been kept."
175. See generally Ved P. Nanda et al., AGORA: U.S. Forces in Panama: Defenders,
Aggressors or Human Rights Activists?, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 494 (1990)[hereinafter AGORA].
176. President'sAddress to the Nation Announcing United States Military Action in
Panama, 25 WEEKLY CoMp. PRES. Doc. 1974 (Dec. 20, 1989).
177. Id.
178. President's Remarks Announcing the Surrender of General Manuel Noriega to
United States Authorities in Panama, 26 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 8 (Jan. 3, 1990).
179. I have borrowed from my earlier analysis in AGORA, supra note 175, at 496-97.
180. See e.g., Steve C. Ropp, Military Retrenchment and Decay in Panama, CURRENT
HIsT., Jan. 1990, at 17; Michael R. Gordon, U.S. Troops Move In Panama In Effort to Seize
Noriega; Gunfire is Heard in Capital- Ordered by Bush, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1989, at Al.
181. See William Branigin, Noriega Appointed 'Maximum Leader'; Panama Says
State of War Exists with U.S., WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 1989, at A21.

1992

HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

ple."' 82 Deputy Secretary of State Eagleburger called it "a charade and
nonsense."' 8 3 In another public statement, a White House spokesman announced that U.S. troops "had not changed their alert status because of
the declaration."'" 4 Yet tension continued to build in the country as confrontations between Panamanians and Americans increased.
Noriega's "declaration of war" against the United States was a clear
provocation. Following the invasion, Secretary of State Baker cited an unverified "intelligence report that General Noriega was considering mounting an urban commando attack on American citizens in a residential
neighborhood," and added:
I cannot prove to you that this report was absolutely reliable, but
I do know that if the President had failed to act as he did and
Noriega's Dignity Battalions had killed or terrorized a dozen American families in Panama, you would be asking us today why didn't you
act to prevent this kind of violence against our citizens?' 86
Granted that the situation was tense and the U.S. was provoked, yet
these facts alone provide little legal justification for the invasion under
the test of "necessity." Nor can a full-scale invasion be considered a proportional response. The state of tension existing in Panama did not present an imminent danger to U.S. citizens. The most serious incident supposedly precipitating the invasion occurred on December 15 when one
U.S. Marine officer was killed by members of the Panamanian Defense
Force, another was wounded, and a third was beaten and his wife
threatened at a roadblock. A second serious incident before the invasion
occurred when an American officer shot and wounded a Panamanian police officer, who, the American claimed, appeared to be reaching for a
8
gun.1
These incidents are important, but on humanitarian grounds the U.S.
response did not warrant the launching of "Operation Just Cause" - a
full-scale invasion of a size not seen since the Vietnam War, eventually
consisting of 12,000 American invaders (added to the approximately
12,000 U.S. military personnel already stationed in Panama), helicopter
gunships, artillery and other heavy firepower.' The military attack resulted in the death of twenty-six Americans and over 700 Panamanians,
mostly civilians, in addition to severe and widespread physical devasta-

182. See Opposition Leader in Panama Rejects a Peace Offer from Noriega, N.Y.
TIMEs, Dec. 17, 1989, at A5, col. 1 [hereinafter Peace Offer].
183. See Noriega gets new powers, title in Panama, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 16, 1989, at C8.

184. See Peace Offer, supra note 182. Assuming the United States was planning its
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185. Excerpts from Statement by Baker on U.S. Policy, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 21, 1989, at
A19.
186. See e.g., George J. Church, Showing Muscle, TIME, Jan. 1, 1990, at 20, 23.
187. See Andrew Rosenthal, U.S. Forces Gain Wide Control in Panama; New Leaders
Put In, But Noriega Gets Away, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1989, at Al, col. 1.
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tion, property damage and dislocation.188
In evaluating the validity of the U.S. response, one must acknowledge
that the United States failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove that
the invasion was necessary to protect U.S. lives. But assuming that some
level of intervention was justified, the scale of the operation and the prolonged period of intervention, coupled with the other objectives cited for
the invasion, cast serious doubt on its having been a legitimate case of
humanitarian intervention.
Based on these case studies, I offer the following criteria to evaluate
the permissibility of intervention on humanitarian grounds:
1. The Severity of the Rights Violations - The Necessity Criterion
a. Genocide
b. Gross, Persistent and Systematic Violations of Basic Human
Rights
2. The Nature of the Intervention - The Proportionality Criterion
a. Duration
b. Was the force proper/excessive?
3. The Purpose of the Intervention
a. Humanitarian Concern?
b. Self-interest?
c. Mixed?
4. Was the action:
a. Collective?
b. Unilateral?
5. Balancing Alternatives and Outcomes
a. Does the intervention maximize the best outcomes?
IV.
A.

89

APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE TO THE KURDISH SITUATION

The Kurdish Crisis

This crisis began with the Kurdish insurrection in the aftermath of
the Gulf War.' 90 As the Iraqi forces, especially the Republican Guard,

188. See Army says 'disciplinedfire' cut Panama's civilian toll, DENVER POST, Jan. 21,
1990, at A13, col. 3; Panama may get $1 billion in aid, DENVER POST, Jan. 25, 1990, at A2,
col. 4.
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190. See Wounded Iraq, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 16, 1991, at 10; Old Enemies Come Together Against the Common Foe, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 16, 1991, at 37; In the Backwash of
the Gulf, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 23, 1991, at 43; The Kurds Bid for Freedom, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 30, 1991, at 37.
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suppressed the uprising,""1 approximately two million Kurds fled Saddam
Hussein's terror; 2 Turkey and Iran opened their borders to the fleeing
refugees.' 93 Iraq's protest against interference in its internal affairs notwithstanding, the United States, Great Britain, and France initially provided relief operations and later sent their armed forces to carve out "safe
havens" for displaced Kurds in northern Iraq. 9" As the Kurds were unwilling to return to their homes without a foreign presence to ensure their
protection, Iraq consented to the stationing of United Nations guards in
its northern territory. Earlier, the U.N. Security Council adopted a resolution 9' demanding that Iraq "immediately end [the] repression" of the
Kurds,'" and insisting that Iraq "allow immediate access by international
humanitarian organizations to all those in need of assistance in all parts
of Iraq ... ."97
Informal "safe havens" were established where aid and refuge could
be given to the Kurds.198 The enclave developed through the initial warning by the U.S. prohibiting Iraqi military maneuvers in the Kurdish areas
north of the 36th parallel, followed by the movement of U.S. and other
coalition forces in the region, and the establishment of refugee camps for
the Kurds.'9 9 The design was to provide assurance to the Kurds that the
refugee camps were secure so that they would return to their homes.2 00
B.

Application of the Suggested Criteria

The foreign intervention in Iraq meets the criteria suggested here to
judge the validity of "humanitarian intervention." The sole purpose was
to provide relief to the Kurds and to protect them from the Iraqi army,
and consequently to ensure that relief operations were not at risk.2"' President Bush expressly stated that the effort was purely "humanitarian,"
and the operation would consist of temporary relief stations to encourage
the Kurds to move to areas where they could be provided with food,
clothing, and medicine.20 Mr. Bush further stated that the move by the
allied forces was not the initial step toward an occupation of Iraqi territory.20 3 The United Nations was to monitor the entire process so as to

191. See Guess Who's Still Running Iraq, THE EcONOMIST, Apr. 6, 1991, at 39.
192. See, e.g., Want Another War?, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 13, 1991, at 12.
193. See id.
194. See Sanctuary for the Kurds, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 20, 1991, at 12; Calvary to the
Rescue, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 20, 1991, at 41.
195. See S/RES/688, supra note 3.
196. Id., Operative Paragraph 2.

197. Id., Operative Paragraph 3.
198. See Patrick E. Tyler, Bush Sees Accord on 'Safe Havens' for Kurds in Iraq, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 12, 1991, at Al, col 3.
199. See id.
200. See id.

201. See Elaine Sciolino, New Activity by Military Purely Humanitarian,President
Says, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1991, at Al, col. 6.
202. See id.
203. See id.
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ensure that relief efforts would be undertaken in conformity with the purpose and spirit of Security Council Resolution 688.2'0
Hundreds of thousands of Kurds had already fled into Turkey and
Iraq, with predictions that over two million would eventually leave Iraq,
when the initiative was taken by Europeans urging an enclave for the
Kurds.2 05 The Kurds fled in such large numbers because of their prior
experience with the brutal use of chemical weapons on their villages by
the Iraqi army and a history of oppression of the Kurds as an ethnic
group by the Iraqi government, especially by the Saddam Hussein regime. 2°" According to some estimates, starvation and exposure were claiming lives of over 1,000 Kurdish refugees daily. 207 The world community
was shocked: there was consensus on the need for urgent action to aid
and protect the refugees.
In view of the pattern of gross and persistent violation of the Kurds'
human rights in Iraq, the claim for humanitarian intervention on their
behalf meets the first criterion set out above, that is, severity of the deprivation of their human rights. Urgent action was needed to save lives.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 688 insisted that Iraq allow immediate
humanitarian access for relief purposes, and condemned the Iraqi repression of the Kurds, which threatened international peace and security. 0 8
As to the second criterion, the nature of the intervention, Britain's
Ambassador to the United Nations, Sir David Hannay, explicitly stated
that the proposed safe havens were a "humanitarian concept. ' 20 9 The duration of the intervention lasted until July 15, 1991.210 As efforts from the
beginning were underway to seek U.N. replacements, 211 the coalition force
was indeed proportionate to ward off the risk to the lives of the hundreds
of thousands of Kurds.
As to the third criterion, the purpose of intervention, the plans specifically embodied a limited purpose of securing a safe region for the
Kurds so that they could receive humanitarian aid and return to their
homes. 12 The coalition forces did not intend to affect Iraq's territorial

204. See Elaine Sciolino, Kurds Will Die in Vast Numbers Without Swift Aid, Agencies Say, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1991, at Al, col. 4.
205. See Alan Riding, Europeans Urging Enclave for Kurds in Northern Iraq, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 9, 1991, at Al, col. 6.
206. See Chuck Sudetic, As Kurds Limp Back in, Ghost Town Relives '88, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 29, 1991, at A8, col. 5; Alan Cowell, Kurdish Refugees, by Thousands, Flee Vengeance
of the Iraq Army, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1991, at Al, col. 4.
207. See Patrick Tyler, U.S. Scouting Refugee Sites Well Inside Iraq's Border, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 18, 1991, at Al, col. 6.
208. See S/RES/688, supra note 3, Operative Paragraphs 1, 3.
209. See Paul Lewis, Europeans Back Off Plan to Help Kurds, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10,
1991, at A12, col. 1.
210. See John Murray Brown, Last Allies Pull Out of North Iraq, FINANCIAL TIMES,
July 16, 1991, at 6, col. 3.
211. See Sciolino, supra note 201.
212. See Tyler, supra note 198.
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integrity, nor even Saddam Hussein's regime.2 13 They had planned for an
early withdrawal date,214 and accordingly withdrew on July 15.215
At the outset of the intervention, the allied leaders agreed to provide
protection to the relief workers as authorized by the Security Council
Resolution 688.216 Another goal was to protect the Kurds. Consequently,
they felt it necessary to station troops to curtail the movement of Iraqi
forces north of the 36th parallel.21 7 Iraq was warned not to use ground or
air forces anywhere near the Kurdish refugees.2 1 8
As to the fourth criterion, that is, whether the action is unilateral or
collective, the initiative came from the British Prime Minister, John Major, but intervention took a collective form after consultations among the
Security Council members.219 A European Community delegation met
with President Bush in efforts to gain further support for the plan as a
collective action.220 The decision was made to establish a multinational
force to provide the needed relief.2 '
Security Council Resolution 688 expressed grave concern at the repression of the Iraqi civilian population, and the massive flow of refugees
'
"threaten[ing] international peace and security in the region,"222
and authorized humanitarian access and assistance to the refugees and displaced
Iraqi people.2 2 3 Although the intervening force was not under the U.N.
auspices, there were consultations at the United Nations and considerable
international support for the operation which drew over 20,000 troops
from 13 countries. 22 4 Subsequently, the United Nations and Iraq signed
an agreement, under which U.N. security guards would move into northern Iraq, allowing the U.S. and allied soldiers to withdraw.22 5
Finally, on balancing alternatives and outcomes, one has to conclude
that the intervention was a justified response, for without the presence of
the allied forces the Kurds were not willing to return to their villages and
homes. After the Kurds' return and the withdrawal of the allied forces, a
residual coalition force is to be stationed in Turkey to deter future Iraqi
213. See David Hoffman, Allied Mission Among Kurds Unsettled as Northern Iraq

Safe Zones Expand, WASH. POST, May 5, 1991, at A39, col. 1.
214. See Sciolino, supra note 201.
215. See Brown, supra note 210.
216. See S/RES/688, supra note 3, Operative Paragraghs 1-5; see also Neil A. Lewis,
Legal Scholars Debate Refugee Plan, Generally Backing U.S. Stand, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19,
1991, at A8, col. 1.
217. See Sciolino, supra note 201.
218. See Elaine Sciolino, U.S. Warns Against Attack by Iraq on Kurdish Refugees,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1991, at A10, col. 1.
219. See Riding, supra note 205.
220. See Tyler, supra note 198.
221. See id.
222. See S/RES/688, supra note 3, preamble.
223. See id., Operative Paragraghs 3-5.
224. See Brown, supra note 210.
225. See, e.g., Security-Force Pact is Settled with Iraq, Official at U.N. Says, N.Y.
TIMES, May 24, 1991, at A8, col. 6.
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aggression against the Kurds. 22 6 Head of the coalition forces, General
Shalikashvali, said that the allied forces retained the right to conduct reconnaissance flights north of the 36th parallel where Iraq is banned from
flying fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters.21 7 The intervention gave the
Kurds breathing space to negotiate with the Iraqi government an agreement for autonomy in their region.2"'
V.

APPRAISAL AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Having concluded that the intervention in Iraq meets the criteria set
out above to determine the validity of "humanitarian intervention" under
customary international law, this interventionary action has serious implications. For example, could the world community take action to provide food and humanitarian assistance to the starving population in a
state in opposition to that state's policy? Recent developments with a
bearing on the subject include a General Assembly resolution adopted in
December 1990 which calls for international relief corridors. '29 In the
United States Congress, Congressman Tony Hall introduced a bill asking
the United States government to take the initiative for the drafting and
negotiation of an international convention on the right to food.23
The following statement of the International Court of Justice in Nicaragua v. U.S. is pertinent: "There can be no doubt that the provision of
strictly humanitarian aid to persons or forces in another country,
whatever their political affiliations or objectives, cannot be regarded as
unlawful intervention, or as in any other way contrary to international
law." 3 ' Could a single state intervene? Could force be justified to provide
food to a starving population under the rubric of "humanitarian
intervention"?
It is recommended that, as a last resort, such use of force be considered justified. The allied forces' response to the Kurdish crisis has
demonstrated that in the post-cold war era "humanitarian intervention"
remains a viable alternative. That it should be sparingly used is appropriate. But that it can be used should prove a powerful deterrent to oppressive regimes.

226. See Brown, supra note 210.
227. See id.
228. See, e.g., Iraqi Kurds BargainHard as Allies Leave, THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
July 15, 1991, at 4.
229. See G.A. Res. 45/100, adopted on Dec. 14, 1990.
230. See, e.g., George D. Moffett III, US Congressmen Pressure UN to Outlaw Denial
of Food, THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 5, 1991, at 6, col. 1.
231. 1986 I.C.J. 14, 124.
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The Security Council of the United Nations
and the Implementation of International
Humanitarian Law
CHRISTIANE BOURLOYANNIS*

I.

INTRODUCTION

For the first twenty years of its existence, the United Nations played
no particular role in the implementation of international humanitarian
law. The main reason for this lack of action, it has been argued, was the
fear that such involvement could be misinterpreted as an admission of
failure on the part of the United Nations to achieve its most important
objective, the maintenance of international peace and security, and as undermining to some extent the fundamental principle of non-use of force
enshrined in Article 2, paragraph 4 of the United Nations Charter.'
The reality of the use of force and the great number of armed conflicts could not continue to be overlooked. Thus, since the Middle East
Crisis of 1967, the United Nations has taken various actions regarding the
implementation of international humanitarian law, 2 of which the most re-

* Legal Officer, Codification Division, Office of Legal Affairs, United Nations. The
views expressed here are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of
the United Nations.
1. On the basis of this argument, the International Law Commission of the United Nations refused to include in its program of work the topic of the laws of war. Report of the
International Law Commission to the UN General Assembly, included in Y.B INT'L L. CoMMISSION %18 (1949). See also Abi-Saab, The Implementation of HumanitarianLaw, in THE
NEW HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 310, 333 (A. Cassese ed., 1979); Sassoli, Mise
en oeuvre du Droit InternationalHumanitaire et du Droit International des Droits de
l'Homme: Une Comparaison, in 1987 ANNUAIRE SUISSE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 24, 48.
2. The United Nations, moreover, from that period on engaged itself in developing this
body of law. Following the International Conference on Human Rights in 1969, the General
Assembly adopted a number of resolutions; see, e.g. Respect of Human Rights in Armed
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cent expression is the adoption of several resolutions by the Security
Council on the Persian Gulf crisis.
This article will focus on the role of the Security Council in the implementation of humanitarian law. This is not to say that the activities in
this field of other United Nations organs, such as the General Assembly
and the Secretary-General, the Commission on Human Rights, and relief
bodies, are of a lesser importance. Each merits a full, independent discussion. The Security Council, however, is the organ entrusted under the
Charter with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. It appears recently to finally be performing its
functions as envisaged by the drafters of the Charter. Most importantly,
it is the only organ which can make binding decisions.
Part II of this article briefly outlines various means of implementing
international humanitarian law treaties. Part III presents an analysis of
the actions of the Security Council to date in that field. Part IV evaluates
the measures adopted so far by the Council and examines other possible
actions that it can take under international law in cases of armed conflicts. The article focuses on the responses of the Council to actions by
states and thus does not address the question of the implementation of
humanitarian law by United Nations forces sent by the Security Council,
which is a separate issue. 3

Conflicts, G.A. Res. 2444 (XXIII), 1748th mtg. (Jan. 13, 1969). The Secretary-General, in
response to the Assembly's request, prepared two reports on the topic, which inter alia
contained suggestions for the development of humanitarian law; see U.N. Doc. A/7720
(1969); U.N. Doc. A/8052 (1970). However, the process of development remained at the time
largely outside the framework of the United Nations. Thus, the 1977 Protocols Additional to
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 were elaborated on by a Diplomatic Conference
convened by Switzerland, on the basis of draft texts prepared by the International Committee of the Red Cross. See the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter First Geneva Convention]; the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 75
U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Second Geneva Convention]; the Geneva Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Third Geneva
Convention]; the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention]. See also
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, Relating to the Protection
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 11255 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I]; the
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, Relating to the Protection
of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol II].
3. See, e.g., Schindler, United Nations Forces and International HumanitarianLaw,
in

STUDIES AND ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN

HONOUR OF JEAN PICTET

LAW AND RED CROSS PRINCIPLES IN

521 (C. Swinarsky ed., 1984)[hereinafter

STUDIES AND ESSAYS];

Komenov, The Origin of State and Entity Responsibility for Violations of International
.HumanitarianLaw in Armed Conflicts, in IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 169 (F. Kalshoven and Y. Sandoz eds., 1989). In this connection, the Secretary-

General has drawn attention to the need to reflect on the questions of "mechanisms required for the Council to satisfy itself that ... the rules of humanitarian law applicable in
armed conflicts are complied with" When the use of force has been authorized by the Council, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 1, U.N. Doc. A/46/1, at 3 (1991). The Model Agreement between

1992
II.

INTERNATIONAL

HUMANITARIAN

LAW

OVERVIEW OF THE MEANS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW TREATIES

Most instruments codifying the laws of war are classical treaties
largely leaving implementation to each Party. The Geneva Conventions of
1949, however, in order to ensure their implementation, rendered
mandatory the institution of Protecting Powers which had been widely
resorted to in practice, but left the activation of the procedure to the
states concerned. 4 In the absence of Protecting Powers, the following
"substitutes" are available to fulfill their duties: "an organization which
offers all guarantees of impartiality and efficacy," ' "a neutral State or
such an organization,"' or "a humanitarian organization, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross."' As for Additional Protocol I, it
further strengthened the above system by expressly stating the legal obligation, implicit in the Geneva Conventions, that the Parties have the
duty to appoint a Protecting Power, and by providing for various means
to ensure such an appointment or that of a substitute.8 The Geneva Conventions also provide for the institution of an enquiry concerning alleged
violations thereof, at the request of a Party. The actual procedure is again
left to the Parties or, in the absence of agreement, to an umpire chosen
by them.' Protocol I institutionalizes this process with an optional clause
on compulsory resort to an International Fact-Finding Commission established under Article 90 to enquire into allegations of violations of the
Conventions and the Protocol, to "facilitate, through its good offices, the

the United Nations and Member States contributing personnel and equipment to United
Nations peace-keeping operations, recently prepared by the Secretariat, provides that such
operations "shall observe and respect the principles and spirit of the general international
conventions applicable to the conduct of military personnel." U.N. Doc. A/46/185 art. X
(1991).
4. Common article 8 of the First, Second, and Third Geneva Conventions and article 9
of the Fourth Geneva Convention provide that "[t]he present Convention shall be applied
with the co-operation and under the scrutiny of the Protecting Powers whose duty it is to
safeguard the interests of the Parties to the conflict." For a discussion of the history and
role of the institution of Protecting Powers, see Abi-Saab, supra note 1, at 311. The cooperation of the Protecting Powers in the execution of the treaty is also envisaged in the
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, May 14,
1954, art. 2, 249 U.N.T.S. 240.
5. Common article 8, T 1 of the First, Second, and Third Geneva Conventions and article 9 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.
6. Common article 8, 2 of the First, Second, and Third Geneva Conventions and article 9 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.
7. Common article 8, 3 of the First, Second, and Third Geneva Conventions and article 9 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Unlike the first alternative for a substitute, which is
decided upon by the High Contracting Parties, it is the Detaining Power that has the obligation to choose between the last two alternatives in the absence of Protecting Powers or a
substitute organization under paragraph 1, or to accept the offer of a humanitarian organization. See, e.g., Abi-Saab, supra note 1, at 318.
8. Protocol I, art. 5.
9. Common article 52 of the First Geneva Convention, 53 of the Second, 132 of the
Third and 149 of the Fourth. This procedure has never been used.
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restoration of an attitude of respect for the Conventions and th[e]
Protocol.""0

An innovative element of the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I is
the obligation for the High Contracting Parties not only to respect but
also to ensure respect for the relevant instruments."1 This covers two
types of obligations: a Party must adopt the necessary measures to ensure
the implementation of the instrument by itself, particularly integration
into its municipal law; it must also, irrespective of whether it is a party to
the conflict, endeavor to bring another Contracting Party which has violated the treaty back to an attitude of respect for that treaty.12
This rather sophisticated legal system of implementation did not succeed in averting violations of international humanitarian law. Before 1949
the principle of reciprocity and the right to reprisals worked to some extent as a deterrent for such violations. It left open, however, the very real
possibility of the lawful violation of humanitarian law against a party to
the conflict which had violated this law first - hardly a satisfactory solution. Therefore, the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I prohibit reprisals
against protected persons and objects.'" Moreover, the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties prohibits reciprocity with regard to the
application of treaties of humanitarian character.' As for the institution
of Protecting Powers:
The assumption which prevailed during the elaboration of the Conventions that States would never hesitate to appoint and accept, or to
15
serve as Protecting Powers was ... disproved in practice.

10. The International Fact-Finding Commission was established on 25 June 1991, after
twenty High Contracting Parties made declarations recognizing its competence under Article 90 of Protocol I. ICRC Press Release, No. 10, June 27, 1991.
11. Common article 1 of the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Geneva Conventions; and
Protocol I, art. 1.
12.

COMMENTARY

TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF

12 AUGUST 1949. art. 1 (J. Pictet ed.,

1958) thereinafter COMMENTARY]. For more details on the obligation to ensure respect for
the Conventions and Protocol I see, e.g., Condorelli and Boisson de Chazournes, Quelques
remarques a propos de l'obligation de 'respecter et faire respecter' le droit international
humanitaire 'en toutes circonstances',in STUDIES AND ESSAYS, supra note 3, at 17; Levrat,
Les conskquences de l'engagement pris par les Hautes Parties contractantes de 'faire respecter' les Conventions humanitaires, in IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 3, at 263.
13. First Geneva Convention art. 46, Second Geneva Convention art. 47, Third Geneva
Convention art. 13, V. 3, Fourth Geneva Convention art. 33, V 3; Protocol I art. 20, art. 51,
6, art. 52,
1, art. 53, 1 c, art. 54,
4, art. 55, 1 2, and art. 56, T 4. As a matter of fact,

reprisals against prisoners of war have been prohibited since 1929. Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War, July 27, 1929, art. 2, 347, T.S. 846. Furthermore, the
Convention for the Protection Of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, May
14, 1954, also prohibits reprisals against protected cultural property, supra note 4, at art. 4,
4. See also Abi-Saab, supra note 1, at 310.

14. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 60, 9 5, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (1969).
15. Abi-Saab, supra note 1, at 324. Resort to Protecting Powers has been limited to
three instances: the 1956 Suez crisis, the 1961 Goa incident and the Indo-Pakistani conflict
of 1971.
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In contrast, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
has been playing a crucial role in the implementation of humanitarian
law, given its right of initiative to undertake humanitarian activities, subject to the consent of the Parties, 6 in addition to specific mandates attributed to it under the Geneva instruments." Its flexible and discrete
way of operating has greatly contributed to its success.
It is difficult to evaluate the extent to which States fulfilled their
obligation "to ensure respect" for international humanitarian law, due to
the necessarily discrete nature of diplomatic demarches to that effect.
Such practice does not, however, seem to be overwhelming as far as bilateral contacts are concerned.'" What then about multilateral means "to
ensure respect" for international humanitarian law?
Unlike the Geneva Conventions, Protocol I expressly mentions the
United Nations in relation to the implementation of international humanitarian law. Article 89, entitled "Co-operation," reads:
In situations of serious violations of the Conventions or of this
Protocol, the High Contracting Parties undertake to act, jointly or individually, in co-operation with the United Nations and in conformity
with the United Nations Charter.
Nevertheless, the scope of this provision is much more limited than
certain proposals on the role of the United Nations put forward before
the adoption of the Protocol. 9
Aside from the "system" of the Geneva Conventions and Protocols,
two other treaties relating to international humanitarian law involve the
United Nations in their implementation. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction provides that a
State Party may lodge a complaint regarding the violation of the Convention by another State Party with the Security Council, which may carry
out an investigation on the matters.20 The Convention on the Prohibition
of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification

16. Common article 9 of the First, Second and Third Geneva Conventions and article
10 of the Fourth with respect to international armed conflicts, and Common article 3 with
respect to non-international armed conflicts.
17. See, e.g., Third Geneva Convention art. 126, and Fourth Geneva Convention art.
143, relating respectively to visits to prisoners of war and civilian internees and relief
assistance.
18. Condorelli, supra note 12, at 27; Levrat, supra note 12, at 291.
19. In particular, proposals were made to the effect that an organ established by the
United Nations assume the duties of the Protecting Powers. See Abi-Saab, supra note 1, at
339.
20. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological, Biological and Toxin Weapons and Their Destruction art. VI, G.A. Res.
2826 (XXVI), Dec. 16, 1971, annex [hereinafter Convention on the Prohibition of Toxin
Weapons].
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Techniques contains a similar provision.2" Both Conventions moreover
provide that consultation and co-operation between States Parties relating to the application of the Conventions may also be undertaken through
appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United
Nations.22
Before concluding this brief survey of means of implementation of
international humanitarian law treaties, mention should be made of one
important non-legal means for ensuring their implementation: public
opinion. Public statements and appeals by states, international organizations, non-governmental organizations and the ICRC may in certain cases
have an impact, because no party to an armed conflict is indifferent to its
public image.23
III.

THE PRACTICE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

The United Nations has taken decisions on the implementation of
international humanitarian law since 1967. Security Council activity in
this regard is quite extensive and is increasing.
The first express mention by the Security Council of the Geneva
Conventions was not couched in strong terms. By Resolution 237, relating
to the Middle East, the Security Council recommended "to the Governments concerned the scrupulous respect of the humanitarian principles
governing the treatment of prisoners of war and the protection of civilian
persons in time of war contained in the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
'

1949 . 24

Subsequently, the Security Council has taken a large number of actions with respect to the implementation of international humanitarian
2
law. These can be divided into several categories. 1
A.

Calls and Demands for Respect of InternationalHumanitarianLaw

Demands for respect of international humanitarian law have been
unequivocal. Thus, the relevant operative paragraph of a Security Council
Resolution either calls for respect of certain rules of international humanitarian law expressly mentioned, usually by citing conventions, 26 or calls

21. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, art. V, G.A. Res. 31/72, Dec. 10, 1976, annex [hereinfafter
Convention of Prohibition of Military Environmental Techniques].
22. Id.; see also Convention on the Prohibition of Toxin Weapons, supra note 20, at
art. V.
23. Veuthey, Pour une politique humanitaire,in STUDIES AND ESSAYS, supra note 3, at

998.
24. S.C. Res. 237, U.N. SCOR, 1361st mtg., 3 (June 14, 1967).
25. The categorization below is made for the purposes of the analysis. Several types of
actions can, of course, be taken under the same resolution.
26. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 307, 3, U.N. SCOR, 1621st mtg. (Dec. 21, 1971) on the situation
in the India/Pakistan subcontinent, which reads:
[The Security Council. . .]
calls upon all those concerned to take all measures
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for the cessation of specific actions, characterized -

ble -

often in the preamas violations of international humanitarian law.2" In the last few

necessary to preserve human life and for the observance of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and to apply in full their provisions as regards the protection
of the wounded and sick, prisoners of war and civilian population.
See also the following resolutions on the Middle East: S.C. Res. 271, U.N. SCOR, 1512nd
mtg. (Sep. 15, 1969) (which calls upon Israel to observe the Geneva Conventions and international law governing military occupation); S.C. Res. 484, U.N. SCOR, 2260th mtg. (Dec.
19, 1980); S.C. Res. 672, U.N. SCOR, 2948th mtg. (Oct. 12, 1990) (which calls upon Israel to
comply with the Fourth Geneva Convention); U.N. Doc. S/21363 (June 19, 1990) (the statement of the President of the Security Council which calls upon Israel to comply with the
Fourth Convention); S.C. Res. 512, U.N. SCOR, 2380th mtg. (June 19, 1982); S.C. Res. 513,
U.N. SCOR, 2382nd mtg. (July 4, 1982); S.C. Res. 520, U.N. SCOR, 2395th mtg. (Sep. 17,
1982); S.C. Res. 521, U.N. SCOR, 2396th mtg. (Sep. 19, 1982)(calling for respect for the
rights of the civilian populations). See also the following statements by the President of the
Security Council regarding the conflict between Iran and Iraq: U.N. Doc. S/16454 (1984),
statement of Mar. 30, 1984, whereby the members of the Council called on the parties to
adhere to the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of the Bacteriological Methods of Warfare of June 17, 1925, 94
L.N.T.S. 2138, at 65 [hereinafter "1925 Geneva Protocol"]; U.N. Doc. S/17130 (1985)(urging
the parties to observe international humanitarian law); S.C. Res. 598, U.N. SCOR, 2750th
mtg. (July 20, 1987) (urging that POWs be released and repatriated without delay after the
cessation of hostilities between Iran and Iraq, in accordance with the Third Geneva Convention). As can be seen, the terminology of the Council's request or exhortation varies slightly
from case to case.
27. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 452 U.N. SCOR, 2159th mtg., V 3 (July 20, 1979) in which the
Security Council "[called]upon the Government and people of Israel to cease, on an urgent
basis the establishment, construction and planning of settlements in the Arab territories
occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem," an action characterized in the preamble as constituting a violation of the Fourth Convention. See also the statements of the President of
the Security Council of May 26, 1976 and Nov. 11, 1976, 31 U.N. SCOR Resolutions and
Decisions of the Security Council (1976), at 4 [hereinafter "Resolutions and Decisions"],
and S.C. Res. 446, U.N. SCOR, 2134th mtg. (Mar. 22, 1979) calling on Israel to abide by the
Convention and, accordingly, to rescind its measures relating to the establishment of such
settlements and desist from any further such actions; S.C. Res. 465, U.N. SCOR, 2203rd
mtg. (Mar. 1, 1980), which makes a similar call, having determined in the operative part
that the above actions are a flagrant violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention; S.C. Res.
476, U.N. SCOR, 2242nd mtg. (June 30, 1980), calling on Israel to desist from policies and
measures affecting the character and the status of Jerusalem, which are qualified in the
operative part as flagrant violations of the Fourth Geneva Convention; S.C. Res. 471, U.N.
SCOR, 2226th mtg. (June 5, 1980), determining that Israel has failed to provide adequate
protection to the civilian population in the occupied territories in accordance with the
Fourth Geneva Convention and calling upon Israel to comply with that Convention; S.C.
Res. 605, U.N. SCOR, 2777th mtg. (Dec. 22, 1987), which calls upon Israel to desist from
policies and practices which violate the human rights of Palestinians and the above Convention; S.C. Res. 468, U.N. SCOR, 2221st mtg. (May 8, 1980) and S.C. Res. 469, U.N. SCOR,
2223rd mtg. (May 20, 1980), calling upon Israel, as the occupying Power, to rescind illegal
measures of expulsion of Palestinians in contravention of the Fourth Geneva Convention,
which is recalled in the preamble; S.C. Res. 636, U.N. SCOR, 2870th mtg. (July 6, 1989) and
S.C. Res. 641, U.N. SCOR, 2883rd mtg. (Aug. 30, 1989), which call upon Israel to ensure the
safe and immediate return of deported Palestinians and to desist from such deportations, a
violation of articles 47 and 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which are recalled in the
preamble; S.C. Res. 694, U.N. SCOR, 2989th mtg. (May 2, 1991), which declares in its operative part that the deportation by the Israeli authorities of four Palestinians is in violation
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years, the Security Council has used stronger wording, "demanding" 8 or
"requesting"" respect for international humanitarian law. In the IraqKuwait crisis, moreover, the Security Council expressly acted under
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. Its resolutions requesting Iraq to comply with international humanitarian law, and particularly
with the Fourth Geneva Convention, were thus clearly binding.3 0 In that
case, Iraq was under a double obligation: to apply the Fourth Geneva
Convention as a party thereto, and to comply with Article 25 of the Charter as a Member of the United Nations.3 '
These calls for the respect of international humanitarian law, as well
as the actions discussed below, are based on the competence of the Security Council under Article 24 of the Charter, i.e. the maintenance of international peace and security. The Security Council is certainly competent
to deal with the implementation of international humanitarian law, which
is applicable in situations affecting the maintenance of international
peace and security, namely armed conflicts. 2
Regarding the Geneva Conventions, one could argue, given their virtually universal acceptance,33 that the Security Council is a means of fulfilling the obligation embodied in Common Article 1 to ensure that the

of the Fourth Geneva Convention and reiterates that Israel refrain from such acts; S.C. Res.
540, U.N. SCOR, 2493rd mtg. (Oct. 31, 1983) on the situation between Iran and Iraq, which
calls for the immediate cessation of all military operations against civilian targets, a violation of international humanitarian law; S.C. Res. 612, U.N. SCOR, 2812nd mtg. (May 9,
1988), which expects Iran and Iraq to refrain from the future use of chemical weapons, in
accordance with the 1925 Geneva Protocol.
28. See U.N. Doc. S/17932 (1986) (the Presidential statement of March 21, 1986, "demanding" the respect of the 1925 Geneva Protocol); U.N. Doc. S/18863 (1987) (the statement of May 14, 1987 "emphatically demanding" the same).
29. See S.C. Res. 607, U.N. SCOR 2780th mtg. (Jan. 5, 1988), "strongly requesting"
Israel to comply with the Fourth Geneva Convention; see also S.C. Res. 608, U.N. SCOR,
2781st mtg. (Jan. 14, 1988); U.N. Doc. S/20156 (1988) (the Aug. 26, 1988 presidential statement "requesting" Israel to desist from deporting Palestinians, a violation of the abovementioned Convention).
30. S.C. Res. 674, U.N. SCOR, 2951st mtg. (Oct. 29, 1990). S.C. Res. 664, U.N. SCOR,
2937th mtg. (Aug. 18, 1990) does not specifically mention the Fourth Geneva Convention,
but it deals also with the right for aliens to leave the territory of a party to a conflict,
enshrined in article 35 of the Convention. In S.C. Res. 666, U.N. SCOR, 2939th mtg. (Sept.
13, 1990), the Security Council "expected" compliance with S.C. Res. 664 (1990) and affirmed the responsibility of Iraq for the well-being and safety of third state nationals in
accordance with international humanitarian law, including the Fourth Geneva Convention.
31. Article 25 reads "[t]he members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry
out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter."
32. The actions of the Security Council discussed in this article are cited in the Repertoire of the Practiceof the Security Council under the chapter dealing with the "Consideration of Questions under the Council's Responsibility for the Maintenance of International
Peace and Security". See, e.g., Repertoire of the Practiceof the Security Council, Supplement 1969-1971 at 94, regarding S.C. Res. 307, supra note 26.
33. In 1968, 111 out of 126 Member States were parties to the four Conventions. In
early 1991, 157 out of 159 Member States were parties to the Conventions. All five permanent members of the Security Council are parties to the Conventions.
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Geneva Conventions are respected when the Council calls for such respect
by the parties to the conflict. The High Contracting Parties which are
members of the Security Council would thus act through the Council to
ensure respect of the Conventions. This does not seem to be the case.
Article 89 of Protocol I, in requiring the High Contracting Parties to cooperate with the United Nations - albeit only in the case of "serious
violations" - clearly envisages independent actions by the U.N., in the
latter's own name and not as a channel for the Parties, which are the only
addressees of Common Article 1. One type of action by the United Nations is to make such calls for respect of international humanitarian law. 4
The Security Council made this clear in one recent instance where it issued an appeal not only to the Parties in conflict, but also called upon the
High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention, "to ensure
respect by Israel, the Occupying Power, for its obligations under the Convention in accordance with article 1 thereof.""6 In so doing, the Security
Council clearly recognized that the obligation to ensure respect is incumbent, under the Convention, upon the High Contracting Parties themselves, independently of the Council's own actions to the same effect. The
Security Council's calls for respect of international humanitarian law are,
however, an important substitute to the inactivity of the High Contracting Parties, as well as an expression of the position of the international community regarding the implementation of humanitarian law.
B. Determination That Certain Acts Constitute Violations of International HumanitarianLaw
The Security Council has also explicitly determined that certain acts
or measures undertaken by states violate international humanitarian law,
usually in combination with calls for respect of the law.36 The importance
of such a pronouncement by the Council lies in the public pressure it
creates on the country in question. It makes it very difficult for a state to
convincingly claim that its actions do not violate international humanitarian law when an authoritative body such as the Security Council declares
that they do. And, last but not least, such a determination, which
amounts to a formal designation as a wrong doer, may lead the Council to

34. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 1035 (Y. Sandoz, C.
Swinarski, B. Zimermann eds., 1987).
35. S.C. Res. 681, U.N. SCOR, 2970th mtg. (Dec. 20, 1990). See also U.N. Doc. S/20156
(1988); U.N. Doc. S/21363 (1990) (the statements by the President).
The Security Council's calls upon the High Contracting Parties to ensure respect for
the Conventions also covers states which are not members of the United Nations. Indeed,
U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 1 6 stipulates that
The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the
United Nations act in accordance with [its] principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.
36. See supra note 27, as well as S.C. Res. 674, supra note 30, indicating that certain
actions by Iraq against third-state nationals and Kuwaitis violated the Fourth Geneva
Convention.
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adopt more severe measures vis-a-vis the violating state.
C.

Fact-finding and Implementation Monitoring

In order to make the factual determination whether there has been a
violation of international humanitarian law, the Security Council relies on
information received from other principal organs,37 the Member States
and the media. In certain cases, however, the Council has itself initiated
fact-finding activities and investigations.
The Security Council may request additional information on the implementation of international humanitarian law primarily from two
sources. The most common is requesting the Secretary-General to followup on the implementation of a resolution on respect for international humanitarian law and to report thereon to the Council. s8 On the basis of
that report, the Security Council may then take further actions. For example, the Security Council, having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Resolution 497, called an emergency special session of the General Assembly on the situation in the
occupied Arab territories. 9
The practical aspects of the follow-up are normally left to the Secretary-General. It may happen, however, that the Secretary-General encounters difficulties in the fulfillment of his fact-finding activities, due to
lack of co-operation from the state concerned. In particular, that state
may refuse to accept a representative of or a fact-finding mission of the
Secretary-General on its territory, or set unfavorable conditions. In such a
situation, the Council may request the state concerned to reconsider its
refusal and to co-operate with the Secretary-General. 40 Whether the decision of the receiving state would thus be changed depends in the end on
the moral and political persuasion of the Council, regardless of the legal
weight of its decisions. It is difficult to understand the refusal of a state
to accept a fact-finding mission sent by the Secretary-General, particu-

37. For example, reports of fact-finding missions sent by the Secretary-General on his
own initiative to investigate allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the conflict between Iran and Iraq.
38. See S.C. Res. 237, supra note 24; S.C. Res. 248, U.N. SCOR, 1407th mtg. (Mar. 24,
1968); S.C. Res. 259, U.N. SCOR, 1454th mtg. (Sept. 27, 1968); S.C. Res. 271, supra note 26;
S.C. Res. 307, supra note 26; S.C. Res. 468, supra note 27; S.C. Res. 469, supra note 27; S.C.
Res. 478, U.N. SCOR, 2245th mtg. (Aug. 20, 1980); S.C. Res. 484, supra note 26; S.C. Res.
497, U.N. SCOR, 2319th mtg. (Dec. 17, 1981); S.C. Res. 512, supra note 26; S.C. Res. 520,
supra note 26; S.C. Res. 521, supra note 26; S.C. Res. 605, supra note 27; S.C. Res. 681,
supra note 35. In this last resolution, the Council entrusted the Secretary-General for the
first time with ongoing responsibilities for the implementation of international humanitarian law with respect to the Palestinian civilians under Israeli occupation. U.N. Doc. S/
22472,
3 (1991).
39. S.C. Res. 500, U.N. SCOR, 2330th mtg. (Jan. 28, 1982).
40. See S.C. Res. 259, supra note 38. See also S.C. Res. 673, U.N. SCOR, 2949th mtg.
(Oct. 24, 1990), relating to a mission initiated by the Secretary-General himself and endorsed by the Council in S.C. Res. 672.
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larly in the field of international humanitarian law, since the result of
that refusal is most likely to be negative publicity. Moreover, acceptance
of a fact-finding mission is also an exercise of sovereign rights, which does
not exclude the sovereign right to conduct one's own investigation and
have it publicized.
The Security Council has also established ad hoc fact-finding bodies
to examine the implementation of international humanitarian law. In
1979, the Council established a commission consisting of three of its
members "to examine the situation relating to settlements in the Arab
territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem.""' The Commission
concluded that the settlement policy of Israel constituted a violation of
48
2
the Fourth Geneva Convention," a conclusion endorsed by the Council.
It appears, however, that there is a strong preference, at least among
some members of the Council, to entrust the Secretary-General rather
than an inter-governmental fact-finding body with the task of investigating allegations of violations of international humanitarian law. A recent
example is the veto by the United States of a resolution attempting to
establish another commission of three Council members to examine the
situation in the occupied territories. The United States argued that such
a commission "would too easily become a vehicle which could be misused
to generate more needless controversy and dispute in this area," while the
sending of a representative of the Secretary-General would be the "best
way to serve the interests of the United Nations in examining the situation in the occupied territories," without setting back the peace process.44
If one looks merely at the humanitarian rather than the political aspects
of the question, experience has proven indeed that the more discrete a
humanitarian mission, the greater its chances of success. The method of
work of the ICRC and its achievements are clearly a case in point.
D. Determination Regarding the
Conventions

Applicability of

Humanitarian

The Security Council has made several pronouncements on the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention."" This Convention does not, as

41. S.C. Res. 446, supra note 27.
42. U.N. Doc. S/13450 1 226 (1979).
43. S.C. Res. 452, supra note 27. In that resolution, the Council requested a second
report, which the Commission produced later in the year, along the same lines. U.N. Doc.
13679 (1979). This report was endorsed by S.C. Res. 465.
44. U.N. Doc. S/PV.2926, at 37 (1990).
45. See the following resolutions and statements by the President of the Security Council on the territories occupied by Israel: Resolutions and Decisions, supra note 27, at 4; S.C.
Res. 446, supra note 27, at preamble; S.C. Res 465, supra note 27, at preamble; S.C. Res.
471, supra note 27, at preamble; S.C. 478, supra note 38; S.C. Res. 484, supra note 26; S.C.
Res. 497, supra note 38; statement of Jan. 26, 1984, U.N. Doc. S/16433 (1984); S.C. Res. 605,
supra note 27; S.C. Res. 607, supra note 29; statement of Aug. 26, 1988, U.N. Doc. S/20156
(1988); S.C. Res. 636, supra note 27; S.C. Res. 641, supra note 27; statement of June 19,
1990, U.N. Doc. S/21363 (1990); S.C. Res. 672, supra note 26; statements of Jan. 4, 1991,
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one may have expected from the elaborate and unique implementation
system of international humanitarian law described in Part II above, provide for a body to determine the circumstances in which it is applicable;
neither do the Hague Conventions, nor the other Geneva Conventions for
that matter." Thus, the Security Council fills an important gap in expressing the view of the international community on the actual legal situation
in question, which might otherwise remain unclear.4
The Fourth Geneva Convention also covers the situation in occupied
territories. The Security Council has so far raised the issue of the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention only with regard to situations
involving what it expressly characterized as "occupations," namely the
territories occupied by Israel, and Iraqi occupied Kuwait. Whether a territory is occupied or not is of course quite often a controversial question,
and that is where the above-mentioned clarity on the legal situation is
essential."' It must be noted, however, that the Council did not make similar determinations in all cases of occupations it has been confronted
with. For example, the Council has not expressly pronounced itself on the
applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to northern Cyprus, although the General Assembly has characterized the territory as
occupied."'
The effect of the determination by the Security Council that the
Fourth Geneva Convention is applicable to a territory, which, in its view
is "occupied," may have important consequences. For instance, the Security Council, having previously determined that Jerusalem is part of the
"occupied territories, " 5 considered the enactment by Israel in 1980 of the
"basic law" changing the status of Jerusalem as null and void, and as not
affecting the application of the Fourth Geneva Convention."
The importance that the Security Council attaches to the issue of the
applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention is further evidenced by
Resolution 681, in which the Security Council, rather than making a sim-

U.N. Doc. S/22046 (1991); statements of Mar. 27, 1991, U.N. Doc. S/22408 (1991); S.C. Res.
694, supra note 27; S.C. Res. 726, U.N. SCOR, 3022nd mtg. (Jan. 6, 1992). See the following
resolutions on the occupation of Kuwait: S.C. Res. 670, U.N. SCOR, 2943rd mtg. (Sep. 25,
1990); S.C. Res. 674, supra note 30, at preamble.
46. See Roberts, What is a Military Occupation, in 1984 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 249, 301
(1989).
47. Other international bodies, such as the General Assembly, the Organization of African Unity, and the ICRC have expressed such a view. Id.
48. Obviously, if the Security Council mentions a humanitarian convention in any instance, it implies that the convention is applicable to that situation. The legal issue of the
applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention has been addressed by the Security Council
only when it was felt necessary to do so expressly. See supra note 45.
49. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 37/253 (May 13, 1983). See also Roberts, supra note 46, at 302.
50. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 446, supra note 27.
51. S.C. Res. 478, supra note 38. See also S.C. Res. 497, supra note 38, in which the
Security Council "[decided] that the Israeli decision to impose its laws, jurisdiction and
administration in the occupied Syrian Golan Heights is null and void and without international legal effect."
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pie determination, urged the government of Israel "to accept the de jure
applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention, of 1949, to all the territories occupied by Israel since 1967 and to abide scrupulously by the provisions of the said Convention." Ultimately, it is only when a state does not
deny the applicability of a particular international obligation incumbent
upon them that there is hope that violations thereof may cease. States
always try to put forward justifications when accused of a breach of an
international obligation which they otherwise accept. If they do not even
accept that they are bound by that obligation, it is unreasonable to expect
compliance.
E. Condemnation and "Quasi-condemnation" of Violations of the
Rules of InternationalHumanitarianLaw
After the call for respect of international humanitarian law and the
determination that a state has breached that law, the next step the Security Council can take is to condemn such actions. There are various degrees of such condemnations, in terms ranging from "regrets" 5 or "deplores '1 3 to "strongly condemns." ' The choice of words is, of course, a
question of politics, including the degree to which the Security Council
wants to put public pressure on the state concerned.
F. Requests to States to Take Specific Actions as a Consequence of the
Violation of InternationalHumanitarianLaw
The Security Council may request states violating international humanitarian law to take certain corrective actions. Such measures include
the cessation of the violation, but the Security Council can go further in

52. See e.g. S.C. Res. 636, supra note 27, in which the Security Council "deeply regrets"
the deportation of Palestinians by Israel. A milder terminology, such as "expresses deep
concern" is found in S.C. Res. 471, for example. S.C. Res. 471, supra note 27.
53. See e.g. S.C. Res. 582, U.N. SCOR, 2666th mtg. Feb. 24, 1986) and the statement of
the President of the Security Council of Dec. 22, 1986, U.N. Doc. S/18538 (1986), where the
violation of international humanitarian law in the Iran-Iraq war is "deplored;" S.C. Res.
641, supra note 27 and S.C. Res. 681, supra note 35, where deportations of Palestinians by
Israel are "deplored;" the statement of the President of the Security Council of Nov. 11,
1976, where certain measures taken by Israel in the occupied territories are "strongly deplored," Resolutions and Decisions, supra note 27, at 4; S.C. Res. 465, supra note 27, which
contains a similar provision, and the statement of Jan. 4, 1991, U.N. Doc. S/22046 (1990),
where certain actions of the Israeli security forces are deplored.
54. See S.C. Res. 540, supra note 27, and the Mar. 30, 1984 statement of the President,
U.N. Doc. S/16454 (1984), where all violations of international humanitarian law in the
Iran-Iraq war are "condemned." See also statements made April 25, 1985, U.N. Doc. S/
17130 (1985), Mar. 21, 1986, U.N. Doc. S/17932 (1986), and Jan. 16, 1987, U.N. Doc. S/18610
(1987), where the use of chemical weapons in the same conflict is "strongly condemned."
See S.C. Res. 612, supra note 27, where the same action is "vigorously condemned" and S.C.
Res. 620, U.N. SCOR, 2870st mtg. (Aug. 26, 1988), where it is "resolutely condemned;" S.C.
Res. 674, supra note 30, condemning, in the preamble, certain actions by Iraq against thirdstate nationals and Kuwaitis which were in violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention and
S.C. Res. 762, supra note 45, where the decision of Israel to resume deportations of Palestinian civilians from occupied territories is "strongly condemned."
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prescribing remedial actions, as in the following example. In Resolution
471 of 5 June 1980, the Council determined that Israel had failed to provide adequate protection to the civilian population in the occupied territories, as provided for in the Fourth Geneva Convention. Indeed, there
had been assassination attempts against three mayors in the area. In light
of these facts, the Security Council called upon Israel to "provide the victims with adequate compensation for the damages suffered as a result of"
the attempts.
The Security Council can moreover address itself to the other states.
Thus, the Security Council has called for "international assistance in the
relief of suffering and the rehabilitation of refugees" in the conflict between India and Pakistan.5 It has called upon "all States not to provide
Israel with any assistance to be used specifically in connexion with settlements in the occupied territories,"5 6 which it regards as illegal. The Council also called upon all states "to continue to apply or to establish strict
control of the export ... of chemical products serving for the production
of chemical weapons" to Iran and Iraq, since use of such weapons during
the conflict had been established.5 7 As mentioned above, the Security
Council has also called upon the High Contracting Parties to fulfill their
obligation to ensure respect of the Fourth Geneva Convention. 8 A practical way of abiding by this obligation, as suggested by the Secretary-General, would be the support by the High Contracting Parties having consulates in the occupied territories for the efforts of the ICRC and the
United Nations.5 9
G. Decisions Regarding Liability for Grave Breaches of International
HumanitarianLaw
The invasion and occupation of Kuwait by Iraq is not the only instance where grave breaches of international humanitarian law were committed, but it is the first case where the Security Council, acting expressly
under Chapter VII of the Charter, particularly dealt with the legal consequences of those breaches. As early as 25 September 1990, the Security
Council affirmed that Iraq was under an obligation to comply fully with
all the terms of the Fourth Geneva Convention, and that Iraq was "liable
under the Convention in respect of the grave breaches committed by it, as
[were] individuals who commit[ed] or order[ed] the commission of grave
breaches." 0 These breaches included the mistreatment of third-State nationals, in particular hostage-taking, the transfer of hostages to military

55. S.C. Res. 307, supra note 26. That resolution also authorized the Secretary-General
to appoint a special representative for dealing with humanitarian problems.
56. S.C. Res. 465, supra note 27; S.C. Res. 471, supra note 27.
57. S.C. Res. 612, supra note 27.
58. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
59. U.N. Doc. S/22472, 4 (1991).
60. S.C. Res. 670, supra note 45.. This provision was reaffirmed in the preamble of S.C.
Res. 674.
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targets, and mistreatment of Kuwaitis.
One member of the Security Council, Cuba, contended that the
Council did not have "the power to make decisions as to liability or to
determine compensation or restitution," since such matters could, under
the Charter, only be addressed by the International Court of Justice, the
principal judicial organ of the United Nations.6 1 The point is indeed well
taken that the Security Council cannot determine amounts of compensation, and in fact the Council did not. However, the Council is clearly competent to merely affirm what the Fourth Geneva Convention stipulates,
namely that a state is liable for grave breaches committed by it. In fact,
under the Convention, a state remains liable for any grave breaches committed by it even if those individuals who committed those breaches have
been punished, as required by the Convention. 2 The pronouncement of
the Council does not add anything to the obligations of Iraq as a High
Contracting Party; it simply highlights them.
Article 89 of Protocol I provides for the co-operation between the
High Contracting Parties and the United Nations in "situations of serious
violations of the Conventions" or Protocol I. It is presumably in that
spirit that the Security Council, in Resolution 674, invited States to "collate substantiated information in their possession or submitted to them
on the grave breaches by Iraq ... and to make this information available
to the Security Council."63 Neither this Resolution, nor the records of the
meeting at which it was adopted, are very clear on the use the Council
would make of this information. Of course, information on the persistence
of grave breaches would allow the Council to take further measures
against these violations; however the request for information covers not
only future but also past breaches perpetrated prior to the adoption of
Resolution 674. This invitation should also be read in conjunction with
the preambular paragraph of the Resolution reaffirming that Iraq is liable
under the Fourth Geneva Convention in respect of the grave breaches
committed by it. One may thus wonder whether, had the crisis been
peacefully resolved, this Resolution could not have served as a basis for
the establishment by the Security Council of a compensation mechanism
for these grave breaches.
Such a mechanism was established by the Gulf War Cease-fire Resolution.6 ' In that Resolution, the Council reaffirmed the liability of Iraq
"for any direct loss, damage, including environmental damage and the depletion of any natural resources, or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and corporations as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and occu-

61.
62.
63.
tions of
law.
64.

U.N. Doc. S/PV. 2951, at 58 (1990).
Fourth Geneva Convention, art. 148. See COMMENTARY, supra note 12 at 602.
The term "grave breaches" in S.C. Res. 674 appears to cover not only grave violainternational humanitarian law, but also grave violations of international diplomatic
S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 2981st mtg. (April 8, 1991).
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pation of Kuwait."68 Clearly such damage and injury were due, inter alia,
to grave breaches of international humanitarian law. These violations
were committed both before and during the war, with the mistreatment
of third-State nationals, the oil spill into the Gulf, the burning of oil
wells, the indiscriminate use of Scud missiles against civilian populations,
etc. In accordance with the cease-fire resolution, all claims, are to be examined by a Commission established to administer a fund which will pay
compensation for such claims. 66
The cease-fire resolution does not deal with the obligation of Iraq
under the Geneva Conventions to punish or extradite the perpetrators of
these grave breaches, although penal sanctions for grave breaches are at
least as important as monetary compensation. However, as long as Saddam Hussein remains in power, it is quite unlikely that he or his high
officials would be tried in Iraqi courts for war crimes. The question is
then whether another state would prosecute him or whether an international criminal tribunal would be established to try him. A number of
states, particularly European states, were in favor of the latter
7
approach.1
H. Recognition of the Special Role of the ICRC with Respect to the
Implementation of InternationalHumanitarianLaw
The special role of the ICRC in the implementation of international
humanitarian law has been recognized by the Security Council on a number of occasions. In particular, the Security Council has tried to facilitate
the work of the ICRC. The Council has, for instance, called for allowing
units of the ICRC into a conflict area to evacuate the wounded and provide humanitarian assistance, or for facilitating the dispatch and distribution of aid by the ICRC. 9 In the Gulf War Cease-fire Resolution 687 of
3 April 1991, the Security Council requested Iraq to co-operate with the
ICRC for the repatriation of all Kuwaiti and third country nationals, by
providing lists of such persons, facilitating access to those persons by the
70
ICRC and facilitating the search by the ICRC of unaccounted persons.

65. See also S.C. Res. 686, U.N. SCOR, 2978th mtg. (Mar. 2, 1991).

66. The Commission was formally established by S.C. Res. 692, U.N. SCOR, 2987th
mtg. (May 20, 1991). For more details on the functioning of the compensation mechanism,
see, e.g., the Report of the Secretary-Generalpursuant to paragraph19 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), U.N. Doc. S/22559 (1991), and the Letter Dated 2 August from
the President of the Governing Council of the United Nations Compensation Commission
to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/22885 (1991), Security Council resolu-

tions 705 (1991), 706 (1991) of 15 August 1991, and 712 (1991) of 19 September 1991.
67. U.N. Press release DH/869 of April 16, 1991, referring to a decision taken by the
European Community to put Saddam Hussein on trial for war crimes.
68. S.C. Res. 436, U.N. SCOR, 2089th mtg. (Oct. 6, 1978), dealing with the situation in
Lebanon.
69. S.C. Res. 512, supra note 26, also relating to Lebanon. In the same resolution, the
Security Council also appealed to Member States to provide the most extensive humanitarian aid possible.
70. See also S.C. Res. 686, supra note 65.
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The Security Council has also underscored the role of the ICRC with
respect to prisoners of war. 7' The Council urged that a comprehensive
exchange of prisoners of war between Iran and Iraq be completed shortly
after the cessation of hostilities, in co-operation with the ICRC; 72 the
Council also demanded that Iraq arrange for immediate access to and release of all prisoners of war under the auspices of the ICRC, even before
the formal cessation of the Gulf War.7 Moreover, the Security Council
has encouraged the co-operation between the United Nations and the
ICRC for humanitarian aid, for example for the distribution of foodstuffs
in Iraq and Kuwait, 7' and the repatriation of Kuwaiti and third country
nationals after the Gulf War. 75 Finally, on a number of occasions, the Security Council has paid tribute to the work of7 1the ICRC, particularly in
providing emergency humanitarian assistance.
Apart from the specific tasks entrusted to the ICRC under the Geneva Conventions, the Committee is more generally considered to be the
"guardian" of the Geneva Conventions. 77 Thus, it was involved in major
developments concerning the Conventions, such as the adoption of the
Additional Protocols.78 Another such development was the proposal by
the Secretary-General that the Security Council call for a meeting of the
High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention to discuss
possible measures that might be taken by them under the Convention to
ensure its implementation.7 9 It was therefore quite appropriate that the
Security Council requested the Secretary-General to develop the idea further "in co-operation with" the ICRC. s0

71. The special position of the ICRC in this respect is recognized, inter alia, by the
Third Geneva Convention, art. 125.
72. S. C. Res. 582, supra note 53.
73. S.C. Res. 686, supra note 65. As far as Iraqi POWs are concerned, the Council simply "welcomed" the decision of Kuwait and the Allied Forces to release them in accordance
with the Third Geneva Convention, under the auspices of the ICRC. Id.
74. S.C. Res. 666, supra note 30.
75. By S.C. Res. 687, supra note 64, the Security Council invited the ICRC to keep the
Secretary-General informed of its activities in this respect. This co-operation was again
mentioned in S.C. Res. 706, U.N. SCOR, 3004th mtg. (Aug. 15, 1991). The relevant information from the ICRC is included in a report from the Secretary-General submitted pursuant
to the latter resolution. U.N. Doc. S/23012 (1991). See also U.N. Doc. S/23514, Annex, sec.
D (1992) for additional information from the ICRC.
76. See the statement of the President of Nov. 11, 1983, U.N. Doc. S/16142 and S.C.
Res. 542, U.N. SCOR, 2501st mtg. (Nov. 23, 1983), both relating to Lebanon.
77. Report submitted to the Security Council by the Secretary-General in accordance
with resolution 672 (1990), U.N. Doc. S/21919, 1 24 (1990).
78. See supra note 2.
79. U.N. Doc. S/21919, 24 (1990). It should be mentioned that Protocol I, art. 7 provides that the depositary
...shall convene a meeting of the High Contracting Parties, at the request of
one or more of the said Parties and upon the approval of the majority of the
said Parties, to consider general problems concerning the application of the
Conventions and of the Protocol.
80. S.C. Res. 681, supra note 35. Pursuant to that resolution, the Secretary-General has
indeed engaged in consultations with the ICRC on the matter. U.N. Doc. S/22472, 1 6
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I. Resolution 688
All the cases mentioned so far relate to international armed conflicts.
The Security Council broke new ground in the aftermath of the Gulf
War. On April 5, 1991, the Council adopted Resolution 688 regarding the
repression by Iraq of part of its civilian population, particularly Iraqi
Kurds, and the need for humanitarian assistance to that population."1
This of course raised the general issue of the respect for human rights,
but also, in as far as parts of the population had begun an internal struggle against the regime, the question of compliance with international humanitarian law. Resolution 688 did not expressly characterize the Iraqi
actions as violations of the rules of international humanitarian law applicable to non-international armed conflicts. However, the United Kingdom, Belgium and8 2 Luxembourg made this point in their statements
before the Council.
The problem for the Security Council is Article 2, paragraph 7 of the
Charter, which precludes the United Nations from intervening in "matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state."
This provision was mentioned in Resolution 688. The Council circumvented Article 2, paragraph 7 by characterizing the consequence of the
repression of the Kurds, namely their massive flight from Iraq to neighboring countries, as a threat to international peace and security. This is
of course an issue outside the scope of Article 2, paragraph 7, one the
Council is competent to address.
Another argument is that once an area, previously exclusively regulated by municipal law, is also covered by international law, then activities within such an area can no longer be characterized as "matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction." This argument is used
particularly with respect to human rights, but is also valid for the international regulation of internal armed conflicts. Nevertheless, states are
clearly very reluctant to accept any infringement on issues they consider
within their sovereignty. Moreover, the characterization of a situation as
an internal armed conflict, triggering the application of humanitarian law,
is in most cases very controversial.

(1991).
81. This resolution was further interpreted as providing a legal basis for the establishment by the United States and its allies of safe havens for the Kurds in northern Iraq. For a
discussion of the legal arguments, see Lewis, Legal Scholars Debate Refugee Plan, Generally Backing U.S. Stand, N.Y. TIMES, April 19, 1991, at A8. The United Nations subsequently assumed responsibility for the relief centers, in accordance with an agreement
reached between the United Nations and Iraq on April 18, 1991. U.N. Doc. S/22513 (1991).
Moreover, units of United Nations guards were deployed in order to strengthen the humanitarian presence of the Organization. U.N. Doc. S/22663 (1991).
82. U.N. Doc. S/PV.2982, at 66, 67, 73 (1991). All three speakers referred to the Geneva
Conventions, Common article 3 of which provides that certain minimum rules apply in the
case of an armed conflict not of an international character. These minimum rules include
the humane treatment of civilians.
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IV.

EVALUATION AND POSSIBLE FUTURE MEASURES

Until the Gulf War, the actions of the Security Council with regard
to the implementation of international humanitarian law have been primarily of a declaratory and hortatory nature. The Council called attention to a number of breaches of humanitarian law by states, and even
condemned them. This in itself could bring some political pressure on the
state concerned. Unfortunately, it did not prove particularly effective,
and the violations did not always cease. The Security Council, with the
assistance of the Secretary-General, monitored developments in specific
cases, such as the occupied territories in the Middle East, but it did not
resort to Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to achieve
respect for international humanitarian law until the invasion of Kuwait.
In this case as well, the violations of Iraq were admittedly not stopped by
the Council, but the Security Council devised measures to deal with the
consequences of these acts in particular by establishing a mechanism for
monetary compensation.
One declaratory measure adopted by the Security Council with regard to the implementation of international humanitarian law has been,
however, quite important. Indeed the repeated statements on the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention in certain situations have provided a consistent assessment by the international community of the illegality of certain acts over the years. Moreover, as discussed, such
statements have generally characterized a territory as occupied, which has
substantial legal and political implications.
The Security Council has focused primarily on the implementation of
the Fourth Geneva Convention, in particular with respect to illegal settlements and deportations, but it has also, when necessary, used the 1925
Geneva Protocol and the Third Geneva Convention, as well as general
international humanitarian law, including to some extent the right to relief. Thus, ratione materiae, the scope of the Security Council's actions
has been relatively broad. This is not the case with respect to the situations addressed. Indeed, the Security Council has been quite selective in
this regard. It has dealt with three cases primarily: the Middle East and
the occupied territories, the conflict between Iran and Iraq, and the invasion of Kuwait. Consequently, the Security Council has pointed the finger
at only a few of the states which have committed breaches of humanitarian law in all these years.
The Security Council's role in the implementation of international
humanitarian law, while important and necessary, has been limited by
significant shortcomings. The political and moral effect of the Council's
actions has been far greater than their practical impact in preventing
human suffering. The question thus arises: What else could the Council
do when states violate international humanitarian law?
The Security Council has the power to adopt binding measures under
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. Such measures include
complete or partial economic sanctions as well as the use of force. This
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latter method is both disproportionate and inappropriate for stopping violations of humanitarian law. But are sanctions adequate responses to violations of international humanitarian law?
The answer depends on the kind of violations involved. In cases of
the use of prohibited means of warfare and/or indiscriminate attacks on
civilian population, an arms embargo appears appropriate. As already
mentioned, when the use of chemical weapons had been established in the
Iran-Iraq war, the Security Council called upon states to apply export
83
controls for products serving for the production of chemical weapons.
Why not go further and declare a comprehensive and binding arms embargo which would include products with potential military use? It would
seem appropriate for the international community to target sanctions at
the very means of perpetrating atrocities. Undeniably, the moral effect of
an arms embargo weighs more than a simple request by the Security
Council to cease the violations. As for the practical effect, presumably,
the state involved would have enough arms to continue its violations of
international humanitarian law, at least for some time. In an extended
war, though, the import of arms would indeed be needed eventually.
This solution, however, is not easily applicable to all cases. For example, what would happen if only one of the parties to the conflict is, to the
best of the Council's knowledge, using prohibited means of warfare ? An
arms embargo against all parties to the conflict would unfairly penalize
those states which respect international humanitarian law. An arms embargo against only that state which has violated humanitarian law may
involve the Council in unduly disturbing the military balance betweeen
the parties. These points may be hypothetical, since it is more likely that
all those involved violate international humanitarian law, rather than one
state only, but this underscores the difficulty of prescribing adequate responses for the Security Council.
As for the duration of the arms embargo, it seems reasonable to
maintain it until the end of the conflict. Although designed to punish a
state for its use of prohibited weapons or its indiscriminate attacks on
civilians, an arms embargo would hopefully in most cases also curtail the
duration of the conflict. 4
In a case of violation of humanitarian rules governing occupation, the
response should be different. In one instance of illegal settlements by the
occupying power, the Security Council has called upon all states not to
provide the occupying power with any assistance which would be used
specifically in connection with those settlements.8 In this case, the Council's decision was not binding. Couldn't the Council go one step further

83. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
84. This was also the motivation of the Council when it declared an arms embargo
against Yugoslavia "for the purposes of establishing peace and stability in Yugoslavia." S.C.
Res. 713, U.N. SCOR, 3009th mtg. (Sep. 25, 1991).
85. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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and render such measures binding on all states? This type of economic
sanction, which targets the precise scope of the violation, seems more appropriate than a comprehensive economic embargo. The latter, apart
from being a disproportionate response, would most likely cause unjust
suffering to the population of both the state concerned and that of the
territory it occupies. On the contrary, a "tied" economic sanction may
result in the desired cessation of illegal acts to the extent that these depend on financial assistance.
What could the Council do, however, in the case of mistreatment of
nationals of an occupied territory or aliens? It is not possible to give a
general answer. Economic sanctions would probably not have the potenin
tial direct effect described above of stopping these actions, at least 8not
6
the short term. They may, however, be justified on other grounds.
Most commentators would share the view that the Security Council
has recently shown an ability to innovate. Given the evidence of its record, as outlined in this article, it will hopefully find new ways of ensuring
respect for international humanitarian law, and consequently strengthen
the role it has played so far.

86. For instance, the Security Council decided to apply economic sanctions on Iraq by
Resolution 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990, as a response to the invasion of Kuwait. The issue
of Iraqi violations of international humanitarian law in Kuwait was raised by the Council at
a later stage. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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1

- REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

1.01 Provincial Securities Commissions
The responsibility for the administration and enforcement of securities legislation in Canada rests with provincial regulatory agencies. Due to
the vagaries of Canadian constitutional law, to date, the federal authorities have not yet attempted to exercise jurisdiction in the field of securities regulation, apart from occasional proposals to merge provincial commissions into a national agency.' As a result, interprovincial cooperation
and administrative integration - notably in the use of national policy
statements to facilitate the filing and approval of prospectuses on a national basis in each of the separate jurisdictions2 - have been necessary
to secure the orderly distribution of securities in Canada.
The ten provinces and two territories of Canada each have administrative agencies or officials responsible for securities legislation, which
vary both in size and sophistication, and in their relationship with the
appropriate elected government. The majority of provinces have a two
tiered structure consisting of an upper appointed commission, and a
lower level director and supporting staff.' Commissions have not been es* Richard Lachcik is a partner with the law firm of Weir & Foulds, Toronto office,
where he serves as chairman of the firm's securities group. He received his Bachelor of Arts
from the University of Toronto, and his Bachelor of Laws from Queens University in Kingston, Ontario. He is a member of the Ontario Bar.
Mr. Lachcik wishes to acknowledge the invaluable assistance of Wayne Egan in preparing this article. Mr. Egan is an associate with Weir & Foulds.
1. PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA, 312-314, 355 (1977). See also CONSUMER AND CORPORATE AFFAIRS, CANADA, PROPOSALS FOR A SECURITIES MARKET LAW FOR CANADA (3 volumes which include a draft federal act).

2. National Policy No. 1: Clearance of National Issues, III Canadian Securities Law
Reporter (CCH) 470-001 [hereinafter cited as Can. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)].
3. British Columbia, Alberta, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Ontario, Quebec, and Nova
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tablished in the other provinces or the two territories where either a government department administers the relevant legislation, 4 or the securities legislation is administered by government officials. 5 The provincial
agencies are a hybrid in the functions they perform, in that they assume
the duties carried out by both the SEC and the "blue sky" state authorities in the United States.
The over-all policy objectives of the provincial agencies are akin to
their American counterparts in that the basic functions served by each
are similar. These include (1) the registration of persons and institutions
trading in securities, and maintenance of the minimum standards necessary to retain registration; (2) the registration of securities distributed to
the public by issuer corporations; (3) the continuous and timely disclosure of relevant information -to the investing public; and (4) the provision
of the necessary investigative, preventative, and punitive mechanisms for
the proper enforcement of the legislation. In addition, the agencies have
assumed the authority to promulgate policy statements for the proper
functioning of their role, and have been delegated duties of supervision
and review of the various self-regulatory authorities involved in the area
of securities.
1.02 Securities Legislation
Each of the Canadian jurisdictions has enacted its own legislation
dealing with trading in securities within its geographical boundaries. Possible constitutional limits on the extent of provincial jurisdiction over interprovincial transactions have been liberally construed by the Canadian
courts so that they do not present any practical barrier.' Four provinces
have modelled their legislation on that of Ontario, and together with Ontario are commonly known as the Uniform Act provinces.7 More recently,
the provinces of Newfoundland and Nova Scotia have passed securities
legislation which is similar to the present securities law in Ontario.s The
other Atlantic provinces form their own separate group in that their legislation is basically modelled on the predecessor legislation in Ontario,9
while the province of Quebec combines features of both the predecessor

Scotia.
4. New Brunswick.
5. Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, Northwest Territories and Yukon Territories.
6. Cf. Gregory v. Quebec Sec. Comm'n, 584 S.C.R. (1961). R. v. McKenzie Sec. Ltd.,
Man. R., 56 D.L.R. 2d (1966).
7. Ontario Securities Act, 111 Can. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 55,101. Revised Regulations of
Ontario, Ch. 910/80, 111 Can. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 55, 251 (1988), as amended by R.R.O. ch.
84/81 (1988) (hereinafter Regulations]. The Uniform Act provinces are Alberta, S.A. ch. 26.1 (1981), as amended; British Columbia, S.B.C. ch. 83 (1985), as amended; Manitoba,
R.S.M. ch. S-50 (1988), as amended; Saskatchewan, S.S. ch. S-42.2 (1988), as amended.
8. Newfoundland, S. Nfld. ch. 48 (1990); and Nova Scotia, R.S.N.S. ch. 418 (1989).
9. Securities Act, R.S.O. ch. 22 (1945), as amended; New Brunswick, R.S.N.B. ch. S-6
(1973), as amended; Prince Edward Island, R.S.P.E.I. ch. 5-4 (1974), as amended.
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and the present Ontario securities legislation.10 In that the Ontario legislation provides the basic foundation for provincial securities regulation in
Canada, it will be utilized as the basis for discussion in this material.
Considerable movement towards reform was accomplished in Ontario
with the enactment of a completely revised Securities Act (effective as of
September 15, 1979) and regulations, which governed all aspects of securities regulation in Ontario." The Securities Act and the regulations thereunder have also been further amended more recently in Ontario. The
reader is cautioned, however, that the legislation of the separate provincial jurisdictions will not always be similar insofar as details of the legislation are concerned, and reference must be made to the legislation of the
appropriate jurisdiction."3
In addition, regulations are enacted by each jurisdiction under the
delegated authority of the provincial legislation, detailing procedures and
requirements for the various functions performed by the provincial agencies. Amendments are frequently made to the regulations, and the reader
is cautioned to ensure that reference is made to the current regulations.
The regulations are supplemented by the issuance of more detailed and
explanatory policy statements1 3 which are classified as either national,
uniform, or local. Local policies apply only within an individual jurisdiction; uniform statements are issued jointly by the Uniform Act provinces,
while national policy statements are adopted by all ten provinces acting
in concert.
1.03 Related Legislation
Securities legislation must be placed within the context of the legislative provisions which relate to corporate and commercial affairs in general. The distinction between company law and securities law, however,
has become somewhat less clear-cut. Because of the flexibility given to
and the discretion exercised by securities administrators, innovative techniques that are first developed in the area of securities law may take some
time before they emerge as substantive provisions of statutes regarding
companies.
Both federal and provincial governments have enacted companies
legislation which deals, inter alia, with matters related to securities including the issuance of shares, proxy solicitation, disclosure by public
corporations, insider trading provisions, derivative actions, and issuer and
take-over bids (the latter two for federally incorporated companies) and

10. R.S.Q. ch. V-1.1 (1982), as amended.
11. S.O. ch. 47 (1978). For a detailed examination of the Legislation, see ALBOINI, ONTARIO SECURITIES LAW (1984) [hereinafter ALBOINI).
12. For a collection of the applicable legislation, see generally I-V Can. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH).
13. See, e.g., National Policy Statements, Can. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
470-001-472-501,
at 57,525-58,313 (1971-1991).
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which are administered by the appropriate government department.1 4 In
addition, federal and provincial legislation dealing with corporate taxation and loan, trust, insurance, and investments corporations must also be
included within the purview of the securities practitioner." In that
chartered banks are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the central
government, and are governed by the provisions of the federal Bank
Act,"6 their regulation is a matter separate from that of provincial securities legislation.
1.04 Self-Regulatory Authorities
Self-regulatory authorities of the securities industry in Canada can
be divided into two basic groups: stock exchanges and industry associations. In the former category are the six functional exchanges in Canada:
the Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver, Alberta, and Winnipeg Stock Exchanges, and the Toronto Futures Exchange. 7 These are established by
provincial legislation and exercise power to regulate and establish rules as
to membership, listed issuers, and the trading of listed securities.' 8 Their
function is to ensure that the qualifications, financial condition, and standards of business and corporate conduct of both members and listed issuers are sufficiently maintained so that the market in listed securities is
both fully informed and orderly.
Apart from establishing rules providing for the disciplining of members for violations of the applicable legislation or bylaws, the important
role of the exchanges is to regulate the trading that occurs on their floors.
The provincial securities authorities generally have the power to make
directions and orders concerning the manner in which the exchanges
carry on business, their bylaws and regulations, trading on or through exchange facilities, and whether listed issuers comply with the relevant securities legislation.' 9 In addition, they possess a general right to review
any decision, order, or ruling made under any bylaw, rule, or regulation of
14. For federal companies, see Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. ch. C-44
(1985), as amended [hereinafter CBCA). For a typical provincial statute, see Business Corporations Act, S.O. ch. 4 (1982), as amended [hereinafter OBCA].
15. E.g., in Ontario: Insurance Act, R.S.O. ch. 218 (1980), as amended; Investment Contracts Act, R.S.O. ch. 221 (1980); Loan & Trust Corporations Act, R.S.O. ch. 249 (1980), as
amended; Pension Benefits Act, R.S.O. ch. 373 (1980); Trustee Act, R.S.O. ch. 512 (1980), as
amended; Corporations Tax Act, R.S.O. ch. 97 (1980), as amended. For federal legislation
see Foreign Insurance Companies Act, R.S.C. ch. 1-13 (1985), as amended; Canadian & British Insurance Companies Act, R.S.C. ch. 1-12 (1985), as amended; Investment Companies
Act, R.S.C. ch. 1-22 (1985), as amended; Loan Companies Act, R.S.C. ch. L-12 (1985); Income Tax Act, S.C. ch. 63 (1970-1972), as amended.
16. Bank Act, R.S.C. ch. B-1 (1985), as amended.
17. A sixth, the Atlantic Stock Exchange, exists only in legislation, and has never
operated.
18. See, e.g., Toronto Stock Exchange Act, S.O. ch. 27 (1982), as amended; General
Bylaw, IV Can. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 801-001.
19. E.g., Conflicts of Interest: Statement of Policies, § 22, Can. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1
450-321, at 55,124 (1987); Id. § 23, 450-324, at 55,125.
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the exchange that affects a party thereto.
Industry associations are not subject to the same broad supervision
by provincial regulatory authorities as are stock exchanges.2 1 The major
national organization is the Investment Dealers' Association of Canada,
which is further divided into regional districts. It exists to protect the
investing public and its members by (1) establishing financial requirements for its members; (2) promoting and maintaining high standards of
business ethics, conduct, and competence; and (3) organizing and administering educational courses for members, employees, and the public.
On a more local basis, there exist bond traders associations - which are
associated with secondary trading in unlisted securities, treasury bills,
bonds, and debentures. These associations have established codes and
procedures to promote and maintain professional competence, financial
stability, and ethical conduct.

CHAPTER

II

- SECURITIES LAWS

2.01 Provincial Securities Laws
Each of the ten provinces and two territories which comprise Canada
maintains its own securities legislation. The applicable statute in each of
these jurisdications must be reviewed where a securities issue arises in
that jurisdiction. While some groups, provinces or territories maintain securities legislation which is similar, the disparity between the various
groups can be quite pronounced. 22 The following list contains the applicable securities legislation in each of the jurisdictions in Canada:
1. Securities Act (Northwest Territories), R.O.N.W.T., 1974 (as
amended);
2. Securities Act (Yukon Territories), S.Y.T., 1986;
3. Securities Act (Alberta), R.S.A., 1981 (as amended);
4. Securities Act (British Columbia), R.S.B.C., 1985 (as amended);
5. Securities Act (Manitoba), R.S.M., 1988 (as amended);
6. Security Frauds Prevention Act (New Brunswick), R.S.N.B., 1973
(as amended);
7. Securities Act, 1990 (Newfoundland), NFLD. R.S., 1990;
8. Securities Act (Nova Scotia), R.S.N.S., 1989;
9. Securities Act (Ontario), R.S.O., 1980 (as amended);
10.Securities Act (Quebec), R.S.Q., 1982 (as amended); and
11.Securities Act, 1988 (Saskatchewan), S.S., 1988, as amended.

20. Id. § 22(3), 450-323, at 55,125-55,126.
21. The subject of self-regulation is more fully detailed in JOHNSTON, CANADIAN SECURITIES REGULATION, 386-403 [hereinafter JOHNSTON]. See also Self-Regulation Generally, § 19,
Can. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 450-491, at 55,124 (1987); Id. § 20, 450-492, at 55,124 (1987); Id.
§ 21, 450-294, at 55,124 (audit requirements).

22. See generally § 1.02 infra.
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2.02 Other Applicable Statutes and Legislation
In addition to securities legislation which exists in each of the ten
provinces and two territories of Canada, there are many other statutes
which affect securities laws in Canada. In particular, the company law in
each jurisdiction, including federal corporate legislation applies in areas
such as takeover bids, proxy solicitation and disclosure requirements.2
Federal legislation in Canada which impacts directly on securities law
includes insurance, loan and trust company legislation, competition (antitrust) legislation, foreign investment provisions and federal criminal law.
Many of the provinces have also enacted legislation in these areas, particularly insurance, loan and trust company laws which may impact in the
realm of securities law. A comprehensive review of this legislation affecting securities laws in Canada cannot be adequately covered within the
confines of these materials. Reference should be made to the applicable
legislation within the jurisdication in Canada where a securities issue
arises.
CHAPTER III - SECURITIES MARKETS AND SECURITIES DEALERS

Securities markets in Canada are basically similar to those in the
United States, varying only in size, volume, and level of sophistication.
To the extent that current communications technology and the interlisting of shares (e.g., on both the Toronto and New York Stock Exchanges)
permits, an increasingly integrated North American market system exists.
3.01 DistributionMarkets
The initial distribution of securities in Canada is effected in a variety
of ways, much of it occurring by means of negotiated public offerings underwritten on a fixed take-down or best-efforts basis, exempt private
placements with institutional investors, or stock offerings to existing
shareholders by the issuance of rights to purchase additional shares. Secondary distributions may occur when control persons sell blocks of outstanding shares, generally in the over-the-counter market. In addition,
stock exchanges may permit the distribution of mining and some industrial issues through the facilities of the exchange. The practice and procedure governing this latter type of distribution vary according to jurisdiction; in Ontario, a statement of material facts satisfactory to the Ontario
24
Securities Commission and the Toronto Stock Exchange must be filed.
3.02 Trading Markets
Trading markets are generally divided into readily distinguishable

23. See, e.g., CBCA supra note 14, §§ 127-131 (Insider Trading), §§ 147-154 (Proxies),
and §§ §§ 194-203 (Take-over bids).
24. Exemptions from Prospectus Requirements, § 72(1), Can. Sec. L. Rep. 450-721, at
55,169 (1988).
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types, which may be generally classified as stock exchange markets or as
over-the-counter markets.
[a]Securities that are listed and traded on recognized stock exchanges form the first major group. Purchases are transacted by members
of the exchanges during exchange business hours on either an agency or
principal basis. The listing requirements of the exchanges generally relate
to minimum standards of net assets, earnings history, and the extent of
share distribution. These are usually lower than those required in the
United States, since less mature securities may be listed on Canadian
stock exchanges.
[b]The over-the-counter market consists mainly of transactions in
unlisted equity securities, although some government and corporate debt
securities are also traded. The over-the-counter market in Canada is considerably smaller than its U.S. counterpart. The smaller Canadian market, together with the more concentrated ownership of public securities in
Canada, delayed the growth of an extensive system of market-makers or
sophisticated electronic trading technology to the extent that it exists in
the United States, although over-the-counter market trading is extensively regulated'and trades fully reported. Similarly, the existence of a
third market for the over-the-counter sales of listed securities is generally
of concern only in the United States. The rise of the so-called "fourth
market," whereby block trades are made by institutional investors without the intervention of a dealer, led the Ontario Securities Commission to
order a mutual fund to cease its relationship with Institutional Network
Inc. on the ground that the latter was not registered to trade in Ontario.2 5
3.03 Commission Rates and Markups
In contrast to the U.S. situation, a fixed commission rate structure
maintained its existence in Canada for a longer period, although it was
subject to the supervision of the provincial securities commissions. In the
past, increases were permitted once it was established that they would
not be prejudicial to the public interest. However, as a result of detailed
and sophisticated scrutiny to which commission rate proposals were subjected over the years, and serious consideration of the feasibility of fully
negotiated rates," a fixed commission rate structure no longer exists in
the securities industry of Canada.
CHAPTER

IV

- WHAT IS A SECURITY?

4.01 Introduction
Like its U.S. counterpart, Canadian securities legislation only applies
to trading in securities. Although semantic and technical distinctions can
be made in comparing the particular legislation of the various provincial

25. See JOHNSTON, supra note 21, at 88.
26. Id. at 397.
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jurisdictions, the definition of a security is basically similar.2 7 The securities need not be written documents, but may be oral agreements and may
be evidenced by the existence of a legal relationship. They can relate to
both individuals and companies.
4.02 Characteristicsof a Security
In their interpretation of the meaning of a "security," Canadian
courts have taken a broad and liberal approach to statutory definitions
and have tended to place a higher priority on substance, as opposed to
form, in general deference to U.S. jurisprudence on this topic. Standard
corporate securities are easily recognized. Evidence of an interest in options, trusts, estates, associations, profit-sharing agreements, oil, natural
gas, or mining leases, or scholarship or educational plans or trusts, are
also included within the definition. Documents of title - for instance,
warehouse receipts for scotch whiskey - which are purchased for speculative or investment purposes will fall within the purview of the legislation. 28 The concept of the "investment contract," whereby any arrangement in which money is invested in a common enterprise with the
expectation that profit will be generated solely or primarily by the efforts
of third parties is used as a residual and all-inclusive means to retain
legislative supervision over most speculative investment schemes. 2 The
Ontario legislation specifically adds to the definition of security commodity futures contracts or options that are not traded on a commodity futures exchange registered with or recognized by the Commission under
the Commodity Futures Act, Ontario.30
CHAPTER V - REGISTRATION OF SECURITIES PROFESSIONALS

5.01 Registration Requirements
As a general rule, Canadian securities legislation prohibits any person
or company from trading, or being connected with a trade, in securities
unless they are registered, and the registration must have been made in
accordance with the applicable statute or regulations. 1 The granting, renewal, and revocation of registration are matters delegated to the discretion of administrative officials or the commissions, to be exercised accord-

27. See, e.g., Interpretation, § 1(1)40, Can. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 450-001 at 55,104
(1988)[hereinafter Interpretation]. For a detailed examination, see ALBOINI, supra note 11,
at 0-24-0-63.
28. In re Brigadoon Scotch Distributors (Canada) Ltd., 3 O.R. 714 (1970).
29. Interpretation, supra note 27, § 1(1)40xiv, 1 450-001, at 55,105; see also Pacific
Coast Exch. Ltd. V. Ontario Sec. Comm'n, 2 S.C.R. 3d 112 (1977) (held by the Supreme
Court of Canada that a margin contract for the purchase of bags of silver coins was an
investment contract and, hence, was a security).
30. Interpretation, supra note 27, § 1(1) 40 xiv, T 450-001, at 55,105. Note that the
Winnipeg Commodity Exchange is not recognized by the Commission for these purposes.
31. Exemptions from Prospectus Requirements, supra note 24, § 24, 9 450-721, at
55,169.
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ing to broad standards of the public interest, of suitability, or of being
nonobjectionable. Procedural requirements for hearings are incorporated
into the legislation in an attempt to limit the ambit of the discretion involved in dealing with registration. 2 The basic objective of the registration procedure is to ensure that those people involved in the securities
business are honest and of good repute, in order that the public may be
protected from fraudulent behaviour.3 3 Canadian terminology differs from
U.S. terminology to some extent. The licensing of securities professionals
in Canada, as in the United States, is referred to as registration. The process by which securities are qualified for public distribution is not referred to as registration, but rather involves the filing of a prospectus and
the issuance of a receipt by the regulatory authority, which may be withheld on statutory grounds. 4 Reference herein to "registration" is confined
to registration of securities professionals. The term "trade" or "trading"
includes any sale or disposition of a security for value.
The actual registration process functions according to a scheme of
classification. The legislation generally delineates major classes of participants that must be registered for trading in securities. The major categories are dealers, advisers, underwriters, and salesmen.3 5 These are usually
defined in broad terms, 6 however, the categories of dealers and advisers
are further classified into subcategories according to differences in function and membership in recognized and self-regulatory organizations. 7
Partners or officers of dealers and advisers must register3 s although discretion is often allowed for designation of employees other than salesmen
as "nontrading employees." 39 Due to the scope and nature of the varying
definitions, there may be some overlapping in function. Thus, while underwriters are normally prohibited from dealing with the public on the
sole basis of their registration as underwriters, the more important classes
40
of registered dealers are deemed to be registered underwriters as well.
Large dealers may often be registered in a variety of classifications because of the divisions within their firms. In addition, some jurisdictions

32. Registration, § 25 Can. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 450-356, at 55,126 (1987).
33. Lymburn v. Mayland, 318 A.C. (1932).
34. See § 7.05 infra.
35. Registration, supra note 2, § 24(1), 450-351, at 55,126 (1987).
36. Interpretation, supra note 27, § 1(1)1, 450-001, at 55,101; The Director, § 7, Can.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 450-132, at 55,108 (1988); Trading Securities Generally, § 39, Can. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 450-458, at 35,143 (1986); Id. § 43, 450-472, at 55,144.
37. Registration Requirements, § 86, Can. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 452-506, at 55,328
(1987). Registration Requirements: Categories of Registration, § 87, Can. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 452-507, at 55,328 (1987). Advisers may be investment counsel, portfolio managers,
or securities advisers. Dealers are divided into seven categories: broker, broker-dealer, investment dealer, mutual fund dealer, securities dealer, and securities issuers, the latter referring to those who desire to "self-underwrite."
38. Registration, supra note 32, § 24(1)(a)(c), 1 450-351, at 55,126.
39. Id. § 24(3), 1 450-353, at 55,126.
40. Broker-dealers, investment dealers, and securities dealers: § 87, Can. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 450.
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have elaborated policies to permit and regulate dual registration in some
situations and to prohibit the practice in others."'
In May of 1987, the Ontario securities regulators instituted a program known as "Universal Registration", which required the registration
of market intermediaries. The introduction was designed to implement
the registration of all those in the business of trading in securities in a
number of situations which formerly were exempt from the registration
requirement as contained in the legislation. For these purposes, virtually
all of the registration exemptions described in Section 5.04 infra were removed from individuals or companies who fell within the definition of
market intermediary.2 The amendments created four new categories of
dealer registrants, Financial Intermediary, Foreign Dealer, International
43
Dealer and Limited Market Dealer.
The breadth of the definition of marketing intermediary has elicited
numerous criticisms and comments from participants in the capital markets in Ontario. The universal registration and market intermediary concept have lead to uncertainty and complexity in the registration system.
The regulators are currently reviewing this program and it is contemplated that the extent of the definition will be restricted, or that information on market intermediaries will be acquired using methods other than
the removal of registration exemptions. At the present time however, the
universal registration provisions still exist in the legislation applicable to
Ontario securities.
5.02 Application Procedures
All jurisdictions of Canada have made extensive provisions for the
procedure governing registration of securities professionals and their continued fitness for registration. Considerable amounts of information as to
personal history and financial and business experience are elicited by requiring registrants to complete and execute forms according to statutory
classification." In addition, the authorities have a general discretion to
require further information to be filed.4 5 These forms provide the administrative officials with a detailed picture of corporate structure and financial capabilities of the proposed registrants as well as an indication of the
background of their principals and officers. Of equal importance to most
principal classes of registrants are the required conditions of registration
which are intended to ensure that registrants will have continued ability
to serve their clients. These generally relate to adequate levels of minimum free capital, bonding and insurance, proper maintenance of business

41. Self Regulatory Organizations: Dual Registration under the Securities Act, Ontario
Policy No. 4.4, Can. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 471-404, at 57,943 (1989).
42. Universal Registration, §§ 176-178, Can. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 453-101-453-105, at
55,358-55,362 (1988).
43. Id. §§ 179-182, 453-107-453-141, at 55,360-55,362.
44. Registration, supra note 32, § 28, 450-372, at 55,127.
45. Id. § 30, 450-374 at 55,127.

1992

CANADIAN

SECURITIES LAW

records and accounting procedures (including a "know your client" rule),
audit requirements and procedures to the extent that they are not imposed by the self-regulatory associations, segregation of funds and securities, proficiency requirements, and, for dealers, participation in a compensation or contingency trust fund."'
Applications for registration as salesmen require successful completion of approved courses of instruction and study."' Registration is withdrawn upon the transfer by a salesman from one firm to another until the
new employment situation is approved by the appropriate official."
5.03 Non-resident Ownership of Registrants
Of interest to non-Canadian readers are the limits placed upon foreign resident ownership or control of registrants. On the basis of various
government and industry reports which indicated the necessity of maintaining substantial Canadian ownership of the investment community in
this country, foreign ownership restrictions were introduced in Ontario in
the early 1970's." 9 Non-Canadian ownership of registrants formerly could
not exceed 10 percent, in cases of individual owners, or 25 percent, in
total.
In 1987, amendments to the legislation introduced at the same time
as the Universal Registration category described in Section 5.01 infra, revised the non-resident ownership restrictions. The new rules remove the
non-resident ownership restrictions and provide that a registered dealer
that is not an individual, except for an international dealer or security
issuer, must be a company incorporated, or a person formed or created,
under the laws of Canada or a province or territory of Canada.5 0 The
Commission also retains discretionary power with respect to designating a
person or company to be a non-resident or not to be a non-resident after
examining the manner in which the person carries on business."1 The designation primarily effects whether the registered dealer may be eligible in

46. Registration Requirements, supra note 37, § 101-111, 1 452-561-452-667, at 55,33355,339. For requirements in other jurisdictions, see JOHNSTON, supra note 21, at 107-108.
See also Violations of Securities Laws of Other Jurisdictions - Conduct Affecting Fitness for
Continued Registration, Ontario Policy No. 17, Can. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) V470-017, at 57,577
(1991); Conflict of Interest - Registrants Acting as Corporate Directors, Ontario Policy No.
18, Can. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 470-018, at 57,577-57,578 (1991); Use of information and
Opinion re Mining and Oil Properties by Registrants and Others, Ontario Policy No. 22,
Can. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 470-002, at 57,595-57,596 (1988); Registrants Advertising: Disclosure of Interest, Ontario Policy No. 25, Can. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 470-025, at 57,611
(1990).
47. Registration Requirements: Conditions of Registration - Proficiency Requirement, §
110, Can. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 452-661, at 55,338 (1987).
48. Registration, supra note 32, § 24(2), 450-352, at 55,126.
49. R.R.O. secs. 132-136, revoked by R.R.O. 345/87, s.6 (June 30, 1987).
50. Dealer Ownership Restrictions: Non-Resident Ownership, § 185, Can. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 453-205 at 55,365 (1988).
51. Id., § 188, 453-222, at 55,365.
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the category of foreign dealer registration.2 In addition, the determination of non-resident status may provide a specific registration exemption
or condition relating to the market intermediary categories of
registration. 3
There are also provisions for the Commission to exempt any person
from the requirements of any part of the dealer ownership restrictions of
the regulation where the Commission is satisfied that to do so would not
be prejudicial to the public interest. 4
5.04 Exemptions From Registration
The wide scope of the registration of securities professionals and the
prospectus requirements of Canadian securities legislation has necessitated a series of exemptions from their potentially extensive provisions.
There are two basic groups of exemptions: The first concerns exemptions
only from the registration requirement relating to dealers and other securities professionals, while the second relates to the so-called "dual exemption," which exempts those affected from both the prospectus and
registration requirements. The exemptions from the registration requirement can be divided into three basic functional categories: (1) those
which relate to the professional qualifications or nature of the parties involved; (2) those which concern certain types of trade which, because of
their particular nature, do not require registration; and (3) those which
involve particular types of securities.
[a] Underwriters and Advisers
Under the Ontario legislation, registration is not required in order to
act as an underwriter where the registrant is registered as a broker, investment dealer or securities dealer; where the registrant is registered as a
mutual fund dealer, scholarship plan dealer, and security issuer but only
for the purpose of distributing the securities in which it is registered to
trade; or where the registrant is registered as a limited market dealer,
international dealer, financial intermediary dealer or foreign dealer but
only for the purposes of a distribution which it is authorized to make by
the Regulations. 5 Banks to which the federal Bank Act applies are exempted from being required to register to Act as underwriters with respect to certain types of bonds and debentures of governments, banks,
and loan, trust, or insurance companies exempted from prospectus requirements, and with respect to certain banking transactions designated
by regulations."

52. Universal Registration: Foreign Dealer Registration, § 182(3), Can. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 453-143, at 55,362-55,363 (1988).
53. Id., § 182(7)(d), V 453-146, at 55,363.
54. Dealer Ownership Restrictions: Miscellaneous, § 192, Can. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
453-229, at 55,366 (1988).
55. Regulations, supra note 7, § 88, 1 452-510, at 55,329.
56. This is accomplished by the definition of "underwriter." Interpretation, supra note
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In addition, certain categories of persons or companies are exempted
from registration as advisers. The first relates to various financial institutions, i.e., banks, loan, trust, or insurance companies which are otherwise
regulated by provincial or federal statutes. 57 Second, various classes of
professionals, such as lawyers, accountants, engineers, or teachers, are exempted.5 8 Third, registered dealers or partners, officers, or employees
thereof are also exempt.5" Fourth, publishers with general and paid circulations, who obtain no direct or indirect interest in any of the securities
upon which advice is given, and who give the advice solely as an incidental to the conduct of their business as publishers obtain the benefit of a
similar exemption.6 0 In all four categories, the exemption is conditional
upon the performance of the service as advisor being solely incidental to
the advisor's principal business or occupation.
[b] Trades Exempt From Registration
Certain types of trades in securities are exempt from the registration
requirements because of their peculiar nature. Thus, transactions initiated by public administrators, such as executors, receivers, liquidators, or
custodians acting under various federal or provincial statutes, are exempt
from this requirement. 6 1 Trades in which a person or company acts solely
through a registered dealer are also exempt, as are trades between companies and underwriters, and those made between underwriters.6 2 Specific
banks and registered trust companies may also execute unsolicited
purchase or sale orders through a registered dealer without the need for
registration. 3
Isolated trades in specific securities, by or on behalf of an issuer or
an owner, for the issuer's or owner account, are also exempt, and are utilized as a means to avoid the necessity of registration. However, they
must also not be made in the course of continued and successive transactions of a like nature, or made by one whose usual business is trading in
64
securities.
27, § 1(1)43(iv), 450-001, at 55,106 (1988).
57. Exemptions from Registration Requirements, § 33(a), Can. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
450-401, at 55,128 (1987).
58. Id. § 33(b), 450-401, at 55,128.
59. Id. § 33(c), 450-401, at 55,128. Broker or investment dealers acting as portfolio
managers are exempt from registration as advisors, subject to conditions respecting supervision or recommendation by self-regulatory associations or the Toronto Stock Exchange.
Regulations, supra note 7, § 137, T 452-781, at 55,342 (1988).
60. Exemptions from Registration Requirements, supra note 57, § 33(d), T 450-401, at
55,128 (1987).
61. Id. § 34(1)1, 450-402, at 55,129.
62. Id. § 34(1)9,10, $ 450-402, at 55,129.
63. Id. § 34(1),11, 450-402, at 55,129.
64. Id. § 34(1)2, $ 450-402, at 55,128. See JOHNSTON, supra note 21, at 122-126 for a
discussion of the various issues raised in the interpretation of the defined terms in this
exemption, especially concerning the question whether an issuer can use this exemption for
its authorized, but unissued capital. Ontario corporations may purchase their common
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Trades in which the purchaser is a bank, loan, trust, or insurance
company, a government agency or a municipality, and the party is
purchasing as principal, but not as underwriter, or a company or person,
other than an individual, who is recognized by the Commission as an exempt purchaser, are also exempt from the registration requirements. 6
Creditors who sell securities which have been pledged, mortgaged, or otherwise encumbered in good faith as a security for a debt, or for the purpose of liquidating a bona fide debt, are also exempt.6
Companies can distribute their own securities to holders of their securities without registration as a dealer if they are distributed or issued as
a stock dividend, as incidental to a bona fide organization or winding up
of a company (in this latter case, the security need not be of its own issue), or securities of their own issue transferred or issued through the
exercise of a right to purchase, convert, or exchange which was previously
granted. Distributions by the issuer of purchase rights (a rights offering)
granted to holders of its securities and the issue of securities pursuant to
the exercise of the right are exempt, provided the issuer has given written
notice to the Commission of the date, amount, nature, and conditions of
the proposed trade, which the Commission accepts or fails to object to in
writing within ten days.6 The same conditional exemption is available for
trades by an issuer in securities of a reporting issuer held by it through
the exercise of a previously granted right to purchase, convert, or exchange. 9 An issuer is exempt if it distributes securities of a reporting
issuer to holders of the issuer's securities as a dividend in specie." In
addition, the exchange of securities in connection with a statutory amalgamation, a merger, or a take-over bid, as well as the issuance of a company's own securities to its incorporators, is exempt from registration. 1
Ontario legislation provides an exemption from registration for a
"limited offering" made without any advertisement or promotion, to no
more than fifty prospective purchasers resulting in sales to twenty-five
persons or less, who (1) purchase as principals within a six-month period,
and are either senior officers or close relatives of a senior officer of the
issuer; (2) possess the necessary net worth and investment experience; or
(3) have access to the advice of a registered adviser.7 2 This exemption is
available only once to the issuer, and no promoter of the issuer, other
than a registered dealer, can have acted in the previous twelve months as

shares without cancelling them, and this is recognized in the definition of a "distribution."
450-001, at 55,101 (1991).
Interpretation, supra note 27, § 1(1)11(ii),
65. Exemptions from Registration Requirements, supra note 57, § 34(1)(3)-(4), 1 450402, at 55,129 (1987).
66. Id. § 34(1)(3)-(4), 450-402, at 55,129.
450-402, at 55,129 (1987).
67. Id. § 34(1)(12),
68. Id. § 34(1)(14)(i), 1 450-402, at 55,130.
69. Id. § 34(1)(14)(ii), 450-402, at 55,130.
70. Id. § 34(1)(13), 450-402, at 55,130.
450-402, at 55,130.
71. Id. § 34(1)(15)-(17),20),
450-402, at 55,131.
72. Id. § 34(1)(21),
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promoter of any other issuer that utilized the exemption.
The exchange by an issuer of its securities as consideration for the
purchase of a portion or all of the assets of any person or company with a
face value of $150,000 or more is exempt.'" In addition, private placements to a purchaser with an aggregate acquisition cost of not less than
$150,000 are exempt, so long as the purchase is made by the purchaser as
principal."4 A trade in a security occasionally transacted by employees of
a registered dealer where the employees do not usually sell securities and
have been designated under the Act as non-trading employees are exempt.7 5 Registration is not required to issue securities to employees if it is
not an inducement to employment or continued employment.7 6 An exemption from registration also exists for a trade in a commodity futures
option or a commodity futures contract by a hedger through a dealer,
within the meaning of the Commodity Futures Act."
A final general category of trades exempt from registration is that
which is provided for by the regulations promulgated under the authority
7
of the securities legislations.
The enacted regulations exempt certain distributions of and "first trades" in securities which are exempted by the
regulations from the requirement of filing a prospectus. 7 9 Other trades
exempted from registration by regulations include (1) trades by a liquidator under federal company legislation, or by a sheriff under specified legislation; (2) trades effected through the facilities of a Commission recognized stock exchange by registered dealers; (3) trades by a registered trust
company in the securities of a mutual fund promoted and managed by
the trust company; (4) trades by a person or company with a registered
dealer acting as principal; (5) trades in bonds or debentures by way of
unsolicited orders to banks or trust companies, provided they Act as principal and acquire from or sell to a registered dealer; and (6) trades made
by an offeree in securities being disposed of to a person or a company
making a take-over bid. 0
[c] Securities Exempt From Registration
Registration is not required for trading in certain defined categories
of securities. Trades in bonds, debentures, or other debt obligations of or
guaranteed by federal, provincial, municipal, or foreign governments, as
well as those of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development as approved by the Bretton Woods Agreement Act (Canada), Asian
Development Bank, or Inter-American Development Bank (if the latter

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§ 34(1)(18), V 450-402, at 55,130.
§ 34(1)(5), 450-402, at 55,129.
§ 34(1)(8), 450-402, at 55,129.
§ 34(1)(19), 450-402, at 55,130.
Id. § 34(1)(22), 450-402, at 55,131.
Id. § 34(1)(23), 450-402, at 55,131.
Regulations, supra note 7, § 140(1)(a),
Id. § 140(1)(a)-(f),
452-787, at 55,343.

452-787, at 55,343.
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three categories are payable in Canadian or American currency and also if
required filings with the Commission are completed), are exempt from
the registration requirements."' Trades in similar securities of or guaranteed by institutions which are regulated by their own particular legislation, including chartered banks, loan and trust corporations, and insurance companies, also enjoy the benefit of the exemption.82 In addition,
trades in guaranteed investment certificates or receipts of trust companies, the shares of cooperative corporations, and shares of credit unions or
caisse populaires do not require registration.83
Securities issued by nonprofit organizations, so long as no part of
their net earnings enure to the benefit of any security holder and no commission or other remuneration is paid in connection with the sale thereof,
are also exempt.8 " Ontario's legislation adds an exemption for securities
issued by a "private mutual fund," which includes private investment
clubs of fifty persons or less, and pooled funds maintained and administered by trust companies for registered savings plans or for estates and
trusts in their care, provided there is no promoter or manager of the private mutual fund other than the trust company.8 5
Mortgages or other encumbrances upon real or personal property,
other than those secured by a bond, debenture, or trust deed, are exempt
so long as they are offered for sale by a registered mortgage broker.8 6 A
similar exemption is available for securities indicating indebtedness
under conditional sales or title retention contracts if such securities are
not offered for sale to an individual.8 7 In addition, trading in securities
issued by a private company does not require registration so long as they
are not offered for sale to the public. 8
Promissory notes or commercial paper maturing within one year
from the date of issue and which have a denomination or principal
amount of at least $50,000 are also exempt.88 Exemption from registration
is available for securities issued and sold (1) by a prospector for financing
prospecting expeditions; (2) by prospecting syndicates who have qualified
an agreement under Part XIII of the Ontario legislation discussed below;

57,
§
supra
note
Registration
Requirements,
81. Exemptions
from
34(2)(1)(a),(b),(d),(e), 450-403, at 55,131.
82. Id. § 34(2)(1)(c), 450-403, at 55,131.
83. Id. § 34(2)2,8,9, 450-403, at 55,131. See also Ontario Co-operative Corporations
Act, Ont. Rev. Stat. 1980, ch.91, as amended; Credit Union and Caisse Populaires Act Ont.
Rev. Stat. 1980, ch. 102, as amended.
84. Exemptions from Registration Regulations, supra note 57, § 34(2)(7), 450-403, at
55,141.
85. Id. § 34(2)(3), 450-403, at 55,131; Interpretation, supra note 27, 1(1)(32), 450001, at 55,103.
86. Exemptions from Registration Requirements, supra note 57, § 34(2)(5), 450-403,
at 55,141 (1987).
87. Id. § 34(2)(6), 450-403, at 55,141.
88. Id. § 34(2)(10), %450-403, at 55,141.
89. Id. § 34(2)(4), 1 450-403, at 55,141.
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or (3) by a mining or mining exploration company as consideration for
mining claims, where the vendor has entered into escrow or pooling agreements which the Director considers necessary.90
Prospecting syndicates are dealt with in a separate registration system in Part XIII of the Act, under which a receipt is issued upon the
acceptance of a prospecting syndicate agreement. The legislation governs
the content of the agreement and limits the applicability of this exemption to those agreements whose sole purpose is the financing of prospecting expeditions, preliminary mining developments, or the acquisition of
mining properties, and whose capital is limited to no more than
$250,000.1 Limits are placed upon the maximum commission that can be
taken upon the sale of units in the syndicate, the maximum number of
units that can be issued in exchange for the transfer of mining properties
to the syndicate, and the amount of administrative expenditures charged
against proceeds of the sale of the syndicate's units. Further acquisitions
or dispositions of mining properties require approval of members of the
syndicate holding at least two-thirds of the issued units.92 The Director
has a discretion to accept the syndicate agreement and is not required to
3
determine if these requirements have been met in every case.
Securities issued by a prospecting syndicate and sold by the prospector who stakes a claim belonging to the syndicate are exempt from the
registration requirement so long as a copy of the syndicate agreement is
delivered to the purchaser before payment is accepted." Similarly, securities issued by the syndicate are exempt if an agreement is filed and accepted by the Director, the securities are not offered to the public, and
they are sold to not more than fifty persons or companies.5
A final exemption is that provided by Commission order, whereby
upon application of an interested person or company, the Commission
may rule that any trade, intended trade, security, person, or company is
not subject to the registration requirement if the Commission is satisfied
that to do so would not be prejudicial to the public interest.9 6
CHAPTER VI - THE DISCLOSURE SYSTEM

6.01 Required Disclosure
The concept of "reporting issuer ' 9

7

is central to the disclosure re-

90. Id. § 34(2)(11)-(14).
91. Prospecting syndicates, § 150(1)(c), Can. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 450-525, at 55,147
(1986).
92. Id. § 50(1)(b), 1 450-525. at 55,146.
93. Id. § 50(2), 450-525, at 55,147.
94. Exemptions.from Registration Requirements, supra note 57, § 34(2)(12), 450-403,
at 55,141 (1987).
95. Id. § 34(2)(13),
450-403, at 55,141.
96. Exemptions from Prospectus Requiremnts, supra note 24, § 73(1), 1 450-723, at
55,169.
97. Interpretation, supra note 27, § 1(1)(38), 450-001, at 55,104.
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quirements under securities legislation. The required disclosure may be
categorized as:
1. financial disclosure;
2. timely disclosure;
3. insider reporting; and
4. proxy solicitation and information circular requirements.
The financial disclosure obligations for a reporting issuer include the
obligation to file and mail to security holders annual audited financial
statements, as well as interim financial statements."
Timely disclosure, which typically involves a release to the public of
any information concerning changes in the business or affairs of the reporting issuer which would be likely to have a significant effect on the
market price or value of the reporting issuer's securities, occurs in a variety of situations. Where a material change occurs in the affairs of a reporting issuer, a press release must be issued and filed forthwith, authorized by a senior officer of the reporting issuer, and disclosing the nature
and substance of the change." The press release is then to be followed
with a report of the material change with the Commission. Relief from
this provision may be sought where the information is considered confidential, and written reasons are provided for the non-disclosure.
The insider trading rules'00 are designed to protect the equal opportunity for investment concept so that advantage cannot be taken by individuals who have access to information which is material and has not
been disseminated to the marketplace. The insider reporting obligations
include the requirement to file with the Commission upon achieving the
status of an insider, and where a change occurs in an insider's direct or
indirect beneficial ownership over securities of the reporting issuer.
The Ontario legislation also requires continuous disclosure in the
form of a proxy for use at all meetings of shareholders of the reporting
issuer. 1° 1 The proxies must be sent concurrently with or prior to the giving of the notice, and must also be accompanied with an Information
10 2
Circular.
6.02 A Glossary of Key Disclosure Forms
Reporting issuers, in complying with required disclosure obligations,
may also be subject to the use of specific disclosure forms:

98.
(1988).
99.
100.
450-934,
101.
(1988).
102.

Continuous Disclosure, §§ 76-78, Can. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 450-774, at 55,171
Id. § 74, 450-751, at 55,169.
Insider Trading and Self Dealing, §§ 101-105, Can. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 450-925at 55,209 (1987).
Proxies and Proxy Solicitations, § 84, Can. Sec. L. Reg. (CCH) $ 450-802, at 55,173
Id. § 85, 1 450-803, at 55,173.
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(a)While there are no specific requirements in the securities legislation with respect to the form in which financial statements are to be
presented, the statements must be prepared in accordance with "GAAP"
as defined in the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants Handbook. While the form of financial statements is not legislated, provision is
included for specific types of statements and where comparative materials
are to be filed.103 In addition, the legislation provides that financial statements not prepared in accordance with GAAP may be accepted by the
Commission.""
(b)Where a reporting issuer is required to file a report in connection
with a material change, the report is to be completed as required in Form
27.10 5 Form 27 provides for the inclusion of information concerning the
name and address of the reporting issuer, date of the material change and
of the press release, a summary and full description of the material
change, and where the report is being filed on a confidential basis, the
basis for such claim. The form must include the name of a senior officer
who may be contacted concerning the material change, a statement that
the report accurately discloses the material change, and a signature by a
senior officer of the reporting issuer.
(c)Where an insider of a reporting issuer is required to file a report,
the report must be provided in Form 36.'06 Form 36 requires information
concerning the reporting issuer, the identification of the insider, the relationship of the insider with the reporting issuer, and a detailed summary
of the insider's holdings and changes, if any.
(d)Where a proxy is solicited in respect of a reporting issuer, the information circular which must accompany a proxy must comply with
Form 30.107 Reference is made to Chapter 14 - Proxy Requirements, infra.
CHAPTER

VII

- PUBLIC OFFERINGS OF SECURITIES

7.01 Prospectus Requirements
Canadian securities legislation generally prohibits any person or company from trading in (selling) a security where that trading would be in
the course of a distribution of such security until there has been filed
with the appropriate agency both a preliminary prospectus and a prospectus for which a receipt has been obtained. The prospectus requirements incorporate both the concept of full, true, and plain disclosure of
all material facts found in the U.S. federal securities legislation, as well as
discretionary provisions for the refusal of prospectuses that are akin to
U.S. state blue sky laws. The distribution of securities offered to the public functions on a basis similar to that which exists in the United States,

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Regulations, supra note 7, § 7-13, 452-075-452-100, at 55,255 (1988).
Id. § 2(4), 1 452-024, at 55,253.
Id. form 27, T 454-027, at 55,774.
Id. § 148, T 452-862, at 55,342; Id. form 36, T 454-036, at 55,888.
Id. § 151, 452-805, at 55,347; Id. form 30, 454-030, at 55,838.
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in that the issuing company usually negotiates either a firm, standby, or
best efforts underwriting agreement with an investment dealer. Depending on the complexity and size of the offering, the underwriter may organize purchase, banking, and selling groups to assist in assuring a successful
distribution of the issue.
7.02 Distribution
The prospectus requirement in most jurisdictions applies to all sales
that are in the course of a distribution. The legislative definition of this
phrase generally extends the requirement to the primary distribution of
securities of an issuer that have not been previously issued, the distribution in previously issued securities of an issuer that have been redeemed
or purchased by or donated to that issuer, and the secondary distribution
of previously issued securities held by control persons. It includes sales
made directly to the public or indirectly through an underwriter, or otherwise, as well as transactions or a series of transactions involving
purchases and sales in the course of or incidental to that distribution.
This latter requirement indicates that the "staging" of a distribution
through exempt purchasers or market support operations in which underwriters purchase part of an issue are part of a distribution to the public.
Insofar as a secondary distribution by a control person holding is
concerned, it is important to note that a control person is deemed to be a
person or company, or any combination of persons or companies, holding
a sufficient number of any of the securities
of a company to "affect materially" the control of that company. 08s In that the issue here is not control, per se, but the material affect on that control, in the interest of providing a more objective standard, the legislation provides that a holding
of more than twenty percent of the outstanding equity shares in the company, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, will be deemed to materially affect the control of the company.' 0 9 In addition, provisions are
made for a ruling by the Commission that, where it is not prejudicial to
the public interest, a trade, intended trade, security, person, or company
is not subject to the prospectus requirements." 0
In essence, the Ontario legislation creates a "closed system," in that
all sales which are part of a distribution will require a prospectus to be
filed unless a specific exemption exists."'
7.03 Preliminary Prospectus
Assuming that no exemptions are available, the actual distribution
process commences with the filing of a preliminary prospectus. The Di-

108. Interpretation, supra note 27, § 1(l)(11)(iii), 1 450-001, at 55,101 (1988).
109. Id.
110. Exemptions from Prospectus Requirements, supra note 24, § 73(1), $ 450-723, at
55,169 (1987).
111. See § infra.
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rector must issue a receipt upon filing, although there is power to order
the limited form of solicitation permitted, as discussed below, upon such
filing to cease if it appears to him that a preliminary prospectus is defective in both form and content.' 1 2 The legislation requires a "waiting period" of a minimum of ten days between the filing of a preliminary prospectus and the issuance of a final receipt for the actual prospectus, to
3
enable information to be disseminated to the market place."
During the waiting period, it is permissible to distribute notices, circulars, advertisements, or letters to prospective purchasers so long as they
identify the proposed security and its price, if determined, and state the
name and address of the person or company from whom purchases can be
made, and from whom a preliminary prospectus can be obtained."" In
addition, preliminary prospectuses may be distributed, and expressions of
interest may be solicited, so long as a copy of the preliminary prospectus
is provided to the intended purchaser. The dealer distributing the security is obligated to provide a copy of a preliminary prospectus to any person who indicates an unsolicited interest in purchasing the security and
requests a copy and the dealer must maintain a record of those to whom a
preliminary prospectus has been distributed." 8
The form and content of this document must substantially comply
with the requirements respecting the final prospectus, except that auditors' reports, and the underwriter's and offer prices may be excluded." 6
In addition, the preliminary prospectus must have a prescribed statement
in red ink on the outside front cover page indicating that it is not a final
prospectus, the information contained is subject to completion or amendment, and that no securities may be sold until the final prospectus is accepted." 7 There must also be on the outside front cover page a prescribed
statement indicating that no securities commission has in any way passed
upon the merits of the securities offered." 8 Any material adverse change
that occurs after the filing of the preliminary document necessitates the
filing of an amendment within at least ten days, which also must be sent
to each recipient of a preliminary prospectus." 9
7.04 Content of Prospectus
Every prospectus must provide full, true, and plain disclosure of all
material facts relating to the security proposed to be issued, and must
comply as to form and content with the requirements of the legislation

112. Prospectuses - Distribution, § 54, Can. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
450-560, at 55,142
(1986); Distribution - Generally, § 67 Can. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 450-665, at 55,163 (1986).
113. Distribution - Generally, supra note 112, § 64(1), V 450-661, at 55,162.
114. Id. § 64(2), 450-662, at 55,162.
115. Id. §§ 65, 66, 450-663-450-664, at 55,162.
116. Prospectuses - Distribution, supra note 112, § 53, 450-558, at 55,147 (1986).
117. Regulations, supra note 7, § 38, 452-247, at 55,277 (1987).
118. Id. § 39, 452-248, at 55,278.
119. Prospectuses - Distribution, supra note 112, § 56, 450-563, at 55,148.
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and the regulations."' Different forms of prospectuses are required for
each of the following types of companies: finance, industrial, natural resource, and mutual fund. The Director may designate into which category
a proposed issuer falls, and can direct that the disclosure called for by the
prospectus form for one or more of the other types of companies be com121
plied with.
Upon filing, the prospectus will be assigned to a review team consisting of a lawyer and an accountant, and other staff, if necessary, to ensure
compliance with the legislation. Consultation with technical experts and
financial analysts may occur in more complicated filings, and prefiling
conferences and deficiency letters are utilized to facilitate the processing
of a prospectus. If a prospectus is rejected, this decision is made in writing after the issuer has been given a hearing, and the determination is
12 2
subject to an appeal to the Commission.
The legislation requires that an income statement, a statement of
surplus, and a statement of changes in financial position for each of the
last five completed financial years (or such shortened period as is permitted), together with a balance sheet as at a date of not more than 120 days
prior to the filing of the preliminary prospectus of the issuing company
and as at the corresponding date of the previous financial year, be included in the prospectus of an issuer other than a mutual fund. 123 Where
the Director is satisfied there is sufficient justification, he may permit the
124
omission of any financial statement required by this section.
Each financial statement must be prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, unless dispensation has been received
from the Director to revise the presentation in the statement, or from the
Commission to vary from generally accepted accounting principles."15 Unless expressly excepted, each financial statement must include an auditor's report which must be prepared in accordance with generally accepted auditing principles, and the Act and regulations." 6 The financial
statements must also be submitted for review to the audit committee, if
the issuer has or is required to have such a committee, and be approved
by the board of directors of the issuer, as evidenced by the signature of

120. Id. § 35,
450-561, at 55,147; see generally id. §§ 55-63, $ 450-581-450-633, at
55,147-55,162; Regulations, supra note 7, §§ 14-70, T 452-125-452-387, at 55,257-55,295; Id.
forms 12-15A, T 454-012-454-015, at 55,534-55,701; National Policy Statements 1,12, and 13,
Can. Sec. L. Rep (CCH) 1 470-001, 470-012, 470-013, at 57,525, 57,573, 57,574 (1991); Uniform Act Policies 2-01, 2-03, 2-04, Can. Sec. L. Rep (CCH) I 470-201, 470-203, 470-204, at
57,775, 57,776 (1987); National Policy Statements, supra, no. 5.1, 5.2,
471-501, 471-502, at
57,965, 57,987.
121. Regulations, supra note 7, §§ 28-33, 452-205-452-221, at 55,276.
122. Proceedings, Reviews and Appeals, § 8, Can. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
450-661, at
55,108 (1988); Prospectuses - Distribution, supra note 112, § 60(2), 450-602, at 55,149.
123. Regulations, supra note 7, § 31, 452-208, at 55,276.
124. Id. § 41(6), 452-266, at 55,278.
125. Id. § 2(4), 452-024, at 55,253.
126. Id. § 2(2),
452-022, at 55,253.
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two authorized directors.'17 Separate financial statements of subsidiaries
may be required by the Director whether or not they are consolidated
with those contained in the prospectus, and unconsolidated statements
may be permitted to be included as supplementary information. 2 8
Any experts, such as solicitors, auditors, accountants, engineers, or
appraisers, whose profession gives authority to any statement that has
been prepared for or is certified as part of the prospectus, or is named as
having prepared or certified a report or valuation connected with the prospectus, must file a written consent to the inclusion of such a statement
or report in the document.' 9 The auditor or accountant must also state
he has read the prospectus and has no reason to believe that there are
any misrepresentations in the information contained therein that is derived from the financial statements upon which he reported or that is
within his knowledge as a result of his audit.'3 0 The consents may be dispensed with if their filing may be impractical or involves undue hardship.13 These persons must also disclose any direct or indirect interest in
the issuer or any of its affiliates, or where any of such persons is or expects to be elected, appointed or employed as a director, officer or employee of the issuer or any affiliates or where any of such persons is or
expects to be elected, appointed or employed as a director, officer or employee of the issuer or any affiliate.' 3 ' The Director may require a further
consent to be filed should any change be proposed to the prospectus that
in his opinion materially affects the earlier consent filed.' 3 Finally, the
Director may refuse to accept a prospectus if the person or company
whose consent is required is not acceptable to him.""
In addition, each prospectus must contain a certificate signed by the
chief executive officer, the chief financial officer, two authorized directors,
and any promoter, that the prospectus constitutes full, true, and plain
disclosure of all material facts relating to the securities offered.' 3 ' A similar certificate is required from the underwriter, although it is qualified to
the extent that it is based on the best of its knowledge, information, and
belief."13 The Director has discretion to dispense with the signatures of
certain persons, to require any person who was a promoter of the issuer
within the two preceding years to sign the certificate, or to allow a promoter or an underwriter to sign by a duly authorized agent." '
The prospectus forms for the varying types of companies described

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. § 52, 452-302, at 55,291.
Id. §§ 50,51, 452-289,452-301, at 55,291.
Id. § 23(1), T 452-187, at 55,273.
Id. § 23(3), 452-189, at 55,273.
Id. § 23(2), 452-188, at 55,273.
Id. § 23(4),(5), 452-190, 452-191, at 55,273.
Id. § 24, 452-192, at 55,273.
Prospectuses- Distribution, supra note 112, § 60(2)(i),
450-602, at 55,149.
Id. § 57, 450-576, at 55,148.
Id. § 58, 450-583, at 55,149.
Id. § 57(4)-(7), 450-579-450-582, at 55,148; Id. § 58(2), 450-584, at 55,149.
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above require, in addition to the financial statements, the following general information:
(1) The number of shares being offered;
(2) On the outside front cover page, the distribution spread on a per
unit and aggregate basis of the offer price, underwriting discounts or commission, and proceeds to issuer;
(3) The plan of distribution giving the names of the underwriters and
the nature of their obligations to take up and pay for the securities;
(4) A summary of the prospectus giving a synopsis of the information
contained which in the opinion of the issuer would be most likely to influence the investor's decision to purchase the security;
(5) The estimated net proceeds to be derived and principal purposes
for which the proceeds are intended to be used and the approximate
amount intended to be used for each purpose;
(6) If any of the securities are offered otherwise than for cash, the
general purposes of the issue and the basis upon which they are offered;
(7) The share and loan capital structure of the issuer;
(8) Full corporate name, and nature and jurisdiction of the incorporation of the issuer;
(9) A description of the business carried on or intended to be carried
on by the issuer and its subsidiaries and the general development of such
business within the last five preceding years, together with, so far as is
practical, principal products or services of the issuer (for financial companies, a breakdown of the operations of the issuer, its subsidiaries and affiliates, e.g., analysis and maturity of receivables, funding requirements,
schedule of current liquid capital position, is required);
(10) Where appropriate, an introductory statement must be made on
the first page or in the summary summarizing the factors which make the
purchase a risk of speculation;
(11) Description of material acquisitions and dispositions of shares or
assets by the issuer or its subsidiaries during the past two years, and
where practicable, their impact on operating results and financial
position;
(12) Explanation of substantial variations in operating results over
the preceding three years;
(13) A description of the location and general character of the principal property, including buildings and plants, of the issuer and its
subsidiaries;
(14) Names and amounts of anything of value received by any promoters of the issuer or its subsidiaries within the preceding five years;
(15) Pending legal proceedings material to the issuer;
(16) If shares or obligations are offered, the description, designation,
and characteristics of the classes offered;
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(17) A record of dividends paid by the issuer during the last five
completed years;
(18) Names and addresses and remuneration of directors and senior
officers, including estimated cost of pension benefits proposed to be paid
to these persons and indebtedness of directors and senior officers;
(19) Details of options to purchase securities from the issuer or its
subsidiaries;
(20) Details of equity shares held in escrow;
(21) Details of holdings of the issuer's securities by persons or companies directly or indirectly holding greater than 10 percent of the equity
shares, plus the percentage of shares of each class of equity shares held
directly or indirectly by all the directors and senior officers of the issuer
as a group;
(22) Ownership and inter-corporate relationship with subsidiaries
and parent corporations;
(23) Prices at which securities of the shares being offered have sold in
the preceding twelve months by the issuer if different from that being
offered and number of shares sold;
(24) A brief description of any interest of management, or shareholders with more than 10 percent equity, in any transaction within the past
three years or any proposed transaction that has materially affected or
will materially affect the issuer or its subsidiaries;
(25) Names and addresses of auditors, transfer agents and registrars;
(26) Particulars of every material contract entered into within the
last two years by the issuer or any subsidiary;
(27) Particulars of any other material facts not already disclosed.
In addition, the Uniform Act provinces require undertakings from issuers not incorporated within their jurisdiction that they will comply with
the proxy, insider trading, and financial disclosure requirements of their
legislation. 138
7.05 Projections, Estimates, and Forecasts
In contrast to SEC policy with regard to forecasts in prospectuses,
estimates of future earnings may be included in the prospectus only if
identified as such and only with the permission of the Director. 3 9 This is
despite the fact that the legislation expressly requires the Director to refuse a prospectus that contains any promise, estimate or forecast only if it
is misleading, false, or deceptive.' 40
The Ontario Securities regulators have enacted a policy,1 41 which

138.
139.
140.
141.

Uniform Act Policies, supra note 120, no. 2-01, 1 470-201, at 57,775.
Regulations, supra note 7, § 48, 452-287, at 55,291.
Prospectuses - Distribution, supra note 112, § 60(2)(a)(ii), 450-602, at 55,149.
National Policy Statements, supra note 120, no. 5.8 (III),
471-508, at 58,050
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deals with future oriented financial information ("FOFI"). The policy
rests the responsibility of deciding whether to publish FOFI with the issuer, although it provides factors to be considered in the decision, as well
as requirements to be followed where FOFI is utilized. Besides prospectuses, the policy applies to rights offering circulars, continuous disclosure
documents, proxy solicitation documents, take-over bid or issuer bid documents, and offering memoranda.""2
The general requirements where FOFI are included in any of these
documents include that the material be presented in the form of a forecast. Projections may only be utilized for issuers engaged in business with
less than 24 months of relevant operating history. It is not permissible to
include both a forecast and a projection." 3 The duration of the FOFI may
not normally extend beyond the maximum of 24 months, a period over
which information can be reasonably estimated. FOFI are to be prepared
in accordance with the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants
Handbook"' and must be pre-filed with the Commission and pre-approved by the Director where either the issuer is not a reporting issuer, or
the issuer is making a distribution of securities in Ontario by prospectus
for the first time. In all other instances where FOFI is being included,
pre-filing and approval by the director is generally not required.1 45
Where FOFI is included, it must be updated when significant
changes occur during the filing period of required documents. In addition,
FOFI must be reviewed each time the issuer is required to file historical
financial statements with the Commission to identify significant changes
resulting from events that have occurred since the forecast of projection
was issued. FOFI must be compared to annual audited actual results and
the reasons for significant differences, if any, must be 4disclosed
to secur6
ity holders. This also applies to interim period FOFI.'
If FOFI is included in a prospectus, offering memorandum, take-over
bid circular, or issuer bid circular, it must be accompanied by an auditor's
report. The policy also allows that where it is not practicable in a takeover bid to provide an auditor's report on FOFI, the Director will allow a
statement signed by the chief financial officer of the issuer stating that
the FOFI was prepared in accordance with the appropriate accounting
47
requirements.
7.06 Discretion to Reject Prospectus
In addition to the requirements of full, plain, and true disclosure, the
acceptance or rejection of a prospectus by issuing or withholding a receipt

(1990).
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. no. 5.8 (II), 471-508, at 58,049.
Id. no. 5.8(111), 471-508, at 58,050.
Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants Handbook, § 4250.
National Policy Statements, supra note 120, no. 5.8 (III), 471-508, at 58,050.
Id. no. 5.8 (V), 1 471-508, at 58,051.
Id., Section VII.
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is also subject to the discretion of the securities regulators. The amount
and nature of the discretion vary according to the jurisdiction and reference should be made to the relevant legislation. In Ontario, the Director
can refuse to issue a final receipt if it appears to him that it is not in the
public interest to do so. In addition, the Director is not to issue a receipt
for any prospectus filed if it appears to the Director that certain prescribed situations exist. 48 These situations are outlined in the legislation,
and include: (1) noncompliance with statutory requirements, or misleading, false, or deceptive statements; (2) unconscionable consideration paid
for promotional purposes or the acquisition of property; (3) net proceeds
of the distribution are insufficient for the purposes stated in the prospectus; (4) failure to enter necessary escrow or pooling agreements or to
lodge proceeds in trust; (5) in the case of a finance company, if the director is not satisfied with the plan of distribution of the securities, the manner, terms, and means by which they are secured, or if it has failed to
meet the requirements and conditions specified in the regulations; (6) if
having regard to the financial condition of the issuer, its officers, directors, promoters, or control persons, the issuer cannot reasonably be expected to be financially responsible in the conduct of its business; (7) the
past conduct of the issuer, or its officers, directors, promoters, or control
persons affords reasonable grounds for belief that the business of the issuer will not be conducted with integrity and in the best interests of its
security holders; and (8) a person or company who has prepared or certified any part of the prospectus or is named as having prepared or certified a report or valuation used in or in connection with a prospectus, is
not acceptable to the Director. With regard to special types of companies,
especially the financing of junior mining companies, there are detailed
policy statements relating to the conditions of acceptance of a prospectus.
Upon the issuance of a final receipt for the prospectus, the securities
may then be distributed to the public for a period of twelve months.
Should the distribution continue for more than twelve months, a new
prospectus must be filed within ten days and accepted within twenty
days, or within such a longer period as the Commission permits, from the
lapse date of the previous prospectus. This is to be preceded by filing a
pro forma prospectus at least thirty days prior to the lapse date of the
previous prospectus. 49 If a material change occurs during the period of
distribution that makes untrue or misleading any statement of material
fact contained in the prospectus, an amendment must be filed as soon as
practicable and in any event within ten days from the date the change
50
occurs.'

148. Prospectus-Distribution, supra note 112, § 60(1), 450-601, at 55,149 (1986).
149. Prospectus-Distribution, supra note 112, § 61, 1 450-609, at 55,150 (1986).
150. Prospectus-Distribution, supra note 112, § 56, 450-563, at 55,148 (1986).
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7.07 Debt Securities
Borrowing from the U.S. experience, several Canadian jurisdictions
have incorporated in their company legislation mandatory trust indenture
provisions relating to the public offering of debt securities.," They provide a basic framework only, and do not prevent the imposition of more
onerous obligations in the trust indenture. These provisions apply if a
company issues or guarantees debt obligations under the terms of a trust
indenture in which a trustee is appointed for the holders of the debt obligation. In Ontario, they apply to all corporations which have issued or
guaranteed debt obligations under a trust indenture and which have filed
a prospectus exchange or securities issuer or take-over bid circular under
the applicable securities or corporations legislation. However, there is no
scrutiny or qualification of the trust indenture by the securities commission as is the case in the United States.
The trustee is required, in exercising the powers and discharging the
duties prescribed by the trust indenture, to "act honestly and in good
faith with a view to the best interests of the holders of the debt obligations issued under the trust indenture" and "exercise the care, diligence
and skill of a reasonably prudent trustee," regardless of any exculpatory
clause in the indenture. The legislation also prohibits material conflicts of
interest to exist in the trustee's role as fiduciary, and either prohibits the
appointment of such trustee or requires his resignation. It expressly prohibits the appointment of trustees as receivers or liquidators of the assets
or undertakings of the issuer of the debt obligation.
The issuer must furnish to the trustee evidence of compliance with
the conditions precedent provided for in the trust indenture, as well as an
annual certificate of compliance with all covenants, conditions, or other
requirements contained in the indenture, the noncompliance of which
would constitute an event of default. The trustee is permitted to rely on
the certificates and evidence of compliance so long as he acts in good
faith and examines the material to ensure that it does comply with the
applicable requirements. Finally, the trustee must give notice to the securities holders of every event of default arising under the indenture
within a reasonable period of time but not exceeding thirty days, unless
the trustee in good faith determines the withholding of such a notice is in
the best interests of the securities holders and the trustee so notifies the
issuer in writing.
7.08 Summary Statements and Short Form Prospectus
Ontario securities legislation provides that, where permitted by the
regulations, a person or company may file a summary statement in the

151. E.g., Ontario Business Corporations Act, 1982 (hereinafter OBCA) Indenture Trus460-136 to 460-180, at 57,021 to 57,024 (1987);
ters, §§ 46-52, Can. Sec. L. Rep (CCH)
Canada Business Corporations Act §§ 82-93.
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prescribed form together with a prospectus filed under the Act. 5 ' The
Director has discretion to not issue a receipt for the prospectus where the
summary statement which accompanies the prospectus does not comply
with the applicable regulations. The summary statement may be forwarded to a purchaser of the security instead of a prospectus."'
Under current legislation, the regulations provide for a summary
statement solely in respect of mutual funds.'" The summary statement
for a mutual fund does not replace the filing of a required prospectus, but
instead is an optional disclosure document which may be filed with and
following clearance of the mutual fund prospectus, may be delivered to
prospectus inventors in lieu of the prospectus. Investors receiving the
summary statement have the right to request and receive the delivery of
the prospectus. 5
While the Ontario legislation contains provision for the use of a
short-form prospectus, there have not been any regulations passed which
permit its use as a disclosure document.'
However, a version of the short-form prospectus has been authorized
through the prompt offer and qualification system (known as the POP
System). The POP System has been implemented by means of a blanket
order and ruling by the Commission, which ruling exempts eligible issuers
making an offering under the POP System from the form and content
requirements of the prospectus provisions provided that there is compliance with requirements of the POP System. 5 '
The POP System is designed to streamline procedures and shorten
the time period required for the distribution of securities of senior reporting issuers. In essence, the POP System integrates the offering document
with previously published issuer oriented information concerning the senior reporting issuer. The public information is referenced in the shortform prospectus at the time of distribution. In order to be eligible to utilize the POP System, the issuer must be a reporting issuer for at least
thirty six months and must file an annual information form prepared in
accordance with the applicable policy.'58 The issuer must not be in default of any requirement under the Ontario securities legislation, and
must have an aggregate market value of common shares, excluding preferred shares, listed and posting for trading on a stock exchange in Canada and held by "non-insider" security holders of the issuer, of
$75,000,000 or more as of the last calendar month of the issuer's most

152. Prospectus-Distribution, supra note 112, § 62(3), 450-627, at 55,161 (1986).
153. Id., § 62(6), 450-629, at 55,161 (1986).
154. Content of Prospectus Non-Financial Matters Interpretation, Regs. § 32(2), Form
15A, Can. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 452-211, at 55,276 (1987).
155. Prospectus-Distribution, supra note 112, § 62(5), T 450-630, at 55,161 (1986).
156. Id., § 62(1), 9 450-625, at 55,161 (1986).
157. Prompt Offering Qualification System, Ontario Policy 5-6, III Can. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 471-506, at 55,015-16 (1991).
158. Id., 471-510, at 58,073 (1991).

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 20:2

recently completed financial year for which audited financial statements
have been prepared. "
In certain circumstances, the Commission will allow a reporting issuer that is unable to meet all of the prescribed criteria to utilize the
POP System notwithstanding its otherwise ineligible status. These exemptions are normally based upon modifications to the three-year eligibility requirement, and modifications to the calculation of the $75,000,000
"public float" requirement.""
7.09 Simplified Prospectus and Annual Information Form
An additional form of disclosure is permitted in place of the prospectus requirements under the securities legislation. This method allows the
use of a simplified prospectus and annual information form, and is currently only applicable for qualification of the distribution of mutual
funds.' Under a blanket ruling, distributions of shares or units of mutual funds affected in compliance with a specific policy statement"6 ' will
not be subject to the otherwise required filing of a prospectus.
The policy statement provides the form and content for both the
simplified prospectus and for the annual information form which is to be
filed in conjunction therewith. The disclosure required in the simplified
prospectus requires, in addition to certain basic material, references to
the annual information form which contains a more comprehensive summary of the issuer and the proposed distribution of securities. In addition, financial statements maintain an integral function with the filing.
CHAPTER

VIII

- EXEMPTION FROM PROSPECTUS REQUIREMENTS

To avoid the necessity of filing a prospectus for a distribution of securities, it is necessary to make use of one of the statutory exemptions
available. As noted previously, many of the exemptions are dual in that
they apply to both the registration and prospectus requirements. Generally speaking, the existing exemptions from the prospectus rules incorporate by reference certain of the exemptions from registration discussed
earlier. These may be classified into two general categories; exempt transactions and exempt securities. As noted earlier, the current Ontario legislation is significantly different from its predecessor; other provincial juris'dictions that have legislation modelled on the earlier Ontario statute will
have different requirements, and specific reference must be made to the
applicable legislation.

159. Id., § 5- 471-506, §B, at 58,016.
160. Alboini, supra note 11, 14-40-14-49.
161. 1984, 7 Ontario Securities Commission Bulletin 5333.
162. Mutal Fund-Simplified Disclosure System, National Policy 36, Can. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 470-036, at 57,639 (1990).
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8.01 Exempt Transactions
In Ontario, no prospectus is required for sales in the course of a distribution to the public where the purchaser is a specified type of bank, a
registered loan or trust, or a licensed insurance company, a government
agency or municipality, or an exempt purchaser recognized as such by the
Commission, provided they purchase as principal. 6 Exempt purchaser
status is not available to individuals, and is usually granted only to established institutional investors, such as mutual or pension funds, which satisfy a number of tests relating to amount of assets, investment expertise,
and number of contributors involved."" Reports must be filed within ten
days of such sales.6 5
The private placement exemption from registration (see Section
5.04(b) supra) applies to the prospectus requirement as well. Thus, where
the purchaser purchases as principal and the aggregate acquisition cost is
not less than $150,000, no prospectus is required. 6 Other jurisdictions
may still exclude individuals from this exemption and require that the
purchase be made for investment only and not with a view to resale or
distribution.
Sales between a person or company and underwriters acting as purchasers or between or among underwriters are exempt, as are those between registered dealers, so long as the registered dealer purchases only
as principal. 67
Issuers may issue their own securities without a prospectus if they
are distributed as stock dividends, as incidental to a bona fide reorganization or winding up of the company (in which case the security need not
be of its own issue), or if they are transferred or issued through the exercise of a right to purchase, convert, or exchange previously granted by the
issuer. 18 The exemption requires that no commission or other remuneration be paid in respect of such trades except for ministerial or professional services or for services performed by a registered dealer. If rights
are issued or securities are sold pursuant to the exercise of a right granted
to holders of a security to purchase additional securities of its own issue,

163. Exemptions From Prospectus Requirements, supra note 24, §§ 71(l)(a)(c), Can.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 450-701, at 55,164 (1986).
164. Id., § 71(1)(c), 450-701, at 55,114 (1986); Further Exemptions From Regulation
Requirements, Regs. §137, Can. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 452-781, at 55,342 (1988).
165. Exemptions From Prospectus Requirements, supra note 24, § 71(3), 450-703, at
55,166-55,167 (1987).
166. Id., § 71(1)(d), 450-701, at 55,164 (1986). A report must be filed within ten days of
the trade. In addition, the exemption is unavailable for a trade made through an advertisement in the general media unless an offering memorandum is furnished to the investor concurrently with or prior to the completion of the investment in which the investor is given a
contractual right of action similar to those discussed in Section 10.01 infra. Regs. § 21(2).
167. Exemptions From Prospectus Requirements, supra note 24, § 71(1)(q)(r), 450701, at 55,166 (1987).
168. Id., § 71(1)(f), 450-701, at 55,165 (1987).
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and written notice has been provided to the Commission disclosing the
date, amount, conditions of the proposed sale, and approximate net proceeds, then so long as the Commission does not object within ten days or
accepts as satisfactory further disclosure requested, those sales will be exempt. ' 9 The requirement of Commission approval permits it to exercise
some discretion over the sdiitability of such a scheme of distribution, especially as securities acquired under this exemption may then be sold to
non-shareholders without the need for a prospectus. In addition, where
an issuer transfers or issues securities of a reporting issuer in the exercise
of a right to purchase, convert, or exchange previously granted by it, the
same requirement must be met."7 This section creates some hardship for
U.S. resident shareholders of Canadian corporations, in that a trade in
such securities in the United States requires registration with the SEC.
As a result, rights offerings may be restricted to non-U.S. shareholders to
avoid the expense of compliance with the U.S. requirements."'
Corporate acquisitions, mergers, amalgamations, and similar combinations in which securities are distributed are exempted in a variety of
ways. First, the issuance of securities of a corporation that are exchanged
in connection with statutory amalgamation arrangements or other procedures resembling mergers are exempt." Unfortunately, these procedures
are nowhere defined in the statute and resort must be had to the appropriate companies legislation in the relevant jurisdiction for assistance in
defining and structuring the permissible reorganizations and combinations. A separate exemption exists for the issuance of securities as consideration for the purchase of some or all of the assets of any person or
company, so long as the fair value of the assets is at least $150,000. 73
Take-over bids involving an exchange offer are exempt, since provision- is made for disclosure of relevant information in a separate part of
the legislation. 4 Some caution is advised in the use of this exemption, in
that a definition of take-over bid restricts its applicability to an offer to
purchase the equity shares of a company that together with the offeror's
holdings will in the aggregate exceed twenty percent of the outstanding
voting shares of the company.' An exemption from the prospectus re169. Id., § 71(l)(h)(i),

V450-701, at 55,165 (1987); Cf. Uniform Policy 2-05 outlining the

nature of information required, III Can. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 470-205, Ontario Policy 6-2,
Can. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 471-602.
170. Exemptions From Prospectus Requirements, supra note 24, § 71(1)(h)(ii), V 450701, at 55,165 (1987).
171. See JOHNSTON, supra note 21, at 210, who notes the SEC practice of permitting the
offering documents, with appropriate warnings to be sent to U.S. resident shareholders.
172. Exemptions From Prospectus Requirements, supra note 24, § 71(1)(i), at 55,165
(1987).
173. Id., § 71(1)(1), at 55,165 (1987); Restriction of Exemptions Requirements, §19(f),
Can. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 7452-173, at 55,271 (1987).
174. Exemptions From Prospectus Requirements, supra note 24, § 71(1)0), $450-701, at
55,165 (1987). See the discussion of take-over bids at Section 13.02 infra.
175. Take-Over Bids and Issuer Bids, § 88(1), Can. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 450-821, at
55,181 (1987).
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quirement is provided as well for a trade in a security to a person or
company pursuant to a take-over bid or an issuer bid. 6 As a result, since
an offer to purchase any and not necessarily all securities of a private
company is an exempt take-over bid, it is exempted from the take-over
bid disclosure rules and from the prospectus requirement,"' as is the acquisition of not more than five percent of the voting securities of an offeree company by an offeror or its associates or affiliates, within any
twelve-month period, provided the purchase price is not in excess of market value,'
where there is a published market for the securities acquired. 79 In addition, take-over bids made through the facilities of a recognized stock exchange are exempt. 8 0 Purchase agreements with not
more than five shareholders is only an exempt take-over bid if the bid is
not made generally to security holders of the class of securities that is the
subject of the bid, and consideration paid for any of the securities, including any commissions, does not exceed one hundred and fifteen percent of
the market price of the class of securities. For purposes of this exemption,
the offeror must make reasonable enquiry both that none of the proposed
vendors are acting on behalf of others who have a direct beneficial interest in the securities, and that none of the vendors acquired the securities
in order that the offeror may use this exemption. If either situation be the
case, the beneficial owners or the prior owners must be included in the
determination of the number of security holders from whom a private
purchase has occurred.
A take-over bid is also exempt if the number of security holders in
Ontario is fewer than fifty and the aggregate securities held by them is
less than two percent of the outstanding shares of the class which is the
subject of the bid, provided the bid is made in compliance with the laws
of a recognized jurisdiction, and all materials sent to security holders in
connection with the bid is also sent to any security holders in Ontario. 8 '
Finally, a take-over bid is exempt where there is no published market
for the securities, purchases are made from not more than five persons or
companies, and the bid is not generally made to a security holder of the
class of securities which is the subject of the bid. 182
Reference is made to Chapter 19 - Take-over Bids, infra., regarding
take-over bids generally. In addition, please see Section 18.03 - Issuer
Bids and Going Private Transactions, infra., for further details concerning issuer bids.

176. Exemptions From Prospectus Requirements, supra note 24, § 71(l)(k)m 1450-701,
at 55,165 (1987).
177. Take-Over Bids and Issuer Bids, supra note 175, § 92(1)(d), 450-840, at 55,184
(1987).
178. Id., § 92(1)(b),
450-840, at 55,184 (1987).
179. Id., § 92(1)(a), 1 450-840, at 55,184 (1987).
180. Id. at § 92(2)t 450-841, at 55,184.
181. Id., § 92(I)(e), 450-841, at 55,184 (1987).
182. Proxies and Proxy Solicitation, supra note 101, § 165, 452-986, at 55,354 (1988).
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Sales by an issuer of its own securities are exempt if made to its employees so long as they are not induced to purchase by expectation of
employment or continued employment. 183 The issuance of securities that
are reasonably necessary to facilitate the incorporation or reorganization
of the issuer, provided the securities are issued for nominal consideration
to not more than five incorporators, unless the incorporating statute requires a greater consideration or larger number of incorporators, are exempt as well.' 84 The issuance of securities in exchange for mining claims
are exempt, provided the vendor enters into such escrow or pooling agreements as the Director considers necessary."8 '
A distribution by an issuer of securities of another reporting issuer to
the issuer's securities holders as a dividend in specie is exempt.186 Of
greater importance is the exemption provided for isolated sales which formerly were exempt only from the dealer registration requirement. The
exemption applies to an isolated sale in a specific security by or on behalf
of an issuer's account, where such sale in a specific security by or on behalf of an issuer, for the issuer's account, which such a sale is not made in
the course of continued and successive transactions of a like nature, provided that it is not made by a person or company whose usual business is
trading in securities. 8 '
One of the more recently enacted exemptions has been termed a
"seed capital" exemption.' 88 Insofar as its objectives and concept are concerned there is a considerable resemblance between this exemption and
rule 14b of the SEC. Solicitations must not be made to more than fifty
prospective purchasers, resulting in not more than twenty-five purchases
by persons who purchase as principals. The purchases must be completed
within six months of the first sale or made pursuant to written agreements entered into in that period. No advertising is to accompany the
offer and sale, and no selling or promotional expenses may be incurred or
paid except for professional services or those performed by a registered
dealer. Perhaps the most restrictive aspect of the exemption is that no
promoter of the issuer (apart from a registered dealer) may have acted as
a promoter for any other issuer that utilized the exemption within the
previous twelve months, and no issuer may use the exemption more than
once. Each purchaser must have access to substantially the same information concerning the issuer that a prospectus filed under this Act would

183. Exemptions From Prospectus Requirements, supra note 24, § 71(1)(n), 450-701,
at 55,165.
184. Id. at § 71(1)(o).
185. Id. at § 71(l)(m).
186. Id. at § 71(1)(g). Formerly, stock dividends were only permitted if they were securities of its own issue. Securities not of its own issue could only be distributed on an exempt
basis as incidental to a bona fide reorganization or winding up of the company.
187. Id., § 71(1)(b), at 55,164; A report must be filed within ten days of such trades, Id.,
§ 71(3), at 55,166-67. For judicial consideration of the meaning of "isolated", see R. v.
McKillop [1972] 1 O.R. 2d 164-167; Zinmann v. Baldry [1964] 13 W.W.R. 622, 627.
188. Id., § 71(1) , 450-701, at 55,166 (1987).

1992

CANADIAN

SECURITIES LAW

provide. This provision appears to incorporate the relevant U.S. jurisprudence deriving from the Ralston-Purinadecision requiring, in addition to
the provision of such information to the purchaser, the existence of sufficient economic bargaining power to compel its disclosure.189 It is not
clear, however, how the Canadian courts will react to this access test. 9 ' In
addition, each investor, either by virtue of (1) his net worth and investment experience; (2) consultation with or advice from a registered adviser
or dealer; or (3) being a senior officer or director (or a close relative
thereof) of the issuer, must be able to evaluate the prospective investment on the basis of the information provided to him by the issuer. Although this exemption was designed to replace the more subjective concept of "the public" with more objective criteria, the range of information
to be provided and the types of investors that may be involved still require a careful elaboration of rules and policies which still restricts the
availability of the exemption to only the most obvious cases.
A trade of securities to a lender, pledgee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer from the holdings of control persons or companies for the purpose of giving collateral for a bona fide debt, and trades in Commodity
futures options or commodity contracts which are those of a hedger
through a dealer, are exempt.' 9'
A final category of exemption from prospectus requirements is the
sale of securities exempted by the regulations. 92 The Ontario regulations
93
presently exempt the following:
(1) Trades in a variable insurance contract by licenced insurance
194
companies, provided the contract is of a specified kind;
(2) Transactions in which each party is a control person of the issuer
of the security;
(3) Transactions involving the purchase, redemption, or acquisition
by the issuer of its securities;
(4) Issuances of securities to promoters of the company or the sale of
securities from one promoter to another promoter of the same company;
(5) Trades under a plan available to holders of publicly traded securities of the issuer, which permit holders to direct that dividends or interest

189. See, SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co., 463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972); Doran V. Petroleum Management Corp., 545 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1977); Lively v. Hirschfeld, 440 F.2d 631
(10th Cir. 1970).
190. See generally, JOHNSTON, supra note 21; See also R. v. Piepgrass and Shelter Corp.
of Canada Ltd., 1977 Ontario Securities Commission Bulletin 6.
191. Exemptions From Prospectus Requirements, supra note 24, §§ 71(1)(e)(s), 1 450701, at 55,164-66 (1987).
192. Id., § 72(1)(d).
193. Prospectus Requirements, § 14, Can. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1452-125, at 55,257
(1988).
194. Id., § 14(a), 1 452-125, at 55,257.
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on the issuer's securities be applied to the holders purchase of publicly
traded securities of the issuer, or any other securities of the issuer which
are redeemable at the option of the holder;
(6) Sales of securities of a mutual fund made by a financial interme'
diary 95
if the sales are solely to retirement savings plans, deferred profit
sharing plans, and pension plans, maintained by the sponsor of such plan
for its employees, where the decision to purchase the securities is not
made by an employee;
(7)Sales by a promoter of an issuer or the issuer in government incentive securities 96 on a "limited offering" basis if solicitations are restricted to not more than seventy-five prospective purchasers and result
in sales to not more than fifty purchasers and the latter are provided with
an offering memorandum and meet access and sophisticated investor tests
similar to that required under the seed capital exemption;9 7 and
(8)Resales of securities acquired pursuant to the "seed capital" exemption, provided each of the parties is one of the not more than twentyfive original purchasers in a limited offering, or one of the not more than
fifty original purchasers of government incentive securities, and a vendor
relying on this exemption files a required report. '98
8.02 Exempt Securities
The prospectus requirement does not apply to the sale of securities
exempt from dealer registration which has previously been discussed. '99
Securities listed on recognized stock exchanges that are sold through the
exchange and the Commission are exempt if an acceptable statement of
material facts if filed with and accepted by those authorities.2 0 0 The basic
content required in these statements is similar to, but is not as extensive
as, that contained in a prospectus, and is detailed in the relevant regulations and policies. '
An exemption is provided for options to sell or purchase puts and
calls from an option writer, provided the option is written or guaranteed

195. Universal Registration, supra note 52, § 176(1)(a), Can. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH), 453101, at 55,358 (1988).
196. Prospectus Requirements, supra note 194, §15(2), 452-128, at 55,258. Defined by
Section 15(2) of the Regulations to mean a security designed to enable the holder to receive
a grant or other monetary benefit, such as a credit or deduction against taxes.
197. See § 8.01 supra.
198. Prospectus Requirements, supra note 194, § 14(e), T452-128, at 55,257 (1987).
199. Exemptions From Prospectus Requirements, supra note 24, § 72(1)(a), 450-721,
at 55,169 (1988). See Section 72(1)(a) incorporating securities referred to in § 34(2), excepting §34(2) 14, which is exempted by § 71(1)(m), and § 34(2) 15, registration exemptions
contained in the Regulations, in which there currently are no registration exemptions.
200. Id., § 72(1)(b), T 450-721, at 55,169 (1988).
201. Reporting Requirements, §§ 59-65, Can. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH), 452-541, at 55,293
(1987). E.g., see also Alberta Policy 4.7 and 5.3, II Can. Sec. L. Rep (CCH) 170-407, 170503.
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by a member of a recognized stock exchange, and the securities which are
the subject of the option are listed and posted for trading on a recognized
exchange, and are in the form prescribed by the regulations.2"2
8.03 Secondary Distributions and Resale Rules
In some jurisdictions, subsequent sales by purchasers of securities
that are themselves exempt from the prospectus requirement are not subject to prospectus disclosure, unless of course, the securities are not permitted to be offered for sale to the public (e.g., securities of a private
company). Sales of securities acquired in exempt trades may, however,
still require a prospectus. If the purchaser was not a member of the public in the initial sale, then a subsequent sale to a member of the public
would be one to which the prospectus provisions apply. If an exempt sale
is made to a member of the public, a subsequent sale may be made without filing a prospectus unless the original exemption prohibits an offer to
the public, requires an investment intent, or involves a control person. As
a result, in such jurisdictions, securities may be distributed to the public
on resales without adequate or continuous disclosure by the issuer.
As part of its "closed system," Ontario places restrictions on the ability to resell securities acquired under exemptions. As noted earlier, the
concept of a distribution to the public has been replaced by that of a
distribution. In general, the first sale of securities previously acquired
pursuant to an exemption is a distribution to which the prospectus requirement applies, unless the resale is also the subject of an exemption,
or unless specified conditions are met. Different conditions apply to different types of transactions and these may be classified in general
categories.
Under section 71(4), the first subsequent sale of securities previously
acquired in eight categories of exempted transactions20 2 are exempt from
the prospectus requirement if they involve securities of a reporting issuer
that is not in default, and which have been held for a prescribed time
period, provided that no unusual effort is made to prepare the market or
create a demand for the securities, no extraordinary commission or consideration is paid in respect thereto, and a report is filed by the seller
within ten days. The burden is placed upon the seller to ensure that the
reporting issuer is not in default and, in this regard, he can rely on a
certificate issued by the Commission or a list of defaulting reporting issuers maintained by the Commission.2"4 The prescribed holding period de-

202. Exemptions From Prospectus Requirements, supra note 24, § 72(1)(c), 450-721,
at 55,169 (1988).
203. These include (1) specified banks, registered loan or trust companies, licensed insurance companies, and government institutions which purchase as principals, (2) isolated
trades, (3) exempt purchasers, (4) private placements, (5) exempt asset purchases exceeding
$150,000, (6) purchase of mining claims, (7) limited offerings, and (8) trades between
registrants.
204. Exemptions From Prospectus Requirements, supra note 24, §§ 71(8)(9)(10), 11
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pends upon the types of security involved, and runs from the date of the
initial exempt transaction or the date the issuer became a reporting issuer, whichever is later. Six months is required for securities listed on a
recognized exchange and for debt securities or preferred shares of an issuer, provided both are authorized by legislation for investment by insurance companies."0 5 One year is required for both listed securities and for
debt securities that are not so authorized, but which are issued or guaranteed by a reporting issuer whose securities are listed on a recognized exchange. A hold period of eighteen months is required for all other
securities.
Section 71(5) provides an exemption for the first trades in securities
acquired in five other categories of exempt transactions," 6 and the first
trade in previously issued securities of a company that ceased to be a
private company, provided the securities do not come from a control person holding. No prospectus is required if (1) the issuer of the securities
has been a nondefaulting reporting issuer for the previous twelve months;
(2) disclosure has been made to the Commission of the exempt transaction, or, in the case of a private company which has gone public, the issuer has filed a report with respect to its outstanding securities; and (3)
no unusual effort is made to prepare the market or to create a demand,
and no extraordinary commission or consideration is paid in respect
thereto.
Section 71(6) deems the first trade in securities acquired by incorporators and registered dealers who purchased as principal to be a distribution, thereby requiring the filing of a prospectus. No resale exemption is
available for these trades, unless, of course, they themselves are the subject of a specific exemption in section 71(1).
The regulations have created further refinements. A prospectus is not
required for the first trade in securities acquired as a result of a take-over
bid, provided that at the time of the take-over a securities exchange takeover bid circular was filed, and the first trade is not in securities from a
control person's holding. 20 7 A first trade in securities acquired pursuant to
the "incorporator's" exemption is also exempt if the purchaser is a promoter of the issuer.2 0 ' Finally, first trades in securities acquired pursuant
to certain exemptions in the regulations are only exempt if they are made
in accordance with provisions in the Act exempting first trades of previ-

450-708 to 450-710, at 55,168 (1987).
205. Id., §§ 71(4)(b)(i) and (ii), 1450-704, at 55,167; Insurance Act, Ont. Rev. Stat. 1980,
ch. 218 as amended. These provisions relate to seasoned companies with an acceptable earnings or dividend record for the previous five years.
206. These include provisions relating to (1) corporate wind-ups, purchase or exchange
rights, and stock dividends, (2) amalgamations and mergers, (3) share exchange in connection with a take-over bid, (4) take-over bid or issuer bid, and (5) trades with employees.
207. Prospectus Requirements, supra note 194, § 16(a), 452-130, at 55,259 (1988).
208. Id., § 16(b), 452-131, at 55,259.
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ously exempted trades. 0 9
These provisions are designed to encourage issuers to become reporting issuers so that there is continuous disclosure of information relating
to the securities. In addition, they represent an intent to increase both
the liquidity and efficiency of the securities markets in an attempt to resolve the problems of locked-in investments and sudden price fluctuations
when blocks of securities are put on the market.21
8.04 Resale by Control Persons
Prior to reforms in Ontario securities legislation a resale by a control
person of a previously issued security was deemed to be a distribution to
the public requiring the filing of a prospectus unless a specific exemption
was available.2 1' Some relief was provided through the provision of a separate exemption for sale of listed securities by control persons through
the facilities of a recognized stock exchange by using isolated sales not
made in the course of continued and successive transactions of a like nature.2 1 2 The current legislation replaced this latter exemption with a more
comprehensive right of resale. Section 71(7) permits a prospectus-free
distribution by a control person in either of two situations: (1) if a section
71(1) exemption exists (see Sections 8.01 and 8.02 supra) or (2) if certain
conditions are met. These latter requirements stipulate that the issuer
have been a reporting issuer for at least eighteen months and is not in
default of regular disclosure, and that the control person files with the
Commission a notice of intent to sell in proper form and content within
seven to fourteen days prior to the proposed sale. In addition, a declaration certifying that the seller has no knowledge of any material change or
material adverse information concerning the affairs or operation of the
issuer must be filed within the same time period. Within three days of the
trade, an insider report must also be filed. The notice of intent must be
renewed at the end of sixty days, and thereafter, each twenty-eight days,
until the securities have been sold or are no longer for sale. Finally, there
must be no unusual effort made to prepare the market or to create a demand for the securities and no extraordinary commission paid. 213 Since
pledges by control persons of their securities for the purposes of giving
collateral for a bona fide debt are also exempt from the prospectus requirements," 4 sales by the lender, pledgee, mortgagee, or other encum-

209. Id., § 17, 452-141, at 55,259.

210.

JOHNSTON,

supra note 21, at 234.

211. Ont. Rev. Stat. 1970, ch. 246, § 1(1)6a.
212. Id. at § 58(2)(c).
213. Exemptions From Prospectus Requirements, supra note 24, § 71(7),
450-707, at
55,168. Control persons of non-reporting issuers will have restricted rights of resale in that
only a few exemptions (notably, trades with financial or government institutions or exempt
purchasers and private placements) will be available. However, control persons, where the
acquisition of their securities was pursuant to an exempt trade, may be subject to the resale
provisions of Section 71(4)(5)(6).
214. Id., § 71(1)(e), 450-701, at 55,164-65.
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brancer of securities are subject to the same resale restrictions of Section
71(7) that are noted above.
The regulations also provide a means by which a control person may
distribute control securities without filing a prospectus, where the securities were acquired pursuant to a take-over bid,215 and the issuer which
was the subject of the take-over bid had been a reporting issuer for at
least 12 months at the date of the bid, the take-over bid circular disclosed
the intention by the control person to make the trade, the trade occurs
within twenty days of the expiry of the take-over bid, a notice of intention, a declaration, and report are filed as required, and no unusual effort
210
has been made to prepare the market.
8.05 Exemption by Commission Ruling
The Commission, upon the application of an interested person or
company, can rule that any trade, intended trade, security, person, or
company is not subject to dealer registration and prospectus requirements if it is satisfied that to do so would not be prejudicial to the public
interest, and can impose terms and conditions which it considers necessary. 1 7 The availability of this procedure, however, varies with each jurisdiction. A decision under this section is final, and no appeal therefrom is
available. The Commission also has the power to order that the dealer
registration or prospectus exemptions do not apply to a named person or
company, provided that a hearing is given to the affected party, where in
21 8
its opinion such an action is in the public interest.
CHAPTER IX

- CONTINUous DISCLOSURE

9.01 Introduction
As indicated earlier, the concept of the "reporting issuer" is fundamental to most Canadian securities legislation. In Ontario, it is defined to
include issuers that (1) have issued voting securities under a prospectus
or take-over bid filed on or after May 1, 1967, (2) have filed a prospectus
or take-over bid under the new legislation, (3) have had any of their securities listed on a recognized stock exchange since the coming into force
of the new legislation, regardless of when the listing commenced, (4) are
subject to and are deemed by Ontario's company legislation to be offering
their securities to the public, or (5) are the successor by way of amalgamation, merger, or other statutory combination to a company which has
been a reporting issuer for at least twelve months." 9
The disclosure legislation is considerably wider in scope than prede-

215. Prospectus Requirements, supra note 194, § 16a, 452-130, at 55,259.
216. Id., §§ 16a (a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f), at 55,259.
217. Exemptions From Prospectus Requirements, supra note 24, § 73(1), 450-723, at
55,169 (1987).
218. Enforcement, § 124, Can. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 451-024, at 55,215 (1988).
219. Interpretation, supra note 27, § 1(1)(38), 450-001, at 55,104 (1988).
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cessor provisions, in that exemptions for banks, regulated financial institutions, and companies otherwise required by company legislation to
make disclosure have been removed, so that these institutions are subject
to the continuous disclosure and insider reporting provisions of the securities legislation. The Commission is permitted to order that a reporting
issuer has ceased to be a reporting issuer if it is not prejudicial to the
20
public interest and there are fewer than fifteen shareholders in total.1
9.02 Continuous FinancialDisclosure
A distinction is drawn between reporting issuers that are mutual
funds and those that are not. Basically, however, both types of entity
must file annually, within 140 days of financial year-end, audited financial
statements.22 ' All filed financial information is open for public inspection
at Commission offices during normal business hours. 222 The annual statements must be filed on a comparative basis with the immediately prior
financial year. Requirements as to type and content of financial statements are detailed in the regulations. For nonmutual fund reporting issuers, the financial statements must be approved by the board of directors
and include an income statement, a statement of surplus, a statement of
changes in financial position, and a balance sheet. 22 Finance companies
are subject to further requirements, as are industrial and natural resource
companies that are in the promotional, exploratory, or developmental
stage. 224 For mutual funds, the financial statements must include an income statement, a balance sheet, a statement of investment portfolio, a
statement of portfolio transactions, and a statement of changes in net
225
assets.
The annual statements must be audited and accompanied by a
proper report after a full review in accordance with generally accepted
accounting principles.22 6 It is in this area of securities legislation that reliance is placed upon the self-regulatory and professional associations, and
the legislation ensures conformity with the principles and practices recognized by the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants or by an
equivalent association in the jurisdiction of the issuer. 22 Provision is
made for deviation from generally accepted accounting principles and

220. Continuous Disclosure, supra note 98, § 82, V 450-779, at 55,173 (1988).
221. Id., § 77, T 451-176, at 55,171 (1988).
222. General Provisions, § 137, Can. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) V 451-176, at 55,232 (1988).
The information may be kept in confidence if the Commission is of the opinion that it
discloses intimate financial, personal, or other information and the desirability of avoiding
disclosure outweighs the desirability of adherence to the principle that material filed be
available to the public.
223. Continuous Disclosure for Isuers Other Than Mutual Funds, §§ 10 & 11, Can. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 442-079 & 452-081, at 55,255 (1987).
224. Id. §§ 10 & 11, 1 452-091, at 55,235 & 55,256.
225. Mutual Funds, § 80, Can. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 452-466 at 55,312 (1988).
226. Continuous Disclosure, supra note 98, § 77, V 450-763, at 55,171.
227. Interpretation, supra note 27, § 1(3) & (4), 452-003 & 452-024 at 55,252 (1988).
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practices if they are accepted by the Director or the Commission.2 2 8
Interim financial statements must be filed quarterly by nonmutual
fund reporting issuers, within sixty days. Comparative statements for the
previous corresponding period are required if the reporting issuer has
completed its first financial year.229 More detailed requirements are contained in the regulations, which require filing of a statement of changes in
financial position (or a statement of changes in net assets for investment
companies) and an income statement. 2 0 The interim financial statements
2 31
need not include an auditor's report.
Similar provisions are made for mutual funds, except that the statements need be filed only semi-annually,2 2 and must include statements of
income, investment portfolio, portfolio transactions, and changes in net
assets.2 '
The legislation also makes provision for exemptions from disclosure
requirements to be granted by the Commission. It may (1) permit the
omission of certain information usually contained in the required financial statements; 234 (2) permit the exemption from disclosure requirements
if the reporting issuer normally distributed to holders of its securities financial information different from that required by the Act; (3) exempt
an issuer, in full or in part, from disclosure requirements, if they are in
conflict with the requirements of the issuer's home jurisdiction; or (4) if
the Commission is satisfied that there is adequate justification for so
23
doing.
Where the laws of the jurisdiction in which the reporting company is
incorporated contain substantially similar requirements, the reporting issuer may comply with the disclosure filing requirements by filing with the
Commission copies of the material required by the incorporating jurisdiction. 36 Reporting issuers must also file copies of information circulars forwarded to security holders pursuant to proxy solicitation requirements of
the Act and, if it is not subject to the proxy requirements, it must file,
within 140 days of its financial year end, a report in accordance with the

228. Id., § 2(4), 452-024 at 55,253 (1988).
229. Continuous Disclosure, supra note 98, § 76, 450-761 at 55,171.
230. Continuous Disclosure For Issuers Other Than Mutual Funds, supra note 224, § 7,
1 452-075 at 55,255 (1987).
231. Id., § 9, 452-078 at 55,255 (1987).
232. Continuous Disclosure, supra note 98, § 76, 450-762, at 55,171.
233. Mutual Funds, supra note 226, § 77(1), 1 452-462 at 55,312 (1987).
234. Section 79(a) of the OSA restricts the exemption to comparative financial statements, sales or gross revenue if unduly detrimental to the interest of the reporting issuer,
and basic or fully diluted earnings per share. Proxies and Proxy Solicitations, supra note
101, § 79, 450-775, at 55,172. Perhaps the most controversial is the sales or gross revenue
disclosure exemption, which is complicated by various court decisions and the inconsistency
of provincial legislation. For a discussion of the problems, see JOHNSTON supra note 21, at
253-57.
235. Id. § 79, 450-775, at 55,172.
236. Id. § 81, 450-778, at 55,173.

1992

CANADIAN

SECURITIES LAW

regulations."23
9.03 Timely Disclosure
Prior to legislative reforms, timely disclosure provisions were not
contained in the securities legislation per se, but were governed by policy
statements only. In the Uniform Act provinces, immediate disclosure had
to be made of all material and significant information concerning the operations and affairs of an issuer.238 This would occur when a decision accepting or recommending acceptance of a proposed change was made, or
when a material change had occurred or had been agreed upon by the
relevant parties. Material changes or developments include: changes in
control; acquisitions or dispositions of material assets; proposed takeovers, mergers, consolidations, amalgamations, or reorganizations; proposed changes in capital structure; proposed changes that would materially affect earnings; and material changes in earnings. The first four categories of changes had to be discussed with the Commission prior to
disclosure to the investing public so that the Commission could stop the
trading where necessary to allow proper dissemination of the information.
The policy statement provided a common standard of materiality, classifying a material change as one "which could reasonably be expected to
affect materially the value of the security." It also explicitly recognized
that disclosure of confidential information which may damage the issuer
might outweigh the possible harm of withholding the information. In such
situations, management had to take "every possible precaution" to ensure
that no insider trading took place on the basis of that information, and
was encouraged to discuss any unusual or difficult situation with the
Commission.
The Ontario Securities Act gives legislative sanction to the current
requirements of timely disclosure. When a material change occurs in the
affairs of a reporting issuer, it must forthwith issue and file a press release
authorized by a senior officer disclosing the nature and substance of the
change.2" 9 A report of the material change is to be filed as soon as practicable and, in any event, within ten days of the date of the change. A
material change is defined with reference to a market oriented test, in
that it means a "change in the business, operations or capital of the issuer
that would reasonably be expected to have a significant effect on the market price or value of any of the securities of the issuer. "240 It includes a
decision by a board of directors to implement such a change, or a decision
by a senior manager who believes that confirmation by the board is probable. In the case of changes of a confidential nature where disclosure

237. Id. § 80,
450-776 & 450-777, at 55,172 & 55,173.
238. Uniform Policy 2-12, repealed December 1, 1987.
239. Continuous Disclosure, supra note 98, § 74, 450-751, at 55,169.
240. Interpretation, supra note 27, 1 450-004, at 55,102 (1992). Note that there is no
requirement to disclose material "facts", which are separately defined, but in terms similar
to those of material changes. Id.
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would be unduly detrimental to interests of the reporting issuer, it can
file a confidential report with the Commission, the confidentiality of
which must be confirmed every ten days thereafter.2 4 However, a ceasetrading order can still be made despite the filing of a confidential
report." 2
The Act also prohibits a person or company in a "special relationship"24 with a reporting issuer from buying or selling securities of the
reporting issuer where they have knowledge of material facts or material
changes in the affairs of the issuer which have not been generally disclosed.2 "' The Act also prohibits knowingly tipping another person or
company about material facts or changes, other than in the necessary
course of business, before general disclosure is made. 4 As to whether
general disclosure requires time for dissemination or evaluation, Canadian jurisprudence is lacking when compared with its U.S. counterpart,
although the wording of the Act suggests a test closer to that which is
prevalent in the United States. 4
CHAPTER X

- SECURITIES LAWS CIVIL LIABILITY

10.01 Prospectus Liability
The Ontario legislation gives a right of action for damages for a "misrepresentation" contained in a prospectus at the time of purchase against
(1) the issuer or a selling security holder on whose behalf the distribution
was made, (2) the underwriter who signed the underwriter's certificate
required to be included in the prospectus, (3) every director of the issuer
at the time the prospectus or its later amendment was filed, (4) every
person or company whose consent was required and filed (but only with
respect to reports, opinions, or statements made by them), and (5) every
person or company who signed the prospectus other than those already

241. Continuous Disclosure, supra note 98, § 74,
450-753 & 450-754, at 55,169 &
55,170.
242. Civil Liability, § 123, Can. Sec. L. Rep (CCH) 451-021, at 55,215 (1988).
243. Continuous Disclosure, supra note 98, § 75, 450-759, at 55,170. This definition
includes insiders, affiliates or associates of the reporting issuer, of a person or company proposing to make a take-over bid for the securities of the reporting issuer, or of a person or
company proposing to become party to a reorganization, amalgamation, merger or arrangement with the reporting issuer (and their directors, officers and employees), persons engaged
or proposing to engage in business or professional activities with or on behalf of the reporting issuer or any of the aforementioned, or a person or company that learns of a material
fact or material change with respect to the reporting issuer from any of the aforementioned,
and knows or ought reasonably to have known that the other person or company is in such a
relationship.
244. Id., § 75, 450-755, at 55,170. A defence is provided to those who can prove they
reasonably believed that the material fact or material change had been generally disclosed.
Id.
245. Id. § 75,
450-756 & 450-757 , at 55,170
246. Compare Green v. Charterhouse Group Canada Ltd., [1973] O.R. 2d 677, aff'd.,
(1976) 68 D.L.R. 3d 592, a case dealing with insider liability, with SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur, 401 F. 2d 833 (1963).
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listed. 47 Every prospectus must contain a statement of this right given to
the purchaser."" Misrepresentation is defined to mean an untrue statement of material fact or an omission to state a material fact that is required to be stated or that is necessary to make a statement not misleading in the light of the circumstances in which it was made.2" 9 A "material
fact" is a fact that significantly affects, or would reasonably be expected
to have a significant effect on, the market price or value of the securities. 50 Every person who purchases a security offered by the prospectus
during the period of distribution is deemed to have relied upon the mis25
representation if it was a misrepresentation at the time of purchase. '
The general defense available to such an action is proof by the defendant that the purchaser purchased the securities with knowledge of
the misrepresentation. 52 In addition, specific defenses are available to defendants other than the issuer or selling security holder. These include:
(1)The prospectus was filed without their knowledge and consent and
reasonable general notice was given on becoming aware of the filing.
(2)Prior to the purchase of the securities, they withdrew their consent and gave reasonable general notice thereof and the reason therefor.
(3)With respect to expert authority reports, opinions, and statements, there was no reasonable ground to believe, and they did not believe, that there had been a misrepresentation or that the position of the
prospectus did not fairly represent the report, opinion, or statement of
the expert.
(4)With respect to a false statement purporting to be a statement by
an official person or an extract from an public official document, it was a
correct and fair representation of the material and they had reasonable
2 53
grounds to believe, and did believe, that the statement was true.
A defendant other than the issuer or selling security holder can also avoid
liability if he did not believe, as to the nonexpertised portion of the prospectus, the representation to be false or misleading and if he conducted
a reasonable investigation so as to provide reasonable grounds for belief
254
that there had been no misrepresentation.

247. Civil Liability, supra note 243, § 126, 451-055, at 55,216.
248. Prospectuses - Distribution, supra note 112, § 59,. 450-585, at 55,149. If securities
are distributed pursuant to an exempt purchaser, private placement or "seed capital" exemptions by the issuer or an affiliate, control persons, or underwriters who acquired the
securities from those persons, and an offering memorandum is delivered, it must contain a
"contractual right of action" or else the exemption is not available. This right of action for
rescission or damages if the offering memorandum contains a misrepresentation is approximately similar to the rights discussed in this Section. See Self Regulation - Generally, § 21,
Can. Sec. L. Rep (CCH) 1 450-294, at 55,124 (1987).
249. Interpretation, supra note 27, § 1, T 450-001, at 55,103.
250. Id. at 55,102.
251. Civil Liability, supra note 243, § 126, 451-055, at 55,216.
252. Id. § 126, 1 451-056, at 55,216.
253. Id. § 126, 451-057, at 55,216.
254. Id. § 126, T 451-059, at 55,225.
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Separate defenses are also available to experts and those whose reports are referred to or contained in a prospectus. If a misrepresentation
results from failure to fairly represent a report, opinion, or statement of
an expert, a defense is established if, after reasonable investigation, the
expert had reasonable grounds to believe and did believe that the prospectus fairly represented his report, opinion, or statement, of it, or, after
becoming aware of the misrepresentation, he forthwith advised the Commission and gave reasonable general notice that such a use had been
made and that he would not be responsible for it. 55 In addition, no expert is liable for portions of a prospectus purporting to be made on his
authority or as an extract or copy of his report, opinion, or statement
unless he failed to conduct such a reasonable investigation as to provide
reasonable grounds for a belief that there had been no misrepresentations. 26 The test for reasonableness, for both investigation and grounds
for belief, is that standard of reasonableness
required of a prudent man in
2 57
the circumstances of the particular case.
The limitation period for this and other civil liabilities sections of the
legislation is the earlier of three years from the date of the transaction
that gave rise to the liability or 180 days after the plaintiff first had
knowledge of the facts giving rise to the cause of action.25 8 Damages are
limited in three ways:
(1)An underwriter will not be liable for more than the total offering
price of the portion underwritten by it.
(2)A defendant will not be liable for those damages he proves do not
represent the depreciation in the value of the security as a result of the
misrepresentation.
(3)The total- damages cannot exceed the total offering price. 259
Liability is joint and several, and a defendant will be able to seek contribution from any person or company who, if sued separately, would be
liable to make the same payment, unless a court orders otherwise in circumstances where it would not be just and equitable. 26 0 Finally, the right
of action for damages is in addition to and without derogation from any
other right the purchaser may have at law, except for the right of
21
rescission. 1
10.02 Prospectus: Rights of Withdrawal and Rescission
The legislation provides for a forty-eight-hour automatic right of

255. Id. § 126, 1 451-057, at 55,216.
256. Id. § 126, 9 451-058, at 55,225.
257. Id. § 128, 1 451-101, at 55,228.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
rescission.

§
§
§
§

135, 1 451-151, at 55,232.
126, T1 451-060, 451-061 & 451-062, at 55,225.
126, T 451-062, at 55,225.
126,
451-064, at 55,226. See Section 11.02 infra. regarding the right of
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withdrawal from agreements of purchase and sale executed in the course
of a distribution to the public." 2 The time period commences upon the
receipt of the prospectus, and ends at midnight the second day thereafter,
exclusive of Saturday, Sundays, and holidays. Receipt by an agent is receipt by the principal, who must continue to retain the beneficial ownership, and every prospectus must contain a statement of this right of
withdrawal.2 "
An automatic right of rescission is given to a purchaser of securities if
as of the date of receipt a prospectus contains a "misrepresentation," the
definition of which is discussed in Section 10.01 supra. However, the exercise of this right is an alternative to an action for damages and is only
available against the issuer, security holder, or any underwriter of the securities.264 Provisions concerning time of receipt by an agent and disclosure of the right of rescission are similar to those relative to the right of
withdrawal."' An action to enforce this right must be commenced within
180 days after the date of the transaction that gave rise to the cause of
action.2 6 The defenses available to a defendant in an action for damages
are also available in the case of an action for rescission.
10.03 Take-Over Bid Circular Liability
A right of action for damages for misrepresentation in a take-over
bid, an issuer bid, a directors' or a director's or officer's circular, similar to
that concerning prospectuses, is conferred upon all recipients of the
circular." 7
Each offeree will be entitled to enforce this right against the offeror
and its directors, experts, and those persons who sign certificates in the
circular. In addition, a right of rescission may be enforced against the
offeror.268 The defenses available are similar to those concerning prospectuses, one of which applies to all defendants (proof by the defendant that
the offeree had knowledge of the misrepresentation) 66 , while the rest are
not available to the offeror.2 7 0 The prospectus liability provisions limiting
liability to damages from misrepresentation only and those providing for
joint and several liability are also applicable to take-over bids.2 71 The limitation period for commencing an action is also the same. 27 2 Similarly, the
right of action for rescission or damages is in addition to and without

262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

Distribution - Generally, supra note 112, § 70, 450-671, at 55,163.
Prospectuses - Distribution, supra note 112, § 59, 450-585, at 55,149.
Civil Liability, supra note 243, § 126, 1 451-055, at 55,102.
Distribution - Generally, supra note 112, § 70, $ 450-671, at 55,163.
Civil Liability, supra note 243, § 135, V 451-151, at 55,232.
Id. § 127, 451-075, at 55,226.
Id.
Id. § 127, T 451-078, at 55,226.
Id. § 127, 451-079, at 55,226.
Id. § 127, T 451-082 & 451-083, at 55,227.
Id. § 135, 1 451-151, at 55,232.
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derogation from any other right the offeree may have at law.273
The legislation provides for a right of rescission for misrepresentation
against only the offeror as an alternative to the action for damages.2"
Defenses available are those that apply to the action for damages, but the
relevant limitation period is 180 days after the date of the transaction
that gave rise to the cause of action.275
Finally, a purchaser of a security to whom a prospectus, take-over
bid circular, or issuer bid circular was requested to be sent who did not
receive the material has a right of action for rescission or damages against
the dealer or offeror who failed to comply with the applicable
27 6
requirement.
10.04 Other Rights of Rescission and Withdrawal
Where a registered dealer issues, publishes, or sends a document with
intent to trade with someone other than another registered dealer and
proposes to act in that trade as a principal, this must be disclosed in
writing before entering into the contract for the purchase and sale of the
security and before receiving payment or security or other consideration
under or in anticipation of any such contract.2 7 7 Failure to comply entitles
the other party to rescind by serving written notice of rescission on the
registrant within sixty days of the delivery of the security, unless they are
no longer the owner of the security purchased.2 7 8 Failure to confirm in
writing that a trade made pursuant to an oral offer or invitation for an
offer was effected by a registrant acting as a principal entitles the opposite party, unless it is a registrant, to a similar right of rescission if written notice is served within seven days of delivery of the written confirmation.2 7 9 No action for rescission call be commenced after ninety days from
the date of the service of the notice.2 " Finally, short sales against margin
accounts by registrants are void at the action of the customer, and the
customer can recover all monies paid with interest or the securities
28
deposited.
The legislation also permits a contractual plan holder to withdraw
from the plan by written notice within sixty days after receipt of the confirmation for the initial payment under the plan. A similar right of rescission exists for lump-sum purchases of mutual fund securities if exercised
in writing within forty-eight hours after receipt of the confirmation of the
purchase. However, this latter right will apply only with respect to

273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.

Id. § 127, 451-085, at 55,228.
Id. § 127, 451-075, at 55,226.
Id. § 135, 1 451-151, at 55,232.
Id. § 130, 1 451-103, at 55,228.
Trading in Securities - Generally, supra note 36, § 38, 450-455, at 55,143 (1986).
Civil Liability, supra note 243, § 133, 451-141, at 55,231.
Id. § 133, 1 451-142, at 55,231.
Id. § 133, 451-145, at 55,231.
Trading in Securities - Generally, supra note 278, § 46, 450-475, at 55,144.
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purchases that do not exceed $50,000.282 In both cases, the purchaser's
recovery cannot exceed the net asset value of the purchased securities at
the time the right is exercised. 28 3 Registered dealers will be required to
reimburse sales charges and other fees relevant to the investment of the
284
purchaser in the mutual funds.
10.05 Insider Trading Liability
legislation extends insider trading liability to persons or companies that
are "in a special relationship" with a reporting issuer if they sell securities
of the latter with knowledge of a material fact or material change with
respect to the reporting issuer that has not generally been disclosed. The
same persons or companies are liable if they directly or indirectly, other
than in the necessary course of business, communicate knowledge of the
material fact or material change to a person or company who thereafter
sells securities of the reporting issues.2 8 1 These persons or companies are
liable to compensate the purchaser of the securities for damages as a result of the trade. Similar liability extends to those who purchase securities with knowledge of a material fact or material change, or who "tip"
others, who thereafter purchase the securities, the result being that both
86
classes of defendant are liable to the vendor of the securities.1
The legislation defines those "in a special relationship" with a reporting issuer to be (1) insiders or affiliates of the reporting issuer, (2) directors, officers, or employees of the reporting issuer or of a company that is
an insider or affiliate of the reporting issuer, (3) persons or companies
who, by virtue of their past, current, or proposed business or professional
activities with or on behalf of the reporting issuer, have acquired knowledge of the material fact or material change, and (4) an associate of the
reporting issuer or of any of those just listed. ' As defined in the Act, a
material fact is one that "significantly affects, or would reasonably be expected to have a significant effect on the market price or value" of the
securities.28 8 A material change is one in the business, operations, or capital of the reporting issuer that would reasonably be expected to have a
significant effect on the market price or value of the securities, and includes a decision to implement such a change by the board of directors or
by senior management who believe that confirmation of the decision by
28 9
the board of directors is probable.
Liability is attached to the special relationship persons or companies
in such circumstances, including tipping, unless they can prove they rea-

282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.

Civil Liability, supra note 243, § 134,1 451-146, at 55,231.
Id.
Id. § 134, 1 451-150, at 55,232.
Id. § 131, T 451-104, at 55,228.
Id. § 131,
451-105, at 55,228.
Id. § 131, 451-127, at 55,231.
Id., § 1(1), 1 450-001, at 55,102 (1992).
Id., § 1(1),
450-001, at 55,102 (1992).
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sonably believed the information had been generally disclosed2 90 or if

they had reasonable grounds to believe that the information had been
known to the other party to the transaction. Where tipping is alleged,
further defenses are available if the information was given in the normal
course of business.2 9 1 Liability, in the case of more than one defendant, is
joint and several. 9 2 If no defenses are available and proven, the statutory
measure of damages is the difference between the price paid or received
in the transaction and the average market price of the security in the
twenty trading days following general disclosure of the material fact or
material change, although provision is also made for the court to instead
consider such 2other
measures of damages as may be relevant in the
9
circumstances.

3

In addition, if the defendant is also an insider or an associate or affiliate of the reporting issuer, he or it is accountable to the reporting issuer
for any benefit or advantage received or receivable as a result of the
purchase or sale of the securities, or communication of the material fact
or material change, as the case may be unless he can prove he reasonably
believed the information had been generally disclosed. 9 4 Similar defenses
to those listed above are also available.
The right of action given to the reporting issuer is an added incentive
for those in a special relationship with the reporting issuer to obey the
insider trading prohibitions. Quite naturally, the board of directors of the
reporting issuer may be reluctant or unwilling to proceed against one or
several of their associates or members. Consequently, the legislation entitles security holders, the reporting issuer, or the Commission, to apply to
the courts for an order requiring the Commission or authorizing the security holders to commence or continue an action in the name of and on
behalf of the reporting issuer to enforce the insider trading liability. "
The court has a discretion to issue such an order, if it is satisfied there
are reasonable grounds for believing the reporting issuer has a cause of
action, and the reporting issuer has failed to commence an action within
sixty days of a written request or has failed to diligently prosecute an
action commenced by it." 6 Every order of this sort will require the reporting issuer to cooperate fully in the institution and prosecution of the
action and to make available all books, records, documents, and other
material information known to it, which is relevant to such an action. 297
The legislation also permits the courts to require that the reporting issuer
pay the costs incurred by the board of directors or the security holder if it
290. Civil Liability, supra note 243, §§ 131(1) & 131(5)(a), (b), (c), (d) & (e), 1451-075 &
451-079 at 55,215 & 55,216 (1992).
291. Civil Liability, supra note 243, § 131, 451-105, at 55,228.
292. Id. sec. 131, para. 451-108, at 55,229.
293. Id. § 131, $ 451-109, at 55,229.
294. Id. § 131, 1 451-107, at 55,229.
295. Id. § 132, 1 451-121, at 55,230.
296. Id.
297. Id. § 132, 1 451-128, at 55,231.
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is satisfied the action is prima facie in the best interests of the reporting
issuer and its security holders.2 9s Where the Commission prosecutes the
action, the court will order the reporting issuer to pay all costs properly
incurred by the Commission.2 99 Finally, an action to enforce the liability
provisions must be commenced within the earlier of 180 days after the
plaintiff first had knowledge of the facts giving rise to the cause of action
or three years after the date of the transaction. 0 0
Similar liability is applicable to any person or company who has access to information concerning the investment program of a mutual fund,
or the investment portfolio managed for a client by a portfolio manager,
and who uses that information for their direct benefit or advantage to
trade in securities of an issuer for their own account where the mutual
fund portfolio or investment portfolio of the client includes securities of
that issuer. These persons or companies are accountable to the mutual
fund or the client of the portfolio manager for any benefit or advantage
received or receivable as a result of such a transaction.30 1 No specific defenses to this liability are contained in the legislation. Provision is also
made for application to the courts to require or authorize the Commission
or the security holders of the mutual fund to commence or continue an
action in the
name of and on behalf of the mutual fund to enforce the
3 2
liability.
10.06 Derivative Actions
In addition to the provisions of the Ontario Securities Act permitting
shareholder application to the courts to require an action to be commenced to enforce the insider liability sections, relevant companies legislation may make provision for derivative actions to be commenced on behalf of corporations." These permit shareholders, with leave of a court,
to maintain an action on behalf of themselves and the corporation to enforce any right, duty, or obligation that could be enforced by the corporation itself, or to obtain damages for any breach of any that right, duty, or
obligation. A number of court decisions concerning the procedure to be
utilized, and its exclusiveness, have rendered this area of shareholder and
investor protection one of continuing development. 04

298. Id. § 132, 1 451-123 & 451-124, at 55,230. To determine what is prima facie in
their best interest, the court is directed to consider the relationship between the potential
benefit to be derived and the cost involved in the prosecution of the action. Id. § 132, 451126, at 55,231.
299. Id. § 132, 451-125, at 55,230.
300. Id. § 135, V 451-151, at 55,232.
301. Id. § 131, T 451-104, at 55,228.
302. Action by Commission on behalf of issuer, § 132(2), CAN. SEC. L. REP.(CCH) V 451123, at 55,230(1988). Provision respecting costs, similar to those discussed above, are also
applicable. Id. at §§ 132(3),(4), & (6), 1 451-123, 451-124, & 451-126, at 55,230.
303. Derivative actions, § 245, CAN. SEC. L. REP.(CCH) V 460-722, at 57,101(1986);
CBCA § 238.
304. See Farnham v. Fingold, 2 O.R.2d 132 (C.A. 1975); Golden Mines Ltd. v.Revill, 7
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CHAPTER XI - INSIDER TRADING

11.01 Introduction
Canadian insider trading provisions can be divided into two categories: (1) the duty to report trades by insiders; and (2) liability for misuse
of insider information. This section deals only with reporting requirements for insiders of reporting issuers; liability for insider trading is discussed in Section 10.05 infra on Civil Liability. Insiders are defined to
include any person or company who beneficially owns, indirectly or directly, or exercises control or direction over more than 10 percent of the
voting equity shares of a reporting issuer. 05 Directors and senior officers 0 6 of a reporting issuer and those of a company which is itself an
insider or subsidiary of a reporting issuer are deemed to be insiders of the
reporting issuer."' To further exacerbate the problem of definition, companies are deemed to own securities beneficially owned by their affiliates,
and persons are deemed to own beneficially securities beneficially owned
by a company controlled by them or by an affiliate of that company."0 ' In
addition, the definition includes the reporting issuer itself if it has acquired any of its own shares and still holds them."0 9 Where an issuer or a
reporting issuer becomes an insider of another reporting issuer, directors
and senior officers are deemed to have been insiders of the latter for the
previous six months or lesser period that they occupied such a position. 31 0
As result, they must file insider reports for changes occurring within that
time period.3 11
11.02 Insider Trading Rules
A person or company that becomes an insider of a reporting issuer,
other than a mutual fund, must file a report of his direct or indirect beneficial ownership, control, or direction over securities of the reporting issuer as of the date upon which he became an insider. 312 However, if no
such relationship, control, or direction exists, no initial report need be
filed until one is acquired.3 13 Subsequent changes in the ownership, conO.R.2d 216 (1974); re Goldbar and Quebec Manitou Mines Ltd., 9 O.R.2d 740 (1975); Beck,
The Shareholder's Derivative Action, 52 CAN. B. REP. 159 (1974).
305. Interpretation, supra note 27, § 1(1)17iii, CAN. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 450-001, at
55,101 (1988).
306. As defined in § 1(1)41i,&ii of the Act to include various named positions and the
five highest paid employees of the company. Id. at 55,105.

307. Id. § 1(1)17iv, T 450-001, at 55,101 & 55-102.
308. Interpretation, supra note 27, §§ 1(5) & (6), 11 450-005 & 450-006 at 55,106 (1992).
Controlled companies and affiliates are further defined in the Act in §§ 1(2) &(3). Id., §§
1(2) &(3), 7 450-002 &450-003 at 55,106 (1992).
309. Interpretation, supra note 27, § 1(1)17iv, 450-001, at 55,102.
310. Id., §§ 1(8) & (9), 11 450-008 & 450-009 at 55,106 (1992).
311. Insider Trading and Self-Dealing - Report, supra note 100, § 102, CAN. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) T 450-929, at 55,210 (1987).
312. Id. 7 450-927, at 55,209.
313. Insider Trading, § 149 CAN. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T 452-863, at 55,347 (1988).
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trol, or direction of securities by insiders must also be reported."" All
insider reports must be filed within ten days following the end of the
month in which such a change occurs.3 "' The report must be in accordance with the regulations 1 " and must designate (1) the category of insider, (2) the class of security, (3) the amount held, (4) the nature of own31 7
ership, (5) the transaction date, and (6) the nature of the transaction.
Information concerning insider reports is contained in the various
policy statements as well. 1 ' In addition, if an insider of a reporting issuer
transfers securities into the name of an agent, nominee, or custodian, unless the transfer is for the purpose of giving collateral for a bona fide
debt, a report must be filed. 19 Where voting securities are registered in
the name of a person or company other than the beneficial owner and
that person knows the securities are owned by an insider that has failed
to file a report, that person must file a report, unless he holds those securities as collateral for a bona fide debt.2 0 To ease the reporting requirements of large corporations with complicated intracorporate and intercorporate holdings, the regulations provide that the report filed by a
company can be deemed to be a report filed by subsidiaries, affiliates, and
controlled companies, and the latter need not file separate reports. 21 In
addition, the Commission can exempt an applicant from the reporting requirements if the requirements conflict with those of the incorporating
jurisdiction, or if there is otherwise adequate justification for so doing. 22
There is no need to apply for exemption if the incorporating jurisdiction
has substantially similar requirements. Compliance is effected by filing
the reports required by the incorporating jurisdiction. 32 3 Summaries of

314. Insider Trading and Self-Dealing - Report, supra note 100, § 102(2), 1 450-928, at
55,209. § 101(2)(b), supra T 450-926, at 55,209, deems the acquisition or disposition of a put,
call, or other transferable option to be a change in the beneficial ownership of the capital
security to which it relates, thereby requiring a report to be filed.
315. Id. § 102(1), 1 450-927, at 55,209.
316. Insider Trading, supra note 100, § 148, 452-862, at 55,347; Form 36 Securities
Act, CAN. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 454-036, at 55,888 (1987).
317. Form 36 Securities Act, supra note 317, 450-927, at 55,209.
318. Uniform Policy 2-09, Insider Trading Reports - Loan and Trust Companies, CAN.
SEC. L. REP.
470-209, at 57,779 (1987); Uniform Policy 2-10, Insider Trading - Persons
Required to Report in More Than One Capacity, id. 1 470-210, at 57,779.
319. Insider Trading and Self-Dealing - Report of transfer by insider, supra note 100, §
104, 450-933, at 55,210; Insider Trading, supra note 314, § 148, 452-862 at 55,347; Id. §
150, 452-864, at 55,347; Form 36, supra note 317, 454-036, at 55,888.
320. Insider Trading and Self-Dealing - Report of transfer by insider, supra note 100, §
105, 450-933, at 55,210; Insider Trading, supra note 314,
452-868, at 55,348; Form 36,
supra note 317, 454-038, at 55,903.
321. Insider Trading, supra note 314, § 155, 1 452-870, at 55,348.
322. Insider Trading and Self-Dealing - Filing in other jurisdiction, § 117(2), CAN. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 450-977, at 55,213 (1988). See Ontario Policy 7.1, Application of Requirements of the Securities Act to Certain Reporting Issuers, CAN. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 471701, at 58,141 - 58,161 (1987).
323. Id. § 117(1),
450-976, at 55,213.
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AND ACQUISITIONS

12.01 Introduction
Corporate combinations can be effectuated in Canada by one of three
basic methods: (1) an acquisition of the shares or assets of a business
enterprise; (2) the take-over of publicly traded shares in accordance with
the applicable legislation; or (3) the statutory amalgamation of two or
more corporations. These are sometimes lumped under the heading of
"mergers" in business discussions, but it is important to note that the
term has no formal or statutory status in Canada. A decision as to the
appropriate method to use depends upon the business purposes to be
achieved and the income tax consequences which will flow therefrom, especially in light of tax provisions relating to capital gains.
Statutory amalgamations are provided for in the provincial and federal companies legislation.3 25 Basically, these provisions permit two or
more companies of the same jurisdiction to combine their assets and liabilities into one continuing corporation. The legislation requires the amalgamating corporations to enter into an amalgamation agreement prescribing the terms and conditions of the amalgamation, the means of carrying
it into effect, and the means to obtain the necessary shareholder
approval.
The impact of securities legislation upon these forms of acquisition
or combination is minimized by the exemptions from the prospectus and
dealer registrations requirements that are provided. As noted earlier, 326
issuance of securities in connection with statutory amalgamations or similar merger-type combinations are exempt from these obligations, as are
those that relate to asset purchases with a fair value of at least $150,000.
To the extent that shareholder approval is required, the proxy solicitation
rules must be complied with and the necessary material filed. 327 In that
insider trading may be involved, the liability provisions may be applicable
as a basis for the assertion of a private claim. 28 Finally, if the acquisition
involves a purchase of a significant block of the outstanding securities of
a corporation, the take-over bid provisions of the securities legislation are
3 29
applicable.
12.02 Merger of Subsidiary and Parent
Both the federal legislation and provincial legislation permit short-

324. 3251d. § 116, 450-975, at 55,213.
325. See, e.g., OBCA, supra note 14, at §§ 173-178; CBCA, supra note 14, at §§ 181186.
326.
327.
328.
329.

See
See
See
See

Sections 5.04[c] and 8.01, supra.
Section 14.02 supra.
Section 10.05 §upra.
Chapter 13 Take-Over Bid Legislation in Canada, infra note 346.
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form vertical and horizontal amalgamations of wholly-owned subsidiaries
with the approval of the directors of each of the amalgamating companies. The general amalgamation agreement details the capital structure of
the continuing corporation, as well as setting out the manner in which the
shares of the predecessor securities will be converted into shares of the
successor. Provided the companies are solvent, the continuing entity will
come into force once articles of amalgamation are issued. Dissenting
shareholders are permitted to require the amalgamated corporation to
purchase their shares at values determined in accordance with the relevant legislation.33
12.03 Issuer Bids and Going Private Transactions
For an offer by an issuer to acquire or redeem its own securities,
other than debt securities that are not convertible into equity securities,
the amount of disclosure to be made by the issuer to its security holders
and approval by the minority security holders is governed by legislation
in Ontario relating to "issuer bids." '' If such an offer is not an exempt
one, various disclosure requirements must be met. Exemptions3 32 are
available if the acquisition: (1) is permitted in accordance with the terms
and conditions of the securities without the prior agreement of the securities holders; (2) is required by the instrument creating or governing the
class of securities or by the statute under which the issuer was incorporated or organized; (3) is pursuant. to pre-existing rights known to security holders at the time of purchase and exercised by the security holder;
(4) is made to meet sinking fund or purchase fund requirements; (5) is
acquired from a current or former employee of the issuer or an affiliate,
provided that where a published market for the securities exists, the acquisition cost does not exceed the market price of the securities and not
greater than five percent of a class of securities are acquired under the
exemption; 333 (6) is made in accordance with the requirements of a recognized stock exchange; (7) is one in which no more than five percent of the
issuer's securities are purchased within a twelve-month period, if disclosure is made to the Commission and the financial press, by means of a
notice of intention, at least five days prior to the proposed issuer bid;33
(8) is of securities of a private company with no published market for the
securities which are being acquired; or (9) is to securities holders which
number fewer than fifty in Ontario, and the securities held by the Ontario
holders represent less than two percent of the class of securities, provided
the bid is in compliance with the laws of a jurisdiction recognized by the

330. OBCA, supra note 14, at § 184; CBCA, supra note 14, at § 190.
331. Take-Over Bids and Issuer Bids - Definitions, supra note 176, § 88(1), 1 450-821,
at 55,181 (1987), defines "issuer bid."
332. Id. § 92(3), 1 450-842, at 55, 185.

333. Id. § 92(3)(a)-(d), 1 450-842, at 55,185.
334. Id. § 92(3)(f),
450-842, at 55,185; Take-Over Bids and Issuer Bids, supra note
176, § 168; 452-991, at 55,354; Form 36, supra note 317, 454-031, at 55,587.
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Commission, and materials are forwarded
to the Ontario security holders
33 5
and filed with the Commission.

Where the issuer bid is not exempt, as a matter of timely and adequate disclosure, prior to making an issuer bid, the issuer must deliver to
existing security holders and the Commission"' an issuer bid circular
containing prescribed information similar to that for take-over bids. It is
also subject to the procedural rules regarding time limits and pro rata
acceptance of tenders that relate to take-over bids, except that disclosure
of intent to purchase in the market is not required..3 ' Federally incorporated companies are exempt from these requirements, in that their own
legislation has disclosure requirements that apply to issuer acquisitions.3 8
In addition, protection of the rights of minority shareholders in going
private situations is also legislated. The basic thrust of the legislation is
to ensure that these transactions are implemented on a basis that is not
unfair to the minority in terms of the price received, while avoiding rules
that might be so restrictive as to preclude desirable transactions. "Going
private transactions" are defined to include amalgamations, arrangements, consolidations, or other transactions proposed by an insider of an
issuer in which the interest of a holder of a participating security is terminated without the holder's permission and without the substitution
thereof of an interest of equivalent value in a participating security of the
issuer or its successor or another issuer that controls the issuer. 339 Thus,
where it is anticipated in a take-over bid or an issuer bid circular that a
going private transaction will follow, the circular must contain a summary
of a valuation of the offeree company or issuer, plus a statement that a
copy of the valuation will be sent upon request to registered security
holders. s ° Although matters of a sensitive nature, the disclosure of which
would be adverse to the interests of the corporation and would outweigh
the benefit of the information to prospective recipients, may be omitted
by permission of the Director, the valuation must arrive at an opinion as
to a value or range of values for the participating securities without any
downward adjustments to reflect the fact that the participating securities
do not form part of a controlling interest.3 " The valuation will be at a
date not more than 120 days prior to the date of the bid, unless a prior
valuation exists and has been updated, there has been no intervening
event that has materially affected the value, or the intervening event is
34 2
described and the change in value is stated.

335. Take-Over Bids and Issuer Bids, supra note 176, § 92(3)(h), 450-842, at 55,185.
336. Id. § 97, 450-868, at 55, 189; Id., § 171, 453-006, at 55,355; Form 33, supra note
317, 454-033, at 55,862.
337. Id., § 93(3) & (4), 450-847, at 55,186.
338. CBCA, supra note 14, at §§ 194-206.
339. Take-Over Bids and Issuer Bids, supra note 176, § 163(1), V 452-961, at 55,351 55,352.
340. Id. § 163(2), 452-962, at 55,353.
341. Id. § 163(1)(6).
342. Id. § 163(4) & (5), 452-965, at 55,352.
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Another requirement is that the squeeze-out element of the going
private transaction should not be carried out without the approval of a
majority of the minority shareholders affected. Two-thirds of the minority must approve where the consideration offered is other than cash or a
security providing an immediate right to cash, or is less than the share
price indicated by the valuation. ' " The requirement for minority approval does not apply if the controllers already hold ninety percent of the
participating securities of the issuer at the time the transaction is initiated, provided a statutory appraisal remedy is available to the minority
or a substantially equivalent enforceable right is made available. 3 " The
provisions for enhanced disclosure, valuation, and minority approval reflect the concern of the Commission to protect minority security holders
and to ensure they are treated consistently in a fair and even-handed
manner.
CHAPTER XIII - TAKE-OVER BIDS

13.01 Introduction
Together with insider trading, proxy solicitation, and regular financial disclosure, the substantive regulation of take-over bids in Canada did
not occur until the enactment of the Ontario Uniform Act in 1966.3'5
Readers should be aware that such forms of corporate acquisitions, insofar as they relate to questions of competition policy or foreign ownership
of Canadian corporations are also regulated by relevant federal
legislation. 4 6
A take-over bid is defined as an offer to security holders in the relevant jurisdiction to purchase such a number of voting securities that the
offeror will end up with an aggregate total exceeding twenty percent of
the outstanding voting securities of the target company. 47 The fixed percentage figure is an attempt to establish an objective standard of the
amount of shareholding necessary to exercise effective control of a company. Included in the definition of a take-over bid are acceptances by an
offeror of an offer to sell and a combination of an offer to purchase and
acceptance of offer to sell so that "puts" and "buy-sell" arrangements will
be subject to regulation as well.346

343. See generally Ontario Policy 9.1, Disclosure, Valuation, Review and Approval Requirements and Recommendations for Insider Bids, Going Private Transactions and Related
Party Transactions, CAN. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 470-901, at 58,217 (1991); Compulsory Acquisitions, § 182, CAN. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) %460-704, at 57,089.
344. Ontario Policy 9.1, supra note 344, T 470-901, at 58,217. Part VIII - Minority Approval, § 2.
345. A comprehensive treatment of this subject is found in Anisman, Take-Over Bid
Legislation in Canada (Toronto, C.C.H. Can. Ltd. 1974).
346. E.g., Competition Act, R.S.C. ch. C-34 (1985)(as amended); Investment Canada
Act, S.C. ch. C-20 (1985)(as amended).
347. Take-Over Bids and Issuer Bids - Definitions, supra note 176, § 88(1), V 450-821,
at 55,182.
348. Id. at 55,182, "offer to acquire."
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13.02 Provincial Regulation of Take-over Bid Offers
[a] Procedural and Disclosure Requirements
The legislation details various provisions applicable to all take-over
bids, 3 9 including: delivery of the bid; the minimum time for which a bid
can be open (twenty-one days); restrictions on taking up the securities;
rights of withdrawal (before twenty-one days and after forty-five days
and an additional ten days whenever the terms of the bid are varied); pro
rata take-up in the event of over-tendering; effect of market purchases on
the bid; take-up provisions and timing of payment; restrictions on extensions of the bid; and required press release where all terms and conditions
of the bid are complied with or waived.
The bid must be sent to all holders of the class of securities sought
and of securities convertible into, or carrying the rights to purchase such
securities, and adequate arrangements must be made to ensure that cash
is available to effect payment in full if the take-over bid is made in
cash. 50 Where the terms of the bid are changed by increasing the consideration to be paid, this must be paid to all offerees, regardless of when
the shares are taken up.35'
A take-over bid circular must form part of or accompany a take-over
bid, and must contain information specified in the legislation and regulations.32 This material includes: inter alia, beneficial ownership of the offeree company securities held by the offeror, its associates, directors, and
senior officers, and insiders; the terms and conditions of the offer; the
method and time of payments and rights of withdrawal; whether the offeror is aware of any material change in the financial position or prospects
of the target company since its last filed financial statement; valuations if
required or included; rights of appraisal and acquisition; market
purchases of the securities sought; and a statement of the right to rescission or damages for misrepresentations contained in the circular.35 3
Contents of the circular must be approved by the directors of an offeror, and no experts' reports may be used therein without their written
consent. 4 In addition, the chief officers and two directors must sign a
certificate to the effect that full, true, and plain disclosure of all material
facts relating to the take-over bid has been made, which must be included
in the circular.355 Where the consideration involved consists, in whole or
in part, of securities, additional material is required, namely, the information prescribed in the appropriate form of prospectus for the company

349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
55,357.
354.
355.

Id. § 94, 450-863, at 55,187.
Id. § 95, 450-864, at 55,188.
Id. § 96(3), 450-867, at 55,189.
Id. § 97(1), 450-868, at 55,189.
See also, Take-Over Bids and Issuer Bids, supra note 176, § 175(f), 1 454-032, at
Form 32, item 24, CAN. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
Id.

454-032, at 55,861 (1987).
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whose securities are being offered in exchange, as well as that company's
356
financial statements.
An offeror cannot sell any of his shares which are the subject of the
bid during the period of the bid, and if it offers to pay a price that exceeds the offer, the bid is deemed to be varied by increasing the consideration to the higher price. 57 Where a significant change has occurred in
the information contained in the circular, or where the terms of the bid
are varied, a notice of the change is to be sent to all offerees whose shares
have not been taken up.3 5 8 In such a case the period during which securities may be deposited shall not expire before ten days after the notice of
variation has been delivered.3 59
[b] Directors' Circulars
Regardless of whether the board of directors of the target company
recommends to its shareholders acceptance or rejection of a take-over bid,
disclosure in the form of a directors' circular must be sent to each offeree
within ten days of the bid. 60 The contents of the circular, which are prescribed in the regulations, 6 ' must be approved and the delivery thereof
authorized by the directors, and the document must contain a certificate
of full, true, and plain disclosure similar to the certificate required in the
take-over bid circular, 6 2 as well as a statement of the right to rescission
or damages for misrepresentation.
Within the circular, the directors must disclose their direct and indirect beneficial ownership in the offeror and offeree companies, whether
any director, senior officer (or their associates), or insiders of the offeree
company has accepted or intends to accept the offer and the number of
securities involved, the existence of remuneration or compensation agreements to be entered into as a result of a successful bid, details of trading
by directors and officers in securities of the offeree company, and particulars of any material changes in the financial prospects or operations of the
target company since the last published interim or annual financial statements. Consideration must be given to the making of a recommendation
to accept or reject a take-over bid, and the reasons for the recommendation must be disclosed, even where the directors cannot make a recommendation. 3 If the offerees are advised not to tender until further communication is received, then that communication must be made at least

356. Id. at 55,860, item 15.
357. Take-Over Bids and Issuer Bids - Sales during bid prohibited, supra note 332, §
93(8), V 450-851, at 55,187; Id. § 96(3), 1 450-867, at 55,189.
358. Id. § 97(2) & (4), t 450-869 & 450-871, at 55,189.
359. Id. § 97(5), 1 450-872, at 55,189.
360. Id. § 98(1), 450-884, at 55,189.
361. Take-Over Bids and Issuer Bids, supra note 176, § 172, 453-007, at 55,355; Form
34, supra ntoe 317, V 454-034, at 55,876.
362. Form 36, item 18 supra note 317, V 454-034, at 55,880.
363. Take-Over Bids and Issuer Bids, supra note 176, § 98(2), 450-885, at 55,190.
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seven days before the expiration of the bid. 64 In addition, an individual
director or officer may recommend to the offerees acceptance or rejection
of the take-over bid if a circular similar to the directors' circular is
delivered. 6 5
[c] Exempt Offers
Six categories of take-over bids are exempt from the rules outlined
36 6
above. These include:
(1)An offer effected through the facilities of a recognized stock
exchange;
(2)The acquisition by an offeror and its associates or affiliates of not
more than five percent of the voting securities of the target company in
the twelve-month period, provided that if there is a published market
price for the securities, the purchase is not made at a price above the
market price;
(3)Purchases made by way of private agreement with not more than
five shareholders, not made to shareholders generally, and for consideration which does not exceed 115 percent of the market price of the
securities;
(4)An offer to purchase shares in a private company that is not a
reporting issuer and where there is not a published market in respect of
the securities bid for;
(5)An offer where the number of securities holders in Ontario is fewer
than fifty who hold in the aggregate less than two percent of the outstanding securities of that class, made in accordance with the laws of a
recognized jurisdiction, and all materials are sent to the Ontario securities
holders; and
(6)Purchases of securities with no published market from not more
than five persons where the bid is not made to shareholders generally.
With respect to calculation of shareholders for the private agreement
exemptions, if the offeror knows or ought to know after reasonable inquiry that the offeree acts as trustee or other legal representative for
others with direct beneficial interest in the securities, or that the offeree
acquired the securities with the intent to sell under a private agreement,
those people with a direct beneficial interest or from whom the securities
were purchased are to be included in the calculation of the maximum
367
number of shareholders.

364. Id. §§ 98(4) & (5),
450-887 & 450-888, at 55,190.
365. Id. §§ 98(3) & (7), TT 450-886 & 4550-890, at 55,190.
366. Id. § 92(1), T 450-840, at 55,184; Take-Over Bids and Issuer Bids, supra note 337, §
165, 452-986, at 55,354.
367. Take-Over Bids and Issuer Bids - Determination of number of security holders,
supra note 176, § 92(2), T 450-841, at 55,184.
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13.03 Defensive Tactics
To a greater extent than is evident in the United States, Canadian
public companies often have a control block holder, rendering most public companies in Canada more or less immune from hostile take-over bids.
The bidders are instead compelled to reach an agreement with the control
block holder to purchase his shares. However, where a hostile take-over
bid is made, strategies may be employed by the target company where the
board of directors wish to thwart the action by the proposed acquiror.
The directors of a take-over target are subject to a duty at law in
carrying out their responsibilities. The directors of the target company
may employ various methods of making a hostile takeover so difficult that
it will be unattractive and be withdrawn. These may be taken in good
faith to protect the corporation and its shareholders from an inadequate
offer. The defensive tactics available to the directors and management of
a target corporation are numerous, and include actions such as providing
themselves with golden parachutes, seeking white knights or white
squires, issuing warrants as a dividend to shareholders giving them the
right to buy additional shares at a bargain price in certain circumstances
(poison pills), issuing shares with multiple voting, subordinate voting or
no voting rights, providing staggered terms for directors, issuing shares or
options (the "lock up" arrangement), divest in corporate assets (the
"scorched earth" or "crown jewel" defences), or taking similar defence of
action commonly known as "shark repellant" tactics. The issue is whether
the use of such tactics by directors and management of a target corporation is in the best interests of the corporation and of the shareholders.
The Canadian securities administrators have enacted a policy which
deals with take-over bids and defensive tactics. 68 The policy reiterates
that the primary objective of take-over bid legislation is the protection of
the bona fide interest of the shareholders in the target company. The secondary objective is to provide a regulatory framework within which takeover bids may proceed in an open and even-handed environment. The
policy confirms the fiduciary standard required of directors of a target
company by corporate law. In addition, the policy identifies the inappropriateness of developing a specified code of conduct in take-over bid situ36
ations for directors of the target company.
However, the administrators identify specific defensive tactics which
will be scrutinized in a take-over bid situation, which include: the issuance, or the granting of an option on, or the purchase of, securities representing a significant percentage of the outstanding securities of the target
company; sale or acquisition, or granting of an option on, or agreeing to
sell or acquire, assets of a material amount; and, entering into a contract
other than in the normal course of business or taking corporation action

368. National Policy 38, Take-Over Bids - Reciprocal Cases Trading Orders,
L. REP. (CCH) 470-038, at 57,670 - 57,671 (1990).
369. Id. § 2, at 57,671.
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other than in the normal course of business.7 0
The policy concludes by stating that administrators realize defensive
tactics, including those that are specifically subject to scrutiny, may be
legitimately taken by a board of directors in genuine search of a better
offer. It is only those tactics that are likely to deny or severally limit the
ability of the shareholders to respond to a take-over bid or competing bid,
that may result in action by the administrators, according to the policy.
CHAPTER

XIV

- PROXY REQUIREMENTS

14.01 Introduction
Since the mid-1960's, substantial proxy regulation has been an important element in the provisions for continuous disclosure contained in
Canadian companies and securities legislation. Current securities legislation applies proxy requirements to those companies subject to the financial disclosure rules discussed above, and in Ontario the requirement applies to all reporting issuers.3 7 1 Equivalent exemptions from the rules are
provided in the case of conflicting legislative requirements, or if the Commission is satisfied adequate justification exists. 72 Provincial companies
legislation generally exempts private companies from proxy rules, and
provision is made3 for
any interested person to apply to the Commission
73
for an exemption.

14.02 Proxy Solicitation
Mandatory solicitation of proxies is required of the management of
all companies, concurrently with or prior to the giving of notice of a meeting of shareholders, by sending to each shareholder entitled to vote a
form of proxy that complies with the provisions of the regulations.374 The
form of proxy must (1) indicate in boldface type whether it is solicited by
management, (2) provide space for dating, and (3) provide means
whereby the shareholder can specify the manner in which his shares are
to be voted with respect to each matter identified in the proxy or information circular, or confer discretionary authority upon a nominee to so
vote, provided that the proxy or information circular indicates in boldface
type how the nominee intends to vote. No proxy can confer authority to
vote (1) for the election of directors unless bona fide nominees for those
elections are named in it or (2) at any meeting other than that specified
in the notice. It must also indicate in boldface type that the shareholders
have a right to appoint a person other than the person designated as
370. Id. § 3, at 57,671.
371. Proxies and Proxy Solicitation - Mandatory solicitation of proxies, § 84, CAN. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 450-802, at 55,173 (1988).
372. Id. § 87(2), T 450-809, at 55,181.
373. See, e.g., OBCA, supra note 14, § 113, T 460-445, at 57,061 (1986).
374. Proxies and Proxy Solicitation - Mandatory solicitation of proxies, supra note 372,
§ 84, T 450-802, at 55,173.
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nominee and contain instructions as to the manner in which this right can
be exercised.37 A proxy can confer discretionary authority with respect to
amendments or variations to matters identified in the notice and other
matters which may properly come before the meeting, if the solicitor of
the proxy is not aware, within a reasonable time prior to the solicitation,
of the new matters and a specific statement is made in the proxy or information circular that accompanies it that the proxy is conferring that dis3 76
cretionary authority.
No solicitations of proxies, whether by management or otherwise, can
be made unless an information circular is sent to each shareholder whose
proxy is solicited. Exemptions from this requirement are provided for the
nonmanagement solicitation of less than fifteen shareholders,3 77 solicitations by registrants or custodians of a mutual fund reporting issuer voting
securities held by them in street name, provided that certain conditions
are met,37 or the solicitation by a person of shares of which he is the
beneficial owner.3 7 9 The form and content of this document are governed
by regulations, and must contain information that is not obtained more
than thirty days prior to the date of first distribution of the circular.380
The stipulated form details items of information which must be clearly
presented according to instructions contained therein. These include: revocability of proxies; persons making the solicitation; interest of directors,
officers, nominees, and companies in matters to be acted upon; voting
shares and principal holdings thereof; election of directors; remuneration
and indebtedness of management and others; interest of management and
others in material transactions; appointment of auditors; and management contracts.
The substance of each matter to be submitted to the shareholder,
apart from the approval of financial statements, should be briefly described in sufficient detail to permit the shareholders to form a reasonable judgment concerning any of the matters."' These include matters
such as alteration of share capital, charter amendments, property acquisitions or dispositions, amalgamations, mergers, or reorganizations. Where
a reorganization or restructuring is involved, reference should be made to
prospectus form or issuer bid form for guidance as to what is material.
While fines may be imposed, a greater importance is the effect of
procedural irregularity or the provision of inadequate information in
375. Proxies and Proxy Solicitation, supra note 101, § 158, 1 452-921, at 55,350; Proxies
and Proxy Solicitation, supra note 101, § 160, 452-929, at 55,351.
376. Id. § 159, 1 452-929, at 55,351.
377. Id., § 85(2)(A), 1 450-804, at 55,174.
378. Id. § 85(2)(b); Trading in Securities Generally, supra note 36, § 48, 450-490, at
55,145 (1986).

379. Proxies and Proxy Solicitation - Information circular, supra note 372, § 85(2)(c), 1
450-804, at 55,174.
380. Proxies and Proxy Solicitation, supra note 101, § 157, 452-902, at 55,350; Form
30, supra note 317, 1 454-030, at 55,838.
381. Form 30, supra note 317, 454-030, at 55,838.
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these documents. If sufficient information upon which a reasonable judgment can be made is not provided, and if the provision of that information is material to the person entitled thereto, then it appears likely that
action taken
at the shareholders' meeting will be subject to
382
invalidation.

14.03 Role of the Intermediaries
In 1987, the Joint Regulatory Task Force to the Canadian Securities
Administrators (the "CSA") recommended the adoption by the CSA of a
National Policy Statement with respect to shareholder communications.
The problem addressed by the task force was the disenfranchisement of
beneficial non-registered shareholders of securities, being held in the
names of market nominees (clearing agencies or financial intermediaries),
due to certain deficiencies in legislation governing shareholder communications. As required by Ontario securities legislation 8 " and by similar legislation within other Canadian jurisdictions, registrants and custodians
are required to deliver proxy related material to non-registered shareholders where the issuer has paid "reasonable fees". These provisions
contain deficiencies in that no specific fee scheduled is regulated, the issuer is not obligated to deliver information or proxy related material to
the underlying owners, there are no specific time periods for such delivery, obligations are not clearly placed on banks or trust companies in
their roles as intermediaries, and the role of clearing agencies in the capital market is not contemplated. As a result of these deficiencies, and
based upon the task force's recommendations, National Policy No. 41 was
approved by the CSA on October 28, 1987.384
The policy is designed to ensure that non-registered shareholders
have the same access to corporate information and voting rights as registered holders, to ensure that the obligations of each participant and the
communication chain are equitable and clearly defined, and to ensure
that regulation and procedures are uniform within Canada. The policy
imposes three basic requirements on issuers: to set a record date for the
meeting; to undertake a search for non-registered holders pursuant to the
methods described in the policy, and to send proxy related material on a
timely basis to each security holder who is entitled to the receipt.
The process utilizes an early search, in which clearing agencies,
namely Canadian Depository for Securities and West Canada Depository
Trust Company, are utilized to determine intermediaries from other registered holders contained on the shareholders' list. Each of these clearing
agencies must then provide the transfer agent of the issuer with an ex-

382. See Garvie v. Axmith, 1962 O.R. 65. See also the discussion of caselaw in Johnston
at 267-68.
383. Trading in Securities Generally, §§ 48 Can. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 450-477 at 55,149
(1992).
384. National Policy 41, III Can. Sec. L. Rep. 470-041.
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haustive nominee register to which the issuer must deliver a search card
so that the determination of the number of sets of proxy related materials
to be sent to each participant and intermediary can be determined.
Under the current regime, the time frames within which the various
searches and materials must be forward are specifically set out. These
include a minimum period of time which must elapse between notification
of the record date, the record date, the mail date, and the meeting date.
CHAPTER XV - INVESTMENT COMPANIES

15.01 Mutual Funds
The regulation of mutual funds has been a subject of much discussion and controversy in Canada, but it was not until the enactment of the
predecessor to the current Ontario Securities Act that any province established a statutory framework that compares with that provided under the
Investment Companies Act in the United States. At the present time, unless the sale of securities of a mutual fund issuer is otherwise exempted, a
prospectus must be filed in accordance with a special form prescribed by
the regulations 8 5
Provision is made for the registration of a class of dealer known as a
mutual fund dealer, meaning a person or company registration exclusively
for trading in securities of mutual funds."8 6 All such registrants are subject to the basic conditions of registration considered earlier concerning
minimum net free capital, bonding, compensation funds, business records
and procedures, financial statements, proficiency standards, and statements of account and portfolio.3 '7 A number of national and local policy
statements regulate such matters as sales charges, management fees, forward pricing, conditions of redemption, ascertaining the net asset value of
units or shares, financial statements, and changes in management or investment policies.388

The Ontario legislation recognizes the basic functional divisions of
the mutual fund industry, insofar as it provides definitions for mutual
fund management and distribution companies, management and distribution contracts, and contractual plans.38 9 Earlier, draft legislation specifically required registration of these entities, as well as of contractual plan
service companies. These proposals were derived from the 1969 Mutual
385.
386.
387.
388.

Prospectus Requirements, supra note 194, § 32(1), V 452-210 at 55,276 (1987).
Registration Requirements, supra note 37, § 86, 452-506 at 55,328 (1987).
Id., §§ 84-140,11 452-501 - 452-787 at 55,325 - 55,344 (1987). See Chapter 5, supra.
See National Policies 36, 39 III Can. Sec. L. Rep. 11470-036, 470-039, Ontario Poli-

cies 1.9, 11.1, 11.2, 11.4, 11.5 III Can. Sec. L. Rep. 471-109, 472-101, 472-102, 472-104, 472105.
389. Interpretation, supra note 27, § 1(1), 1 450-001 at 55,101 (1992). "Mutual Fund" is
defined to include an issue of Securities that entitles the holder to receive on demand, or
within a specified period after demand, an amount computed by reference to the value of a
proportionate interest in the whole or in a part of the net assets, including a separate fund
or trust account of the issuer of the securities. Id.

DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 20:2

Fund Report39 which was concerned with abuses, both actual and potential, in the then expanding mutual fund industry. Since then, the industry
has grown smaller in size, and it is felt that it is less able to withstand
unnecessary administrative costs. In that provision is made for effective
control of mutual funds by means of prospectus filings and the requirements discussed below, the proposals for registration were dropped from
the legislation. 9 1
At present, there is also provision for a class of advisers known as
portfolio managers which are investment counsel registered for the purpose of managing investment portfolios for clients with discretionary authority granted by the clients.3 92 They are subject to self-dealing restrictions imposed by legislation. A portfolio manager must not knowingly
cause any investment portfolio managed by it to (1) invest in any issuer
in which a "responsible person" or his associate is an officer or director,
unless this is specifically disclosed to the client and written consent from
the client is obtained, (2) purchase or sell the securities from or to the
account of a responsible person or his associate, or the portfolio manager,
and (3) make a loan to the same persons.

93

"Responsible persons" are

defined to include the portfolio manager, its partners, directors, officers,
and employees, together with affiliates and their directors, officers, and
employees, but only if the latter group participates in the formulation of,
or has access prior to9 4 implementation of, investment decisions made on
3
behalf of the clients.

In addition to these conditions of registration for portfolio managers,
registered dealers managing mutual finds are subject to a National policy
directive.3 91 This makes provision for: (1) qualifications of dealer managers; (2) prior shareholder approval of dismissal of auditors; (3) material
changes in the investment objective, policies, practices, or management
company of the fund; (4) disclosure of aggregate brokerage commissions
paid to related dealers and yearly management fees; and (5) prohibiting
certain investments.
The Ontario legislation imposes similar self-dealing restrictions on all
mutual funds, in which loans to or investments with "related" persons or
companies will be prohibited unless exempted. Thus, mutual funds will
be unable to make loans to an officer or a director, or their associates, of
the fund, the management company or distribution company, or to a sub-

390.
(1960).
391.
129-34.
392.
393.
(1992).
394.
395.

Report of the Canadian Committee on Mutual Funds and Investment Contract
For a discussion of proposals in earlier drafts of the legislation, see Johnston at
Registration Requirements, supra note 37, § 87, 452-507 at 55,328 (1987).
Insider Trading and Self-Dealing, supra note 100, § 118(2), 450-972 at 55,208
Id., § 118(1), 450-971 at 55,208 (1992).
National Policy 39, III Can. Sec. L. Rep. 470-039.
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stantial security holder of one of the latter three entities. 9 A substantial
security holder is a person or company, or a group of persons or companies, that holds more than twenty percent of the voting securities of a
company. 97 Nor can a management or distribution company of a mutual
fund make loans to the officers or directors, or their associates, of the
fund or to a substantial security holder of the fund, so that indirect investments by way of loan are also prohibited. 98
A fund cannot make an investment (1) in any substantial security
holder of the fund, or its management or distribution company, (2) in any
person or company of which the fund, or related funds, is a substantial
security holder, or (3) in an issuer in which an officer or a director, or
their associates, or a substantial security holder, of the fund or its management or distribution companies has a significant interest. " A significant interest is defined to include a more than ten percent interest by any
one person or company, or a more than fifty percent interest by a
40 0
group.
The Commission will have the power to order that these restrictions
do not apply, provided that the proposed investment "represents the business judgment of responsible persons uninfluenced by considerations
other than the best interests of the fund" or is in fact in the best interests
of the fund. 01 No investment which will result in the payment of a fee or
other consideration to a related person or company will be permitted, unless (1) it is paid pursuant to a contract disclosed in a prospectus, or (2)
02
the Commission grants an exemption.
Every management company must also file reports of (1) transactions
between the mutual fund and any related persons or company, (2) loans
made from or to the mutual fund to or from any of the related persons or
companies, (3) purchases or sales effected by the mutual fund through
any related person or company for a fee, (4) any transaction in which the
mutual fund is a joint participant with one or more of its related persons
or company, in respect of each mutual fund to which it provides services
or advice, within thirty days after the end of the month in which it occurs. 0 3 On the application of a management company, the Commissioner
will have the discretion to order that thpse requirements do not apply to
any transaction or class of transaction upon terms and conditions, if nec-

396. Id., § 111, 1 450-936 at 55,206 (1992).
397. Id., § 110(2)(b), 450-933 at 55,205 (1992). Note that an investment of one issue in
another deems the shareholders of the first to have proportionate interest for the purpose of
this definition. Id., § 110(2)(c), 1 450-933 at 55,205 (1992). Relief from this is found in Section 114 which will not permit imposition of the investment restriction if only because of
this deeming effect.
398. Id., § 112, 1 450-951 at 55,206 (1992).
399. Id., § 11(2), T 450-937 at 55,206 (1992).
400. Id., § 110(2)(a), 450-933 at 55,205 (1992).
401. Id., § 113, 450-952 at 55,206 (1992).
402. Id., § 115, 1 450-954 at 55,207 (1992).
403. Id., § 117(1), 450-958 at 55,207 (1992).
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essary, if to do so would not be prejudicial to the public interest. 4" The
legislation also imposes a standard of care on those responsible for the
management of mutual funds, requiring them to "exercise the powers and
discharge the duties of [their] office honestly, with good faith and in the
best interests of the mutual fund, and in the connection therewith shall
exercise the degree of care, diligence, and skill that a reasonably prudent
person would exercise in the circumstances."4 5 A person or company is
responsible for the management of the fund if it has the legal power or
right to control the fund or if, in fact, it is able to do so. 06
Finally, a wide provision for insider liability governs mutual funds.
No person or company who has access to information regarding the investment program of a fund or the investment portfolio managed for a
client by a portfolio manager will purchase or sell securities of an issuer
where the portfolio of the fund or that managed by a portfolio manager
includes securities of that issuer and where the information is used for
their direct benefit or advantage.47
CHAPTER

XVI

- ENFORCEMENT

16.01 Introduction
The enforcement of securities legislation by provincial regulatory authorities is an important element in attaining the objective of effective
and consistent protection of the investing public. The division of legislative jurisdiction between federal and provincial governments in Canada
and the central authority's control of the criminal law power could create
constitutional conflicts resulting from the concurrent enforcement of different legislations. However, the conflict has been more potential than
real to date, 0 " although this may change in the future as Canadian capi40 9
tal markets become more integrated.
The enforcement mechanisms available to provincial administrators
can be grouped in three categories: (1) administrative and civil sanctions;
(2) violations of provincial securities legislation; and (3) breaches of the

404. Id., § 117(2), 450-959 at 55,207 (1992).
405. Id., § 116(1), 1 450-956 at 55,207 (1992).
406. Id., § 116(2), 450-957 at 55,207 (1992).
407. Id., § 119, 450-974 at 55,208 (1992).
408. See Smith v. Queen, 1960 S.C.R. 776, for permissive treatment of provincial assumption of criminal type sanctions in the field of securities law enforcement.
409. See Multiple Access Ltd. v. McCutcheon, 16 O.R.2d 593 (D.C. 1977), where it was
held that an order granting leave to the plaintiff to commence an action against its corporate insiders, made pursuant to provisions in the Ontario Securities Act, was invalid in that
these provisions were rendered inoperative by virtue of similar sections of the Canada Corporations Act. This was affirmed by the Ontario Court of Appeal, 19 O.R.2d 516 (1978), but
on appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada the decisions of the Ontario Divisional Court
and the Ontario Court of Appeal were set aside. The majority of the Supreme Court of
Canada held that the provisions were within the legislative authority of both the provincial
and federal governments, and that the otherwise valid provincial legislation was not rendered inoperative due to duplicity with valid federal law, 2 S.C.R. 161 [1982].
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federal Criminal Code.
16.02 Administrative Sanctions
The range and applicability of the sanctions available to provincial
securities authorities are very much a function of the discretion conferred
upon them by the relevant legislation. Prime among the remedies utilized
is the power to suspend, cancel, or revoke the licenses of registrants, provided that a hearing has been held.4 10 Violation of the securities laws of
any jurisdiction or of the rules of recognized self-regulatory organizations
that are adopted for the protection of investors is considered in principle
to be prejudicial to the public interest, and may affect a registrant's fitness for continued registration. 1
Where it is appropriate, registration can be suspended without a
hearing for an interim period of fifteen days.4 21 Provision is made for voluntary surrender of registration, if the Commission is satisfied that financial obligations to clients have been discharged and surrender of the registration would not be prejudicial to the public interest." 3 The
Commission also possesses a general power to order that trading in securities cease where, in its opinion, that action would be in the public interest.41 4 This must be made after a hearing, unless the length of the hearing

would be prejudicial to the public interest, in which case a temporary
cease trading order may issue for a period of fifteen days, or longer if
insufficient information is provided within that period.4 5 Cease trading

orders are most usually imposed in cases of default in financial reporting
and provision is made for partially lifting a cease trade order
to permit a
4 16
shareholder to establish a tax loss for income tax purposes.
An equally effective means of stopping trading is the denial of exemptions from the registration and/or prospectus and take-over bid requirements for certain trades or securities.1 Such orders apply only to
named persons or companies, a requirement which is strictly construed
by the courts. 4 8 This technique is frequently utilized for chronic violation
of insider reporting rules and in situations where prosecution is not feasible or is inconvenient." 9 Again, a hearing is required prior to such an
order unless a temporary order is made for an interim period of no longer
than fifteen days. Provided the hearing is commenced by the end of fifteen days, the temporary order can be extended until the hearing is
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.

Registration, supra note 32, § 27(1), V 450-357 at 55,128 (1992).
Enforcement, supra note 219, § 27(1), 451-024 at 55,214 (1988).
Registration, supra note 32, § 27(2), 1 450-358 at 55,128 (1992).
Id., § 27(3),
450-359 at 55,128 (1992).
Enforcement, supra note 219, § 127(1), 451-021 at 55,212 (1992).
Id., § 127(3), 1 451-023 at 55,212 (1992).
Ontario Policy 2.9, III Can. Sec. L. Rep. T471-209.
Enforecement, supra note 219, § 128, 1 451-024 at 55,213 (1992).
See in re Clark, O.S.C., 2 O.R.2d 277 (1976).
See JOHNSTON, supra note 21, at 362-63.
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conducted. 20
The Commission can order that the distribution of securities to
which a prospectus relates must cease if it appears that after the acceptance of a prospectus there exist circumstances which would justify the
refusal of a prospectus."2 ' A hearing is required unless circumstances exist
warranting a temporary fifteen-day order.2 2
Finally, the Commission can apply to the courts for an order directing compliance with the Act, restraining violations and directing the
directors and senior officers of a person or company to cause the person
or company to comply with or cease violating a decision or provision.'2 3

Although this is a distinct and independent remedy in addition to those
discussed above, it is not frequently utilized, presumably because application to the courts is required.
16.03 Offenses Against the Ontario Securities Act
Securities legislation generally makes provision for penalties to attach to specific violations of its requirements. Breaches of the provincial
statutes are punishable by way of summary conviction only, with varying
levels of fines and imprisonment being applicable.
In Ontario, every person or company who makes a statement in any
material, evidence, information, or document submitted, filed or furnished under the Act or regulations, or who makes a statement in any
application, release, report, preliminary prospectus, prospecting return, financial statement, information circular, take-over bid circular, issuer bid
circular or other document required to be filed or furnished under the Act
or regulations, that, at the time and in light of the circumstances under
which it is made, is a misrepresentation is guilty of an offense, unless they
did not know and in the exercise of reasonable diligence could not have
known that the statement was a misrepresentation.' 2 ' Anyone who contravenes the Act or regulations or fails to observe or comply with any
direction, decision, ruling, order, or other requirement made under the
legislation is also guilty of an offence.' 2" If convicted, persons or companies are liable to a maximum fine of $1,000,000 or imprisonment for a
maximum of two years, or both. Every director or officer of a company or
person, other than an individual, who authorized, permitted, or acquiesced in such an offense is also gu*ilty of an offense and is liable to a fine
of up to $1,000,000 or imprisonment for up to two years, or both.'2"
The enforcement sanctions also provide that where a person or com-

420.
421.
422.
423.
424.
425.
426.

Enforcement, supra note 219, § 124(2), 451-025, at 55,215 (1988).
Distribution - Generally, supra note 112, § 69(1), 450-667, at 55,163 (1986).
Id. § 69(2), 450-668, at 55,163.
Enforcement, supra note 219, § 122(1), V 451-008, at 55,215.
450-999 & 451-000, at 55,213 & 55,214.
425d. §§ 118(1)(a),(b) & (2),
Id. §§ 118(1)(c) & (d), 450-999, at 55,214.
Id. § 118(3), 451-001, at 55,214.
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pany contravenes the continuous disclosure requirements by trading
based upon undisclosed material information and has made a profit, that
person or company shall be liable on conviction to a fine of not less than
the profit, and not more than the greater of $1,000,000 and triple the
profit.' "
The consent of the Minister is required before proceedings for such
offenses can be instituted.4 28 No court proceedings and no administrative
proceedings can be commenced more than one year and two years, respectively, after the facts upon which the proceedings are based first came to
the knowledge of the Commission.429 Extensive powers of investigation
are given to the Commission to assist in its regulatory and enforcement
functions. These include appointment of persons to investigate and report
upon the affairs and assets of the persons or companies subject to investigation, the summoning of witnesses and production of documents, and
the seizure of documents, records, securities, or other property of those
whose affairs are being investigated.4 30 Additional powers include the discretion to issue orders freezing property or application to the court for
the appointment of receivers, managers, trustees, or liquidators.' 3
16.04 Criminal Offenses
Various provisions of the federal Criminal Code are applicable to the
field of securities regulation, but any detailed discussion of their technical
application is beyond the scope of this section.4 3 2 General offenses of conspiracy, fraud, and false pretenses are of potential widespread application. 433 Knowingly making false statements in writing, with the intent
that they be relied upon, respecting the financial condition or means or
ability to pay of any person, firm, or company in which the accused is
interested or for whom he acts, for the purpose of procuring financial
benefits, is an offence. 43 4 Specific offenses relating to the securities industry include knowingly making or publishing a false prospectus, fraudulent
manipulation of stock exchange transaction, i.e., wash trading, and short
43 5
sales against margin accounts.
CHAPTER

XVII

- INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS

17.01 Introduction
In general, issuers of foreign jurisdictions involved in an offering in

427. Id. § 118(4), T 451-002, at 55,214.
428. Id. § 119, 451-004, at 55,214.
429. Id. §§ 125(1) & (2), 451-027, at 55,216.
430. Investigations, § 11(1), CAN. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 450-201, at 55,110 (1988).
431. Id. §§ 16 & 17, 77 450-224 - 228, at 55,122.
432. See Johnston, supra note 21, at 373-85.
433. Criminal Code, Can. Rev. Stat. 1985, c.C-46, as amended §§ 463, 380, 362.
434. Id. at § 362.
435. Id. at §§ 382, 400. Note that the Ontario Securities Act requires a declaration by
any person or company of a short position.
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which a portion of the securities are being sold in Canada are required to
fully comply with the requirements within the jurisdiction of Canada in
which the securities are to be offered. It is important to note that in the
Canadian context, as the securities legislation is administered by each of
the provincial securities regulators and there is no federal system, co-ordination of issuances in Canada may require different disclosures and filing requirements. 3 '
Given the close proximity to the United States capital markets, and
the extent to which security holders of various companies incorporated in
Canada and the United States are held by residents of each of the two
countries, the Securities Exchange Commission ("SEC") and the Canadian Securities Administrators ("CSA") recently completed a joint initiative to reduce duplication of regulation in cross-border offerings, issuer
bids, take-over bids, business combinations and continuous disclosure and
other filings. The purpose of the multi-jurisdictional disclosure system
(the "MJDS") is intended to remove unnecessary obstacles to certain offerings of securities of U.S. issuers in Canada and to facilitate take-over
and issuer bids and business combinations involving securities of U.S. issuers having less than a specified percentage of Canadian security holders, while ensuring that Canadian investors remain adequately
4 7
protected. 1
The MJDS applies to the public offering of securities of a U.S. issuer
in Canada and the United States, or in Canada only. The intent of the
MJDS is to reduce disincentives to extending to Canadian security holders of U.S. issuers take-over bid, issuer bid and business combination disclosure and opportunities generally in the same manner as in the United
States, and on the basis of the U.S. disclosure documents.
17.02 MultijurisdictionalDisclosure System
The basic approach of the MJDS is to allow regulatory review of disclosure documents for offerings made by a U.S. issuer in Canada and the
United States by both the SEC and the Canadian securities regulatory
authorities. The SEC will be responsible for carrying out the review in
respect of the United States securities requirements, while the Canadian
securities regulatory authorities will monitor compliance with the MJDS
policy statement. The MJDS specifically confirms that the liability provisions of the securities laws of any province or territory or the discretionary authority of Canadian securities regulatory authority to implement
remedies or important provisions contained therein may apply.
The MJDS system utilizes an approved rating system, in which ma-

436. However, uniform treatment of specific securities issues has been implemented.
See e.g., Policy 1, Clearance of National Issues, CAN. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
470-001, at
57,525 (1971).
437. Policy 45, Multijurisdictional Disclosure System, CAN. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 470045, at 57,743-2 (1991).
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ture issuers which have acquired a significant market following, and
about which information is publicly disseminated, will be eligible under
the system. The MJDS system encompasses prospectus offerings, offerings of debt or preferred shares, offerings of other securities, and rights
offerings. Where the U.S. issuer meets the various requirements, and fully
complies with the MJDS policy statement, offerings may be made concurrently in Canada and the United States with substantially similar disclosure documents.
The MJDS system also provides regulation with respect to the requirements for a bid made to security holders in Canada where the offeree issuer is a U.S. issuer, the offeree issuer meets certain requirements,"3 8 and where less than fourty percent of each class of securities
which are subject to the bid are held by persons or companies whose last
address as shown on the books of the issuer is in Canada. Where each of
the requirements are met, the bid made under the MJDS system shall be
exempt from compliance with the provision of applicable Canadian securities legislation governing the conduct of bids, except for the requirement
to file the applicable disclosure documents. The MJDS policy statement
contains specific provisions concerning securities exchange bids and the
mechanics of making a bid.4 3
The MJDS permits securities of a U.S. issuer to be distributed by
prospectus in Canada on the basis of documentation prepared in accordance with U.S. requirements (with certain additional Canadian disclosure) in connection with a business combination where less than fourty
percent of the securities to be distributed by the successor issuer would
be held by Canadian residents. The rationale for the availability of the
MJDS in these circumstances is primarily to encourage fair treatment of
44 0
Canadian investors.
Finally, where an issuer becomes a reporting issuer in a province in
Canada, and subject to, among other things, certain continuous disclosure, proxy and proxy solicitation, and shareholder communication requirements, and with its insiders being subject to certain insider reporting requirements, MJDS allows the U.S. requirements in these areas to
44 1
satisfy the requirements of the Canadian provinces and territories.
17.03 Extraterritoriality
In order to distribute securities within a jurisdiction in Canada, subject to various agreements and discretionary matters to be determined by
the relevant regulatory authority, compliance must exist with the securities legislation in the jurisdiction which the securities are to be offered.
Generally speaking, grounds available to an investor throughout Canada

438.
439.
440.
441.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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to sue a foreign issuer in respect of a misrepresentation in offering documents, or other securities related offences, do not differ from remedies
generally available where a foreign issuer is not involved. A foreign issuer
wishing to offer securities in Canada will be subject to compliance with
the applicable disclosure and filing provisions. As such, compliance with
such measures will bring a foreign issuer within the scope of the remedies
available under the applicable statute or common law (see Section 10
INFRA.).

Where a person or company from Canada has made an offering
outside of Canada, the ability of an investor from a country other than
Canada to bring an action against the issuing Canadian person or company is not subject to any particular provisions under Canadian securities
regulation. Instead, where the issuer is subject to the applicable securities
legislation in the jurisdiction in which the securities are issued, a foreign
investor would have any rights accorded under the law of that particular
jurisdiction in Canada. Essentially, the issue becomes whether the relevant provincial securities administrators in Canada, based on the underlying policy, will assume jurisdiction in the situation where a Canadian
issuer has issued securities in a foreign market.
Where the jurisdiction is assumed, and where disciplinary or other
proceedings under applicable regulation, or court proceedings are initiated, the issue of enforcement of such orders or judgments becomes one
of conflict of laws. Any detailed discussion of conflict of laws rules is beyond the scope of these materials.
CHAPTER

XVIII

- SECURITIES COMMISSIONS AND THE PROFESSIONAL

18.01 Accounting and Accountants
The accountants role in the securities industry is to act as professionals in examining the financial statements of an issuer. The issuer's financial results, as reflected in the financial statements, form an integral part
of the basis of most decisions to buy or sell a security. Accountants are
trained to provide an independent expert opinion on the accuracy and
method of preparation of the financial statements.
Accountants, in their roles both as accountants and as auditors have
come under intense scrutiny and been subject to increased criticism in
Canada recently, according to some authors.4"2 These authors comment
that the Ontario securities regulators have continually supported self regulation of accountants and auditors. However, one criticism of self regulation by accountants and auditors has been the delay in dealing with disciplinary action. The utility of the financial information prepared by
accountants and verified through the auditing process will depend in
large part upon whether users of the financial information believe the
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data. This, in turn, depends on users faith in the system of financial reporting and the confidence in the integrity of the auditor of a particular
set of financial statements. 4"
18.02 Lawyers
The role of lawyers in the securities industry and in the capital markets can be generally outlined as three-fold. Lawyers, in a primary role,
ensure that the intent of buyers and sellers of securities is reflected in the
documents which evidence the transaction. The lawyer in performing this
role is often acting as a corporate or contract law specialist, but also must
be acutely aware of securities law implications.
The second role of securities lawyers is to monitor compliance with
applicable laws by buyers and sellers. This role requires a lawyer with a
comprehensive knowledge of securities law, so that buyers and sellers may
be properly advised of their responsibilities under the applicable securities legislation. In that the securities legislation in Canada is prefaced
upon the participants ensuring compliance, this role of a lawyer in advising the proper method of compliance is extremely crucial.
Finally, lawyers have a responsibility to ensure that a transaction
does not violate the public interest in efficient capital markets. Similar to
the second role outlined above, lawyers in performing this task must be
securities law specialists. The necessity for professionalism is apparent, as
often this responsibility opposes directly the needs of a client in completing a transaction.

443. Id., at 44.
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ERICKSON, R., LEGITIMATE USE OF MILITARY FORCE
AGAINST STATE-SPONSORED INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM,
Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama (1989); GPO-008070-00631-6, 267 pp. $10.00
As the title suggests, this book examines the legal ways in which
armed force, in contrast to civil police action, can be used against international terrorism and its state sponsors. The book is useful to both the
lawyer and the lay person, providing an extensive study of terrorism and
the means to combat it on an international level. The study identifies
principles of international law which decisionmakers must consider before
using military force against terrorism. The basic text provides a clear, rational analysis of international terrorism and its treatment. The footnotes
at the end of each chapter provide an exhaustive treatment of the legal
issues and concepts.
Erickson provides a working definition of terrorism as a foundation
for discussion of the problem. Incorporating ideas from a number of
sources, he concludes the following:
Terrorism is the unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence
against individuals to generate fear with the intent of coercing or intimidating governments, societies, or individuals for political, social,
or ideological purposes.
The author argues that although state sponsorship is not a precondition
of international terrorism, the level of state involvement (from greatest to
least: sponsorship, support, toleration, and inaction) determines the legal

remedies available to the harmed state.
The book continues with a historical review of terrorism, pointing out
instances in which terrorism has changed the course of history. Although
* Major, United States Air Force, law instructor at the United States Air Force
Academy.
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significantly fewer terrorist incidents occur than ordinary violent crimes,
Erickson explains that the effects of terrorist acts are more far-reaching
than numbers would indicate. For example, the 1983 and 1984 bombings
of the U.S. Embassy in Lebanon, and subsequent withdrawal of U.S.
forces, allowed more radical elements to take control of the country. Fear
of terrorism has caused worldwide alarm. Other examples given include
the rash of airline hijackings in the 1970's and the 1979 seizure of the
U.S. embassy in Tehran, when the U.S. itself was held hostage for 444
days.
The effects of terrorism have shaken confidence in governments. This
loss of confidence was illustrated in the U.S. in 1986 when the Reagan
administration revealed that it had sold military arms to Iran in exchange
for the release of American hostages in Iran. Diplomatic relations between countries have also been adversely affected; for example, in April
1984 the shooting of a London policewoman in front of the Libyan People's Bureau ruptured diplomatic relations between Great Britain and
Libya.
These examples are used by Erickson to support his thesis that terrorism has become a serious challenge to international world order as it
has become more widespread and acceptable as a form of political action.
While modern conventional war is expensive and destructive, terrorist
acts can provide an impact that could not be achieved in a conventional
arena at a lower cost. Moreover, recent developments such as state sponsorship and networking between terrorist organizations provide the terrorists themselves with capital, arms, training, and protection, exacerbating the threat to international order. By stressing the increasing
seriousness of terrorism, the author lays a basis for the use of military
force in particular situations.
Erickson discusses two approaches to terrorism encapsuled in the
question: Should we address terrorism in a law enforcement capacity, or
should the approach be more combative, using the law of armed conflict?
Erickson compares and contrasts these approaches, focusing on two major
differences: law enforcement treats terrorism as a criminal act and therefore a civil responsibility, whereas the law of armed conflict (LOAC) considers international terrorism primarily a military responsibility.
Under the law enforcement approach, civilian authorities are responsible for the arrest, prosecution, and imprisonment of terrorists. There is
little agreement, however, over the requirements of international cooperation, what terrorism is or what the consequences of a terrorist act should
be. This disagreement limits authorities in all areas of police action. Ideally, terrorism would be internationally outlawed like piracy or slave trading. Efforts to define and outlaw terrorism have failed amid debate over
terrorist causes, and have not focused on the terrorist acts themselves.
Effective extradition agreements have been difficult to achieve since political offenses are usually excluded. Third world nations have typically
been concerned about national liberation movements, and it has been difficult to obtain their support.
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The LOAC approach absolutely and unconditionally bans terrorism,
regardless of the justness of the cause. A fundamental tenet of this approach is the distinction between combatants and noncombatants; i.e., civilians and civilian property can not be direct objects of attack. Other
LOAC prohibitions include the taking of civilian hostages, killing prisoners, and using weapons which cause unnecessary suffering. Under the
LOAC approach, terrorists are unlawful combatants and are afforded
prisoner of war status. The LOAC approach also includes a universal obligation for states to prosecute or extradite terrorists.
The author explains that the West has, for the most part, chosen the
law enforcement approach to terrorism. In the U.S., domestic terrorism
(that is, action that has nothing to do with foreign policy) is primarily the
responsibility of the FBI, while the Department of State is the lead
agency for combatting international terrorism (rather than the Department of Defense). Other Western democracies have organized their response along a similar, civil police vein. Erickson argues that the law of
armed conflict approach offers greater potential in dealing with terrorism,
and he urges the reader to reconsider the choice our decisionmakers have
made.
The book goes on to examine the duties that states owe each other in
the international community, and the rights of one state against another
in the face of state-sponsored terrorist activity. Erickson proposes that
before a state may be held accountable for its sponsorship or support of
international terrorism, a link must be made between that state and the
terrorist act. The suggested burden of proof for this link has been widely
debated and has ranged from "beyond a reasonable doubt" to "substantial evidence." The author uses the standard suggested by the late William J. Casey: sufficient evidence to persuade the international community of the propriety of any proposed intervention. Such persuasion
depends on the threat, the response, and the audience. Obviously, different audiences will have different views.
Compounding the problem is the fact that some evidence may be collected by intelligence sources we do not wish to reveal; thus the evidence
cannot be presented in an international forum. Moreover, even if a sufficient link is shown between a state and the terrorist activity, intervention
must be justified with legal support, such as self-defense or peacekeeping,
to permit the use of force.
The heart of this study, then, is to analyze legal arguments supporting the use of force to combat terrorism. These arguments include individual self-defense, collective self-defense, regional enforcement action,
regional peacekeeping, invitation, peacetime reprisal, protection of one's
own nationals, humanitarian intervention, and hot pursuit. Erickson concludes that the various forms of self-defense offer the strongest legal bases for forcible action, and he outlines the conditions that must be satisfied before self-defense can be a valid option.
Lt. Col. Erickson summarizes his discussion by establishing overall
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limits for the use of force. First, the use of force must be strictly limited
to achieve a specific objective. Second, force used must be proportional to
the injury suffered. Third, the use of force must be a last resort. Finally,
the acting state must immediately report its actions to the appropriate
world community agencies. Ultimately, the state exercising the use of
force has a heavy burden of proof to show the world community and its
public at home that its actions are legal. The harm caused by the intervention and use of force must be less serious than the harm caused by
unchecked acts of international terrorism.
This book provides a scholarly and insightful perspective on satisfying that burden of proof, and it challenges our key decisionmakers to consider an alternate approach in dealing with international terrorism.

